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PREFATORY NOTES
This v/ork has attempted to interpret and to critically evaluate 
Jacques Ellul’s Christian ethic by means of a direct examination of his 
theological, and social writings. At particular points where he has 
shown dependence on various theological thinkers, their related -.writings
have been studied. The various statements Ellul makes have also been
b ib 1ical3 y evaluat ed.
. In all cases scriptural quotations are taken .from the Revised 
Standard Version, unless they appear as part of a quotation from Ellul
or enother author.
The many references abbreviated as "Barth i/l", "Barth I.V/3", etc., 
apply to Karl Barth’s Church Dogmatics and specifically to the edition 
published by T. & T. Clark (Edinburgh, 1936-1969) and edited by G.7<. 
Bromiley and T.E. Torrance.
ii -
Since Jacques Ellul*3 person and thought are inseparably inter­
related, we begin with a brief biographical sketch.
Ellul was born in Bordeaux, Erance, on January 6, 1912- Ko
writes, “I was not brought up in an especially Christian faraily, and had
only a very remote knowledge of Christianity in. my childhood.”He
tells us that his family was quite poor and that he grew up amid the 
' 2people of the docks of Bordeaux.' He began to earn his own living at 
the age of sixteen and continued to do so while completing his univer­
sity studies.
Ellul began his un.i.versity studies at Bordeaux and graduated from 
the University of Paris in 1936 with the degree of Doctor of Daws. In 
his course of study he received degrees in history, sociology and law.^ 
Later in his career he was to receive an honorary doctoral degree from
the University of Amsterdam.
Ellul says that at the age of nineteen he happened to be reading 
Marx’s Capital and became so enthusiastic about what he read that he 
began to devote a great deal of time to reading Marx’s thought and soon
■ 131 OCR A PHY
1. Jacques Ellul et al,v, ’’From Jacques Ellul,” Katallagetei Be Recon­
ciled II, Nos. 3-4 (Winter/Spring 197*9), p. 5»
2. Corresponding to Ellul's own life among the poor will be his concern
to define the Church’s role with reference to the poor, as well as his 
concern to help the Church to gain a true self-understanding concern­
ing money. .
3« Kaiallagete, p. 5*
4. Corresponding to Ellul’s own formal training in three fields will be 
his almost Renaissance concern Cor a synthesis of knowledge transcend­
ing narrow technical ways of thought. He writes, ”It seems as though 
the specialized application of all one's faculties in a particular 
area inhibits the consideration of things in general” (The Technologi­
cal Society, p. 435)*
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became a ’’Marxist*’. However, he was disappointed with the Communists 
because they seemed to be so far from Marx, and hence he never joined 
the Party.1 He tells us that at approximately the age of twenty-two 
”1 was also reading the Bible, and it happened that X v/as converted— 
with a certain ’brutality d
The great problem for Sllul then became whether it was possible to
be both a Marxist and a Christian. On the philosophical plane he
’’quickly” recognized the incompatibility; in choosing Jesus Christ,
he abandoned Marxist philosophy. But he had learned more from Marx
than philosophy; he had also learned a sociology, a radical wsy of
looking at social3 economic and political problems. This sociological
method of interpretation was retained.
In 1933, as a twenty-one-year-old student, Sllul participated with 
c;
E. Mounier in the founding of the journal Esprit.y At the time he was.
3* Katallagate, p. 5­
2. Ibid. The word '‘approximately’* must be emphasized, for Ellul's 
conversion and his struggle between Christianity and Marxism was more 
complex than these statements indicate. In a letter to this writer, 
dated September 14, 1972, he said that his conversion to the Christian 
faith involved a struggle of five or six years, between the ages of 
nineteen and twenty-five <he thought that he first experienced the 
presence of God when he was approximately twenty years old, but at that 
time he did not truly believe in Christ, and continued to doubt and to 
refuse to obey God’s will). Sllul was considering Christianity even 
at the time when he became attracted to Marxist thought;, but as hi3 
Christian understanding grew he abandoned Marxist philosophy.
3. The word ’’quickly” is Ellul’s own and in fact somewhat simplifies 
his actual experiences. If Sllul had a religious experience at 
approximately twenty-two years of age which led him to ’’quickly” aban­
don Marxism (Katallagete, p. 5)» it is, nevertheless, the case that 
his nominal Christianity of the years from nineteen to twenty-two had 
not led him to do so.
4* Katallagete, p. 5' The precise meaning of Ellul’s retention of 
Marxism as a sociological method is not entirely clear. He does not 
accept the notion that social ills stem basically from the fact that 
capital is not held by the proletariat. Perhaps what he means is that 
he, like Marx, has found a central theme by which he interprets other 
problems of modern life. He, unlike Marx, sees this central motif to 
be the rationalization of life under technological determinants — not 
the Issue of class warfare to gain control of capital.
5* Katallagete, p. 5< -
at least philosophically, a committed Marxist, hut only an interested 
Christian. (He pointed out that though the journal represented the 
concerns of social Christianity, some non-Christians also participated. 
Ellul was apparently in between these two classifications.)^‘ By 1937 
his Christian beliefs had solidified and as a result he broke with
Esprit in 1938• He took his way ’’all alone” because he was convinced
that the Mounier circle was headed toward ordinary socialism and was 
2superficial both theologically and sociologically.”
In 1935, ns a twenty-three-year-old law student, Ellul wrote his 
first article on technique.'^ ’’Since 1935, I have been convinced that 
on the sociological plane, technique was by far the most important 
phenomenon, and that it was necessary to start from there to understand 
everything else.”
Upon graduation from the University of Faris in 193*5 he was an 
assistant lecturer at Montpellier, Strasbourg, and Clermont-Ferrand. 
From 1935 to 1939 Ellul was also active in French politics. In 1948
his teaching appointment was revoked by the Vichy governmerr In the
years from 1948 to 1944, along with such notables as Sartre and Camus, 
he was a leader of the French Resistance. During this time his own
father was deported.
. In 1944 after the liberation, Ellul became deputy mayor of Bor­
deaux and held that post until 1945, abandoning his political career* in
51947. Since 1945 he has been professor of the History and Sociology
1. Letter, Sept. 14, 1972. .
2. Katallagete, p. 5* Thus began Ellul’s lifelong criticism of ''social 
Christianity” for its theological and sociological superficiality.
He will later accuse the World Council of Churches on this same count 
(Ellul, "Mirror of These Ten Years,” The Christian Century LXXXVII,
Ho. 7 (Feb« 18, 1970),p. 202).
3» Katallagete, p. 5«
4- Ibid.
5. He frankly admits that he became sceptical about politics after his 
political/...
./ X
of Institutions at the Faculty of Law and Economic Sciences of tne 
University of Bordeaux. Sines 394? he has also held a chair at the 
Institute of Political Studies.
In 1946 Ellul published he Fondsinent Theologique du Pro t i. Though 
ho had already written a major article on law in 1939 and though ho had
shared in the joint authorship of two books, this was his first major
work. In this book Ellul related biblical and theological insights to
the problem of understanding the meaning of human legal tradition. In
1948 he wrote Presence au Monde Moderns. He has said that he regards 
}
this work as his general introduction to all of his writings. Indeed 
this work lays the sociological and theological foundations from which 
he will develop his later thought.
Over the years Ellul has been an active though critical churchman.
From 1946 to 1953 he was a member of the Committee on ft'ork of the ?/orId
Council of Churches, and between 1953 and 1972 he was a member of rhe 
2
National Council of the Reformed Church of France. In July 1969 he
political experience as deputy mayor of Boirdeaux. He then began to 
realise that any action we take in politics is small-scale, concerned 
only with details. Since ours is a global society, all political 
activity is interrelated. This meant to Ellul that even serious 
political action at the local level will be nullified or totally taken 
over by society and utilized in society’s own ways (’’Mirror,” p. 203}. 
His bitter experiences led him to the rejection of direct political 
activity and to the conclusion that democracy is in the process of 
being lost (The. Political Illusion) p, 230). ’’These various crises 
have led me ... to withdraw more and more from politics ... I am con­
vinced that eny action sre take ... in-politics ... is utterly useless” 
(“Mirror,” p. 203). The entire thesis of The Political Illusion can 
be read as a theoretical statement of Ellul’s own political experience 
What he came to realize in 1944-48 is precisely what be later states 
with utmost cynicisms ”If indeed we seek a place to make our fine 
feelings and our humanism count, let us not participate in politics*, 
it is no longer capable of absorbing human warmth” (Political Illusion 
p. 94).
1. Letter, Jan. 2, 1972.
2. Some interpreters have concluded that Ellul has totally abandoned
the organized Church (e.g. James Y. Holloway, Katallagete? p, 14; 
Stephen Rose, Katallagete, pp. 44-6; see below, nthe
following paragraph will indicate, he is greatly discouraged with the 
institutional/...
institutional Church and. does not think that -there is much hope that 
it can be renewed to any great extent. Thus he writes, “I am con­
vinced that any action we can take ... at church reform is utterly 
useless’* ("Mirror,” p. 2O3). It does not follow, however, that such 
discouragement about the general renewability of the organised Church 
is for Ellul synonymous with a flat rejection of it. He tells us that 
though the Church is “bourgeois and unfaithful ... she is still the 
Church” (False Presence of the Kingdom, 1972, p. 35)• He argues that 
institutional, form and structure are essential for the Church’s 
existence (False Presence, p. 35)• Though Ellul is very critical of 
both the World Council of Churches and the Reformed Church of France, 
he most definitely has not withdrawn from the Church’s worship, nor on 
his terms can one be a Christian alone (Letter, Jan. 2, 1972). How­
ever severe his criticisms of the organized Church, they are not spoken 
from the safe distance of institutional non-involvement. This is as 
we would expect from one who argues that the Christian life necessarily 
involves suffering and “agony”, and that Christians should put them­
selves in situations where they have to struggle in opposition to the 
ways of the world (The Presence of the Kingdom, 1967? pp. 27-28). It 
seems that the most that can be said {and this is simply a deduction 
from what follows) is that Ellul is open to experimental forms of the 
Church, especially those of an informal and personal nature, bub is not 
willing flatly to reject the present form of the Church, (On his 
terms, even new forms will necessitate a degree of organizational 
structure.)
Nov/ we must be more specific as to the exact nature of Ellul’s criti­
cism of the organized Church. He is unhappy with the World Council of 
Churches for four reasons J (l) He thinks that it is on the way towards 
becoming a bureaucratic system which conforms to sociological laws of 
organization rather than obeying the Holy Spirit. (2) He thirties that 
theological differences are being dropped, because of indifference to 
theological truth, only to have a new political credo offered in their 
place (he believes that this new political creed will lead to even 
greater divisions). (3) It is his opinion that many of the social 
stands taken by the World Council of Churches are based on .inadequate 
study of society and on inadequate theological study (“Mirror," p, .202) 
“The ethical consequences of the faith have not been examined with any 
theological depth, and the stupendous newness of our society—a new­
ness that renders all older conceptions antiquatedhas not been 
adequately analyzed" (Violences Reflections from a Christian Perspec- 
jtive, 1969? P« 70). (Ellul's critique of the World Council of Churches 
came into the open at the Conference on Church and Society in 1966: 
"There I voiced my total dissent, because it seemed to me that the 
conference had not tackled any of the basic problems of our society, 
had simply affirmed purely demagogic theses (for example, those about 
the so-called underdeveloped countries), had proposed remedies some of 
which were in fact inapplicable, and had adopted a theology of revolu­
tion without taking theological thought at all" ("Mirror," p. 2O2),)
(4) He believes that the Church must adopt a point of view at variance 
with society’s, one which is based on faith in Cod as "Wholly Other".
He thinks that the position of the World Council of Churches (as set 
forth in the four volumes on "Church and Society") involves a cultural 
Christianity, whereby the tension between the Church and the world is 
minimized (Ellul, “Between Chaos and Paralysis," The Christian Century 
LXXXV, No. 23 (June 15? 1968), pp. 749-750).
Ellul's/...
- Vlll - .
became the editor of the prestigious French Christian journal Foi et 
Vie?
In attempting to understand someone of the stature of Jacques 
.Ellul, it would be easy merely to list external marks .of distinction, 
implying that these are the best biographical clues. In the case of 
Ellul this -would be a terrible misunderstanding. It is vitally import­
ant to note that when he talks of the one activity in which he believes
Ellul’s discouragement with the Reformed Church of France is due to 
two reasons. The first is the fact that the Reformed Church of France 
rejected the report of the "Commission on Strategy", with its sugges­
tions for the reform of the Church and its ministry. This commission, 
of which Ellul was one of the ten members, worked for six years on 
its proposals. He believes that the suggestions were sound and that 
every possible tactical precaution had been taken, so that their 
introduction would be gradual and not offend custom ("Mirror," p.
202). He writes, "We were wrong. Some of our reforms were accepted, 
others so changed as to make them worthless, still others rejected 
outright. Well, our plan was of a piece; so it must be said that we 
failed. We came up against a ponderous apparatus (even though we 
were part of the governing orga.niza.tion), against tradition, against 
the indifference and apathy of the church’s members" ("Mirror," p. 
202). The second reason is that he was discouraged by the break-up 
of a churchly discussion on hermeneutics. All but "the three 
Barthians" (among whom he includes himself) dropped out of the study 
group dedicated to the question of the proper interpretation of the 
Bible ("Mirror," p. 202).
"These two failures so deeply influenced my thinking that I v/as led 
to conclude that the church, as church, was incapable of reforming 
itself, and that dialogue and communication were as difficult in the 
church as elsewhere—if not more difficult. Hence arose certain 
theological reflections. For if the Holy Spirit is present in the 
church, the church ought always to be reforming itself; and the 
Spirit will establish communication and true understanding in the 
faithful. So I asked myself whether God, who sometimes turns away, 
had actually abandoned our church. A question, not an affirmation" 
("Mirror," p. 202). (Against those who interpret Ellul as simply 
anti-institutional, one must remember that he is here simply asking a 
question, not making a dogmatic declaration.) He generalized from 
the problems of the Reformed Church of France to the problems of the 
organized Church generally! "Where a thousand steps need to be taken, 
the mass of the faithful will consent to take only one. Moreover, 
the general view is that the church needs merely to adapt itself to 
society and modern thought—whereas it is just the opposite that 
must be attempted! so to structure the church that it can live and 
speak as an unas3imilated foreign body in our society. But that is an 
idea that, so far as I can see, is impossible to realize today, an 
idea too high for the generality of the faithful" ("Mirror," p. 203).
1. Ellul’s editorship of this journal seems irreconcilable with the 
view that he has "dropped out" of the organized Church.
that his Christian witness is moat free, he refers to his directorship of 
and personal involvement in a “prevention club", an organization designed 
to minister to young people in need of helps delinquents, runaways, 
those contemplating suicide, etc* The purpose of the club is to 
provide a context of fellowship, where such young people can feel 
accepted and can grow in their self-understanding. In addition to 
providing interpersonal relationships and a kind of therapy (devoid of 
a rigorous application of psychological techniques), the club also 
attempts to provide learning through various sports activities (para­
chuting, mountain-climbing, etc.)3 Y/e believe that this glimpse of 
Ellul reveals what he .regards as really important to him, and is 
probably more important for understanding him than those aspects of his
life which mark him. as a “famous“ man.
Earlier in Ellul's life he had been a member of a small group of 
2Frenchmen concerned with exposing the problems in Algeria.-. As early 
as 1934j he and the journal Esprit had sought to put the Algerian problem 
before the French public. He had written articles calling for inter­
vention, that a federalistic solution might be offered or a system of 
double nationality established. Years later, in 1956, he concluded 
that it was too late for any just solution and that France’s defeat was 
inevitable. Many French intellectuals were in 1956-1958 calling for 
support for the National Liberation Front.Ellul could not in 
good conscience support the National Liberation Front because he believed 
that “its victory would necessarily result in the impoverishment of the 
French colons, in a dictatorship, and in far-reaching retrogression In
1. “Work and Calling,” Katallagete/ Be Reconciled IV, Nos. 2-3 (Fall/
Winter 1972), pp. 14-15. ’
2. In the letter of Sept. 14? 1972, Ellul said that the Esprit group 
was not the only one in France concerned with the Algerian question 
at this early date, but he implies that it was the main group.
3. ’Mirror," p. 201.
every department of Algeria.’.! life".~ He was angered by the hypocrisy
of those who did nothing when something could have been done, but who
later, at a, time when no solution was possible, stepped forward to offer
one-sided support for the National Liberation Front, support which meant 
the . 2
nothing but„endorsement of violence. " he parted company with the 
majority of French intellectuals* ”1 refused to sign petitions, to take 
part in demonstrations, to vote on synodal motions. Besides, it seemed 
to me that petitions and so on were of little importance. 1 found 
myself very much alone and under severe criticism on the part of those 
who supported the ’good cause’." $
Ellul tells us that this experience concerning the Algerian, prob­
lem led him to think more carefully about the role of the Christian
intellectual. He came to believe that one of the Christian intellec­
tual’s functions is to see social problems as they emerge in their early 
stages and to sound warnings when situations are still fluid and capable 
of solution. He came to believe that once events become publicized, 
passions unleashed, and opinions popularized, it is too late for just
solutions.
1. "Mirror,” p. 201.
2. He says that these Christians supported the National Liberation 
Front’s use of violence, while rejecting the French army’s use of the 
same ("Mirror," p. 201). This awareness of political special pleading 
is the background for Ellul's later criticism of politicized thought.
3. "Mirror," p» 201.
4» "Mirror," pp. 201-2. See also False Presence, pp. 186-190; The 
Politics of God and the Politics of Man Tl972~), pp. 89-6, 101. "It 
seems to me," he wrltesT^lse Fresenee, p„ 187), "that to the very 
extent that the Church depends upon another Lord and another Kingdom, 
for which she is ambassador to the world, she ought to have sufficient 
independence so that Christians would be capable of understanding the 
true issues with which man is to be faced tomorrow', in a manner very 
different from that of the partisan or the statistician. The giving 
of this warning would be extremely useful to mankind. It would be 
much more important than deciding in favor of a given solution, in a 
situation already at its climax or at the point of deterioration." 
Ellul is here arguing for an indirect political role for the Church. 
For additional suggestions concerning indirect political activity see 
pp. 310-316 below.
We now move from biograpiiy proper to a consideration of Ellul’s 
phenomenal rise to popularity in the United States in the years since 
1964, Though The’ Presence of the Kingdom and The Theological I'onnd action 
of haw were available in English earlier, it was with the publication of 
The Technological Society in 19^4 that a wide segment of Americans began 
to read Ellul's writings. The background is this. The Center for the 
Study of Democratic Institutions (at Santa Barbara, California) was 
becoming increasingly concerned about the problems of technology. In 
1959 John Wilkinson (from the Center) asked Aldous Huxley for his opinion 
concerning contemporary European works on the subject. Huxley recommen­
ded Ellul’s Ba Technique (published in 1954) above all others3 Wilkin­
son undertook the difficult task of translating ba Technique and Alfred 
A. Knopf, Inc., published it in 1964. Three years after the English 
publication of this v/ork a steady stream of books by Ellul began to be 
published in English, from one to three per year! The two previous 
books available in English were re-issued; books written earlier in 
French were translated into English; books recently written in French
were immediately translated; two books were even directly translated,
2English being the first language of publication.
Though Ellul’s reputation in Europe is immense, in part due to his 
participation in the French Resistance and in the World Council of 
Churches, the irony is that at the present time he seems to be even more
influential in America than in France. The eminent Church historian
Martin Marty wrote: "If I were asked to introduce a man from the
1. John Wilkinson et al.1 Katallagete, p. 59• "According to Huxley, 
the book had 'really made the case’ that he had tried to make in 
Brave New World, that he was ’jealous of the author's penetration’, 
and further, that the book would become one of the 20th century's 
most authentic, documents of social criticism .... Huxley repeatedly 
compared Ellul's work with Spongier’s magnum opus" (op. cit», pp<- 59~oO)
2. The Ethics of liberty will be translated directly into English and is 
scheduled to be published in America in the spring of 1974•
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Protestant orbit to let the church know what 1 think its agenda should
be, it would be Ellul.“x Ellul’s sociological insights and criticisms
are particularly apt for America, a country in the forefront of techno™
logical developments. His theological insights are even more important
for America, a country which has always been a bit illiterate when it 
2comes to sound, biblical theology. A man combining both sociology and 
theology-—Jacques Ellul •—offers America a challenge she can little
afford to ignore.
Hot only has Ellul exerted a phenomenal influence in America in. 
recent years, but he has been .read by an incredibly wide spectrum of 
readers. A glance at the bibliography y/ill show that he has had access 
to magazines and journals of the most diverse sorts: scientific jour­
nals, Roman Catholic publications, a student journal, and Protestant 
publications of both liberal and conservative theological orientations. 
It is hard to think of another man today who has access to such a wide 
group of publishers and readers.
If Ellul’s influence in the United States continues to increase, 
one reason may be that America particularly needs the kind of bridge 
building that he represents—bridge building between young and old,
pietists and activists, conservatives and liberals. The strange thing 
is that Ellul does not set out to build bridges; he is caustic in his 
style and much of his content is offensive to everyone.’ Perhaps his 
thought is even most helpful at those very points where he shakes us
1. Martin Marty, National Catholic Reporter — printed on the 
back cover of Introducing Jacques Ellul.. Time magazine, in 
1970, hailed The Meaning of the City as "perhaps the most im­
portant theological book of the year" — printed on the back 
cover of The Judgment of Jonah.
2. One could argue that Barth’s theology has never made a major 
impact in America, though it has influenced the thinking of some 
theologians. Ellul may represent the first real wave of Barthian 
influence in America, though Ellul, of course, is no mere 
Barthian.
If Ellul
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loose and forces us to reconsider our basic presuppositions,
is"relevant" it is because he 5 s a genuine prophet in the full Christian 
sense of that word. With urgency and authority he seeks to represent 
God; he has not been bought off by .any popular clique of this world.
He is a remarkably free individual because he is not in the least 
concerned to be a liberal, conservative, or radical, in either’ the 
political or the theological sense of these vague terms. Ellul is 
simply striving to be a Christian witness, faithful to Jesus Christ in 
the twentieth century.
1. The significance of Ellul’s thought is thus blunted to the degree 
that people handpick one aspect of his thought and totally ignore 
the other. Students discontented with society do him an injustice 
if they read his sociology but not his theology. Likewise churchmen 
distort his thought if they pay attention to his theology but ignore 
his sociology. (The latter’ is not as easy to do as the former, since 
much of his critique of the modern world is present in his theologi­
cal writings.) John Wilkinson’s paraphrase of Kanfc is indeed 
correct; "Ellul’s theology without his sociology would be empty, and 
his sociology without his theology would be dead" (Kata.11 agete, p. 59).
INTRODUCTION
INTRODUCTION
By way of introduction we vri.ll first seek to outline the scope
and limits of this work, to establish what we are and are not seeking 
to accomplish — in short, to state our purpose. Second, we will deal 
with some of the problems involved in our task, and thus will explain 
the specific approach we will need to take account of these difficul­
ties. Third, we will give some indication as to why we think it is 
worth while to pursue our purpose in spite of the problems involved.
Purpose
As the title indicates, we are concerned to come to an under­
standing of Ellul's Christian ethic. We must not apologize for the 
word "Christian" in our title. We are seeking to probe Ellul’s thought 
to see what it means for the living of the Christian life and for
Christian strategy in the tvzentieth century. In a sense we are looking 
Ellul's
at thought from the perspective of the Church, asking what he has toA -
teach the Church concerning her self-understanding and the ordering of 
her life. We are seeking to understand and assess the uniquely 
Christian presuppositions which inform his ethic. We are asking the 
following questions What does Ellul teach concerning the nature and 
basis of the Christian life?
Since we are asking this question we will avoid another equally 
legitimate approach. We will not give a detailed critical exposition 
of Ellul’s sociology (this task has been well undertaken by others).
1. See Katallagete: Be Reconciled, II, Nos. 3-4 (Winter/Spring 1970), 
later published as Introducing Jacques Ellul under the editorship of 
James Y. Holloway (Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 
1970). The Kat all age te issue is excellent! It is no depreciation of 
that/...
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This is not to say that we are unconcerned with his sociology, but that 
we have no independent interest in this. We are not here concerned with
Ellul’s sociological ideas per se, but with the relationship of his sociology 
to his theological ethic. Thus it is entirely beyond the scope of this work 
to point out sociological parallels in the writings of other sociologists.
' While not giving exclusive attention to Ellul’s theology, we are 
giving primary attention to his theology. This is as Ellul would have it, 
since he understands the Christian ethic as decisively related to Christian 
theology. As with Barth, ethics in Ellul’s understanding is an insepar­
able aspect of Christian belief in God. Thus as a work in Christian 
ethics the sister disciplines that we will rely upon most are systematic 
and biblical theology rather than secular sociology.
Problems and Methods
We now consider some of the difficulties involved in our work and
thus the kind of approach needed to take account of these difficulties.
A first problem, which might seem to invalidate our whole effort, is the 
simple fact that Ellul is a layman who makes no claim to be a formal 
’’theologian”. What is the value of assessing the theology of a man who 
is not a professional theologian?^ The answer is simple; one need not 
be a professional theologian in the modern sense of this word in order 
to write vitally important theology. Modern biblical scholarship has
that work to point out that it deals mainly with Ellul’s sociology and 
only occasionally with either his theology or his theological ethic.
As far as this writer is aware there has been no major work on Ellul’s 
theology nor on his ethic.
1. “I make no claim to being a philosopher or dogjnatician. I can never 
look at anything sub specie aeternitatis" ("Mirror,” p. 200). Ellul 
says that of his theological writings only The Theological Foundation 
of Law in ’’pure” theology. He explains that the rest represent a 
theology of engagement and combat, intended to provoke decision 
(Letter, Jan. 2, 1972). We note that he does not deny that his works 
are theological; he only attempts to explain in what sense they are 
so. There can be no debating the fact that theology is at the centre 
of his concern; ’’Today my thinking centres on the search for a Credo 
for the Church of tomorrow" ("Mirror,” p. 204).
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shown that most biblical authors had profound theological intentions
and their writings can only be properly assessed if we pay careful
attention to their theology. Yet it is doubtful that even the apostle
Paul or the author of the Fourth Gospel can properly be called
'‘theologians” in the modern technical sense of this word. If the
Bible is any guide in this matter, it becomes obvious that one need not 
1
be a professional theologian to write important theology.
Whether Ellul is a theologian or not is entirely a matter of
definition and not in the final analysis important. What is important 
is that he is an extremely knowledgeable and sophisticated witness to
the meaning of the Christian faith. He has a masterfil knowledge of
2 3biblical theology, of the theology of the Protestant Reformation, and 
of contemporary theology.The fact that he usually writes in a lively 
style and strives to be free from the traditional jargon of technical 
theology is a mark in his favour, not a blemish on his theological 
record: even academic theologians should have the wisdom to see this.
Perhaps it is best to refer to Ellul a9 a “lay theologian”. This
1. It might be objected that the biblical authors were trained in the 
scholarly methods of biblical interpretation of their day* Tme, but 
this is a far cry from modern theology in the technical sense of the 
term. What separates Ellul from modern professional theology is his 
refusal to use the traditional academic form when writing theology.
His theological writings are also extremely unsystematic and devoid 
of the technical jargon of processional theology. Also, he does not 
strive for “objectivity” in the scientific sense of that word. He 
freely expresses his own convictions. One wonders, however, whether 
Ellul is not closer to the theological task as biblically defined 
than many of his professional counterparts. Has not professional 
theology in recent years become all too much a matter of the second­
hand examination of other men’s theologies? Do not many professional 
theologians owe their very existence to the fact that men such as 
Ellul have convictions which they in turn can discuss and assess?
2. See Ellul’s detailed exegetical study of 2 Kings in The Politics of 
God. •
3. See Les Chretiens et 1 * Etat (1967)*
4. See the 42 pages of footnotes in To Will and To Do (1969). French 
Christian intellectuals regard Ellul as a theological thinker of 
immense importance, otherwise his editorship of the prestigious French 
journal Foi et Vie is inexplicable.
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terra shows that we recognize that he is a theologically profound and 
serious writer, hut also shows that we recognize that he does not claim 
to he a professional theologian. We can he grateful for Ellul’s own 
informal writing style, his freedom of approach, his exuberant 
enthusiasm, and his creative way of interrelating theology and sociology. 
It is at least debatable whether formal theological trainingwould 
have encouraged the development of these unique gifts. While 
being grateful for the fact that Ellul is a layman, and while taking 
seriously the layman’s right to speak theologically and to be heard by 
all, it is nevertheless the case that certain problems involved in 
interpreting Ellul’s thought relate to the simple fact that he is a 
layman.
Because a professional theologian earns his living by his theologi­
cal teaching, he has much more time to devote to the logical clarifica­
tion and refinement of his theology. He can weigh his words and 
sentences carefully, think out various subtle shades of meaning and seek 
a coherent and precise presentation. Whether his thought is true or 
even inspiring, he nevertheless has the time to be careful, clear, and 
non-contradictory. This is the service of formal theology, a service
the Church can little afford to do without if she values truth.
A lay theologian earns his living in ways other than the teaching 
of theology; hence he has less time to devote to careful and precise 
theological formulation, and even less time if he is expected to publish 
at anything like the pace of Ellul. The lay theologian may have more 
to say than his professional counterpart, but he doesn’t have as much 
time to spend saying it. Thus certain difficulties are particularly 
associated with lay theology, at least in Ellul’s case.
1. By thia we mean the study of theology as an academic discipline in 
a university or seminary, as contrasted with individual reading.
Ellul has done none of the former and plenty of the latter.
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The major difficulty involved in interpreting Ellul’s Christian 
ethic is the unsystematic nature of his theological writings3 The 
impression one gets when reading many of his theological writings is 
that they were written in the heat of battle. Many of them read as 
though Ellul in a burst of enthusiasm felt called to sit down and write? 
but scarcely had time to re-read what he had written. One finds
repetitions and seemingly contradictory statements even within the same
2book. His individual words and sentences are usually clear enough and 
present no major problems of interpretation. The difficulties arise 
when, remembering what he said at one place, you compare it with what he 
said elsewhere. The problems become even more acute when you compare 
statements in one book with related statements in other books, bringing 
into the conversation the amazing breadth of Ellul’s spectrum of 
interests.He has an extremely dialectical style of writing which is 
so paradoxical that it is difficult to determine the truth-claim he is
1. Arnold Beichman, not without some justification, has accused 
Ellul of applying the "stream-of-consciousness" technique to modern 
sociology (Arnold Beichman, "Is Technique Running Us?" Christian 
Science Monitor (Sept. 24, 1%4), p. !)• One might add that Ellul's 
theological writings are much less systematic than, his sociological 
one si
2. I agree with John Wilkinson when he says, "Ellul has not worked 
out his theology as thoroughly as he has elaborated his social criti­
cism" (John Wilkinson et al., Katallagete, p. 59 )♦ However, the fact 
that his theology is less systematic and harder to get hold of should 
not lead us to think that it is of little importance. Ellul's 
theology is assumed and operative at every point in his work.
3. "As for Ellul himself, he is hard to pin down. Were it not for his 
most distinctive style and its caustic effects, one could hardly 
believe it is the same man who has written all the books he has 
published to date. I make this remark not only because the range
of his interests includes law and ethics, sociology and technology, 
as well as theology, but also because he can anticipate a theme and 
denounce it when it becomes a slogan. Thus some thirty years ago 
when 'revolution' was not a word whose resonance would appeal to 
Christian ears, Ellul was among the first to 'listen in'; and now, 
just published in Paris, his latest book is entitled Autopsie de la 
revolution. Previously, his well known Presence au monde moderne had 
already found its counterpart in Fausse presence au monde moderne.
Not that he contradicts himself. But he does not step twice in the 
same river" (Gabriel Vahanian et al., Katallagete, pp. 16-17).
. , . . . ...... . • • - - • . ... . .... ...... w?
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really making unless you compare one-sided statements from one place
with one-sided statements from elsewhereEllul admits that his 
2
theological thought has only progressively become clearer. These
difficulties are further compounded by the fact that his theological
■!
works are all intensely polemical. It is always much easier to say ’ s
what he opposes than to state the precise content-of his own theological-
affirmation.
Granted that these problems exist (and they probably exist in part 
simply because Ellul is a layman), our method of interpretation must be ;
designed to deal with these difficulties. We must seek to interrelate 
his theological statements, bringing them into a systematic relationship 
with one another in a way which he himself has not done. We must see 
if systematic coherence can be found, so that the truth of his theology 
may be properly assessed. We ought not to be under any illusion that 
our systematic method is any improvement over Ellul’s informal and
unsystematic presentation. It’s just that we hope that by assessing
his Christian ethic in this way it will then be possible to more clearly 
understand and evaluate what he is actually saying. His unique contri­
bution to theological ethics is his application of Christian theology to 
modern life-settings. Ellul is a practical theologian, a theologian 
less concerned with the formal statement of principles than with the 
application of Christian truth to life.^ It is part of our task to test 
the adequacy of his practical theology by a careful appraisal of the 
actual theology assumed in his position. To do this we must certainly
1. It seems to us that a nearly infallible principle for interpreting 
Ellul’s writings is thisJ Never interpret one statement without 
putting it in conversation with other related statements.
2. “I have come to a progressively clearer view of my writings and to 
the principles underlying them ... The writings I had undertaken in 
a tentative frame of mind assumed a progressively better structure” 
(’’Mirror,” pp. 200, 201).
3* Ibid., p. 200.
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take account of his theological polemics, but we must press beyond them 
by asking what he is affirming rather than what he is denying.
To understand precisely what Ellul is affirming, not only will we 
need to draw together his va,rious statements, but we will need to relate 
these statements to the amplification provided by the theologians from 
whom he has learned. We will pay attention to the more developed state­
ments by other theologians of thoughts which he states in less developed 
ways. Since we are seeking an understanding of Ellul’s theological 
ethic and not seeking to give a full exposition of other theologians’ 
thoughts, we must ruthlessly restrain ourselves from developing these 
parallels beyond the point where they illuminate his thought. (We are
not attempting to do a comparative theology, but are seeking to assess 
Ellul’s thought.) Wq will note also the way in which he independently 
parallels various other theological thinkers through a common apprecia­
tion of a biblical understanding.
In addition to seeking to locate Ellul’s theology within the con­
text of the thought of other theologians, we will utilize the theologies 
of various thinkers to help us critically assess and evaluate his 
position. Of course, most of our critical comments will come directly 
from our own encounter with Ellul’s thought.
Because of the above difficulties Ellul’s theological work is not 
easy to interpret. We can make no claim to have offered the definitive 
interpretation; all we can claim is that we have done our best to be 
fair and have sought to understand. This writer has the feeling that 
Ellul and his thought will always to a certain extent remain an enigma. 
Try as we may, we will never fully understand either the man or his 
thought, yet from what we can understand we can see that the effort is
well worth while
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The Promise of Ellul1 a Ethic
Ellul makes no claim to be coining a new theology. Yftiile at all 
points seeking to be faithful to a Christocentric biblical faith, he 
uses insights from various "Neo-Reformation” thinkers. Though individ­
ual items in his theology are not new, the mixture is unique. Sven 
more unique is his way of applying theology, thus expanding the meaning 
of theological statements by setting them in new contexts. It is our 
conviction that such a creative synthesis and new application is itself 
theologically significant and hence deserves careful study.1
Aside from the inherent value of Ellul’s ethic (a value which we 
can truly see only in the process of examining it), there is an indirect 
reason why it is important to study his theological ethic. It may be 
that the rest of his thought is in jeopardy unless his theology is 
understood. Mlul’s critique of civilization is so ruthlessly critical 
that it can lead to utter hopelessness and nihilism if isolated from its 1 2
1. Ellul greatly contributes to the task of enabling ’’Neo-Reformation” 
theology to be heard in America. He utilizes insights from Barth, 
Bonhoeffer, Kierkegaard and Rudolf Bultmann, while remaining 
remarkably free in his selection. (He takes account of Reinhold 
Niebuhr’s theology, but usually disagrees with it, while often agree­
ing with Niebuhr's social analysis.) Ellul’s own freedom comes 
because he is himself engaged in seeking to understand the biblical 
message, and hence uses insights from theologians only if he believes 
those insights to be faithful to scripture. For example, he is 
extremely critical of Bultmann*s method of interpreting scripture, 
and yet learns from him concerning certain important features of 
Johannine theology.
2. There is evidence that Ellul’s sociology is indeed being isolated 
from his theology. When we remember that his leap to popularity in 
America came with the publication of The Technological Society, 
whereas his earlier two theological books had gained little attention, 
we see a sign of this danger. Also, it is common knowledge that The 
Technological Society is popular reading among ’’radical" students in 
America. It seems unlikely that these same students are reading 
Ellul’s theological writings.
It must also be admitted that within Ellul’s sociological works he 
makes little explicit reference to his theology; from a reading of 
his sociological writings one might not even be aware that he is a 
Christian. Of course, once one understands his theology, one can see 
the relationship between his theology and sociology.
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theological counterpart, his affirmation of the Christian Gospel.
It is possible that a knowledge of his Christian ethic may help protect
against a nihilism which could be encouraged by reading his sociology
’ 2 out of context.
It may even be true that the best point from which to see the 
relationship between Ellul’s theological and his sociological insights 
is his Christian ethic. Though he bases the Christian life on norma­
tive biblical beliefs, he nevertheless sees the Christian life as the 
point of ’’agony” where the sinful ways of the modern world are con­
fronted by those who owe allegiance to the ’’Wholly Other” God known in 
Jesus Christ. If we pay attention to this point of intersection, we 
may be able to see the way in which Ellul's scathing sociological 
criticism serves to clear away obstacles so that a genuine Christian 
way of life may emerge in its own integrity.
1. ”1 have sought to confront theological and biblical knowledge 
without trying to come to any artificial or philosophical synthesis; 
instead I try to place the two face to face, in order to shed some 
light on what is real socially and real spiritually. That is why I 
can say that the reply to each of my sociological analyses is found 
implicitly in a corresponding theological book, and inversely, my 
theology is fed by socio-political experience” (Ellul et al., Katalla­
gete, p. 5)« The theological counterpoint to The Technological 
Society is The Meaning of the City; the counterpoint to The Political 
Illusion is The Politics of God and the Politics of Man; the counter­
point to Propaganda will be The Ethics of Liberty.
2. "Just as post-war France established what we call the theater of 
the absurd, Professor Ellul may now claim to have produced the 
sociology of the absurd with its continuing emphasis on man’s 
bewilderment, his helplessness, his utter futility in the world of 
Technique” (Arnold Beichman, "Is Technique Running Us?” p. 7).
"Perhaps Ellul dhould add the Christian apology to his sociological 
works, for otherwise they are spirals of down-tending pessimism” 
(Stephen Rose et al., Katallagete, p. 45 )• In our view Ellul has 
written his Christian apology in the form of a direct proclamation 
of the Gospel; it’s just that the apology does not appear in the 
sociological writings.
• . - - . «* V
3. "From the beginning my thinking revolved chiefly around the contra­
diction between the evolution of the modern world and the biblical 
content of Revelation” ("Mirror,” p. 200).
CHAPTER I
CHAPTER I
THE HUMAN CONDITION: BONDAGE
Ellul believes that man in his natural state is not free, but is 
rather in bondage to various determinants. He also believes that this 
bondage, this absence of freedom, can begin to be overcome only as man 
receives the gift of God’s grace. The whole shape of Ellul’s ethic is 
decisively, related to these two interrelated convictions. He bases 
both beliefs on Christian theology, yet at both points he translates 
his theology into sociological language, giving classical theological 
ideas an additional range of meaning. In Chapter One we will examine 
Ellul’s understanding of the human condition and in Chapters Two and 
Three we will deal with his exposition of the meaning of divine deliver­
ance.
Sin
Ellul has several diverse but interrelated ways of describing the 
human condition. One way is to speak of the human condition as that of 
sin. He defines sin as autonomy, separation from God.^ He identifies 
his view of sin with the Pauline and Johannine understanding, believing
that Paul and the author of John understood the fundamental condition of
man as the search for self-justification and autonomous life. In Paul’s
understanding and for the Fourth Gospel sin is equated with the failure
to live in and from God. In later Christianity, he thinks, sin was 
2often understood as the failure to measure up to objective laws.
1. False Presence, p. 29*
2. To Will and To Do, p. 276.
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• Ellul believes that man has totally fallen from any true communion
with God and that this broken relationship vzith God radically corrupts
man’s entire being and his relationship with others.'1' He thinks that
sin has so totally corrupted man that he "can neither discern God's will 
2 'nor accomplish it". Because he defines sin as autonomy or separation 
from God, even if an outvzard action is pleasing to God it is still seen 
to be an expression of sin if it is committed by one who does not dwell 
in a covenant relationship with God.^ Ellul, however, has little 
confidence that natural man is apt to agree frequently with God's will 
even in a merely objective sense. While recognizing that natural man
1. "Either the communion with God is the very ground of one's being,
of life and the good, in which case the rupture of that communion 
changes the whole, or else the change is only partial, which implies 
that communion with God was only secondary and not decisive" (To Will 
and To Bo, p. 39)• "Nowhere are we told that nature conforms to the 
good or is capable of producing the good. To the contrary, all men 
are by nature children of wrath (Ephesians 2i3) (ibid., p. 46).
Ellul thinks that to deny man's radical fallenness is to deny the 
truth of God's grace in Jesus Christ (ibid., p. 276). "If the fall 
and evil were not totally serious would God have gone to the extreme 
of this unthinkable sacrifice of his Son, of this incomprehensible 
self-deprivation? For the work of salvation to be as great as that, 
the alienation in the fall must have been fundamental. The whole must 
have been shattered for the whole to have been restored. The whole 
must have been lost for the whole to have needed to be saved by grace" 
(ibid., p. 41)•
2. "Sur le Pessiraisme Chretien," Foi et Vie (March-April 1954), P» 165•
3. If one makes the mistake of speaking of sin as merely self-love or 
the absence of altruism, then it is impossible to affirm the radical 
fallenness of man, for it does not seem empirically true that all acts 
committed by non-believers are selfish. If sin is a broken covenant
. relationship with God, then it is possible to affirm the radical
fallenness of man. It may be possible to reconcile Reinhold Niebuhr's 
anthropology with Barth's and Ellul's if we realize that Niebuhr was 
speaking of sin mainly in the first sense and Barth and Ellul in the 
second. All men may be totally depraved in the sense that all men 
have fallen from a covenant relationship with God (Barth-Ellul), but 
men may not be totally depraved, if by this we mean that men naturally 
love only themselves and are utterly incapable of having regard for 
others, (i sm indebted to N.H.G. Robinson for his development of this 
distinction between total depravity in the religious sense and total 
moral depravity; see Faith and Duty (195^), pp. 138-9> and Christ and 
Conscience (1956), pp. 7^-71•) However, differences still arise as 
to the degree to which sin entails moral disruption and whether natural 
man's morally pleasing acts serve as points of contact fox* the receipt 
of grace. •
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may occasionally do acts objectively in agreement with God’s will, 
Ellul’s fundamental stress is on the disastrous results for human life
of man’s separation from God,
Ellul’s understanding of man's radical fallenness and his under­
standing of the covenant basis of the good is perhaps best expressed in 
the following words describing the reality of prayers-
I must realize that if 1 pray I signify and attest by that very 
act that I am inclined to evil, that my nature is incapable of 
carrying out the good, that my v/ill is not free, that my reason 
is defective in that area, that my conscience deceives me. More 
than that, in the act of praying, I am signifying that the good is 
not an objective reality known in advance, with evil as an equiva­
lent opposite, as though I had a choice to make between the two 
things. I am signifying that, to the contrary, evil is a condition, 
a situation which affects me, and that it is not visible to the eye 
like a tumor in healthy flesh. I am signifying that the good is 
not a source for objectifiable commandments, but that the good is 
the will of God. Even if I am not a theologian, that is what I 
mean when 1 pray. 2
In prayer man realizes that sin is decisively autonomy and knows that 
God’s v/ill is a personal reality (not just an outward conformity at the 
level of acts). For Ellul the dynamic of the Christian life has to do 
with the gift of grace which overcomes human autonomy and redirects man 
toward obedience to God’s personal will.^
1. See below, pp. 36-41­
2. Prayer and Modem Man (l97O)> P- 81.
3. Ellul agrees with Barth that man can know his sin, his broken 
covenant relationship, only in the context of the renewal of that 
covenant relationship (To Will and To Bo, p. 273, citing Barth, Il/2, 
PP- 747-748). ”In reality ... man has even less knowledge of the 
true evil than he has of the good. Man learns what is evil; that is, 
discovers himself as a sinner, at the time of the revelation of the 
good as the will of God ... He learns it at that time only. He can 
have no true natural experience of it whatsoever; because all natural 
experience of evil will necessarily be ambiguous ...” (To Will and To 
Bo, pp. 16-17). Bike Barth, he emphasizes the freedom of God in 
revelation and denies a natural ’’point of contact” for the receipt of 
grace, even a negative one based.on a natural awareness of sin. 
However, in an earlier work he did affirm that man is capable of a 
natural knowledge of the wickedness of the world. He wrote, ’’’There 
is none righteous, no not one' (Rom. 3^10) ... The world of the 
present day teaches us that this doctrine is neither an idea nor an 
explanation. It is a statement of reality, which is just as concrete 
as/...
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Ellul’s understanding of the human condition is very similar to 
Rudolf Bultmann’s exposition of Paul's theology.We find no acknow­
ledged dependence at this particular point; both men share a common 
understanding of a biblical theme. Bultmann, like Ellul, thinks that 
Paul defines sin not in terms of external, moral acts, but in terms of the
sphere of influence in which a man lives:
The sinful self-delusion that one lives out of the created world 
can manifest itself both in unthinking recklessness (this especi­
ally among the Gentiles) and in considered busy-ness (this 
especially among the Jews)—both in the ignoring or transgressing 
of ethical demands and in excessive zeal to fulfill them. For the 
sphere of "flesh" is by no means just the life of instinct or 
sensual passions, but is just as much that of the moral and 
religious efforts of man. * 1 2 * 4 5
The attitude which orients itself by "flesh", living out of "flesh", 
is the self-reliant attitude of the man who puts his trust in his 
own strength and in that which is controllable by him. 3
Bultmann understands Paul as believing that only a life lived in the
miraculous life-giving Spirit of God is pleasing to God.^ To live
according to the "flesh", to use natural existence as the norm of life, 
5
is seen in his interpretation of Paul to be the essence of sin.
as the solidarity of all men in modern war" (The Presence of the King­
dom, p. 13). From the context we can see that Ellul in this early 
quotation was referring not only to a natural knowledge of wickedness, 
but also to a natural knowledge of sin. Thus there seems to have 
been a movement in his thought at this point paralleling Barth's own 
movement from an existentialist understanding of the human condition 
to a more consistent theology of revelation.
1. Ellul's acceptance of Barth’s "One Kingdom" reasoning protects his 
thought from the kind of inner-outer dichotomy one finds in some of 
Bultmann’s writings (see below, pp. 88-9). Ellul is very clear that 
Christ claims the whole life of the Christian, internal and external.
2. Rudolf Bultmann, Theology of the New Testament, transl. Kendrick 
Grobel, Vol. I (l95l), P- 239­
3- Ibid., p. 24O.
4. Ibid., p. 235­
5. Ibid., p. 238- Victor Paul Furnish's understanding of Paul's theo­
logical ethic is also in agreement with Ellul's position. Speaking of 
Paul's theology Furnish writes (Theology and Ethics in Paul (1968), pp. 
193-4)! " The law is not really kept by those whose obedience is
measured in terms of their formal adherence to a collection of statutes, 
but/...
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The Fallen World
Ellul describes the human condition in a broader context than that
of separation from God. When he speaks of a fallen world we can begin 
to see the way in which his sociology is consistently related to his 
theology.
He bases his understanding of the fallenness of the world mainly
on New Testament teachings and Johannine theology in particular:'1'
The world is still the world. The entire Gospel of John is there 
to testify to that. The world is a hostile power in revolt ...
The Prince of this world is still Satan. He wields an extraordin­
ary power even when vanquished, as Oscar Cullmann reminds us. * 1 2
but only by those whose obedience consists in their new life in the 
Spirit, in their belonging as whole persons ('secretly*, 'in their 
heart', i.e. inwardly), to the Lord. Paul's conception of obedience 
is further illustrated in his polemic against 'works of the law’ ...
When the concept of obedience is formalized and externalized, the 
effect is to limit its meaning to the performance of specified, 
measurable, and visible deeds. Thereby the obedient acts are regarded 
as possessing value in and of themselves, quite independently of the 
one who performs them. It is precisely this formalization and exter- 
nalization of the concept of obedience which Paul understands 'works 
of the law' to represent. They are acts regarded as having meritorious 
value for the one who does them, accomplishments by which the doer 
presumes to establish and make secure his relationship to God. When 
Paul rejects the view that justification is something earned in this 
way, he is rejecting the superficial conception of obedience which it 
presupposes. When, in its place, he claims that justification is on 
the basis of faith apart from works (e.g. Rom. 3:2Q), he is presuming 
that faith means the surrender of every supposed claim that the doer 
has on God, and acknowledgment of and surrender to the total claim God 
makes on him.”
1. Ellul simply quotes New Testament Scripture to make the point that 
the world is Satan's domain (Rev. 12:9), that it is in revolt against 
God (John 15520; Luke 16:13) and that it is incapable of accepting 
Christ's teachings (John 15:20-25) (Ellul, "Signification actuelle de 
la Reforms,” in M. Boegner and A. Siegfried (eds.), Protestantisme 
Franpais (1945), P» 142).
2. False Presence, p. 16. Ellul even makes the following bold statement, 
arguing for the radical fallenness of the world on the basis of belief 
in the Incarnation. "To attribute value to the world is to deny the 
incarnation. If God loved the world, it is because the world was not 
lovable and good. If God reconciled the world to himself, it is because 
the world was in a state of rebellion and rejection. But this loved and 
reconciled world is still the world. It is not yet the Kingdom. The 
works of the world remain works of darkness, but darkness into which a 
light has come, which does not validate or justify the darkness” (ibid., 
p. 38)• Is not this statement a fair representation of Johannine 
theology? Is not our embarrassment with Ellul at this point really an 
embarrassment with the Fourth Gospel?
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Though Ellul does not explain what the fallenness of the world
may mean in terms of the non-human realm, he thinks that it has funda­
mental implications for society. He believes that the vzorld’s fallen­
ness points to a supra-personal demonic power which is embodied in 
society’s institutions.'1' He conjoins Hew Testament apocalyptic thought 
(two ages, the present being under Satan's influence) with his extreme 
sociological realism:-
It is too easy, and in fact false, to go so far as to say that 
the society, the environment in which we are living is not 'the 
world’. Indeed it is.' The political, economic and technological 
world is the world which the Gospel of John speaks of as radically 
lost and radically the enemy of God: and its works are not good 
works. ... When Satan proposes to Jesus Christ to turn over to 
him the dominion over all the kingdoms of the world he is not lying. 
He continues to have authority over the political powers, and Jesus 
in no way disputes that point with him. 3
Ellul reaches his conclusion about the fallenness of the world
from direct exegetical study. Current New Testament scholarship seems 
to confirm his point. New Testament scholars recognize Paul as having 
understood the present "age” or "world" as evil and wicked (Gal. 1:4$ 
Phil. 2:15) and filled with all kinds of immorality (i Cor. 5;1Q)- 
Though Paul believed that God is the Creator of this world, he shared the 
apocalyptic belief that the present age is captive to powers hostile to 1 2
1. The correlate sociological statement of the same is that 
"institutions have a weight of their own which causes them to go 
where men sometimes do not want them to go" (The Politics of God, 
p. 182).
2. Ellul does not here choose his words carefully, since at face 
value this sounds as though all non-Christian deeds are objectively 
contrary to God’s will. Elsewhere (cf. below, pp. 36-41) He ex­
plicitly denies this. What we can see from a statement such as 
this is that he has little confidence that non-Christian acts are 
to any great extent in agreement with God’s will.
3* False Presence, pp. 16-17$ cf. also p. 38- "It is a mistake 
to emphasize — as is always done — that the word-’world * has several 
meanings in the Bible, and to suppose that ’cosmos’ in the natural 
sense has nothing to do with the world of power, revolt, and opposi­
tion that John in particular speaks of. I think that it is society 
in the first place that is the world of revolt, rejection and 
negation" (Violence, p. 25)•
_As. -A
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God.3' The Johannine witness, while recognizing God as Creator (Jn. 1:3) 
and as sovereign Lord even amid evil’s power (i Jn. 4*4), affirms that 
the “world” has turned away from God (Jn. 1:5) and has placed itself 
under the rule of the “evil one” (i Jn. 5*19), ’’the prince of this 
world” (Jn. 12:31; 14*30; 16:11; see also Mtt. 4*C1P*)«^ Neither Paul 
nor John denies that in a mysterious way God is still the sovereign Lord 
of the world—neither does Ellul. The Pauline and Johannine witness, 
as well as Ellul’s interpretation of them, affirm that God rules over a 
rebellious world, a world which is not only enslaved to sin but in bondage 
to supra-personal demonic powers. The biblical viewpoint may be described 
as a “relative dualism”, a reign of evil which is ultimately subject to
1. Victor Paul Furnish, Theology and Ethics, pp. 115-116. “Thus,” writes 
Furnish (p. 116), “Paul speaks of the rulers of this age who are ’doomed 
to pass away’ (i Cor. 2:6), and the god of this world (II Cor. 4*4),
and the elemental spirits of the cosmos (Gal. 4*3)• While these rulers 
and powers cannot finally frustrate the purposes of God (Rom. 8:38) and 
will at last be destroyed by him (I Cor. 15*24), their power still has 
its effect in the present world.” Paul sees these hostile powers as 
enslaving man to their purposes (Gal. 4*3) and blinding man to God and 
the Gospel of Christ (II Cor. 4*4)• Paul believes that these powers 
are ultimately behind Christ’s crucifixion. He also describes natural 
man as in bondage to the power of sin (Rom. 3-9; 6:17,20; 7*14,23; Gal. 
3»22) (Furnish, loc. cit.).
C.K. Barrett (From First Adam to Last (1962), p. 90) argues that to 
do justice to Paul's thought his “'principalities and powers* must be 
taken seriously and objectively. But what does it mean to take them 
seriously and objectively? It cannot mean less than the recognition 
that there exist cosmical conditions and circumstances which actively 
engender sin, suffering, and death ... It is naturally possible to 
believe in the objectivity of these conditions and circumstances without 
believing in their personality; and it is also possible to see that 
so far as the human conditions for their existence have ceased to be — 
that is, as Paul would say, in Christ — these forces have lost their 
strength and grip ..."
2. Rudolf Schnackenburg, The Moral Teaching of the New Testament (1965), 
p. 310. "As for Paul, so for John the kosmos means primarily the 
world of men; on it the judgment falls that it is evil and would be 
lost were it not for the coming of the ’Son"' (Bultmann, Theology, Vol. 
2, p. 15; see also Vol. 1, p. 239)» “Thus, the creation has a 
peculiarly ambiguous character: on the-one hand, it is the earth 
placed by God at man’s disposal for his use and benefit (I Cor. 10:26); 
on the other, it is the field of activity for evil, demonic powers. ... 
The perishable ’creation' becomes a destructive power whenever man 
decides in favor of it instead of for God (Rom. 1:25*••); i.e. when 
he bases his life upon it rather than upon God" (Bultmann, Theology,
Vol. 1, p. 230). -
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the rule of Christ. Ellul’s unique contribution is to express this 
biblical point of view in sociological language and thought forms.
Both the Protestant Reformers and modern ’'Neo-Reformation'’ thinkers
have spoken of the bondage of the will to sin. Ellul extends the mean- 
1ing of this thought by relating it to modern social determinantst "It
is a commonplace to speak of slavery to sin, but in reality this needs
to be translated from the inward life to the totality of life in speak- 
2ing of the order of necessity." That man has lost his freedom means 
in part that natural man conforms to the sociological patterns of the
world < .
Scripture everywhere reminds us that man's independence in relation 
to God is in the strict sense bondage as regards sin. This man is 
not free. He is under the burden of his body and his passions, 
the conditioning of society, culture, and function. He obeys its 
judgments and setting. He is controlled by its situation and ,
psychology. Man is certainly not free in any degree /my underline/.
He is the slave of everything save God. 5
1. From what we have said concerning his understanding of sin, we can 
see that Ellul is no mere "environmentalist" in his understanding of 
the human condition. That is, he sees the human problem as based on 
man’s separation from God, not on mere external factors. Ellul, how­
ever, believes that separation from God has social implications and 
that society itself works to transmit a false understanding of man 
(separation from God and disobedience). Sin not only implies bondage 
to the world (in the form of sociological determinants), but sociolo­
gical factors help to perpetuate the human dilemma. Because Ellul 
will not choose either a one-sidedly individualistic or a one-sidedly 
corporate understanding of the human condition, his analysis is 
necessarily circular.
2. To Will and To Do, p. 281.
3* Violence, p. 91 •
4. Ellul’s reasoning seems to be that bondage to sin (autonomy) implies 
that natural man is incapable of transcending the conditioning of his 
society (see also A Critique of the New Commonplaces (1968), pp. 23C~ 
232; The Political Illusion, p. 238"/. This is not to say that all 
non-Christian acts are objectively contrary to God’s v/ill. Ellul, how­
ever, does argue that separation from God implies that such things as 
murder, war, and pollution are the "normal" state of affairs and that 
it is a divine miracle when these are held.in check (The Politics of 
God, ppo 178-9).
5* The Politics of God, p. 16. "Man is enslaved to sin. This slavery 
includes, engulfs and explains all others. Political slavery, economic 
alienation, servitude to passions, sociological necessity are all forms, 
expressions,/...
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Ellul's understanding here is based partially on his New Testament 
theology, but is also based in part on his understanding of the findings
of modern sciences-
The mathematical, physical, biological, sociological, and psycho­
logical sciences reveal nothing but necessities and determinisms on 
all sides. As a matter of fact, reality is itself a combination of 
determinisms, and freedom consists in overcoming and transcending 
these determinisms. Freedom is completely without meaning unless 
it is related to necessity, unless it represents victory over 
necessity. * 1
He refers to political regimes and economic planning as reducing man’s 
' freedom." Most of all he refers to man’s bondage to technical necessi­
ties. He concludes that man is not the master of his means, but is the 
’’object of the forces which he has created”.^ Ellul concludes from
theological and sociological insights that freedom cannot be regarded as 
* 5
an immutable fact, a natural datum of the human heart.
expressions, aspects of this essential slavery which is that of sin” (”Le 
Sens de la Liberte chez Saint Paul,” Foi et Vie (May-June 1962), p. 4).
1. The Technological Society, p. xxxii.
2. To Will and To Bo, p. 169•
3* Presence of the Kingdom, pp. 71-2, 76.
4. Ibid., p. 76.
5. Ellul explicitly says that he does not claim that man is more deter­
mined by society today than in the past, but only that man io differ­
ently determined today. Instead of being hemmed in by prohibitions 
and taboos, man io today determined by a technological civilization 
(The Technological Society, p, xxix). This statement *is in Ellul’s 
foreword to the revised American edition of The Techno]ogical Society. 
An objective reading of that book seems to indicate that to a consider­
able extent he does think that the situation is now morally worse than 
ever before. He may try to qualify this impression with these words
in the new foreword, but I doubt that many readers will be convinced.
In a considerably earlier work he had already said, ”In no other 
civilization has man been so totally repressed ,.. All civilizations 
have imposed a certain amount of restriction, but they left man a 
large field for free and individual action. The Homan slave, the 
medieval serf, was fi-eer, more personal, more socially human ... 
than the modern industrial worker or the Soviet Union official. Our 
civilization which claims to exert no restraint, tries to dominate man 
as a whole, and to confine him within narrow limits, whore all his 
gestures, and his secret thoughts, will be controlled by the social 
machine. This represents the triumph of means. It is this new fact 
which hinders men from living the Christian faith” (Presence of the 
Kingdom,/...
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It is at least open to question whether Ellul has overstated his 
ease at this point. Even if one accepts the notion of the total fallen­
ness of man, one can still debate whether separation from God necessarily 
implies total conformity to one's sociological milieu, rather than merely 
a strong degree of such conformity. One might argue that bondage to sin 
severely lessens the possibility of transcending sociological condition­
ing but that it is not an all-or-nothing issue. Is it theologically so
obvious that separation from God implies such total sociological conform- 
X
ity? If so, where is the exegetical basis'? If the case is not to 
rest on theology alone, but on scientific observations, is it so clear 
that science proves only the existence of sociological determinism?
Many would want to point to examples of non-Christian behaviour which 
seemingly transcend social conditioning, at least at particular points.
Here we see an example of an interpretive problem that will con­
tinually confront us in Ellul’s thought. He often seems to have dis­
covered very valuable insights, but often overstates the amount of truth 
implied in those insights. Che might, for example, agree that separa­
tion from God implies that natural man is usually unlikely to possess 
the moral resources needed to stand over against his milieu. One might
Kingdom, pp. 77~8)« Many may think, that this quotation from an earlier 
work more accurately represents the general thrust of Ellul’s social 
thought than his words of qualification in the new foreword to The 
Technological Society.
This last statement implies that even for the non-Christian there 
can be degrees of bondage to and freedom from society’s values, since 
Ellul says that natural man was once freer in the face of society's 
values. This recognition undercuts Ellul’s point that sin implies 
total sociological conformity. This lack of consistency perhaps points 
to the fact that Ellul's language concerning total bondage to sociolo­
gical patterns is not carefully chosen. Elsewhere he can also refer 
to degrees of conformity to society when he writes that "the average 
frenchman was much, freer in 1685 than in 1950.'" (A Critique, p. 102 ). 
(These last words also undermine the statement.that man is no more 
determined today than in the past.)
1. In terms of Ellul's own theology this is a fair question, since he 
seeks a biblical rather than a philosophical basis for his theology.
also agree that scientific findings tend to validate the notion that
natural man conforms to his environment to a great extent. Ellul sees
these insights? hut his formulation goes further and states that natural
man is totally and absolutely conditioned by his society. Perhaps at
these points we should remember that Ellul expressly tells us that his
intention is to provoke thoughtful decision rather than to give final 
1
answers. By painting sharp contrasts? he sounds warnings and provokes 
thought. It is then the reader's task to think through what he says 
and see if it can be formulated in a more careful and precise way which 
can more adequately withstand criticism.
Ellul goes on to describe several specific social determinants?
such a3 the city? technique? politics and propaganda. He believes that
these are influential factors in the way the modern world exerts a
corrupting influence on man. At this point we will consider one such 
2factor — the city.
The Sin of the City
Though Ellul does not himself explicitly make this distinction? it 
seems that wha/fc he says about the city implies a distinction between the 
sin of the city and the sins of the city. What he says about the sin 
of the city might seem at first to be a mere reiteration of what he has
elsewhere said about the sin of the y/orld. If he refers to the city as 
under demonic influence?he also refers to the social world as a whole 
as under this same influence.^ The city thus seems to be one example 1 2
1. "Mirror?" p. 201,
2. We will indirectly also consider some of Ellulls statements about 
the technological society, since his thought about the city is 
integrally.related to his thought about technique.
3- The Meaning of the City (l976>)? pp. 45? 102? 114«
4« Ealse Presence? p. 16. At one point Ellul even refers to the city 
as a kind of symbol for the sinful world as a whole:- "We must not 
forget/... -
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of a more general phenomenon: man io embedded in the sinful structures 
of the world, structures which reinforce his autonomous separation from 
God. Ellul’s position concerning the city is related to his more 
general thought about natural man’s bondage to sociological fate.
Though Ellul does not say so, he seems to be giving us a modem 
restatement of the doctrine of original sin. In effect, he is telling 
us that man is born into a world that has rebelled against God and whose 
rebellion has certain concrete consequences today. Prior to any con­
scious activity on man’s part, he is already in bondage to a false under­
standing of life:-
Man in his affective life, his intentions and ambitions, his 
judgments and prejudices, his habits and manners, his needs and 
thoughts, has been changed, whether he like3 it or not, whether 
he knows it or not, by the simple fact that he lives in a mechani­
cal environment, in obedience to the logic of machines. 2
forget that the city is the symbol of the world, especially today, 
when it has become the synthesis of our entire civilization" (Meaning 
of the City, p. 72).
1. In The Meaning of the City Ellul uses biblical language to make 
this point regarding the city. He speaks of the continuing influence 
and power of the exousia and stoichae^ He states that the city "has /V 
a very definite spiritual character, an orientation toward evil and 
away from good which in no way depends on man" (p. 169)• In The 
Technological Society he uses the language of sociology to make an 
analogous point regarding technique (p. 306): "What seems most dis­
quieting is that the character of technique renders it independent of 
man himself ... The important thing is that man, practically speaking, 
no longer possesses any means of bringing action to bear xipon tech­
nique. He is unable to limit it or even to orient it ... Technique
is essentially independent of the human being, who finds himself naked 
and disarmed before it."
Since Ellul’s analysis of "technique” is not primarily a statement 
about machine technology, we should perhaps give his own definition of 
what he is talking about under the heading of technique or technology:- 
"In our technological society, technique is the totality of methods 
rationally arrived at and having absolute efficiency {for a given stage 
of development) in every field of human activity" (The Technological 
Society, p. xxv). The two central aspects of Ellul’s definition of 
technique are thus a concern for efficiency and rationality.
2. A Critique, p. 229. Ellul’s words on "technological convergence" 
seem to be a sociological statement of the bondage in which modern man 
finds himself. He believes that though individual technicians do not 
generally intend to manipulate men (only the advertising technicians 
are accused of wicked intent), the net effect of the multiple technical 
influences/...
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So far the basic contours of Ellul’s position make a great deal 
of sense. For anyone who believes in the radical sinfulness of man, it 
would be unreasonable to think that society is exempt from the problem 
facing individuals. We are born into a world that does an effective 
job of ignoring God, and this way of autonomy is proclaimed to us by 
society, though each one of us chooses this way for himself. There is 
no inconsistency between insisting on a covenant understanding of sin 
and yet realizing that the world as a whole helps to transmit this 
autonomous self-understanding. If individual men rebel against God 
they do so in a world that has already rebelled against God, continues 
to do so, and invites us to do the same. Like the world at large, the 
city helps to transmit and reinforce this false understanding of life.
Difficulties begin to appear when we recognize that Ellul's thought 
about the city extends considerably beyond the point just made. He Is 
not content to see the city as merely one example among others of the
influences converging on man is an "operational totalitarianism”. He 
thinks that the result of technological convergence is that man loses 
his freedom and independence and becomes an object of techniques (The 
Technological Society, pp. 389? 391, 409; "Conformism and the Rational 
of Technology," in G.R. Urban and M. Glenny (editors), Can We Survive 
Our Future? — A Symposium (1972), pp. 89-102). An inadvertent dictator 
ship by the technicians occurs, though individual technicians seek 
only to pursue their own limited goals using their own technical 
methods (The Technological Society, pp. 162, 169; "Technique, Institu­
tions and Awareness," The American Behavioral Scientist 11 (July 1968), 
pp. 39-41)• (Ellul thinks that the mark of the technician is the 
methodological avoidance of normative questions — The Technological 
Society, pp. 160-161.)
Along these same lines, Ellul refers to the economy as man's master 
rather than his servant. He argues that modern economic systems 
control and subordinate other aspects of life and there is nothing that 
can be done to change the general situation ("L'Economic, Maitresse ou 
Servante de 1'Homme," in Ellul et al., Pour une Economle a la Tai,lie 
de 1*Homme (1947), P* 44)• He refers to the fact that a nation's 
intellectual life is virtually in the hands of the publishers and those 
who control the mass media (ibid., p. 43). He argues that man's basic 
self-understanding now corresponds to economic reality, man having lost 
his autonomy in relationship to the economy (ibid., pp. 44-49)* "Man 
is no longer opposite the economy as an independent creature, Man is 
included in the economy. He belongs to the economy, body and soul" 
(ibid.., p. 45)*
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general phenomenon of social institutions helping to transmit a false 
understanding of life. He singles out the city for blame; both at 
the level of sin and sins he thinks that the city adds a unique corrupt­
ing influence which goes considerably beyond what is generally true of
the social world as a whole.
Ellul says that in a very unique way man has used the city to
strengthen confidence in himself} in his own security, and in the power
secured through his own hands.He writes of the city: ’’She has
within her every disorder because she is the 2my underline/ great means 
2
of separation between man and God, the place man made to be alone.” 
Instead of' seeing the city as merely accentuating man's fallen state, he
1. Meaning of the City, p. 117; cf. also p. 67.
2. Ibid., p. 119. Ellul even goes as far as to suggest that God's
appraisal of the city, given in revelation, is that the city stands 
for man’s autonomy (ibid., p. 7; see also pp.'168-169)• He singles 
the city out for blame when he says: “It is only in an urban civi­
lization that man has the metaphysical possibility of saying ‘I killed 
God’” (ibid., p. 16). He also refers to the city as being especially 
"cursed” by God, cursed in a way going beyond God's general judgment 
on the world (ibid., p. 45)• He can speak of a special curse of God 
resting on the city from creation onward (ibid., p. 48). This last 
reference surely borders on a dualism whereby aspects of the created 
world are seen as inherently bad. It may be no accident that Ellul 
occasionally refers to the city as itself a demonic power (ibid.5 pp. 
61, 132), rather than as under the influence of demonic powers. At 
these points he seems guilty of a depreciation of the goodness of 
creation. It is not surprising that in his sociology there is a 
tendency to single out certain aspects of the modern world as in­
herently bad and incapable of good use. It is only fair to recognize 
that his evaluation of technique does not seem entirely self-consis­
tent. At some places he affirms that technique is ambivalent, neither 
inherently good nor inherently bad ("The Technological Revolution: its 
Moral and Political Consequences,” Concilium 6, No. 3 (dune 1967), PP- 
48, "Conformism and the RationsJ.e of Technology,” p. 95; see
also "Vers un Nouvel Humanisme Politique,” in Ellul et al., L'Homme 
Mesure de Toute Chose (l947)» PP- 17-18)- His more characteristic 
thought is that technique is a monistic mass which will not tolerate 
moral judgments (The Technological Society, pp. 96-97, Hl). At these 
last points he also seems to be saying that technique is inherently 
bad. At one place he says precisely that: he tells us that technique 
is "contrary to God’s will” and "bad in itself” ("La Technique et les 
Premiers Ghapitres de la Genese,V koi et Vie (March-April i960), p. 
113). What is beyond dispute is.that he dwells on the negative feat­
ures of technology and seldom talks about the positive aspects (see 
”Sur le Pessimisme Chretien," p. I69).
- 24 -
regards the development of the city as almost a second fall. It is 
very difficult to see how this aspect of Ellul’s thought can he accepted, 
since separation from God is separation from God I If all men are
separated from God, how can this autonomy-be a unique function of the 
city? It is understandable that all social institutions (vzith the 
exception of the Church, when she is truly responsive to God) would 
transmit a false self-understanding, but by what right can the city be 
singled out for blame, in this regard? If the city is to be singled 
out it is the sins of the city which alone must be criticized. Granted 
a common alienation from God among all men, the city may indeed lead to 
particularly immoral sins against one’s fellow-men. It is difficult, 
however, to see how man’s basic alienation from God can be attributed 
to the city in any unique way. In accusing the city of uniquely con­
tributing to man’s sin, one wonders whether Ellul has confused sin (a 
religious category related to God and leading to sins) with particular 
sins (a moral category which is the result of sin).
The Sins of the City
In addition to speaking of the city's sin, Ellul refers to the sins
of the city. He believes that the city encourages the development of
particularly immoral forms of conduct whereby men violate each others-
The city must, in order to stay alive, have its night shifts, the 
accumulation of a proletariat, alcohol, prostitution (under what­
ever form it adopts, including the ’’very noble naturalism" prac­
ticed in Sweden), an iron schedule of work hours, the elimination 
of sun and wind. And it is simply false to say that we can do away 
with all this and still keep the city. This is the urbanists' 
illusion. 1
He thinks that the unique meaning of the city is materialisms the city 
is said to have developed because men were willing to gather around the
1. Meaning of the City, pp. 152-153’
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industrial machine to produce and consume its products. it may indeed
be the case that there are particular sins associated with the city,
some of which we have just listed. One. wonders, however, whether this
judgment concerning the city can be a timeless one based in part on a
biblical ontology or whether it must be a matter of strictly empirical
investigation. One also wonders whether Ellul does not have a personal
bias against the city which is based on neither biblical nor sociological 
2study but on personal inclination.
Just as Ellul seemed to unfairly single out the city for blame 
3
regarding man’s sin, he seems to do the same concerning human sins.'
For example, he tells us that war is a phenomenon possible only in a
J
city culture. Harvey Cox writes, "Unlike what Ellul believes, urban
civilization cannot be equated with warfare. On the contrary, many of
the early cities emerged when people huddled close to protect themselves 
5
from the marauders who rode in from the country." At places, Ellul
1. The Technological Society, p. 113; Meaning of the City, p. 155*
Of course materialism is not a new phenomenon of history invented by 
modern technological society. Ellul is not saying that it is. He is 
merely insisting that materialism is a more widespread form of dis­
obedience to God today than in the past and that it is so because of 
the influence of the values emanating from the modern city.
2. The following quotation may indicate personal bias; it certainly 
indicates Ellul’s belief thaTf an ontology of the city can be biblic­
ally determined: "Man always attains a better equilibrium, always 
feels his best, and probably is his best, in a primitive environment. 
This is no ideology of the country, nor some brand of naturalism, but 
only a simple observation corresponding with the revealed fact that 
God wanted man in that situation" (Meaning of the City, p. 173)• Is 
it so clear that these words do not represent an ideology of the 
country?
3« It may be true that some sins are particularly associated with the 
city, but are not other sins particularly associated with the country? 
For example, one might argue that gossiping is a much more character­
istic feature of rural and semi-rural life than it is of the city. 
Perhaps on balance the sins of the city are worse than those of the 
country, but surely not to the degree Ellul imagines.
4* "We could find many causes of war—ontological, economic, technical — 
but Scripture affirms that the agent of war is the great city. There is no 
such thing as a great agricultural war. A rural people is never a ravenous 
people ... War is an urban phenomenon" (Meaning of the City, p« 5l)«
5. Harvey Cox, "The Ungodly City," Commonweal 94 (July 9? 197-1 )> P* 357. 
Could/...
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uses language which borders on outright cynicism, which seems more an 
expression of his bias than a description of the city. He can make a 
characteristic overgeneralization which seems ridiculous. ’’The man 
who disappears into the city becomes merchandise. All the inhabitants 
of the city are destined sooner or later to become prostitutes and 
members of the proletariat.”^
The Biblical Basis of Ellul’s Ontology of the City
Ellul believes that his ontology of the city is based on Scripture 
2and that it therefore calls for an either~or decision of faith. Ke is
Could the clan wars in Scotland be said to be a function of the 
developing cities'?
1. Meaning of the City< p. 55* He casually mentions the fact that 
intellectual life cannot exist outside the city (ibid., p. 151 )• Con­
cessions such as this one might seem to indicate a more balanced 
appraisal of the city, but Ellul does not develop such comments but 
drops them and goes on to emphasize the negative aspects of the city 
(as he also does with technology). The following passage shows the 
lengths to which he will go to depreciate the city, seemingly contra­
dicting his own insight that intellectual life is a function of the 
cityJ “The city is dead, made of dead things for dead people. She 
can herself neither produce nor maintain anything whatever. Anything 
living must come from outside. In the case of food, this is clear.
But in the case of men also ... The city is an enormous man-eater.
She does not renew herself from within, but by a constant supply of 
fresh blood from outside” (ibid., p. 150)* Such emotive language does 
not foster confidence in the objectivity of Ellul’s thought concerning 
the city!
For Ellul’s hopelessness about the improvability of the city and the 
technological society, see below, pp. 169-171 and fn.
2. “Everything we have said so far concerning the city was of biblical 
origin, which means that it was an appeal to a decision of faith.
Either we believe that the Bible expresses the revelation of God 
centered in Jesus Christ and that therefore what we have understood 
concerning the city has an element of truth., or else we do not believe 
it” (ibid., p. 179)*
Ellul differs from Barth as to whether the Bible implies a world-view 
He, unlike Barth, thinks that the Bible does imply certain sociological 
facts and that it can thus be used to correlate and interpret these 
facts. (This theological conviction certainly casts suspicion on the 
objectivity of Ellul’s sociology.) He writes, “The reality of the 
city, not as an event, but as a structure of the world, can be under­
stood only in the light of revelation. And this revelation provides 
us with both a means of understanding the problem and a synthesis of 
its aspects as found in the raw data of history and sociology ... 
Revelation/...
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1
quite certain that the Bible does offer an ontology of the city, but he
admits that it is only because the city has recently become such a
monster that we are able to see that Scripture has indicated all along 
2that it was so. The second half of this last statement may seem to 
defeat the first half. If the Bible offers a clear ontology of the 
city should not this have been obvious before now? If the Bible's 
ontology of the city can be discovered only because recent events lead 
us to see things others have not seen before, may this simply be because 
the Bible offers no clear ontology of the city and because we are simply 
reading modern sociological viewpoints back into the Bible?
The exegetical procedure used by Ellul to deduce his doctrine of 
the city is itself open to question. Does not Ellul time and time again 
lift specific references to God’s judgment from their original histox’ical 
contexts, wrongly assuming that God's judgment at those points concerns 
the city as such? Is not Ellul's exegetical procedure at this point 
highly inferential and perhaps even non-historical? Does he not deduce 
a unified doctrine of the city only by isolating and then synthesizing 
references to the city which occur in historical contexts not directly
Revelation — which was not given with this in mind, but which incident­
ally serves in this way — enlightens, brings together and explains what 
our reason and experience discover" (Meaning of the City, p. 153; see 
also p. 179)* John Wilkinson (Katallagete, p. 6l) says that Ellul 
regards the Bible as implying sociological facts, but not all sociolo­
gical facts — only the exceedingly important ones. Ellul's thought 
here represents a fundamentally un-Barthian understanding of the 
relationship between natural reason and revelation. Barth is less 
willing to use the Bible to pre-judge sociological reality.
1. Meaning of the City, p. 8.
2. Ibid., p. 42.
3. Not only does Ellul’s radical pessimism regarding the city set his 
position off from traditional Christian viewpoints, it also seems to 
isolate him from the mainstream of current Christian attitudes. If 
very few Christians agree that the modern city is as monstrous as 
Ellul assumes, then his hermeneutical key for unlocking the meaning 
of the Bible at this point cannot itself be assumed to be a given.
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1implying judgment on the c-ity, but judgment on Israel or on man generally*
Human Morality
Ellul’s conclusion about human morality is that it is of the order*
of the fall, that it is a part of man's autonomous existence over against 
2
God. He believes that however helpful and important human morality is, 
it is a morality created by sinful men and thus does not transcend man.^
1. Even in Ellul’s most convincing text, the Tower of Babel (Gen. ll:4-9)> 
the specific reference to the city may be really only an aspect of God's 
judgment concerning the corrupting influence of culture and civiliza­
tion generally. The text may be a critique of man's tendency to use 
self-reliance, fame, alliance, and political development to fence 
himself off from God (Gerhard von Rad, Genesis, transl. John H. Marks 
(Philadelphia* The Westminster Press, 1961J, pp. 143-148).
It should be noted that at one point Ellul refers to the city as 
that reality which comes into existence whenever a human group asserts 
its existence over against nature and over against other human groups 
(Meaning of the City, p. 149). Here he identifies city-culture with 
the barest minimum of civilized existence, saying that the city is 
"one of the rare invariables of civilization" (ibid., p. 150). This 
broadened definition of the city is, however, uncharacteristic of 
Ellul’s general thought, for he singles out the modern city for blame 
and could not possibly do so if he were working with such a broad 
definition of the city. Besides, if he really took, seriously such a 
broad definition of the city, he would render his whole discussion 
hopelessly vaguej by definition he would regard as a city-culture all 
forms of human organization which have progressed beyond the most 
rudimentary form of cave-man existence.
Ellul sees it as a fact of vital significance that men’s inability 
to communicate with one another is said to have occurred in the city 
(ibid., p. 19). By the same type of reasoning, one could just reverse 
his conclusion and argue that it is of vital significance that the fall 
is said to have occurred in a Garden! To attempt to squeeze an 
ontology of the city (or of the country for that matter) out of such 
texts (texts dealing with pre-history) is surely to miss the real points 
that the authors were trying to make and to use the Bible as a sounding 
board for expressing opinions arrived at by methods other than bibli­
cal exegesis.
S.H, Hooke points out that Genesis 4 divides between verses 1-15 
and verses 16-26 and that in the first strand Cain is seen to be a 
nomad (Gen. 4*12b) while in the second he and his descendants are 
seen to be city dwellers ("Genesis," by S.H. Hooke, in Peake’s Commen­
tary on the Bible, general - editor and New Testament editor Matthew 
Black, Old Testament editor H.H. Rowley (London and Edinburgh: Thomas 
Nelson and Sons, 1962), p. 181). This observation undermines Ellul’s 
ontology of the city, since his whole line of reasoning about the city 
begins with the assumption that it (and not the country) is to be under­
stood in terms of Cain (Meaning of the City, pp. 1-43).
2. To Will and To Do, p, 39.
3. Ibid., pp. 103, 112-113.
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He writes of human morality, "It is neither a divine gift nor a product
of higher nature over and above man* It is not universal. It is tied
to the power which man has taken upon himself of ’knov/ing good and evil’
and deciding concerning them.”'1' It is because of Ellul’s covenant
understanding of the Christian good that he cannot regard autonomous 
2
human morality as anything other than sinful: "Sin is not the failure
to obey a morality. It is the very desire to determine that morality 
independently of God, a desire which is at the same time concupiscence, 
the will to power.”He thinks that the Genesis account of the Garden 
of Eden indicates that an autonomous knowledge of good and evil is 
precisely what the Bible understands as human sin.^ Ellul says that he 
agrees with Karl Barth's denial of the possibility of a natural know­
ledge of God and thus agrees with Barth’s denial of the possibility of
5
a natural knowledge of the Christian good.
Ellul recognizes the obvious existence of human morality. How­
ever, he insists that since it is based on human autonomy it must be 
completely distinguished from the Christian good, which has to do with 
personal obedience to the living God. Because he believes that God
1. Io Will and To Bo, p. 113.
2. That Ellul sees the Christian good as the fruit of man's covenant 
relationship with God is indicated when he writes, "In Scripture, there 
is no possible knowledge of the good apart from a living and personal 
relationship with Jesus Christ” (ibid., p. 16).
3* Ibid., p, 13.
4* Ibid., pp. 14-15? 42, 271*
5* Ibid., p. 16. Barth indeed does understand natural morality in the 
way Ellul has suggested. He speaks explicitly of. natural ethics as a 
prolongation of the fall (Barth Il/2, pp. 517-518)} and writes of human 
ethical systems, "Revelation and the work of God's grace are just as 
opposed to these attempts as they are to sin ... The grace of God pro­
tests against all man-made ethics as such” (ll/2, p. 517)* He believes 
that Christian ethics, quite unlike human.morality, has to do with the 
grace of God addressed to men (ll/2, p. 518). Barth and Ellul are of 
one mind in totally opposing "the fatal assimilation of the Christian 
to the human” (Barth, Il/2, p. 534). For an identical point of view 
see Bonhoeffer, Ethics, pp. 142-144*
6. To Will and To Bo, p. 45*
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requires a holiness which comes from a relationship with Himself} mere 
1
human virtue and good works cannot measure up to God’s expectations.
In the final analysis. Ellul’s separation of human morality from Christ­
ian obedience is based on his belief in the centrality of the Holy 
Spirit in the Christian life. He believes that natural man does not 
possess the Spirit (I Cor, 2:14) and thus cannot do a good which is 
pleasing to God. In this sense Ellul equates the natural with the
sinful.1 2 3 •
It comes as no surprise that Ellul does not think that men in 
their natural consciences have an ability to perceive God's will.^ He 
is in total disagreement with those early post-New Testament theologians
1. Eo Will and To Ho, pp. 44-45*
2. Ibid., p. 46. Ellul quotes Barth to the effect that natural man 
uses the law as an autonomous form of instruction which contributes to 
his own separation from God (ibid., p. 276). Ellul points out that 
Jesus' most severe attack was reserved for the Pharisees, who estab­
lished a rigorous morality, but a morality of autonomy (ibid., pp. 
276-277),
He agrees with Reinhold Niebuhr (The Nature and Destiny of Man (1949/) 
when Niebuhr points out the autonomous nature of human systems of 
ethics. He disagrees when Niebuhr understands the autonomous nature of 
ethics as a favourable observation about man's condition (To Will and 
To Do, p. 277)* Niebuhr retained the view that natural man is capable 
of a degree of self-transcendence, which is a kind of ethical point of 
contact between natural man and God. Ellul, like Barth, believes that 
natural man has totally fallen from his covenant relationship with God, 
— that whatever self-transcendence natural man may possess is of no 
value in the procurement of grace. Ellul disagrees with Niebuhr's view 
that through a natural sense of justice man can approximate to the 
Christian good. He points out that Niebuhr fails to see the unbeliev­
able variety in the actual content of justice in various civilizations. 
Also, he points out that Niebuhr's understanding of justice is itself 
determined by Christian content (mediated through Western tradition) 
and thus does not represent the actual reality of justice throughout 
the world (To Will and to Do, pp. 292-3). He concludes: "It is not 
surprising, then, that Niebuhr can establish a relation between this 
creation which he considers 'natural' and the Christian faith!" (ibid., 
p. 293). - -
3. Victor Paul Furnish comments on Paul’s understanding of conscience. 
Paul "never establishes conscience as a firm principle or guide for 
moral•action. Its chief function is to evaluate actions (e.g. Rom. 
2:15; I Cor. 8:7PP«; 10:25ff.) or persons (e.g. Rom. 9*1; II Cor. 
4*2; 5{ll)> not to identify and define 'the good' or 'God's will' 
either abstractly or concretely. Conscience has a strictly limited 
and provisional place in the Christian's life" (Victor Paul Furnish, 
Theology and Ethics, p. 229).
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who insisted that fallen man retains intact a true knowledge of good 
and evil. He thinks that such an approach can be sustained only if 
one starts with philosophical rather- than biblical assumptions3 
If knowledge of the good has to do with a personal relationship with 
God, it is incorrect to say that people possess a natural knowledge of 
God’s will. This would be the case only if the Christian good had to 
do with certain objective rules or principles or if the relationship
2with God were an innate gift of creation (not requiring repentance).
Ellul’s thought at this point is decisively influenced by Barth
and Bonhoeffer. With Barth, he agrees that natural conscience is not
the voice of God.^ With Bonhoeffer, he agrees that natural conscience
has to do with man’s agreement with himself and is based on the fall
rather than on God.^ He agrees that natural conscience is based on
autonomy and hence must give way to responsibility before God, which is 
5
seen to be something entirely different.
1. To Will and To Do, p. 14.
2. ’’The doctrine of grace eliminates the possibility of the value of 
a moral conscience. The conscience is neither the reflection of God 
(who only reveals himself in Jesus Christ), nor the place where God 
speaks (for one cannot separate the encounter with God in scripture 
from the encounter within the person by the Holy Spirit); nor is it 
the voice that judges us (for it is God, in the moment in which he 
gives himself, who reveals to us our true guilt), nor the i^eceptacle 
in us of a hidden truth which revelation merely brings to light 
(without grace we cannot believe the gospel, so how can it be pre­
existent in us?). Conscience holds no knowledge. The Holy Spirit 
entering into us sets up a dialogue other than that of conscience.
To pretend to validate the moral conscience is, in the last analysis, 
to empty out the entire doctrine of grace" (To Will and To Do, p. 57). 
Ellul agrees with Soe (Christliche Ethik, sec. 5 and~*7T~that moral 
conscience is a human phenomenon which has no reference to revelation 
(To Will and To Bo, p. 279)•
3* To Will and To Bo, p. 57? citing Barth Xl/2, p. 668.
4* Ibid., p. 279? citing Bonhoeffer/ Ethic's, pp. I6lff. "In effect, 
the conscience in no way implies a relation of man with God, and in­
stead of leading man to find his unity by the covenant with God (act 
of grace), it claims to cause man to find his relation with God by 
man’s inward peace with himself" (To Will and To Bo, p. 279).
5« To Will and To Bo, pp, 279-280, citing Bonhoeffer, Ethics, pp. 211ff
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Ellul is not denying that the inward aspect of men can become, the 
instrument for God's speaking. If the conditions outlined exe main­
tained, if "conscience” is used only with reference to Christ’s free 
relationship with the converted Christian and if "conscience" is related 
to the written word of Scripture, then the content of his position is
not inconsistent with, the use of the word "conscience". Ellul himself
at one point refers to a Christian conscience, which i3 the consequence 
1 2of revelation. Bonhoeffer also does so. Even Barth speaks of the 
command being given to conscience, as contrasted with it being given by 
conscience.Even Barth is not able to abandon totally the use of the
4
word conscience.
Ellul also tells us that human morality is of the order of necess­
ity. The order of necessity refers to the conditions which result from
5man's separation from God. Granted the fact of the fall, granted that
natural man seeks to know good and evil, human morality becomes a
necessity. He agrees with Barth that sinful men not only can make
distinctions between good and evil but must make such distinctions.
"The consequence of man’s decision to be like God is, among other things,
his being subject to a certain good that is not the will of God but that 
7
forms part of the order by which the world lives." Ellul is not here
!• Will and To Do, pp. 55-6.
2. Bonhoeffer, Ethics, pp. 212-213.
3. H/2, p. 668.
4. Helmut Thielicke agrees with Barth and Bonhoeffer on the inability
of natural conscience to perceive the will of God (Thielicke, Theologi- 
Ethics (1966), p. 300) and he goes on to speak at some length of a 
Christian "conscience" in terms v/hich would surely be unobjectionable 
to Ellul. -Thielicke speaks of conscience becoming the voice of God 
as man is conquered by the revelation of God (ibid., p. 319). ”if it 
is to be pacified, conscience must learn to understand itself in a 
wholly new way; it must ’die', as it were" (ibid., p. 313).
5. Violence, p. 128.
6. To Will and To Bo,pp. 280-281, citing Barth, Il/2, pp. 5Q6~7 on p. 281
7. To Will and To Bo, p. 62.
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saying that human morality is without value? only that it is determined 
not by obedience to God but by various human necessities.^
Individuals feel the necessity of living in a universe where 
things are divided up according to whether they are good or bad. Thus 
human morality is based in part on psychological necessities. Men 
seek a steady and dependable line of conduct to follow. "The individ­
ual will obey whichever necessity is the most urgent, because he
2
inevitably seeks to avoid conflicts and tensions."
Ellul also thinks that there are social necessities which form
the basis of natural morality. He tells us that some degree of common 
moral content is necessary for the sake of the preservation of the 
groups in which individuals live.^ "Life is possible within an ethical 
system. Apart from that it would be a constant warfare, and inter­
personal relationships would be unthinkable. Therefore, we must 
respect this morality for its utility, since it is useful to man."^
When Ellul seys that human morality is based on social necessity, 
he means not only that morality is necessary for the preservation of
1. To Will and To Do, pp. 65-66. Ellul believes that because man has 
separated himself from God, various necessities have appeared. He 
believes that nature as it now is is not nature as God intended it to 
be. Thus the fact that something is necessary or natural does not 
mean that it is good (ibid., p. 46; Violence, p. 128; Theological 
Foundation of Law, p. Il) in the Christian sense. Ellul, for example, 
says of propaganda that it has become an inescapable necessity for 
everyone. But he insists that in saying this he is not putting a 
positive value on propaganda nor trying to encourage its use (Propa­
ganda (1969), P« xv): "In my opinion, necessity never establishes 
legitimacy ... To say that a phenomenon is necessary means, for me, 
that it denies man: its necessity is proof of its power, not proof
of its excellence" (ibid.). He thinks that it is precisely in facing 
up to the inevitability of a phenomenon that the individual begins to 
have some hope of transcending it (ibid., p. xvi).
2. To Will and To Do, p. 65.
3* Ibid., p. 62. '
4- Ibid., p. 80, "The experience of our time shows, and the humanities 
are helping us to understand better and better, that people can only 
live together and cooperate with one another on the basis of a shared 
moral structure" (ibid., p. 3.60; see also p. 72).
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groups. He also means that morality is determined by heredity,
biological life, the environment, and education.^ He is extremely 
Marxist in the sense that he (like Barth) sees human morality as 
determined by human necessity and does not see it to be an expression 
of transcendence. (He thus relates a Barthian understanding of the 
fall, man’s quest for a natural knowledge of good and evil, to his own 
sociological relativism.) He points out that the question, of applica­
bility itself becomes a norm and in the end the decisive norm of natural 
morality.Because he thinks that human morality is based on immanental
environmental factors,it is not surprising that he thinks that the 
5
content of human morality fluctuates throughout history. He thinks 
that human values are linked to the societies in which they are embodied
g
and perish with the perishing of those societies.
1- To Will and To Bo, p. 63.
2. Ibid., p. 291« "The moral structure, the defining of the good, 
are ideological expressions of the social and biological determinants 
with which the individual lives. The good is determined by historic, 
geographic, and psychological circumstances” (ibid., p. 63). “In 
reality, the good which morality affirms is a good determined by 
necessity ... Man is remarkably predetermined ... What he achieves 
as good, what he defines as evil, are completely relative and 
essentially variable notions ... Henceforth, the morality that man 
formulates is never an act of his freedom” (ibid.).
3» To Will and To Bo, pp. 67-69* "Like technology and politics ... 
morality is an art of the possible ... The necessary becomes the 
good” (ibid., p. 66).
4. Ibid., p. 63.
5. Ibid., pp. 74, HQff.
6. Ibid., p. 152. "Ethics are never a proof of man’s freedom ... It 
is no use to say that the just, the good, and the beautiful are pro­
claimed anew. That is true. But their contents differ according to 
the place and the moment" (ibid., p. 7°). "Morality has no permanent 
content. Murder is generally reproved but that is not always true" 
(ibid., p. 118). "In point of fact, if we base ourselves not on a 
preconceived idea but on what people live and treat as morality we 
see that the latter varies extraordinarily with times and places"
(ibid■, pp. 123-124). "Every morality dies. Everything that man 
proclaims as good today.is laughed at and flouted tomorrow or it 
merely collects dust, becomes anemic and collapses of itself. The 
successive collapse of ethical values is the best proof from experience 
that when all is said and done, morality is of this world of the fall, 
where/... •
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Though Ellul believes that human morality is based on the fall, 
though itis seen to be based on autonomous existence, nevertheless this 
sinful human morality is seen as necessary in a fallen world which must 
operate on the basis of its false assumptions. The world would not be 
the world if it could govern its life on the basis of the Spirit 
morality of the Christian Church. Because Ellul believes that God 
sustains human existence through natural moralities, he thinks Christ­
ians ought not to seek to destroy human morality3 He tells us that
2
God tolerates human morality because it is useful to man. Through 
the existence of human morality man’s life is preserved,and it is 
preserved so that God in His own mysterious freedom may bring man into 
a covenant relationship with Himself.
5
Dual Morality? A Qualification
Ellul concludes from his discussion of human morality that for the
Christian there are two kinds of moralities in the world
where tragic destiny reigns ... There is nothing in morality which 
is free of the general law of absolute destiny: death—the work of 
man” (To Will and To Do, pp. 69-7C).
1. To Will and To Do, pp. 79-80.
2. Ibid., p. 80.
3. Ibid., pp. 80, 99-100.
4. Ellul agrees with Bonhoeffer that the morality of the world con­
stitutes the "next-to-the-last things” which ’’were neither condemned 
by the finality of revelation nor validated by a compliment of grace” 
(To Will and To Do, p. 995 see Bonhoeffer, Ethics, pp. 84-98). Ellul, 
however, is much more concerned than was Bonhoeffer that human moral­
ity should not be regarded as a preparatory step toward faith in 
Christ. Ellul regards human morality as a competitor which often 
helps to prevent men from responding to Christ in obedience (both men 
regard human morality as based on the fall). Regarding human morality 
itself, all that Ellul is willing to affirm is that it is of value 
because it helps to hold the world in existence (To Will and To Do, p. 
100). Though he refers to Bonhoeffer at this point, in actual fact 
Ellul has a more modest evaluation of the role of human morality than 
the Bonhoeffer concept of ”things-before-the-last” really indicates.
5* See below, pp. 82-83, for another perspective on dual morality.
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On the one hand there is the revelation of the good according to 
God, and all that is entailed by that. On the other hand there 
is the elaboration of a morality by man in the given circumstances 
in v/hich he finds himself. These two moralities are in contrast 
with one another in all fields of action. 1
In Ellul’s thought, there is a sense in which the contrast between 
human morality and Christian obedience is not as absolute as this state­
ment seems to imply. He believes that the contrast is absolute in the 
sense that human morality is human; that is, it is based on autonomy 
and hence is sinful. He believes that Christ overturns all human
morality in the sense that Christ establishes a different criterion of 
2good—covenant faithfulness to God. Ellul, however, believes that
non-Christian acts can sometimes be in agreement with obedient Christian
acts. The contrast between human morality and Christian obedience is 
3not always absolute at the level of concrete action. It is important 
to understand him at this point, for what he says here is crucial for 
his understanding of the relationship between Christians and non-Christians
Ellul tells us that he is not preaching a ’’systematic maladjustment” 
to society. Rather, he is simply reminding us that the biblical view 
does not allow us to see adaptation to society as an inherent value.
1. To Will and To Do, p. 02.
2. Ibid., pp. 44-45*
3. Ellul explicitly affirms that non-Christians can do acts objectively 
in accordance with God's will (To Will and To Do, pp. 36-7, 49) 79, 
89-91, 97, Theological Foundation of Law, pp. 89-90). Put the oppos­
ite way, Christians can sometimes in good conscience act in agreement 
with non-Christians'• ’’There can be a coincidence, either accidental 
or volitional ... between what a society calls good and the good 
according to God ...” (To Will and To Ho, p. 36). He tells us that at 
particular points a judgment or decision made by a socialist or a 
platonist morality could be in agreement with a truly Christian stance. 
But he warns that this agreement can only take place "at the level of 
concrete and piecemeal operations. As Niebuhr has emphasized (Nature 
and Destiny), the search for justice, resistance to tyranny, the demand 
for peace, are indications of moral judgments which are valid, but 
which are always intermingled with principles of violence and hate”
(To Will and To Do, p. 90). -
4* False Presence, p. 58. He speaks of ’’the fine balance between the 
positive and negative features” in the Christian’s attitude toward 
society (“Conformism and the Rationale of Technology," p. 102).
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(.Then again, neither does the biblical view see rebellion against society 
as an inherent value.) Though the Church must represent the values of 
her Lord, though she must in this sense be separate from the world, 
nevertheless her conduct does not have to be absolutely unique at all 
points3 Extending Ellul’s argument in terms of the. logic of what he 
says, we could interpret his position as followst-
The Church’s task is simply to be faithful to her Lord. At many 
points this will nean that the Church's action will need to be distinct­
ive; however, the Church is required only to aim at faithfulness, not 
at absolute distinctiveness. If the v/orld agrees with the Church at
the level of specific action, and if the Church is convinced that she 
has arrived at her position in obedience to her Lord, then she can join
the world at those points. The issue for the Church is neither an
abstract agreement nor an abstract disagreement with society — but 
obedience to God. Neither agreement nor disagreement with the world 
can become a general principle for the Church. Agreement or disagree­
ment must be the concrete event in which Christians find that, in obedi­
ence to Christ, they can agree with a line of action in the world, or in 
which, in obedience to Christ, they find that they must not do so.
Thus, the degree to which Christians can agree with non-Christians will 
vary according to time and place. The norm for determining such
agreement or disagreement as may exist will be obedience to Christ 
2(direct obedience, using the Bible for instructional preparation.
1. False Presence, p. 83.
2. In the above interpretation, we are taking very seriously Ellul's 
view that the Church is not to seek to be systematically maladjusted 
to society (Falsa Presence, p. 59$ see also p. 83)• As often, one’s 
interpretation of Ellul's thought depends on which statements are 
taken to be characteristic of his major thrust and which ones are 
regarded as careless and peripheral. Thus, there is a danger of 
subjectivity in any interpretation of Ellul's thought, but running 
this danger is surely preferable to merely cataloguing contradictions. 
In favour/...
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As we have seen from our previous discussion, whatever agreement 
there may be between human morality and Christian obedience is not to 
be attributed to some natural moral or religious relationship which all
In favour of our interpretation at this point is Ellul's general 
ethical point of viewr that what is important in the Christian life 
is concrete obedience to God's will (see below, pp. 94Y1’«)» not 
some philosophy of absolute disagreement with society.
Ellul does sometimes make statements which, taken literally, would 
seem to imply a speculative opinion as to the degree to which Christ­
ians and non-Christians can or cannot agree at the level of concrete 
acts. The fact that these statements contradict each other may 
indicate that this is not the heart of Ellul's concern.
In support of the rarity of agreement between Christians and non- 
Christians at the level of acts, one could quote the following:- 
"Within the faith, then, it is a matter of expressing the oddness of 
Christian conduct by starting with the person of Jesus Christ. But 
be very sure that this does not mean a striving after originality at 
all costs, or an ipso facto rejection of all modes of human 
behavior. There can be an occasional /my underline/ and accidental 
overlapping at the behavior level" (~To Will and To Do, p. 89)• "In 
the majority /my underline/ of instances, moreover, there will be a 
conflict between the two moralities, or again, ignorance and 'indiffer­
ence on the part of the world's morality toward Christian morality" 
(ibid., p. 92). In one statement, Ellul even seems to be affirming 
the very "systematic maladjustment" to society which he has denied is 
his intention. He writes, "Nothing /my underline/ in the life of 
these Christians corresponds to what men call good" (To Will and To Bo, 
p, 43). These statements taken at face value seem to imply that 
Christian behaviour can seldom, if ever, be in agreement with non­
Christian behaviour.
That these statements should not be taken with this degree of serious 
ness is evidenced by the fact that diametrically opposite statements 
can be set next to them. Ellul writes, "Obedience to the current 
morality, doing, what others around us call 'good', is one of the 
elements of the Christian life itself" (To Will and To Bo, p. 78)* He 
goes even further when he writes, "You can obey the morality of man. 
Normally /my underline/ you should do so" (ibid., p. 79) • Elsewhere 
he says of the non-believers in charge of the world that "in normal 
conditions they discharge their task correctly" (The Judgment of Jonah
(1971). p. 29). ■'
Ellul's "impressionistic" writing style, his contradictions and his 
ambiguous statements make the task of interpretation difficult. At 
this point, one wonders if the contradictions don't themselves indi­
cate something of positive value. May it not be that he is indecisive 
about the degree of agreement between Christians and non-Christians, 
because such a general discussion is hopelessly vague? The presence 
of contradictions here may indicate that in the back of his mind he 
knows that' any degree of overlap can only be decided with reference to 
concrete issues facing specific people. Any inherently revolutionary 
or inherently conservative philosophy would pre-judge that which can 
only be decided with reference to the varying conditions present in 
diverse societies.
The fairest interpretation of Ellul's thought at this point may be 
to let/.♦.
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men have with God. Ellul follows Barth in emphasizing the freedom of
God and in denying a moral or religious “point of contact*' for the
receipt of grace. Both men understand the goodness present in natural
man’s conduct as due to the mysterious sovereignty of God and not due
to some inherent worth present in natural man.'1' There may be occasional
agreements between Christians and non-Christians at the level of acts
because Christ is objectively the Lord of the world, not because natural 
2man is somehow subjectively related to Christ.
There is certainly biblical warrant for refusing to set Christian
obedience in total antithesis to the ways of the world. For example, 
Victor Paul Burnish writes that “Paul’s concern is not to be ’original’ 
or to foster a morality of exclusively ’Christian’ content,” and
continuesi-
He readily appeals for support to any sources—pagan, Jewish, or 
Christian — which uphold the kind of conduct he wishes to commend 
and attack the vices he wishes to condemn. By doing this he is 
taking quite seriously his own advice to “test everything, hold fast 
to what is good, abstain from every form of evil”73 * 1 2 3
to let his contradictory statements cancel each other and, instead, 
pay attention to his general point, that Christian obedience is not 
necessarily in total antithesis to v/orldly morality at the level of 
concrete acts. If there cannot be a synthesis between Christian 
obedience and the world’s morality (Presence of the Kingdom, p. 16), 
neither can there be a systematic and total dualism between Christian 
action and the ways of the world.
1. See To Will and To Bo, p. 292, for Ellul's reference and apparent 
agreement with Barth at this point.
2. Ellul writes, “In the event that there is agreement, it does not mean 
that Christian morality is an extension of natural morality, nor that 
it completes it, but only that the life of faith does not annihilate 
nature and that God does not abandon humanity, even in its most rebelli­
ous state and at the focal point of its sin" (To Will and To Bo, p. 92). 
Barth writes, “In all ages the will of God has been fulfilled outside 
the Church. ... Indeed, to the shame of the Church it has often been 
better fulfilled outside the Church than in it. This is not in virtue
of the natural goodness of man. It is because Jesus, as the One who has 
risen from the dead and sits at, the .right hand of God, is-in fact the Lord of 
the whole world, who has His servants even whereHis name is not yet or no 
longer known or praised" (Barth, Il/2, p. 5^9» see also IV/3(l), pp. 
476-477; Robert E. Willis, The Ethics of Karl Barth (l9?l)> P* 173).
3. Victor Paul Furnish, Theology and Ethics, p. 72; see also p. 241.
How, then, does Paul approach practical matters of conduct? We find 
him/...
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Paul was not concerned that Christian conduct be absolutely unique at
all points, only that it be absolutely faithful to God. On the basis
of the knowledge of God revealed in Christ and on the basis of direct J
obedience to the Holy Spirit} he was able to use non-Christian moral
wisdom in a selective way, subordinating it to his Christian convictions.
In Ellul’s emphasis on the importance of a Christian style of life, 
he certainly agrees with Matthew’s Gospel that the Christian’s righteous- 4 
ness must exceed that of the scribes and the Pharisees (Mtt. 5*20). -4
This, however, is not to say that the Christian life must be absolutely 
different at all point si 3
When Ellul says that the Christian can only occasionally agree with 
non-Christians at the level of acts,^ he may do so, not because he wants 3
to offer a timeless philosophy concerning the Church’s relationship to 4
the world, but because, he is so convinced that the greatest danger to the 
modern Church is adaptation to the world’s values. By stressing the 
occasional aspect of the agreement between the Church and the world, he 4
him time and again, seeking to be informed by every possible datum
available—the facts of the situation at hand, the teaching of f
Scripture, some word of the Lord, the practice of Christians %
generally, the ethical wisdom of the ages, or even — once, anyway $
(I Cor. 11:14)—“nature itself” (Victor Paul Furnish, The Love |
Command in the New Testament (1972), p. 216). “He never supposes
that ’what is good and acceptable and perfect’ (Rom. 12:2) has an
exclusively Christian provenance. Thus, for example, he does not -s
hesitate, in exactly the same context as that in which he appeals 
to the Christian creedal tradition and to the church’s scripture 
(l Cor. 15s3ff., 45fL»), to appeal also to a quite secular proverb,
’Bad company ruins good morals’ (I Cor. 15*33; cf. Menander Thais,
Fragment 218). Similarly, Paul’s listing of particularly repulsive
vices (Rom. 1:29-31; 13:13; I Cor. 5:10-11; 6:9-10; II Cor. 12:20-21; X
Gal. 5:19-21) and of particularly commendable virtues (II Cor. 6:6;
Gal. 5:22-23; Phil. 4*8) shows the extent to which his ideas of 
•good’ and ’bad’ are in accord with those of contemporary ethical 
writers. He does not seek to distinguish between'the content of his 
ethical advice and theirs, but supports his own exhortations by relat­
ing them to what, on other grounds, his readers are already willing to < 
acknowledge” (Victor Paul Furnish, Theology and Ethics, pp. 71-2).
1. To Will and To Do, pp. 43j 89? 92.
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is able to warn the Church against what he regards as her greatest 
threats accommodation to the modern world 3
1. Ellul is very suspicious of the ways in which Christianity is dis­
torted when Christian values are selectively employed and used for 
non-Christian purposes by the world. For example, he argues that the 
bourgeois world agrees with Christian morality at the point of family 
virtues, the dignity of the individual, and the importance of charity 
— but does so for the building up of a work ethic which contributes 
to the technological society (To Will and To Jo, pp. 94-5)• The bour­
geois world recognizes Christian morality only insofar as it can be 
utilized to achieve secular goals (ibid., p. 94)« he concludes, “The 
bourgeois morality, since it is not U3ed for the glory of God but for 
the development of a certain type of society, is really a caricature 
of the Christian life and at bottom its worst deformation—this in 
spite of the fact that in its concrete works it exhibits many points 
of identity with the Christian morality ...” (ibid., p. 95)« he 
accuses the bourgeoisie of having killed God by declaring man to be 
the beginning and end of everything (Metamorphose du Bourgeois (1967), 
pp. 19-20). He criticizes them for relativizing Christian truth, such 
as the belief that man is a sinner and the belief in the Incarnation, 
atonement, justification by grace, and Christ’s resurrection. Ellul 
says that .they annexed Christianity by attaching to it the bourgeois 
values of happiness and optimism (ibid., pp. 112-116). He claims that 
bourgeoisie denied the radical demands of the Sermon on the Mount as 
well as the call to love one’s enemies. In short, he accuses them of 
eliminating everything scandalous from Christianity, that is, every­
thing contrary to bourgeois ideology (ibid., pp. 116-118).
CHAPTER I I
CHAPTER II
FREEDOM AS CHRISTOCENTRIC EXISTENCE
In Chapter One we have been dealing with Ellul’s description of 
the human condition as that of bondage. In this and the next chapter 
we vri.ll focus our attention on the related issue of his understanding 
of how bondage can begin to be broken and freedom established.
Freedom as the Receipt of Grace
-We will begin our discussion by considering freedom as the receipt 
of grace. That is, we vzill discuss Ellul’s understanding of God’s act 
of revelation as the granting of true human freedom.
Ellul believes that natural man is so enslaved to sin that of
himself he is utterly incapable of hearing the Word of God. He agrees 
with Barth that only God’s free Word of revelation can create the con­
ditions necessary for the receipt of grace."1' He believes that as man
1. Ellul’s understanding of God’s covenant with man is relevant at 
this point. He tells us that a covenant is first and foremost an act 
of divine mercy (Theological Foundation of Law, p. 50). He points 
out that ’’Berit, covenant, is formed from the same root as bar ah, 
to elect” (ibid., p. 50). Thus the covenant has to do with God's 
free act of grace whereby God chooses a partner (ibid., pp. 50, 53).
He tells us that in God’s covenant with man God judges and condemns 
man, but in so doing grants grace and pardon and restoration to man 
(ibid., p. 52). Though the covenant is a contract of loyalty between 
God and man, Ellul tells us that the Bible places the emphasis on 
God’s initiative. It is God who establishes the conditions of the 
covenant. Man responds by endorsing that which God establishes 
(ibid., pp. 5O*“5l)« Ellul believes that the covenant of the Old 
Testament has been brought to fulfilment In Jesus Christ. He insists 
that it is only from the perspective of fulfilment in Christ that the 
nature of the covenant, as just outlined, can be truly understood 
(ibid., p. 56).
Assumed in Ellul’s position is a concept of God as the One who takes 
the initiative. God evokes faith and faith can be described as a gift 
of God (To Will and To Do, pp, 2O3, 3O3), ”It is not because men 
choose/... .
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is granted this gift of revelation he is also granted the gift of
1 ’ freedom. Thus vzhen Ellul refers to freedom, he is not talking about 
autonomy (for autonomy is sin), but is referring to a "supernatural" 
possibility of obedience to God made possible by the event of revelation.
Christian liberty is seen to be the God-given freedom to live in the 
2
power of God and the freedom to represent God before men. ‘ Freedom, 
grace and obedience are seen to be words which have meaning only in 
interrelationship with each other. The ethical dilemma of the relation­
ship of freedom to authority is overcome by redefining freedom as the
freedom to obey God, rather than as the neutral freedom to choose between 
3
good and evil. One might say that Ellul thinks out the concept of
freedom with reference to the freedom of the Christian man and the
freedom of the Christian man is thought out in terms of the freedom of
choose Christ that they become Christians, it is because Christ has 
chosen them. It is not because Christians choose to go out into the 
world that they work there, it is because Christ sends them there" 
(Presence of the Kingdom, p. 43). Freedom is not seen to be a charac­
teristic of man’s natural being, but a possibility which is a part of 
the gift of sonship and the task of prayer (Prayer and Modern Man, 
p. 121).
Karl Barth also connects freedom with prayer. He writes, "Prayer 
is literally the archetypal form of all human acts of freedom in the 
Church ... our freedom is only true freedom when the Holy Ghost 
intercedes for us to accomplish what out of our own resources we 
certainly cannot do" (Barth, l/2, p. 698).
1. "Le Sens de la Liberte," pp. 4-5*
2. Ibid., p.
3* To Will and To Bo, p. 84- In Ellul’s understanding, true freedom 
is filled with the content of Christian love. He sees the two poles 
of the Christian life as being freedom and love; he insists that 
there cannot be any freedom without love and no love without freedom 
("Le Sens de la Liberte," p. 7)* Freedom is freedom for God and 
neighbour. ,
"In his Gifford Lectures, Bultmann contrasts the Renaissance-En­
lightenment view that freedom is freedom from authority, with the 
traditional Christian view that freedom is always freedom under 
authority, and thus a freedom that is known only in obedience"
(Thomas C. Oden, Radical Obedience (The Ethics of Rudolf Bultmann) 
(1964), p» 100, referring to Bultmann, History and Eschatology, pp. 
14ff.)
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the Christian God.1
Ellul’s concept of freedom consistently relates to his understand­
ing of the human condition. If sin is autonomy, then true freedom
cannot be a neutral freedom but must be obedience to God’s will.
2Citing Barth, he concludes that disobedience to God is never a choice 
but is rather evidence of bondage to sin.^ Ellul and Barth thus con­
trast natural ethics (based on human, choice) with Christian ethics 
(based on life lived from God’s grace).^ 1 2 3 4
1. The biblical basis for Ellul’s thought at this point is his analysis 
of Pauline theology (see "Le Sens de la Liberte") and his appreciation 
of the theological truth of the Garden of Eden story (To Will and To 
Bo, pp. 5-19, 27l)« (Gen. 2:8-17 understands man's true life as life 
lived from grace; freedom is not seen to be the neutral choice between 
good and evil.) He also ci.te3 John 15*5? "Apart from me you can do 
nothing,” and concludes that freedom has to do with a relationship 
with Christ (To Will and To Do, p. 297)* (Commenting on John 8:36
Bultraann writes(The Gospel'.of John, A Commentary, 1971> P* 44G)J
’’Jesus promises freedom; he alone can bestow it, and only that is 
genuine freedom.”)
Ellul tells us that he agrees with Barth that God’s true commandment 
captures man in, such a way that he cannot escape; the commandment 
"permits" man to live in obedience to God (To Will and To Do, pp. 86,
198, on p. 299 citing Church Dogmatics Il/2, p. 564) • "The command­
ment rests on the fact of man’s liberation by Jesus Christ, on the 
fact that man becomes free through grace received in faith" (To Will 
and To Do, p. 87).
Ellul also agrees with Bonhoeffer that when God reveals Himself, He 
gives us the freedom to obey, rather than the freedom to choose among 
various possibilities of which obedience is one. To the degree that 
we hear God's Word, we are free from the choice of disobedience. 
Disobedience (in the words of Barth) becomes the "impossible possi­
bility” (To Will and To Do, p. 297; see also Bonhoeffer, Ethics, pp. 
220-221). .........
Sail Brunner and Sbren Kierkegaard also think of freedom in the con­
text of obedience to God* see Emil Brunner, The Divine Imperative (l947)> 
pp. 58-59’; S$ren Kierkegaard, The Journals of Kierkegaard (1634-1354) 1 
edited and translated by A1exand ar Dru (l969 j/pp• I87-I89.
2. II/2, p. 669.
3. Barth writes, "Is there a worse threat to freedom itself than the 
establishment of man as his own lord and lawgiver? Who can exercise a 
worse tyranny over us than the god in our own breast?" (l/2,p. 668).
Barth believes that only the Son can make us free from the compulsion 
in which we live (Jn. 8:31ff.; Rom. 6:17,20-23; Rom. 7!17-2O; Rom.
8:2): cf. Il/2, pp. 586, 589­
4. To Will and To Do, pp. 297-298. Ellul agrees with Barth that the
fact of the covenant in Jesus Christ eliminates the central concern of 
natural/...
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Ellul seems to have quite correctly understood Barth’s thought at 
this point and has based his own thinking mainly on Bax’th's biblical 
reflection. To deepen our perception of Ellul’s position, it may be 
helpful to say more about Barth's position, extending our knowledge of 
Barth beyond Ellul’s explicit references. V/e are not seeking to give 
an exhaustive description of Barth’s thought at this point, but are 
looking to see the way some of Barth’s statements legitimately expand 
what Ellul himself says, which in turn is based on Barth’s thought.
Barth indeed does not set human freedom in antithesis to God's
authority, but sees freedom as "freedom under the Word".^ "Being a 
p
slave of Christ means being free." " He sharply distinguishes Christian 
freedom from mere creaturely freedom. Christian freedom is seen to 
rest on the free revelation of the Holy Spirit which enables man to 
participate in a new kind of freedom, freedom for God.^ Though freedom 
and obedience are virtually synonymous terms for him,^ we must remember 
that obedience is itself understood in the context of God’s gift of 
revelation. God's command differs from all other commands because it 
is the free revelation of God which enables man to respond with obedience
Barth's way of understanding the Law as a form of the Gospel, God's 
gift as a form of God's gift of Himself, is closely based on Christology.
natural ethics — the search for a criterion of good (To Will and To Bo, 
pp. 249-250, 265). He says that the Christian ethic cannot offer an 
objective definition of the good (To Will and To Bo, p. 265). "To 
conceive the existence of this ethic is by that very fact to assert 
that 'all independent search for the knowledge of good and evil is 
excluded' (Barth, Il/2, p. 535)« ft can never be formulated as a way 
of being correct with God or of protecting ourselves from him" (To 
Will and To Do, p, 265). -
1. Barth, 1/2, p. 695•
2. Barth J Karl Barth’s Table Talk, edited and recorded by John D.
Godsey (1963), p. 37- • . -
3. l/2> PP- 2O3ff.
4. III/4, p. 595­
5- IX/2, p. 505-
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He looks to Jesus Christ and to Jesus Christ alone to gain an under­
standing of true freedom* What he discovers when, he looks to Christ
is that obedience and freedom are not antithetical. Jesus was the
truly free man because His life v/as lived in obedience to God* Barth
accepts this definition of freedom as normative, thus calling into
question the common assumption that freedom is the neutral choice 
1between good and evil.
In Barth's Christology, however, statements about Jesus are under­
stood primarily as statements about God. From God's revelation in 
Jesus Christ we learn that God wills to make Himself responsible for 
man's life. In Christ, Ood here and now invites and enables man to 
live from God's own resources, rather than living in autonomy. The Lav/ 
is a form of the Gospel because God makes demands only in the context of 
the bestowal of His Spirit, which enables those demands to be met.
Grace is thus the answer to the ethical problem because grace sanctifies
man and puts him under God's command. Grace is not merely the forgive- 
2
ness of sin, but also God's enabling power which bestows new life. 1 2
1. Karl Barth, Community, State, and Church (i960), pp. 77-BQ}
II/2, p. 605. '
2. Barth Il/2, pp. 533-516, 557 > 560, 6O5. “The God who claims man 
makes Himself originally responsible for man. The fact that He gives 
man His command, that He subjects man to His command, means that He 
makes Himself responsible not only for its authority but also for its 
fulfilment. Therefore we do not speak completely about God Himself, 
if we do not go on at once to speak also about His command" (Barth 
Il/2, p. 543)* “The core of the matter is that God gives His command, 
that he gives Himself to be our Commander. God's command, God Himself, 
gives Himself to be known. And as He does so, He is heard. Man is 
made responsible (Barth Il/2, p. 54B)*
Through independent study of Paul's concept of justification, Ernst 
Kasemann has reached conclusions which vindicate Barth's understanding 
of the Law as a form of the Gospel (see “'The Righteousness of God' in 
Paul" in Hew Testament Questions of Today (1969), pp* 168-182). Barth's 
stance is vindicated all the more because Kasemann makes no reference 
to him and does not appear to realize that he made a similar theological 
point much earlier (Barth did not make his theological point on the 
basis of an exegetical study of Paul's concept of justification and 
this may be the reason why Kasemann makes no reference to him). Writing 
of Paul1s/..•
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Ellul’s emphasis on the importance of a Christian style of life 
would be impossible were he to agree with the isolation of declaratory 
justification from sanctification. The shape of his ethic is decisively 
related to the biblical knowledge he has acquired from Karl Barth.
of Paul's theology Kasemann says, "Paul knows no gift of God which 
does not convey both the obligation and the capacity to serve. A gift 
which is not authenticated in practice and passed on to others loses 
its specific content (New Testament Questions, p. 170). He describes 
the sense of Paul's imperative with the formula "'Abide by the Lord who 
has been given to you and by his lordship.' If a transformation of our 
existence is really effected ... this cannot help but mean a change of 
lordship. The new Lord cuts us off from what we were before and never 
allows us to remain what we are at any given time, for otherwise he 
might be the First Cause but he would not be our Lord in the true sense 
In this particular theological context, man is never seen as free in 
the sense of autonomous. But he does receive — eschatologically — the 
possibility of choosing between the kingdom of Christ and the kingdom 
of Sat.an ..." (ibid., p. 176). Kasemann is not denying the forensic 
nature of justification in Paul's thought; he is insisting that 
forensic justification cannot be isolated from God's gift of power 
without distorting Paul's thought (his assessment of Paul's thought 
has the effect of bringing Paul's theology into a more integral rela­
tionship with Jesus' proclamation of the Kingdom of God).
In line with Kasemann's thought, Victor Paul Furnish writes, "The 
Pauline imperative is not just the result of the indicative but fully 
integral to it" (Theology and Ethics, p. 225 )• Furnish explains that 
the reason this is so is that in Paul's thought, justification has to 
do not only with forensic pardon but also with entering the new age 
and living under a new Lord (I Thess. 5’4ff«; Hom. 13«llff.? Phil.
3J2O) (Theology and Ethics, pp. 151-152, 225-226). Fumish's comments 
on Rom. 6:l2ff. are reminiscent of Barth's defence of the reverse.1 of 
the traditional Law-Gospel schema: "The Christian's obedience is 
inseparable from the event of God's grace which makes it possible.
God's grace constitutes not just the summons to obedience but the 
possibility of obedience. Vs. 14 makes this clear when it speaks of 
sin's power being displaced by the power of grace ... The Christian 
already has a new life because he already has a new Lord ... The new 
Lord not only asks all, but gives all" (ibid., p. 195)* "As always in 
Paul's thought, what God gives is inseparably tied to what he asks; 
where the command is heard, the power to obey is also received. This 
is most profoundly expressed in the famous appeal of Phil. 2:12-13 to 
’work out your own salvation with fear and trembling; for God is at 
work in you, both to will and to work for his good pleasure' (RSY).
This is what is meant by being 'led1 by the Spirit (Rom. 8:14; Gal. 
5:18) and by 'living' and 'walking’ by the Spirit (Rom. 8:4-5,* Gal. 
5:16,25; cf. II Cor. 3:6).- Belonging to Christ means being subject to 
his power in the double sense of one who is both dependent upon and 
responsible to a sovereign Lord" (Theology and Ethics, pp. 238-9).
J.A. Ziesler’s study The Meaning of Righteousness in Paul (1972) 
is in line with Kasemann's interpretation that God's righteousness 
involves the gift of His power and presence which leads in the way of 
obedience/.,.
- 48 -
Freedom as Life in Christ
Ellul believes that the Christian ethic is distinguished from
all other moralities by the phrase ”in Christ”s-
Everything derives from the fact that Jesus is God, that Jesus 
Christ is Lord and Savior ... Christian ethics is going to be 
the relation between the person of Jesus Christ and a person who 
takes him as his Savior and Lord. Here we are restored in the 
good which God says and does. Now the good is strictly impenetr­
able, incomprehensible, beyond our grasp from the standpoint of 
what man calls good. There is no comparison possible.
obedience (Ziesler, op. clt., pp. 13-14? 170-171)* Ziesler makes this 
point on the basis of a painstakingly careful linguistic study. The 
main conclusion of the study is that for Paul the verb ’’justify” is 
used relationally, often meaning eschatological acquittal, but that 
the noun and adjective of the same word describe behaviour within 
such a relationship (ibid., pp. 1, 212). "Justification is entirely 
by grace through faith, it is declaratory, yet on the other hand,
Paul’s ethical seriousness is fully allowed for, v/ithin the one section 
of vocabulary.” "Always, solely by God’s grace is man forgiven, 
acquitted, restored to right relationship, but also made a new creature 
whose life is now righteous in Christ, really and observably” (ibid., 
p. 212). Ziesler insists that his conclusion supports the traditional 
Reformation doctrine that man’s status before God is based entirely 
on grace and always remains so based. Man is never justified by -works 
(ibid., p. 168). Because Christ is the source of the Christian’s 
ethical life, the Christian can never claim any righteousness as his 
own. "It is no longer I who live, but Christ who lives in me” (Gal. 
2»20). However, Ziesler insists that justification has ethical con­
sequences, precisely because it involves sharing in God’s power 
(ibid., pp. 168-9)•
1. To Will and To Bo, pp. 285-6.
2« Ibid., p. 88; see also p. 75* Ellul is against separating ethics 
from theology and against putting ethics in the foregrounds ”It is 
the attempt to consider the fact, the phenomenon, the problem, the 
value of ethics in itself and preferentially which leads to all errors. 
What is needed, obviously, is to reduce ethics to its humble station 
and, consequently, to begin afresh with Christ and his work” (ibid., 
p. 306). He does not intend to devalue the importance of a Christian 
moral response to Jesus Christ. He does insist that the moral life 
of the Christian is a response to and a participation in Jesus Christ.
Barth shares the same point of view. "What are we to do? We are to 
accept as right and to live as those who.accept as right the fact that 
they do not belong to themselves, that they, therefore, do not have 
their life in their own hands and at their own disposal, that they are 
ma.de a divine possession in Jesus Christ” (Barth, Il/2, p. 580; see 
also p. 583'). "’For me the good is to cleave to God.’ Every ethic 
which is at least half serious, aims consciously or unconsciously to 
say this” (Barth, Il/2, p. 552). Brunner also shares a similar point 
of view (Brunner, The Divine Imperative, pp. 55, 84, 86) as does Bon- 
hoeffer. Bonhoeffer writes, “The point of departure for Christian 
ethics is not the reality of one’s own self, or the reality of the 
world;/...
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The title of Ellul’s first volume of Christian ethics is called
To Will ,and To Do, The title is taken from Phil 2:13 and that passage 
is quoted on the fly-page of the hook: "’For it is God which worketh 
in you both to will and to do his good pleasure.’ (KJY)."^ Though he 
stresses the importance of visible ’’life-styles'* and thinks that Christ­
ian faith should make a difference in outward life, he still puts 
decisive emphasis on the invisible basis of the Christian life in
prayer. Prayer itself is seen to be an integral part of the Christian 
2life-style and its most distinguishing feature. Though outward works 
are seen to be important, Ellul believes that the Christian life can never 
be proved and certainly cannot be proved by outward works. "The same
world; nor is it the reality of standards and values. It is the 
reality of God as He reveals Himself in Jesus Christ. It is fair to 
begin by demanding assent to this proposition of anyone who wishes to 
concern himself with the problem of Christian ethics" (Bonhoeffer, 
Ethics, p. 56). "The problem of Christian ethics is the realization 
among God’s creatures of the revelational reality of God in Christ, 
just as the problem of dogmatics is the truth of the revelational 
reality of God in Christ. The place which in all other ethics is 
occupied by the antithesis of ‘should be’ and ’is’, idea and accom­
plishment, motive and performance, is occupied in Christian ethics by 
the relation of reality and realization, past and present, history and 
event (faith), or, to replace the equivocal concept with the unambigu­
ous name, the relation of Jesus Christ and the Holy Spirit. The 
question of good becomes the question of participation in the divine 
reality which is revealed in Christ" (ibid., p. 57)• Bonhoeffer tells 
us that the Christian ethic does not ask the question "How can I be 
good? or "How can I do good?" Instead, it asks a totally different 
question: "What is the will of God?" This letter question, the 
question of Christian ethics, presupposes a decision of faith with 
reference to the reality of the living God (ibid., p. 55)•
1. From the fly-page of To Will and To Bo; see also p. 214 and The 
Presence of the Kingdom, p. 83 •
2* Prayer and Modern Man, pp. 172-3* "Prayer goes with action, but 
it is prayer which is radical and decisive. Every action will necess­
arily be taken over by the milieu in which it occurs. It will be 
turned aside from its purpose. It will be vitiated by circumstances. 
It will entail unforeseeable consequences and will drag misfortune in 
its train. Prayer, on the other hand, when it is genuine, cannot be 
taken over (since it obtains its import and substance from God). It 
attains its goal. It entails the consequences granted by God" (ibid., 
p. 172). ,
Karl Barth also believed that prayer is the Christian’s most import­
ant and effective activity (III/3, pp. 264-5).
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acts, the same deliberations, the same decisions, which in factual
objectivity are identical arid ethically equivalent, do not have the same
value nor the same meaning before God, according as they vzere or were
not inspired by the Holy Spirit."'1' Since Ellul sees personal obedience 
2
to Christ as the Christian good, he assumes that a life which is not 
lived "in Christ" cannot be pleasing to God, though particular acts of
3
non-Christians may be indistinguishable from particular Christian acts.
Ellul points out that most of the biblical texts having to do vzith
morality address the covenant peoples Israel and the Church.Put 
differently, the good in the biblical sense has to do with God’s speak­
ing and man’s listening and cannot be divorced from that context.
"Man only reflects the good that comes from God ... If Jesus says, ’You
are the light of the world’, it is because he says ’I am the light of
6 7the world.’" Ellul agrees explicitly with Barth that the Christian
8good is determined by whether or not God is active in our activity.
He also thinks that only the Holy Spirit can create the faculty for 
o
accomplishing the will of God. Obedience must be man’s immediate 1 2 3 4 * 6 7 8 9
1. To Will and To Bo, p. 214.
2. Ibid.., ppo 25, 28, 83.
3. Ibid., p. 31.
4. Ibid., p. 20.
Ibid., p. 21. Barth writes, "Man does good in so far as he hears 
the Word of God and acts as a hearer of this Word. In this action as
a hearer he is obedient. Why is obedience good? Because it derives
from hearing, because it is the action of a hearer, namely, of the 
hearer of the Word of God. It is good because the divine address is 
good, because God Himself is good" (ll/2, p. 54^} see also p. 547).
6. To Will and To Bo, p. 22. ‘ '
7. Barth, III/4, p. 327­
8. To Will and To Bo, p. 22. "What Paul says about our prayers goes
even more for our-works. If the Holy Spirit must be the interpreter 
of our poor prayers, our stammerings, before God, still more must he 
be the one to make vzorthy our unworthy works, to take them upon 
himself for God" (ibid., p. 214).
9. Ibid., pp. 34, 304.
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response to the activity of the Holy Spirit. If obedience is put off 
until later, Ellul thinks that v/e no longer have the power to fulfil 
God’s will, ’’for that power is tied to the presence itself of the Holy- 
Spirit”.^
Ellul is very much in the tradition of Barth’s "actualism” even 
2
when he does not make explicit reference to Barth. Ellul believes
that the free grace of God can never be mastered or domesticated—not 
even by Christians. Even the Christian must ever and again receive 
God's grace which is "new every morning”.The Christian man. is not 
ontologically changed in such a way that from his new nature he can 
speak God's Word to himself.The Christian is set in covenant rela­
tionship with God, but God's speaking and man’s listening must occur 
ever and again if the Christian is to remain a faithful covenant partner.
The theological presuppositions assumed in this position are that 
man has radically fallen from grace, that God alone is good, and that 
man comes to know the good only in relationship to God. Key texts
1. To Will and To Do, p. 213.
2. For example, Ellul say3 that even the Christian man does not have 
any intrinsic capacity to do God's vzill: "There is no permanent 
transformation of his being which would consist in this ability to 
perform the will of God by himself. He has no intrinsic possibility 
which would be self-sufficient and new and which vzould become a 
second nature” (To Will and To Bo, p. 34; The Politics of &od, p.134)
What we mean by Barth’s actualism is evidenced when Barth writes: 
"What I heard yesterday I must hear again to-day; and if I am to 
hear it afresh to-morrow, it must be revealed by the Father of Jesus, 
vzho is in heaven, and by Him only” (Barth, The Epistle to the Homans 
(1933), 98; see also Barth Il/l, p, 235~7-~
3* Will and To Bo, pp. 33-34­
4- Ibid., pp. 32-34- ’
5- "To he sure, a relationship can.he restored; Barth /and Ellul/* 4 5 * 7 - 
certainly would claim this as part of what Christ has done for men
and the world. But man’s rejection or acceptance of the new or
restored relation is a matter, not of infused disposition or growing 
seeds, not a once-for-all conversion /though it assumes the latter/; 
it is problematic in each day and each moment. One can fall from the 
subjective apprehension of newness of life at any time; and this is 
the case” (James M. Gustafson, Christ and the Moral Life (1968), 
p. 115). - -
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are—Mark 10:18, "No one is good but God alone," Rom. 14*23, "Whatever 
does not proceed from faith is sin," and Heb. 11:6, "Without faith it is 
impossible to please him /Goj£7." Assumed is the "infinite qualitative 
difference" between sinful men and the Holy God. Because the discon­
tinuity between man and God is emphasized it is seen to be continually 
necessary for God to speak and for man to listen. The Christian, good 
is thus radically differentiated from any natural good one might come to 
know in the Christian home, Church, or in a "Christian civilization".
In this tradition, the answer to the moral, question is seen to have 
a great deal to do with prayer. What we ought to do is to live in daily 
openness to the spiritual impact of God, so that we may perceive the 
concrete shape of God's will for our daily lives. "Prayer comes before
all the rest in the life in Christ ... All the rest of life in Christ
flows from prayer. The whole ethic and behavior of Christians rests on 
2
the practice of prayer ..."
Ellul attributes a priority to being over doing."According to 
God’s will, it is not a question of doing good but of embodying faith, 
which is fundamentally different. It is not a matter of doing works 
but of 'bearing fruit'. The question of the fruit is really a question 
of the tree which bears it."^ It's not that being and doing are set in 
antithesis in Ellul's covenant ethic, but that doing is seen to have its
1. The latter can be forms of witness to God, but cannot take the 
place of God's free revelation (see To Will and To Bo, p. 255).
2. Prayer and Modern Man, p. 116. "All further radicalism, of behavi­
our, of style of life and of action, can only have the prior rupture
of prayer as its source" (ibid., p. 174)* Stfren Kierkegaard represents 
a similar view on the importance of prayer for ethics (Journals of 
Kierkegaard, p. 145)* He understood the Christian life as based on a 
personal relationship with God (ibid., p..222). Ellul has read Kierke­
gaard's journals (Prayer and Modern Man, pp. Ill, 139), and hence may 
be influenced by him at this point.
3. To Will and To Bo, p. 215.
4- Ibid., p. 217.
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basis in Christian being (Christian being is itself understood in
dynamic "actualistic" terms as already suggested). He is not denying
the importance of action, but is insisting that action must be the
expression of faith. He agrees with Bonhoeffer that there must be a 
2unity between being and doing.
1. "We do not mean to contend that this contrast is ontologically valid 
and permanent. We merely observe the fact that man in ethics looks for 
a deed, and that the gospels and the letters are talking, on the other 
hand, of a being, of a transformation of being, not moreover separated 
from the deed, but such that the deed comes second and as a consequence" 
(To Will and To Bo, p. 275)*
2. Ibid., p. 26l, and on p. 3O9 citing Bonhoeffer, Ethics, pp. 151ff•, 
I66ff. Bonhoeffer writes, "For just as hearing must not be made 
independent of doing, so, too, doing must not make itself independent 
of hearing ... One thing is needful: not to hear or to do, but to do 
both in one, in other words to be and to continue in unity with Jesus 
Christ, to be directed toward Him, to receive word and deed from him 
... Jesus recognized neither doing in itself, the busy activity of a 
Martha, nor hearing in itself. There is a fsJ.se doing and a false 
hearing" (Bonhoeffer, Ethics, p. 170). "To object that Christ, too, 
had this distinction between person and work in view in His saying 
about the good tree that brings forth good fruit (Matt. 7s17) is to 
distort the meaning of this saying of Jesus into its exact opposite.
What is meant by this saying is not that first the person and then the 
work is good, but that only the two together are good or bad, in other 
words that the two together are to be understood as a single unit" (Bon- 
hoeffer, Ethics, p. 58)• We must keep Bonhoeffer's words in mind if
we are not to misunderstand Ellul when he writes, "What actually matters 
in practice is ‘to be* and not 'to act'" (Presence of the Kingdom, 
p. 90)• "Revelation tells us that to be in the covenant of God is much 
less a matter of doing something than of being someone, and in reality 
of living by the grace of God" (To Will and To Bo, p. 215). That these 
words are not to be interpreted as though doing is unimportant is 
indicated in the sentence which immediately follows the last one quoted: 
"Action, the bringing to pass of the good, the carrying out of some 
moral law ... has no value in itself" (ibid.). Works are seen by Ellul 
to have no independent significance, but a great deal of significance 
if they occur in the context of grace. He cites his agreement with 
Bonhoeffer, that the Christian life must be lived or it is nothing 
(ibid., p. 3C5)« "Man can retain revelation only if he lives it. The 
word of God is grasped in the action performed, in the process of 
carrying it out" (ibid., p. 305)• Because Christian action is the 
embodiment of faith, acts cannot be judged in isolation from the person 
committing the acts (ibid., p. 29). HThe act is nothing but a sign of 
something deeper. It has no existence.or content of itself ... The 
acts of the Pharisees, though 'good' were condemned by Jesus Christ 
because the inside was bad" (ibid., p. 217)*
Ellul also stresses the priority of thought to deeds, in the sense that 
deeds should be the expression of thought. He criticizes the modem 
tendency to isolate action from theological reflection. (However, he 
believes/...
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Ellul thinks that the modern world values only acts:
Our world is entirely directed toward abtion ... People are 
always looking for slogans, programmes, ways of action; indeed, 
our world is so obsessed by activity, that it is in danger of 
losing its life ... A man who spends all his time in action, by 
that very fact ceases to live. 2
’’Precisely because our technological society is given over entirely to
3
action, the person who retires to his room to pray is the true radical.”
Ellul is certainly stating a biblical theme which is desperately 
needed today in the field of Christian ethics. A superficial activism 
is a constant danger for those Christians particularly interested in 
ethics. This has always been a danger, as Jesus’ encounter with the 
Pharisees indicates, but as Ellul suggests, this is a particular danger 
today — because we live in a society preoccupied with activity. In an 
age in which the Church is prone to let the world ’’write the agenda”, 
Ellul reminds the Church of the importance of her own spiritual and 
reflective life. If indeed the Church is an eschatological community, 
she must continually pause so that she may be renewed by her transcendent 
Lord. Only as the Church seeks the mind of her Lord can she truly serve
the Lord in the world.
Ellul also contributes to the Church’s thinking at this point 
because he bridges the gap between ’’evangelical” and.’’liberal” Christian­
ity. With the evangelicals he stresses the priority of man’s relation­
ship with God. With the liberals he believes in the importance of the 
command to love the neighbour in response to God’s love. He does not
believes that theological thought should itself be an aspect of 
Christian being and should not be based on an autonomous rationality) 
(’’Chronique des Problemes de Civilisation,” Foi et Yie (Sept.-Oct. ■ 
1946), pp. 686-687). He criticizes the popular mood which-expects 
the Church to be mainly concerned about the burning issues of the day 
and non-concerned about the content of her own belief in Christ (False 
Presence, pp. 92-93).
1. Presence of the Kingdom, pp. 92-93; To Will and To Do, p. 28.
2* Presence of the Kingdom, p. 91.
3. Prayer and Modern Man, p. 174*
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intend to isolate either love for God in a quietistic way nor love for 
the neighbour in a humanistic way.
Though Ellul is consciously dependent on Barth and Bonhoeffer in 
developing his ideas concerning the covenant basis of ethics? he is also 
equally close to some aspects of Rudolf Bultmann’s thought? though he 
does not consciously depend on him at this point. What Ellul says of 
the priority of being over doing is what Bultmann means by "radical 
obedience". Radical obedience is the action of the Christian in which
one participates in doing with one’s whole being.Bultmann affirms his
own theology when he writes of Jesus’ teaching:-
Radical obedience exists only when a man inwardly assents to what 
is required of hirn? when the thing commanded is seen as intrinsic­
ally God’s command; when the whole man stands behind what he does; 
or better? when the whole man. is in what he does? vzhen he is not 
doing something obediently, but is essentially obedient.
Ellul is in agreement with the broad range of "Neo-Reformation" 
theologians at this point? in contrast to both more secular or humanistic 
theologians who divorce Christian doing from its covenant basis and also 
in contrast to a quietistic orthodoxy.
Freedom as Deliverance to the Captives
What we are going to discuss in this section builds on what we have
just said concerning freedom as the receipt of grace and freedom as life 
in Christ. It also links with what we are going to say in Chapter 
Three concerning freedom as eschatological existence. Ellul has various
ways of talking about the saving significance of Christ’s relationship 
with man. Here he refers mainly to the present saving activity of the 
Holy Spirit which frees Christians from bondage to fatality and bondage 
'to modern idols. Here he uses language which? though non-eschatological?
1. Thomas C. Oden? Radical Obedience? p. 30.
2.' Rudolf Bultmann? Jesus and the Word (1958)? 
Existence and FaithTl960),p. 203. Also cf.
p. 145.
p. 77? see also his 
Emil Brunner? The Divine
forms a consistent relationship with what he will say in the succeeding 
chapter in the language of eschatology.
We have earlier spoken of the ways in which Ellul understands the 
fact of separation from God as implying bondage to various social 
determinants. He believes that the continuing gift of revelation can 
enable a person to receive a degree of freedom from bondage to these 
forces. He speaks of the gift of grace as God’s power which enables 
Christians to begin the lifelong process in which God helps them to
1. In Ellul’s sociological works he can partially state his view of 
freedom without reference to the receipt of grace. Here he sounds 
like an existentialist, who sees man’s actual state of existence as 
unauthentic and who sees authentic existence as involving a decision 
over against bondage to the general. ’’Man is indeed determined, but 
... it is open to him to overcome necessity, and ... this act is 
freedom. Freedom is not static but dynamic, not a vested interest, 
but a prize continually to be won. The moment man stops and resigns 
himself, he becomes subject to determinism. He is most enslaved when 
he thinks he is comfortably settled in fi’eedora” (The Technological 
Society, p. xxxiii; see also ’’Conformism and the Rationale of Techno­
logy,” P« 98)• Elsewhere in his sociological writings, it seems quite 
clear that he has little confidence that natural man can find the 
strength to surmount the various social determinants (see above, pp. 
17-18). He tells us that he believes that no natural movement within 
this world can be truly revolutionary (The Technological Society, pp. 
4l6ff.).
Ellul is quite clear in his theological works that he affirms no 
hope of freedom apart from radical faith in Jesus Christ. He expli­
citly contradicts existentialism by saying that man by himself is not 
free to give a new meaning to his life (Presence of the Kingdom, p.
775 Will and To Ho, p. 169). ”As I see it only the Christian
faith (and no other belief or revolutionary stimulus) gives man 
sufficient hope to prompt him to embark on the undertaking I have 
described. If we are to question our society in so radical a fashion, 
we must adopt a point of view essentially different from society’s-— 
one that we can’t arrive at by starting from our human wisdom” ("Be­
tween Chaos and Paralysis,” p. 749 )• “No one, unless he is moved by 
a supra-human power, can consider himself truly revolutionary. All 
that belongs to this world has become radically conservative, and 
maintains the forces which inevitably lead toward suicide" (Presence 
of the Kingdom, p. 50).
Gabriel Vahanian writes, "For Ellul ... the chief characteristic of 
man is his ability to contest the way things are” (Katallagete, p. 17) 
Strictly speaking, this statement is a correct summary of Ellul’s 
thought only if one adds that this is not a natural ability but a 
possibility acquired through the receipt of grace. Ellul writes, "To 
the Christian is given a freedom through which he (and he only!) can 
challenge all slaveries of whatever kind and escape them himself” 
("Between Chaos and Paralysis,” p. 75O)« Concerning natural man, one 
could/...
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struggle in opposition to bondage to sociological patterns of conformity.
The gift of grace is no mere norm or idea, but the presence of Christ’s
power; but the presence of Christ’s power leads man into a difficult
struggle against his own sinfulness and bondage to the sinful ways of
the world. At this point, we are not going to deal with Ellul’s under- 
2standing of the difficulties involved in this process; rather, v/e are 
going to examine his Christological convictions which lead him to believe 
that Christ is the resource adequate for the human dilemma. In the 
process of this examination, we will look at some of the areas of human 
existence where he believes Christ can and does grant freedom.
Ellul’s reasoning about grace leading to freedom from captivity 
goes back to his reasoning about the Incarnation. He believes that the 
Incarnation involved a miraculous shattering of historical fatality.
He so insists that the Incarnation was the once-and-for-all breaking of 
fatality that he affirms that our contemporary relationship to the 
Spirit must take the form of faith in this past activity of God.^ He 
believes that true faith in the Incarnation means that the Risen Christ
begins to grant us freedom from slavery to the powers He has defeated. 
Christ grants Christians a share in that freedom which overcomes histori­
cal necessity.He believes that Christ can grant freedom with respect
could just reverse Vahanian’s statement and argue that Ellul sees 
natural man’s chief characteristic as that of conformity to his social 
milieu!
1. ’’What Christ does for us is above all to make us free ... But to 
have true freedom is to escape necessity or, rather, to be free to 
struggle against necessity” (Violence, p. 127).
2. See below, pp. 77-82, where we will discuss Ellul's view that the 
attainment of Christian freedom involves an ongoing.struggle.
3* l^he Politics of God, p. 186.
4* Ibid., p. 188. "The whole of Christ’s work is a work of liberation 
— of our liberation from sin, death, concupiscence, fatality (and 
from ourselves) ...” (Violence, p. 129). "Man becomes free through 
the Spirit of God, through conversion and communion with the Lord” 
(ibid., p. 127). "We are no longer under fatality, we are free in 
Jesus/...
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to such things as money, one’s profession, the state, and public
opinion. He believes that as Christ grants freedom with respect to
these things, He begins to teach us how to use these things in the
proper*way — to glorify God.^ Ellul tells us that Christ can grant 
2freedom from obsession with politics and current events. He claims
that Christians actually can derive their inner and outer way of life 
3
from God, rather than from the world. This means for Ellul that
Christians can never swear absolute loyalty to nation, family, or any
other human reality.^ Through prayer, we encounter the power of God 
5
which contradicts ourselves, our milieu, and our past.
Interrelated with Ellul’s reasoning about the present saving
activity of the Risen Christ and the meaning of faith in the Incarnation 
is what might be called '’Christocentric monotheism". That is, he 
believes that Christ grants freedom from allegiance to other
Jesus Christ" ("Vers un Nouvel Humanisms Politique," p. 21).
In Gal. 1«4 Paul writes that Jesus Christ "gave himself for our
sins to deliver us from the present evil age".
1. "L'Humilite Precede la Gloire," in Ellul et al.» Appel aux Laics
(1950), pp. 41-42.
2. This freedom comes "not because we might be more intelligent than 
others, nor because we may have a disinterested attitude toward poli­
tics, but because Christ is the Liberator. In him we are delivered 
from the pseudo-theater of current events and of political passion" 
(False Presence, p. 183). An obvious danger in this kind of soterio- 
logy is that Ellul runs the risk of giving his own non-biblical defi­
nition of that from which Christ grants freedom. Put differently, he 
may expand the New Testament definition of the powers defeated by 
Christ. Though elsewhere he gives an exegetical basis for his view 
that Christ frees us from political obsession (see below, pp. 26lff.), 
it would surely be impossible to provide an exegetical basis for the 
issue of gaining freedom from current events (Christians in biblical 
times weren’t bothered by this problem because the means of mass 
communication did not exist). Ellul’s procedure, though risky, may be 
biblically defensible. The Bible is-not a law book for dealing in 
detail with all foreseeable problems. May it not be a part of the 
meaning of the ongoing activity of the Holy Spirit (witnessed to in 
scripture) to free the Church even from problems not directly encoun­
tered in the Bible? Is it not the role of modern Christian prophets 
to suggest these very areas?’
3. Presence of the Kingdom, pp. 44-46.
4. Ibid.
5• Prayer and Modern Man , PP- 133, 145.
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claimants to divinity, modern idols. He tells us that Paul not only 
spoke of freedom from the Jewish law, hut also of freedom from, any other 
Lord than Jesus Christ (Rom. 12•2)3 He concludes that this means that
Christ grants freedom with respect to all .varieties of sociological, 
political and familial conformities, conformities relating to such things 
as the state, work, and money. Ellul may have this kind of Christo­
centric monotheism in mind when he attacks technology as a new area of
3
the sacred. Though in The Technological Society he does not mention 
the One to whom he owes ultimate allegiance, it is nevertheless the case 
that he attacks the new idols with a ruthlessness v/hich implies a loyalty 
to the transcendent God. From Ellul's theological writings we know that 
this God is the Father of our Lord Jesus Christ. Though he has no hope 
that the general direction of the technological society can be changed, 
he does apparently hold out some hope that Christ can free Christians 
from an idolatrous attachment to technique and thus can enable them to 
begin to make a break from the order of technological necessity.
Ellul's ethic is dedicated precisely to the effort of helping
1. Dietrich Bonhoeffer has a line of reasoning which is very sjjnilar.
He tells us that Christ has delivered us from an immediate relation­
ship with the world and has brought us into an immediate relationship 
with Himself (Bonhoeffer, The Cost of Discipleship (1963), pp. 84-88). 
The meaning of our immediate relationship with Christ is that all 
other relationships must be reinterpreted in the light of this primary 
loyalty. "Wherever a group, be it large or small, prevents us from 
standing alone before Christ, wherever such a group raises a claim of 
immediacy it must be hated for the sake of Christ" (ibid., p. 86).
2. "Le Sens de la Liberte," p. 6.
3. The Technological Society, pp. 143-145. "The technician uses 
technique perhaps because it is his profession, but he does so v/ith 
adoration because for him technique is the locus of the sacred" (ibid., 
p. 144). ’’The young snob speeds along at 100 m.p.h. in his Porsche.
The technician contemplates with satisfaction the gradients of his 
charts, no matter what their reference is. For these men, technique
is in eveiy way sacreds it is the common expression of human power 
without v/hich they would find themselves poor, alone, naked, and 
stripped of all pretentions" (ibid., p. 145)-
4* See below, pp. 169-171 and fn.
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Christians to become freed from the stifling pressure of conformity to 
this present civilization. The Church's real relevance to the world 
is to introduce the transcendent possibility of freedom from slavery to
the world
The Church is there to proclaim and to bring them freedom. But 
if she is an agent of those forces, and shares in them herself,
she cannot be for people at all. 
the world, she is in no position 
to the justification in Christ, 
to becomes one of the powers of
If she justifies the works of 
to witness, on people's behalf, 
She becomes what she always tends 
the world.
1. Presence of the Kingdom, pp. 59-60.
2. False Presence, p. 39.
CHAPTER III
CHAPTER II'I
FREEDOM A3 ESCHATOLOGICAL EXISTENCE
In Chapter One, we sought to demonstrate that, in Ellul’s under­
standing, man’s lack of freedom is due to bondage to sin and to bondage 
to the sinful ways of the world. In Chapter Two, we began to explore 
his understanding of the way Christ grants freedom from bondage. Here
we hope to show that freedom involves a detachment from the world made
possible by an attachment to the Lord of the future Kingdom. If 
freedom begins with the receipt of grace and continues with life in 
Christ, both of these imply an allegiance to a Kingdom which is not of 
this world. Likewise, deliverance from captivity occurs because
Christians have their true home elsewhere than in this sinful world.
The Otherness of the Christian Life
Ellul has several ways of talking of freedom as eschatological 
existence. At some places, he simply speaks of the ’’otherness” of the
Christian life based on the ’’otherness" of the Christian God. Darth’s
early statement of his underlying conviction about God applies equally 
1
well to Ellul’s thought. Barth wrote in his preface to the second 
edition of his commentary on The Epistle to. the Romans
1. Both Ellul and the later Barth see the Incarnation in more
realistic terms than did 3arth when he wrote this statement; Ellul 
and the later Barth see the Incarnation as a real event in past 
history. It is, nevertheless, the case that they have continued to 
stress the "otherness" of Cod in His continuing relationship with men 
In this sense, Barth’s early statement still expresses the thought of 
both men. (See our discussion of "actualism" on pp. 51”52.)
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If I have a system? it is limited to a recognition of what Kierke­
gaard called the ’’infinite qualitative distinction" between time and 
eternity3 and to my regarding this as possessing negative a° well as 
positive significances "God is in heaven, and thou art on earth,” 
The relation'between such a God and such' a man, and the relation 
between such a man and 'such a God, is for me. the theme of the Bible 
and the essence of philosophy.
One of Ellul’s most frequent ways of referring to God is to use this 
2
language, calling God the "Wholly Other". He tells us that man’s
relationship with God involves tension and confrontation precisely 
3
because God is Holy and man is sinful, that is, because God is other 
than mans "It is precisely because it speaks of a Wholly Other that 
the revelation provides us with a point of view and a point of depart­
ure that are essentially different."^' Ellul, like Barth, believes 
the,fc the Christian life begins not with the awareness of a natural 
continuity between man and God, but with the revelation of God which
calls man’s life into question.
Though it might be argued that the early Barth never developed . 
an ethic from the above insight, Ellul has proceeded to do precisely 
that.. Ellul believes that the revelation of God not only calls man’s 
life into question and then pronounces forgiveness; he also believes 
that the Christian’s relationship with the "Wholly Other" leads to the
"otherness” of the Christian life. This otherness from the world is
due to the possibility of freedom from bondage to the sinful ways cf
1. Barth, Homans, Prefa.ee to the Second Edition, p, 10.
Barth wrote of God, "His will is not a corrected continuation 
of our own. It approaches ours as a Wholly Other. There is 
nothing for our will except a basic re-creation. Not a reformation 
but a re-creation and re-growth"- (Barth, The Word of God and the 
Word of Man (1957), p. 24).
2. Prayer and Modern Man, p. 174; Violence, p. 148; False Presence, 
p. 40; The Politics of God, pp, 1/J1-2; "Between Chaos,,," pp. 749-750^
3* Prayer and Modern Han, p, 133.
4. "Between Chaos rand Paralysis," pp. 749-750; see also Violence, 
pp. 46, 148.
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the world. He believes that Christians can and should exist as ’’the
incarnate presence of the Wholly Other”. Christians are to live their
lives by asking, ’“How can we be the question that God puts to the 
2
world?’” Ellul is quite careful in his formulation at this point: 
Christians are not simply to object to the world or to condemn it, but
are to represent the Wholly Other; they .are to witness to a trans­
cendent possibility.
On the basis of this reasoning concerning the otherness of the 
Christian God and the otherness of the Christian life, Ellul calls for 
a uniquely Christian presence in the world freed from conformity to .
the ways of the world.1 2 3' In an age in which there is much popular talk 
about the Church existing in mission, Ellul, without disagreeing 
with the premise, reminds the Church that Christian mission is meaningless
1. Ellul tells us that when the Word of God comes to us, it seems 
-absurd because it is of a different order (The Politics of God,
p. 30). "Our conversion does not consist in assimilating this 
Word so that it becomes reasonable. The absurd element persists, 
but from this moment what becomes absurd is the world, its wisdom, 
its intelligence, its power, its politics, its experience. Por the 
foolishness of God is wiser than the wisdom of men” (ibid., p, 30).
Though Ellul admits that the Church has not manifested the true 
freedom it should with reference to the world, he nevertheless 
argues that the Church has preserved a degree of freedom from the 
ways of the world ("Conformism and the Rationale of Technology," 
p. 101). "The Christian was encouraged to participate in the con­
cerns of society but also to keep his critical faculties intact. Cf 
course, from time to time, he has been subject to great social 
pressure to conform, but the fine balance between the positive and 
negative features in his attitude to society has never been destroyed. 
In other words, Christianity has guaranteed a form of freedom which, 
it seems to me, is worth preserving" (ibid., pp. 101-102).
The Politics of God, pp. 141-142.
3, Ea-lse Presence, pp, 39-40.
4« Ibid,, p. 40. .
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unless its content is determined by the Christian faiths1
If the Church which is a mere association conformed to the 
propensities of the world, which is informed by the same ideas 
and prejudices, which follows the same sociological trends, is 
asked to be present to the world, that means nothing. It is 
merely a part of the world reuniting with the world. 2 1 2
1. False Presence, p. 85. Ellul tells us that whereas Protestants 
a century ago were preoccupied with man’s interior life, they are 
today obsessed with social and economic problems "such as the
world defines them,_sees them and chooses to present them" (False
Presence, pp. 48~9)7" He is not arguing that the Church should be 
devoid of concern about these matters, but that she should adopt 
her own angle of approach. '
One flaw in Ellul’s reasoning in False Presence of the Kingdom 
is that he minimizes the pluralism actually present in the Church. 
Specifically, one wonders if there is not much more introspective 
preoccupation among rank and file Church members than he realizes 1 
He sets out to assess the opinion of avant garde French Protestant 
intellectuals (False presence, p. 5) and does a good job — but he 
forgets that the Church at large is not identical with her more 
intellectual leaders (nor for that matter is French Protestantism 
simply to be identified with Protestantism the world overi). The 
statement that we have quoted applies to French Protestantism 
generally; Ellul’s research in False Presence of the Kingdom has
-to do entirely with the opinion of French Protestant infce 11 ectuals,
It is interesting that only fifteen years ago Ellul was critic­
izing the Church on precisely the opposite score. In 1948 Ellul 
wrote, "The Church has left to others the responsibility for the 
spiritual life of the peoples. The Church has become introspective 
and has forgotten that the Gospel must be present in the midst of the 
people... The Church has restricted its work almost exclusively to 
individual witness and private conversion, and has left the nations of
Europe to seek their spiritual food elsevmere" ("The Situation in 
Europe," Han’s Disorder and God’s design, Vol. Ill (1948), p. 60) .
One wonders if the Church situation has so totally changed in the 
last fifteen years. Is not the problem of introspective preoccupation 
still a major feature of modern Christianity, though not the only one? 
May not the same modern Church be guilty of both errors which Ellul 
has described?
2. False Presence, p. 83. "The presence in the world supposes, 
first of all, a separation with respect to the world. It is because 
the Church is holy (that is, separated) that she is also sent» But 
if the Church is only a non-separated, sociological body ... neither 
is she sent, for that sending would be meaningless" (False Presence, 
p. 85)* As this quotation shows, Ellul represents a modern emphasis 
on what has traditionally been called "sanctification", an emphasis 
which is all the more powerful because it is devoid of traditional 
jargonl He sets his sanctification theology in confrontation with 
modern secular theology, which is, of course, based on diametrically 
opposite premises.
Ellul is a warrior against "cultural Christianity" every bit as 
much as were Barth and Kierkegaard, two of his notable teachers. He 
sees the whole trend of contemporary theology as a compromising of 
Christian truth for the sake of a cheap armistice with the world 
("Mirror,”/...
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Not only does Ellul apply his thought about the otherness of
God to the'Christian life, he also sounds an extremely practical
warning concerning the missionary presence of laymen in the world. He
argues for the urgency of theological training for laymen because he
believes that mere Church attendance does not, in most cases, adequately 
1
prepare Christians for genuine missionary witness. He believes
("Mirror,” pp. 203-4)• He points out that secular theology is 
radical only with respect to God and that it is conformist with 
reference to society. He is puzzled as to why William Hamilton and 
Thomas Altizer speak of Christianity at all, since they are concerned 
only with philosophy, politics^ldsocial action. That is, all they are 
interested in is the world (prayer and Modern Man, p, 147) <■ He crit­
icizes Tillich’s theology of culture, Bultmann’s demytholegizing, and 
the death of God theology as all being forms of adaptation to modern 
man and society (Violence, pp. 146-7). "What I find very striking in 
such vzritings as those of Bultmann and Bonhoeffer is that God has once 
again become a passive object, in spite of the claims of these authors 
who are writing precisely to do battle against ’God as object’. One 
manipulates him according to the need of the moment" (prayer and 
Modern Man, p. 149)- Ellul comments on the later Bor.hoeffer’s belief 
that man has today "come of age", He tells us that this attitude is 
not new, but is what the Bible describes as human pride, He thinks 
that what is new today is the Christian effort to see in man’s 
autonomy a dignity, rather than a state of sin. He thinks that this 
new Christian understanding is due to Christian conformity to secular 
society (Violence, pp. 40--1). Along similar lines, he criticizes 
Teilhard and Altizer for committing the error of seeing modern man as 
secular, rational, and mature. Ellul, cpiite to the contrary, regards 
modern man as the worshipper of idols: "Under the cover of this 
error, they reintegrate into their theology, precisely the religion 
of this time, of our society..." ("Les Religions Seculieres", Pol et 
Vie (Nov, - Dec. 1970), p. 76).
Ellul’s disagreement with secular Christianity is a part of his 
Christian disagreement with humanism. He accuses humanism of having 
a materialistic doctrine of man, being concerned only with marl’s 
sociological condition. He says that humanism is contemptuous of 
man’s inner life, his moral and intellectual life (The Technological 
Society, p. 338). Ellul protests against the humanistic collapsing 
of the double love commandment into the mere love for our fellow-men.
He also resents the secular-humanist Christology which sees Christ as 
present only in identification with our brothers, and not as also our 
•transcendent Lord (prayer and Modern Man, p, 87). He argues that 
prayer is not the encounter of man with man, as secular theology and 
humanism would have us believe. Rather, prayer is an encounter with 
God, which alone opens up the possibility of a truly human relation­
ship with one’s neighbour (Prayer and Modern Man, p. 129*, see below, 
pp. 193-194).
1. "The fact that they are committed Protestants by background, that 
they have been confirmed after a sketchy instruction and more or less 
come to ’worship services’ —those facts do not make them apt witnesses 
for Jesus Christ, nor do those experiences insure that their faith 
will/.,.
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that unless Christians are disengaged from the world and theologically pre­
pared, their engagement in the world will he ’’nothing but the empty pursuit 
of 8. fad”. he criticizes the tendency of Christians to think that the 
Church automatically contains the presence of the Wholly Other and, hence,
that all that is needed is to be involved in the world. He stresses the
importance of the Church's reflective and meditative life precisely because 
he believes that in the absence of this, Christians simply conform to the 
world. ‘ In effect, Ellul, a layman, is saying that it is simply naive to 
assume that most laymen have even a rudimentary understanding of the nature 
of the Christian faith (one wonders if he might not say the same thing about 
the clergy; Kierkegaard did). If in an earlier book he argued that the 
layman is the essential link in the Church’s missionary strategy,he is now 
arguing that the layman’s presence in the world is a false one unless more 
effort goes into the theological and spiritual preparation needed for this 
calling, The mere bodily presence of laymen in the world means nothing.
In fbe World but not of the World
Ellul’s reference to the otherness of the Christian life is his most
vague way of describing Christian eschatological existence. How we will 
begin to assess his more precise references to eschatology.
Though the centre of emphasis in Ellul’s thought is on ’’realized es­
chatology” or ’’eschatology in the process of realization”, he nevertheless 
believes in God’s Kingdom beyond death and sees this belief as having moral 
significance for Christians.Eschatological hope is for him closely
will be strengthened (more often it founders) by the encounter with others 
nor that they are fulfilling a genuine mission” (false Presence, pp. 85-86)
1. Ibid., p. 86.
2. Ibid., pp, 83-86.
3* Presence of the Kingdom, p, 19.
4. "The Christian is essentially a man who lives in expectation. This ex­
pectation is directed towards the return of the Lord who accompanies the 
end of time, the Judgment, and proclaims the Kingdom of God” (Presence of 
the Kingdom., p. 49).
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related to social realism. lie believes that it is only through a hope
reaching beyond history that one can have tne boldness to criticize and call into
question the very ground on which one walks* the sociological patterns of conforai- 
2
ity by v/hich y/e live. Ellul’s eschatology provides the theological rationale for his 
lifelong task of criticizing the commonplaces of the modern world? He believes
r *M:
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1. Ellul is convinced that only Christians can be truly realistic, only 
Christians can see the frightening reality of the world — because they 
have a hope which transcends history (Violence, p. 81). He is also con­
vinced that Jesus was realistic. Though Jesus offered His life for men,
He knew the nature of man and took this into account (John 2:24-5) 
(Violence, p. 84).
2. "In order to bear up under the utter harshness of our situation, we must 
have a hope beyond it; for without such a hope this world would be too tragic. 
And that is wny Christians, possessing the hope of the resurrection and 
the kingdom of God, ought to be the only ones to carry out this decisive 
task for society" ("Between Chaos and Paralysis," p. 75C» "Sur le Pessi­
mism© Chretien? ' p. 172)*
3. See especially A Critique of the Hew Commonplaces, though that work is really 
but a drawing togefner of soma!cSticisms" scattered throughout Ellul's other 
sociological works, most notably The Techno I ogical Soc.i ety.
I am happy to note my essential" agreement*~wit"H'”a statement by Vernard 
Eller related to Ellul' s theology (v. Eller, "Pour Who Remember," -a.talla- 
gete* Be Reconciled III (Spring 1971)? PP* 6-12). I agree that ElluTV social 
criticisms can only be understood in the context of bis belief in the re­
levance of the future Kingdom for life today. It is indeed this eschato­
logical perspective which explains the radicalism of his social critique and 
his freedom from ideological bondage. I agree that it is, at least in uart, 
Ellul's eschatological perspective which enables him to take a critical stance 
with reference to various fads and trends. I most definitely agree that it 
is his rather straightforward reading of the Bible, and especially his read­
ing of the Hew Testament, which leads him to his understanding of the 
transcendence of God and the moral significance of a Christian relationship 
with this transcendent God (ibid., pp. 8-9)* What Ellul discovers through 
the Bible is indeed "an order of~"re,ality that is 'not of this world’". ~He 
does not find "simply a different method 9! conceptualizing the human 
phenomena with which mankind is familiar vwhich is about as much as most 
contemporary theologians undertake to do)". Eor him, the Gospel indeed 
points to "that which is truly new and not merely to a new arrangement of 
the old" (ib id, p. 9)« Perhaps the most significant feature of the 
Eller article is the clear implication that if Ellul is to be understood 
at all, we must realize that here we are confronted by a modern Christian 
prophet.
My only criticism of Siler's article does not have to do with its 
substance, but with Ellul's intellectual ancestry. Eller makes no mention 
01 the influence of Barth on Ellul's thought (this may be explained by 
the fact that the article deals explicitly with the parallels between 
Kierkegaard, Blumhardt, Ellul and Muggeridge). Eller mentions the 
influence of Christoph Blumhardt. Ellul, quotes Barth frequently, and yet 
never once have I seen a reference to Blumhardt. I agree that there are 
similarities between Blumhardt’s thought and Ellul’s at some points, but 
I wonder if these similarities are not due to the influence of Blumhardt 
on Barth vzho, in turn, influenced Ellul.
V
R'
•x<
~ 68 -
that genuine eschatological hope leads the Christian to be discontented
with every existing society.' Specifically, he thinks that Christian
hope should free Christians from bondage to ideological illusions, the 
2
false consolations of human idealisms* For Ellul, eschatological hops 
has to do with the establishment of Christian courage to ’withstand the 
evils of the world and to embody a higher standard; it has nothing 
to do with a confidence that world history is improving*
"Futuristic" and "realised" eschatology are for Ellul integral
aspects of one belief. In his understanding, eternal hope is itself
based on realised faith, not on the absence of such faith or on a 
3
philosophy of non-fulfilment in the present.' Eschatological existence 
means that Christians can begin to live in accordance with the will of 
the transcendent C-od.^ Christians have the unique responsibility of
1. ’Me must examine everything, question everything, .in the light of 
the kingdom. Vie may never stop end say, ’Now justice is established, 
now we have set up a valid society in v/hich we can peaceably await 
the coming of the Lord*’ Every advance realized in Church and 
society must immediately be analyzed, criticized, measured by the 
kingdom yardstick, The kingdom demands nothing less than radical 
change " (Violence, pp. 44-5)•
2. "Sur le Pessimisms Chr&tien," pp. 173-4? 18O, For additional 
material related to Ellul’s opposition to human ideologies and for 
Reinhold Niebuhr’s similar opposition see below, pp* 214-215*
3. The Politics of Cod, pp. 136-7* See Jurgen Koltmann, Theology of 
Hope(l 967}, pp. 18 and 22, and Wolf hart Pannenberg, Jesus — Goa and 
Man (1968), p. 28, for a totally different understanding of hope
, based on faith’s non-fulfilment in the present, Moltmarm and 
Pannenberg parallel secular theology at this point.
4. ’’To be a revolutionary is to judge the world..,in the name of a 
truth which does not yet exist (but which is coming) — and it is to 
do so, because we believe this truth to be more genuine and more 
real than the reality which surrounds us. Consequently it means 
bringing the future into the present as an explosive force. ...It 
means understanding the present in the light of the future, dominat­
ing it by the future*,. Henceforth the revolutionary act forms part 
of history: it is going to create history,* by inflecting it towards 
this future..." (presence of the Kingdom, pp, 58-51).
Ellul’s words about hope sound similar to those of the modern 
theologian of hope Jurgen Moltmann; in reality, Ellul’s position is 
quite different. Ellul connects his theology of hope with a real­
istic and even pessimistic view of human history. Cur hope enables 
ns to live amid an intolerable 'world situation with a degree of 
detachment and with standards derived from elsewhere. His theology 
of/,*.
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of hope is entirely opposed to Moltmann’s tendency to give approval 
to various human trends, Ellul sees very’little meaning to human 
history in the sense of an optimistic confidence about the improv- 
ability of the world. He admits that without the belief in the 
eschatological Kingdom "history is an outbreak of•madness"
(Presence of..the Kingdom, p. 50). In short, Ellul’s theology of
hope is related to New Testament eschatological thought and social 
realism. Moltmann seems to base his approach on the possibilities 
involved in a merger between Marxist and biblical eschatology (see 
Moltmann, Religion, Revolution, and the Future (1969)j ses also 
Theology of Hope, p, 25), Ellul regards any such merger as utopian, 
unbiblical, and the exact opposite of his intention. The future is 
brought into the present in Ellul’s view by the life and witness of 
Christians who live from the coming Kingdom (Violence, p, 44) and 
not by secular forces. The only element Ellul and Moltmann have in 
common is that they both see hope as a way of establishing a critical 
stance over against the status quo (Moltmann, Theology of Hope, pp. 
21-22, 41)* Ellul thinks (quite to the contrary of much popular 
belief) that to believe in the coming Kingdom means to oe freed from 
bondage to the past (Presence of the Kingdom, p. 49)* He coined the 
phrase "revolutionary Christianity" to apply to this Christian 
eschatological existence (ibid., p. 51),
Ellul’s eschatological understanding is perhaps even closer to 
the Old Testament understanding of hope than is Moltmann’s Marxist 
reinterpretation of Old Testament eschatology. As Walther Zimmerli 
has argued, Old Testament hope has to do with the free gift and 
promise of God and is not at all to be confused with human world 
views (Walther Zimmerli, Man and His Hone in the Old Testament (1971), 
pp, 24-5)* Thus, hope can be present even in the midst of political 
hopelessness (ibid., pp. 9°~3, citing Hos. 5:13--14 and Hos. 2:1z’ff,). 
"Hope hopes in God, the God whose freedom men do not take away by 
hoping, no matter how immovably certain they are. of the promise of 
God to his own, no matter how they cling to that premise. It is 
upon this foundation that the hope of the apocalyptic writer rests"
(ibid., p. 150)« In the Old Testament, hope is seen to be a trans­
cendent reality, a function of man’s relationship to God, capable of 
being present amid human hopelessness. "Hope cannot seriously be 
spoken of as though it were a. possibility humanly inspired or pro­
duced. But the place where man encounters bis creator and Lord is 
where hope lies’* (ibid,, p, 42). Commenting critically on Ernst 
Bloch’s understanding of hope (which, of course, forms the philoso­
phical base of Moltmann’s position) 'Zimmerli summarizes: "Cur look 
through the Old Testament statements considered in the previous 
chapters led repeatedly and with surprising persistence to one central 
point from which all statements about hope proceeded. It became clear 
that it was precisely where man was led to the edge of human hope­
lessness that every look turned away from man and his immanent 
possibilities. There was at no .place a ’principle of hope’ that was 
generally held or believed by man, no existential hope to be discover­
ed in the existential understanding of man or in his understanding of 
his world. Rather it became clear that it was precisely where the 
sharpest criticisms of hope were loudest, that man in a frightening 
recklessness threw himself upon the one he was conscious of as coming 
to his people, or in the broadest meaning, to his creation" (lj^id., 
p. 161). Zimmerli’s insights, if correct, block the way for any 
Marxist reinterpretation of Old Testament hope, One is forced to 
choose/.,.
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manifesting the coming Kingdom. in their own persons.
The Exegetical Basis
Ellul’s eschatological understanding is itself a restatement
of the New Testament view eloquently summarized in the Letter to
Diognetus, The author of that letter referred to Christians as those 
2
who “live in the world, but are not of the world’*. Ellul states his 
agreement with this theological point of view when he insists that the 
Christian must think of himself in the literal sense as belonging to 
two cities, The Christian’s life setting is the same as everyone 
else’s, but his thought and action are not to be determined by the 
world in which he lives."If the Christian is necessarily in the 
world, he is not of it. This means that his thought, his life, and 
his heart are not controlled by the world, and do not depend upon the 
world, for they belong to another Master.One of Ellul’s favourite 
and most frequently quoted passages of Scripture is the Pauline state­
ment of this position:- "Do not be conformed to this world but be 
transformed by the renewal of your mind, that you may prove what is the 
will of God, what is good and acceptable and perfect" (Rom. 12:2)^
He tells us that his interpretation of the Christian life is an appli­
cation of Pitt. 6:33,"’Seek first his kingdom and his righteousness..,*”^
choose between a theocentric understanding of hope and a humanistic 
one. In each instance the word "hope” has a totally different meaning,
1» Presence of the Kingdom, pp, 50—51• "He has to carry into the 
actual world of the present day elements which belong to the eschaton, 
In so doing he fulfils a prophetic function,,," (ibicL, p. 50*).
2, Diog. VI. 3, cited in Oscar Cullmann’s Jesus and the P.evolut ionar— 
ies, p. 60.
3* Presence of the Kingdom, pp. 44-45.
4» Presence of the Kingdom., p, 7; see also Violence, p. 26,
5» Cited in Presence of the Kingdom, p. 97j Prayer, p. 145} Ellul
also cites II Pet. 1:13, Heb, 11:13 and HCor, 5*^0 in Presence of the 
Kingdom, p. 45*
6. Presence of the Kingdom, p. 95*
He also bases his position on other Mew Testament passages, such as 
Heb. 11:13 (Christians as "’strangers and exiles*”), John 15:19,
Mtt. 10:16, and particularly John 18:36 ("’My kingship is not of this 
world*
Ellul is self-consciously cutting against the grain of popular 
secular theology in his emphasis on the Christian as "in the world but
not of the world". However controversial such an emphasis may be in
terms of popular theological taste, this position is based squarely on 
an accurate understanding of New Testament theology, particularly 
Johannine and Pauline theology..
1 * Protestantisme Franqais, p. 147«
2• False Presence, p. 114.
3. One can cite additional texts to the ones referred to by Ellul.
I Peter 2:11 is certainly similar to Heb. 11:13. Phil. 3:20 is perhaps 
the most convincing text of all:— "But cur commonwealth is in heaven, 
and from it we await a Saviour, the Lord Jesus Christ," Heb. 13’-14
makes the same point:- ’’For here we have no lasting city, bat we seek 
the city v/hich is to come." 1 Jn. 5:19 emphasizes the otherness of the 
Christian life in a radical way:- "We know we are of God, and the 
whole world is in the power of the evil one." Likewise, Paul
speaks of Jesus Christ a.s the one vzho in delivering us from our sins 
delivers us "from the present evil age" (Gal. 1:4). That such diverse 
texts can be quoted to support Ellul’s position shows that what/says 
is no peripheral aspect of Mew Testament thought, but at the centre 
of early Christian faith.
Victor Paul Furnish’s assessment of Paul's theology is in decisive 
agreement with Ellul’s thought at this point (Victor Paul Furnish, 
Theology and Ethics, pp. 127, 134, 214-216), Commenting on II Cor.
5:17 and 6:2 Furnish says that Paul’s eschatology does not "just mean 
-that salvation which will be fulfilled in the future has been 
initiated in the present. Rather, Faul’s thought at this point is 
genuinely dialectical, ... The salvation which is already present 
is not, therefore, somehow qualitatively preliminary on second-rate. 
What is given is present in its fulness (although there is still 
something not given—namely resurrection from the dead and the final 
cosmic triumph of God’s power over death)" (Victor Paul Furnish, 
Theology and Ethics, p, 215) » I'he appeal not to be ’conformed to 
this age’ /Roru/ (12:2) presupposes the believer’s belonging to 
another age in which, through faith, he already participates. ...
The exhortations are not designed for some ’interim’ before the 
future comes; they are rooked precisely in the future as it is 
already present to faith, though still hidden within this age"
(ibid,, p. 216). What Furnish has said agrees with Ellul’s basing 
of hope on realized faith and not on a philosophy of present non­
fulfilment .
Ellul’s exegetical basis is also related to Bultmann’s exposition 
Ofy/ ...
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Detachment from the VJ or I d *
Ellul is consciously dependent on Bultmann’s interpretation of 
Johannine and Pauline theology for his thought about the. Christian as
in the vrorld hut not of the world. Ellul writes:- ‘
This presence of the eschaton means that we are free with respect 
to the world hut committed to the kingdom of heaven. The life of 
the Christian is necessarily a life of "the end of the ages”. It 
is already located at a critical distance from the world. This 
insertion into the kingdom leads to an "unworldling" (Bultmann).
He agrees with Bultmann that Christian freedom from the world begins
with an inner detachment from the values of the world, "a smashing of 
2
all human standards and evaluations", "desecularization". Ellul tells
us that we must stand at a distance from the tendencies and movements 
3
of society. He, like Bultmann, believes that Christians must have 
freedom of thought (I Cor, 7:23) and, like him, he believes that this
of the Fourth Gospel, but since this exposition already has to 
do with the applied meaning of Ellul’s thought, we have included 
it under the following heading.
1. To Will and To Do, p. 222.
2„ Bultmann, Theology of the Mew Testament, Vol. 2, p, "(6,
Bultmann continues, "It is in this sense that the believer is no
longer ’of the world’ (/jn_.J7 15-19; 1?^4t 16) j i.e. since the 
world is no longer his determining origin ... But their not being 
’of the world* must not be confused with a retreat out of the world* 
Jesus prays the Father: ’I do not pray that thou shouldst take them 
out of the world, but that thou shouldst keep them from evil’
(/jn^/ 17-15)- As God sent him into the world, so he sends his own 
into the world (/jn»7 17:1S) not out of it" (Bultmann, Theology of 
t he K ew Testament, Volc 2, p, 76).
3. ' Violence, p« 26„ Ellul believes that the Church should serve men, 
but be the servant of Christ alone (Fa Ise Presence, p. 198). He 
rejects the notion that the Church should be "converted" to the world 
By this, he means that the Church must serve the world, not in terms 
of the world’s demands, but in terms of what loyalty to Christ 
requires (False Presence, pp. 38-9)« That is, the Church cannot 
serve the world in a Christian ‘sense if she conforms to the world’s 
values,
. . , , 1can come only as man knows himself confronted by God.
A central hermeneutical principle in Bultmann’s ethic is that
one must not sever ’’’the unity of the eschatological and the ethical 
2proclamation’ ”. "The ethical radicalizes the eschatological. The 
3
eschatological provides the context for the ethical.”
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1 Presence of the Kingdom, p. 93. Bultmann sees faith as related 
to the surrender of worldly security and the empowering of the 
Christian to live by the strength of the invisible world (Bultmann, 
Theology of the New Testament, Vol. 2, p, 75)« means accepting
completely different standards as to what is to be called death and 
what life. It means accepting the life that Jesus gives and is 
(/jn./ 5:19ff.; 11:2^ffa life that to the world’s point of view 
cannot even be proved to exist" (ibid., Vol. 2, p. 75)• "Faith is 
itself desecularization ~~ detachment within the world from the 
world. Or better: faith as the act of believing constantly brings 
about this desecxilarization" (ibid., Vol. 2, p. 86: see 
also Vol. 1, pp. 22, 343; This World and Beyond, p. 117?
Existence and Faith, p. 260). Bultmann’s favourite passage from
which he develops his idea of "desecularization’ I Cor. 7:29-31
(Theology of the Mew Testament,, Vol. 1, p, 351 5 Existence and Faith, 
p„ 26o}. Christians are to participate in the world as though they 
did not do so, with "eschatological reserve", a distancing from the 
values of the world.
In Bultmann’s commentary on John, he relates the Christian’s 
eschatological freedom.to Christologyi "As the origin and essential 
nature of the Revealer, to whom the community owes its existence, 
does not lie in the world, neither does that of the community 
itself" (Bultmann, John, p. 508). Victor Paul Furnish writes in words 
reminiscent of Bultmann’s when he says, "Paul’s Christology ... has . 
a thoroughly eschatological orientation. In Pauline thought, Jesus 
is a figure in history, but not of history. That is, Jesus’ 
’historicity’ is seen as derivative from his primary role as God’s 
emissary to ’the world’”(Victor Paul Furnish, Theology and Ethics, 
p. 162). Likewise, one can argue that the Christian life, based on 
a relationship with Christ, takes on the same pattern.
Kierkegaard, of course, also affirmed the belief that the Christian 
is to be "in the world but not of the world": "Christianity isa 
kingdom which is not of this world. Yet it wants to have a place 
in this world—-and there is the paradox and the conflict, it wants 
to have a placef but again not as a kingdom of this world" 
(Kierkegaard, The Last Years (Journals 1852-1855). ed. and transl. 
R.G. Smith (1968)", p. 222’). ~ '
2, Thomas C. Oden, Radical Obedience, p. 
Theologie des Neuen Testaments, pp, 19,
3. Ibid., p. 26.
26, citing Bultmann, 
327ff,, 544-47.
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This eschatological consciousness carries with it an implicit 
imperative, which summons men to live now in terms of God’s coming 
reign. It calls men to answer an absolute either/or: either to 
order their lives in terms of God’s new order, or to cling to their 
former outmoded self-understanding,
Ellul, like Sultmann, thinks of the ”otherworldliness" of the 
Christian life in part in terms of the inner reality of the Christian’s 
relationship with God* The Christian does not seek first of all to 
change the outward form of civilization, but strives to live in the 
power of the transcendent Kingdom and strives to manifest this reality
in life.
Evidently a change of this kind will lead indirectly to very 
deep political or economic changes, but it does not inevitably 
lead to a direct.conflict with authority, unless the latter 
champions the disorder which exists, and openly challenges the 
truth of God with regard to a new order,
It would be an incorrect interpretation of Ellul’s thought if we
were to conclude that he understands man’s inner life as divorced from
his outward conduct, He accepts Barth’s "One Kingdom” reasoning, and
thus is much less willing than is Bultmann to accept such an inner- 
outer dichotomy (see below, pp. 88-89). it is, nevertheless, the 
case that he thinks that man’s inner attitude is very important and that 
the Christian revelation has decisively (though not exclusively!) to do
with the human heart,
Ellul thinks that man’s inner distancing from the world relativiz.es 
human action and this interpretation is in agreement with the applied 
meaning of Bultmann’s theology*^ For example, Ellul thinks one
1. Oden, Radical Obedionce, p, 26, One can see that what Bultmann and 
Ellul are doing is restating their indicative-imperative (Gospel-Law) 
understanding in the language of eschatology.
2. Presence of the Kingdom, p, 44»
3. See the numerous sermons to this effect in This World and Beyond.
In a personal letter to this writer dated Jan. 2, 197^? Ellul has 
said that he very much likes Bultmann’s sermons (the implication 
being that he agrees wixb. their essential content). He says that 
what he disagrees with in Bultmann is his philosophy and the relation­
ship he establishes between philosophy and theology, (Ellul, cannot 
accept/.,.
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important meaning of prayer' is that it helps to free us from the
bondage of preoccupation with our own works,1 "Prayer", "inner
distancing", "desecularization", these are ways of describing the
Christian belief that man is not justified by any of his own works,
2
but by God’s free grace, received ever anew. He and Bultmann share
accept the non-historical bias of existentialism and the demythoi- 
ogizing or de-historicizing of the Gospel which this philosophy 
entails.)
1« Ellul writes, "Action really receives its character from prayer. 
Prayer is what attests the finitude of action and frees it from 
its dramatic and tragic aspects. Since it shows that action is not 
final, it brings to it humor and reserve. Otherwise we would be .
tempted to take it with dreadful seriousness. But in so doing 
prayer bestows upon action its greatest authenticity. It rescues 
action from activism, and it rescues the individual from bewilder­
ment and despair in his action. It prevents him from being engulfed 
in panic when his action fails, and from being drawn into activism, 
when he is incited to more and more activity in pursuit of success, 
to the point of losing himself. Prayer, because it is the warrant, 
the expression of my finitude, always teaches me that I must be mere 
than my action, that I must live with my action, and even that my 
action must be lived by another in his action. Thanks to prayer, I 
can see the truth about myself and my action, in hope and not in 
despair" (Prayer and Modern Man, p. 172; for a similar point with 
reference to Christian humour see False Presence, pp. 210—211)„
2. Meaning of the City, pp. 125, 181; Prayer and Modern Han, pp. 16, 
118. The doctrine of justification by faith relativizes not only 
human works in general, but man's vocational activity in particular, 
Ellul vrrites, "Whatever work is undertaken by man does not reveal 
its meaning or its value save in Jesus Christ and through the Holy 
Spirit" (presence of the Kingdom, p, 123), Our work is not holy in 
itself (Meaning of the City, p. 145), but only as it is an aspect of 
our relationship to Jesus Christ. "Outside Christ, there is absolutely 
no vzay for man’s work to be elevated. Outside of Christ, the vanity 
of Ecclesiastes is fully true ... Outside of Christ, all goes back 
to nothingness" (Meaning of the City, p. 177? see also A Critique, 
pp. 149-158).
Bultmann also applies the traditional doctrine of justification by 
faith to the issue of work and likewise affirms that God frees us 
from "absorption” in our work (Bultmann, This World and Beyond, pp. 
29-30, 137-8). Like Ellul, he states that life receives its true 
meaning only from what takes place in the inner man. The meaningful­
ness of work is established at the same point where the meaningfulness 
of life is established (ibid., pp. 85—88),
Karl Barth also stressed the belief that work, is not inherently 
meaningful but becomes so when life is lived in and from God’s grace 
(Barth, III/4, pp. 53-4; Theology and Church, p. 349? see also 
Charles C. West, Communism and the Theologians, pp. 208-240),
It must be admitted that at some places Ellul has such a negative 
understanding of work that it is hard to see how work can become a 
channel/,,.
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this common Reformation faithr To argue, as Ellul does, that 
Christian prayer and humour relativize human action does not mean 
that human action is unimportant. It does mean that the free and
channel through which Christians are enabled to witness to Christ.
At some places his thinking seems to fall into a kind of "Two 
Kingdom" reasoning, whereby it is seen as impossible to have one’s 
vocation influenced by one’s Christian understanding (*Work and 
Calling," pp. 13-14). However, at other points (as above) he 
seems to admit that one’s vocation can become an avenue for Christian 
witness, though this is seen as possible only because one has discov­
ered styles of free Christian involvement outside the confines of one’s 
technical vocation (ibid-,., pp. 14-16), We need to consider the basis 
for that aspect of his thought, where he seems to utterly negate the 
possibility of using vocations to witness for Christ.
He argues that the Bible sees vzork as little more than the "travail" 
necessary for survival (ibid., pp. 8, 13; A Critique, p. 15^)» 
spite of the two or three biblical texts counselling work, it must not 
be forgotten that-the stream of theological opinion was that work was 
a mark of condemnation, a sign of our fallen nature ..." (To Will 
and To Do, p. '95)« To make this point he has to overlook a most 
important text. Is it of so little significance that when the Bible 
described what it regarded as the ideal state of human existence 
(the Garden of Eden), it described a state of affad.rs which included 
work (Gen, 2:15)? Related to his biblical tendency to overstate the 
meaninglessness of work is his overdrawn sociological thesis that the 
modern world is hopelessly in bondage to technique, so much so that 
there is little likelihood that Christian freedom can come to expres­
sion through vocational channels ("Work and Calling," p, 13). He 
also seems to us to overstate his case by implying that all work Is 
merely a variation of assembly-line boredom (ibide, pp. 11-12), He 
fails to see the extent to which much work even today remains an 
avenue of self-fulfilment, We also think that in some vocations it 
is far easier to witness for Christ than he imagines, since many 
vocations directly involve caring for people. The fact that some 
degree of technique is involved does not seem to us to disprove the 
point that genuine caring for people does occur, though to Ellul it 
does seem to do just that (ibid,, p. 13).
We think that Christian conviction can and should modify the way 
people go about vocational tasks, encouraging them to seek to be fair, 
just, honest, etc. We also think that even in assembly-line jobs, 
Christians should be encouraged to try to establish human relationships 
with fellow-workmen and in so doing to manifest Christian concern, In 
the tradition of Ellul’s own "One Kingdom" reasoning, we side with that 
aspect of his thought where he encourages Christians to attempt to 
remain faithful to Christ at all points in their lives, however 
difficult such a task may be. While agreeing that the Bible does not 
identify vocational work, with Christian calling (which is to witness 
to Christ, not to earn an income) ("Work and Calling," p. 8), we be­
lieve that every effort should be made to introduce the latter into 
the context of the former. While agreeing with Ellul’s critique of the 
bourgeois tendency to see work as itself capable of establishing mean­
ing in life (A Critique, pp. 152-3), we think that he at some places 
over-reacts and fails to sec that Christians, who know meaning in 
Christ, can and should attempt to have this meaning influence their 
vocations.
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sovereign God. stands in a creative and judging relationship to man’s 
works. The burden of the world does not rest on man’s s’noulders. Man
can go about his work freed from the anxiety of having to establish his
status before God on. the basis of his workst
Agonistic Existence Illustrated With Reference to the City
Ellul applies his eschatological faith to the issue of modern 
urban life. He believes that Christ does not call us to leave the city,
but that He does call us to an inner and outer detachment from the
1
values of the city. Though the Christian lives in the rnidst of the
technological society, the urban-industrial-commercialized-materialistic 
world, Christ can grant freedom from the acquisitive-status values of
this world;-
Chr.ist introduces a kind of break between man and his world,,.
Never again can he enter the city with the same spirit, the same 
strength, the same submission, the same destiny. No longer does 
man belong to the city, exactly as he no longer belongs to the 
crowd, because his individuality has been affirmed by his encounter 
with Jesus Christ ... The Spirit of the city no longer dominates 
him, because Jesus Christ has vanquished this spirit.
Christ enables us to live as those for whom the twentieth century has 
been "demythologized"« Of course, we still live in this twentieth- 
century urban-technological world, but we live as those whose true
home is elsewhere,
Ellul’s statements about eschatological existence and about de­
tachment from the values of the world and the city, in particular, might 
seem a bit optimistic. One might get the impression that be is affirm­
ing that conversion brings a simple and immediate deliverance from bond­
age to the sinful ways of the world. It must be admitted that Ellul
1. Meaning of the City, pp. 132-3,
2, Ibid., p, 132,
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does have the writing habit of stating his points and then considerably 
later introducing qualifications5 yet, in fairness to him, we must 
recognize the qualification which he does offer here, a qualification 
which protects his thought against the charge .just mentioned. 1
When Ellul talks of being’ freed from the values of the city, he 
also admits that this is no simple once-and-for-all achievement, but 
a daily struggle. In the tradition of "actualism”, he sees freedom as 
a continuing task, based on the continuing gift of grace. This is so 
not only because God is free, but also because man is so radically sin­
ful that he must continually struggle in opposition to his cwn sinful-
2
ness and his bondage to the sinfulness of the world. 1 2
1. If Ellul believes that Christian existence has to do with living
out an obedience to the future Kingdom, he nevertheless believes 
that this involves a genuine effort and struggle. We are to seek 
first the Kingdom of God ('Presence of the Kingdom, p, 55; Mtt
6:33). Conversion does not make an eschatological way of life easy 
or automatic. He admits that certain biblical passages might give 
the impression that after conversion the Christian life is ''rosy, 
there are no more problems, one is automatically in tune with God’s 
will, one obeys without effort ...” (Jonah, p. 71; see also False 
Presence, p. 84). He, however, cannot agree with this interpretation 
of the Christian life and cites Paul and other biblical sources to 
the contrary (Jonah, p. 72; To Will and To Do, p. 31)«
Victor Paul Furnish writes of Paul’s eschatology: "’God’s trans­
cendent power’ has already broken in, Man does not, precisely stated, 
stand 'between' the ages, but at the point where they interpenetrate" 
(Victor Paul Furnish, Theology and Ethics, p. 134). Ellul’s 
eschatological understanding is in line with this statement, and this 
statement shows the reason why seeking to be obedient to the Kingdom 
of God involves an agonizing struggle: the Christian, still partici-
■ pates in the old age (marked by sin) though he knows the power of the 
new age (grace).
2, Ellul tells us that the receipt of grace plunges man’s life into 
the agony of a conflict with his sinful self and the sinful ways of 
the v/orld (presence of the Kingdom, p. 46). "It is because Christian 
faith and hope are manifesting themselves in a life that life is 
henceforth plunged into contradiction" (To Will and. To Do, pp, 93-—’99)• 
“The heart of this ethic may be expressed thus: it is based on an 
’agonistic' way of life; that, is to say, the Christian life is 
always an 'agony' (Gk: a contest, wrestling), that is, a final 
decisive conflict; thus it means the constant and actual presence
in our hearts of the two elements of judgment and of grace. But 
it is this very fact which ensures our liberty, We are free, because 
at every moment in our lives we are both judged and pardoned, and 
are consequently placed in a new situation, free from fatalism, from 
the bondage of sinful habits” (presence of the Kingdom, pp, 20-2]),
Ellul/,..
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Because man is and remains a sinner, freedom in Christ means the freedom
to struggle against sin and sin’s effects, rather than a once-and-for- 
-j
a.ll conquest of sin* For example, when Ellul describes Israel’s 
relationship to the city, he tells us that Israel continually had to 
struggle, living out the conflict between the sinful ways of the city
p
and the power of grace, He is not trying to encourage a Christian 
schizophrenia; he is trying to he perfectly frank about the difficult 
nature of Christian discipleship.
Ellul is much too much of a realist about human sinfulness to 
think tha.t the receipt of grace makes discipleship easy. He is 
decisively in the Reformation tradition in his emphasis on the 
radical sinfulness of even converted Christians (To Will and To Do, 
p. 33)« He appeals to Paul’s understanding of the continuing conflict 
between sin and grace as representing the essential biblical descrip­
tion of the Christian life. He tells us that there is only a holy and 
a not holy and that Cod regards all men as not holy (ibid,, p, 31 )* 
"Let us avoid such a terribly simplistic notion as a clear separation 
between good men and evil men, right and wrong. The judgement of God 
is not separation of good and evil, but annihilation and re-creation" 
(Meaning of the City, p, 73)* In spite of all the contrast Ellul 
sees between the Christian and the non-Christian, nevertheless the 
decisive contrast he sees is bet ween God and all men J "He have no 
right to replace God, to make ourselves judges of the world’s sin"
P« 74? see also To Hill and To Do, p, 32).
Ellul does not deny that a restored relationship with Christ can 
and should bring moral renewal ("Rappels et Reflexions", pp, 159-~16O). 
Nor is he claiming that there are not degrees of Christian existence 
(see Phil, 1:9-11)• He argues, for example, that there are Christian 
brothers who are weak in faith and those who are more mature (Palse 
Presence, p. 84)* (He does not seem to be denying the Wesley^an in­
sight that there can be growth in the Christian life,) What he is 
saying‘/that all men, even converted Christians, naturally tend to live 
in separation from God, If there is growth in the. Christian life, it 
is based on man’s continuing responsiveness to grace, whereby he more 
and more lives in and from God’s power, rather than from his own 
resources, (Thus, Ellul is close to Luther’s understanding of sancti­
fication as the daily struggle to live under the influence of grace.) 
He writes of the Christian, "He does not act by progressive approxim­
ations to a fixed perfection, but in a decision which is total and new 
at each moment ... There is no adding yesterday’s work to today’s. 
There is only the: renewal of one’s being by the increa.se of faith 
through the power of the Holy Spirit who works in us" (To Hill and 
To Ho, p. 83),
1, Notice the qualification in the second part of the following state­
ment? "To have true freedom is to escape necessity or, rather, to be 
free to struggle against necessity " (Vi oience, p. 127)»
2. Meaning of the City, p. 41 •
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T'or Ellul, the basic heason that the Christian life is a struggle,
T
an ’’agony", is because the converted Christian is still a sinner/'
The struggle comes because the Christian knows the conflict of grace
against sin. Through the daily receipt of grace, he can live in the
power of the new age, but the power of the new age collides with the
sinful ways of the old age. The Christian life is precisely this
collision, this "agony”. The Christian life cannot be understood in
static terms, but only in terms of a dynamic teleology. The Christian
must daily move from sin to grace and because the Christian remains a
sinner, there is no theoretical solution to this problem. The only
solution is the practical one of life lived in daily repentance, a daily 
2
turning away from bondage to freedom.
Another reason that the Christian life is seen by Ellul to involve
a struggle is that it has to do with Cod’s grace calling for concrete 
obedience in the particularities of each Christian’s life," obedience 
which is terribly difficult and humanly impossible.Each hour of the 
Christian life is to be regarded as the last hour, the hour in which the
either-or decision of obedience to Christ is called for amid the clash
of life.
A final reason that the Christian life is seen to involve "agony"
1. Presence of the .Kingdom, p. 13; Violence, p. 133.
2. Ellul generalizes from the problem facing Israel, with reference to 
the values of the city, to the problem’facing all men, with reference
to sin. He writes, "Such is the problem for every man who wants to live 
by the grace of Christ. And what seems both tragic and disconcerting is 
that there seems to be no theoretical solution to satisfy this problem. 
There is no theological demonstration for one to folio?/-. The answer 
comes with life, day by day, in the conflict between tine 'world’s necess­
ity and the liberty given us of God, between the world’s wisdom (which 
we can never totally set aside) and the folly of the cross (which we can 
never totally live out)" Cleaning of the City, p. 41; see also Protes­
tant i sme Franpais, pp. 147-143).
3. To Will and To Do, pp. 97-93. 
4- Ibid., p. 267.
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is that a distancing from the world’s values does not involve geograph­
ical separation from the world, Ellul calls the Christian to place
himself at the point ’..’here the will of God clashes with the suicidal 
1
ways of the world. For example, he has a very pessimistic under-
standing.of the city, cut his response to the problem is the exact 
opposite of what one would expect. He calls the Church to assume its. 
preaching task in the city^ (and preaching for Ellul involves both 
words and deeds). .If Christians gain a degree of freedom from the 
values of the world, this is for the sake of serving Christ in the 
world.Hence, the Christian life is plunged into "agony", struggle.
Ellul’s exposition of "agonistic existence" protects his thought 
from two charges. Against the charge of perfectionism, he insists 
that the problem of sin still plagues the Christian. Freedom is less 
a once-and-for-all deliverance from the power of sin and more the 
continuing preparation for a daily battle in which there are tremendous 
dangers and real risks. Likewise, his description of agonistic exist­
ence protects his thought from the charge of quietism or "cheap grace". 
Though he is aware of the difficult nature of the Christian life, he 
is not prepared to compromise the absolute claim of God on the Christian’S' 
life nor will he grant an acceptable status to man’s sinfulness.If 
the Christian lives his life at the overlap of the two ages, he is 
nevertheless called and empowered to live from the future Kingdom.
Christ introduces freedom from bondage to the sinful ways of the world, 
and Christians are called to live in and from this freedom.
If the receipt of grace does not immediately transpose one to
1 ■, Presence of the Kingdom, p, 27• "Our concern should be to place 
ourselves at the very point where this suicidal desire is most active, 
in the actual form it adopts, and see how God’s will of preservation 
can act in this given situation"(Ibid,, p. 28).
2, Hearing of the City, pp, 76, 83.
3* Protestantisme Franpais, pp, 147-148.
4- .Jonah, p. 72,
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heave?!, neither does it invite one to remain in the far country of 
human disobedience. Rather, grace leads man into a daily dynamic 
struggle to move from disobedience to faithfulness.
Before concluding this section of our chapter, we need to note 
that Ellul’s understanding of agonistic existence also relates to his 
“dual morality1 1. We earlier spoke of dual morality in terms of an . 
agreement between Christians and non-Christians at the level of 
particular acts,^ We pointed out there that he believes that, non­
Christian acts can sometimes be in agreement with faithful Christian 
acts. At those points, the Christian can join the non-Christian in 
good^ conscience, in obedience to God,
When Sllul speaks of dual morality in connection with agonistic- 
existence, he is thinking of an overlap between Christian conduct and 
human morality which is due to the Christian’s sinfulness. Here the 
Christian is seen as sharing in human morality, not because he ought to, 
but because he is ail too much in bondage to sin, as are men generally, 
When he speaks of dual morality in this sense, he speaks of Christians 
living between the claims of two moralities (the morality of the world 
and obedience to Christ),
rather than speaking of living in direct obedience
2
to Christ, When he describes dual morality in this way, he simply 
seems to be repeating what he says about agonistic existence. He 
emphasizes the difficult life-struggle to be obedient, rather than 
pointing but that the Christian is called to be obedient at all points. 
Ellul is not denying that man is called to be obedient at all points, 
but is describing how very difficult is this task.^ He is not seeking
1, See above, pp, 36-41»
2. To Will and To Bo, pp. 109-110, 290.
3» To Will and To Do, pp,108-109; Presence of the Kingdom, p. 46,
4» If the Christian chooses to participate in politics in the norrna.l
sense of the word. Ellul believes that he is faced with the 
impossibility of being obedient to God in his political vocation 
[this/T,,
I
Jto give a ste/tus to sin, but is calling Christians to a frank confession 
1
of their sin and. a strenuous effort to deal with it.
Christian Ends-Keans Reasoning
What we are going to discuss here is Ellul’s restatement of his
eschatological understanding in the language of ends and means. The '
connection with his eschatological and Christological thought is vital, 
JilS
since/reasoning is based on the unification of means and ends "realized” 
A
in Jesus Christ. He believes that in Jesus Christ the goal of salvation
and the methods of salvation were harmoniously unified. The means 
2
utilized were the realized presence of the ends sought.
Stressing the realized nature of eschatology in Jesus Christ,
Ellul even says, "The end, this Kingdom, which -will ’come* at the end
of time, is already present when the divine means (the only, unique 
■3
Mediator) is present I1
(this due to the autonomous nature of politics and the relativity of all 
political choices). Ellul apparently sees such a situation as more 
tragic than the Christian’s general situation in the face of the 
world (see below, fp. 299-3 CO). However, at one place his general socia,l 
thought evidences the same problem. He privatizes love to such an 
extent that ho utterly divorces it from public service (see below 
pp. 197-203).
1, The distinction we have just drawn in terms of Ellul’s two-sided 
understanding of dual morality is our distinction, not his. The 
justification for drawing this distinction is based on the fact that 
he speaks of a Christian agreement with non-Christian acts in both 
a positive and a negative sense.
2„ Presence of the Kingdom, p. 79* Ellul bases his position not only 
on his general eschatological understanding, but also on an exegesis 
of Jesus* temptation story in particular. He points out that Jesus 
refused to use non-godly means even to attain worthy ends (The 
Politics of God, p, 114? False Presence, pp, 41~42)» He also des­
cribes his position with reference to Rom, 12:17-21, the overcoming 
of evil by the methods of good. He tells us that he regards this 
Pauline passage as a generalisation of the meaning of the Sermon on 
the Mount (Violence, p. 1?2). .
His position is also based cn a study of II Kings (The Politics of 
Cod, p, 116).
.3, Presence of the Kingdom, p. 79
When Jesus Christ is present the Kingdom has "come upon" us.
This formula expresses very precisely the relation between the end 
and the means. Jesus Christ in his Incarnation appears as God’s 
means, for the salvation of men and for the establishment of the 
Kingdom of God, but where Jesus Christ is, there also is this 
salvation and this kingdom.1
Ellul likewise calls for those who live in Christ to share in 
this reunification of means and ends which is possible through
eschatological existence. He writes, "We are invited.to take part in'
a dialectic, to be in the world but not of it, and thus to seek out a
. . 2
particular, and specifically Christian position," Though other 
ethicists may apply eschatological thought differently, he uses his 
understanding to support the cause cf radical obedience to God, 
decisively opposing a softening of God’s severe demands,^
1. Presence of the Kingdom, p. 79♦ ••
2. Violence, p. 26.
3. Ellul believes that the radical demands of the Gospel and the 
Sermon on the Mount must not be "toned down" (Violence, pp. 146, 172), 
but he also believes that the Sermon on the Mount is not to be under­
stood as a law, a code, or a set of rules (ibid., p. 16S), He is too 
influenced by Barth to understand the moral teachings of the Bible in 
a legalistic way, He is convinced, however, that the moral teachings 
of the Bible are quite authoritative and hence are more than mere, 
symbols. He thus disagrees with the antinomianism implicit in 
J.A.T. Robinson’s position (ibid,, pp. 167-168). Ellul agrees with 
the rigorism of Tertullian and Tolstoy, but not with their literalism 
or legalism, nor with their belief that Jesus is primarily a law­
giver (see H. Richard Niebuhr, Christ and Culture, pp. 52, 59)•
Ellul agrees with Reinhold Niebuhr (An Interpretation of Christian 
Ethics) that the validity of an ethic has to do with the tension 
which it.sets up between the transcendent and the historic (To Will 
and To Do, p. 310), He agrees that revelation demands an impossible 
absolute (ibid,, pp. 260, 267). Revelation leads to demands which 
are contrary to natural man (ibid., p. 22l). "Christianity compli­
cates dreadfully the situation of the person trying to answer ethical 
questions, because it places man in a last situation. Surely the 
commandment of Jesus is inapplicable. His ethic has nothing to do 
with the immediate moral problems bearing on the relativity of the 
arrangements to be sought in economics or politics, or of balances of 
power to be stabilized" (ibid., p, 266), Ellul accepts Niebuhr’s 
exegesis of the teachings cf Jesus (see Reinhold Niebuhr, An 
Interpretation of Christian Ethics, pp. 43-62), but, unlike Niebuhr, 
he is resolved to strive to live out directly the requirements of 
Jesus rather than compromising them for the sake of having a pragmatic 
influence on the world, Yet he is fully aware that humanly speaking 
Jesus’ demands are impossibly difficult — hence only God Himself can 
enable Christians to begin to realize Jesus’ way, "It is not a matter 
of finding a middle road, nor of setting up distinctions and 
compromises/,.,.
Though he knows that, the Christian life is difficult and in the
final analysis unattainable, he nevertheless calls Christians to
uncompromising obedience; he stresses the uniqueness of the Christian
life. He writes, "Ke must remember that the Christian must not act in
exactly the same way as everyone else. He has a part to play in this 
j
world which no one else can possibly fulfil.” He argues that the . 
Church must live as an “unassimilated foreign body in our society”.
He tells us that "it is only through complete refusal to compromise
with the forms and forces of our society that we can find the right 
2 •orientation and recover the hope of human freedom.”
Ellul believes that Christians are to represent the unification
of means and ends established in Jesus ChristThe means which
Christians are to use must be a consistent reflection of their loyalty
t-o Christ “Christians are not in the same situation as others with
regard to the end: they have received this end in themselves by the
grace of God, They are to represent before the world this unity between 
5
end and means, authorized by Jesus Christ." Noble Christian purposes
compromises so that the ’extraordinary’ demands of Jesus might 
become ordinary. Now that is just the temptation of almost all 
those who have developed an ethic, and even of Niebuhr, when he 
makes love a principle and a commandment which remains an impossib­
ility as well as a possibility” (To Will and To Do, pp, 266-267).
"In a word, this ethic is not applicable or inapplicable. It is both 
at the same time, for considered solely at the human level it is ' 
without logic, foundation, or meaning. Considered as the life in 
Christ, the ’whether’ no longer comes to mind for the applicability 
is no longer our responsibility” (To Will and To Do, p. 267; see 
below, p, 136 et seq., n. 2). .
1. Presence of the Kingdom, p. 8; see also p, 24; To Will and To Do, 
pp, 85-86; Violence, pp. 26, 45-46, 69-70, 14^.
2, "Mirror," p. 203.
3- Presence of the'Kingdon, p. 80,
4- Ibid., p. 95.
5» Ibid., p. 80. So far as the Church and all its members are God’s 
’means' they ought to constitute that presence of the ’end’ which is
characteristic of the Kingdom" (Presence of the Kingdom, p, 80).
"What is in the service of Jesus Christ receives its character and 
effectiveness from Jesus Christ" (Propaganda, p. 231),
tdtt, J - --- ___Ai.t ..
the end does not justify the meansdo not justify immoral practices;
1
Rather, "Means corrupt ends." He believes that to reason that the 
end justifies the means is fundamentally contrary to God’s revelation 
in Jesus Christ. To reveal the future Kingdom of love and peace, God
utilized the methods of sacrificial and self-giving love: Christ on
a Cross. If the Christian’s sole task is to witness to this Christ,
2
then he must seek to embody Christ's way of life.
An example of an application of Ellul’s non-compromising approach
is his advice to young people. He warns young people against com­
promising their convictions for the sake of climbing a status ladder.
He thinks that by the time they have reached anywhere near the top 
they will have compromised the convictions with which they began and . 
hence will have become different people,Translated into specifically
1 A Critique, p. 302.
2, He harshly criticizes Sartre’s glorification of compromise
(A Critique, pp. 38-48). Contrary to existentialism, he argues that 
the only responsible human attitude is the sincere effort not to com­
promise (A Critique, p, 45) » In particular, he says that people 
should not accept compromise in a.n a priori way, excusing themselves 
ahead of time (A Critique, pp. 43-44T* He recognizes that it is 
difficult to "keep one’s hands clean", but he feels that the necessity 
of compromising should not be glorified by being given theoretical 
justification. If (because of man’s sinfulness) "’evil eventually 
creeps .in’", it is never to be accepted, tolerated, or justified 
(A Critique, p. 45)• While addressing a mainly non-Christian reader- 
ship (in A Critique of the New Commonplaces), he urges the consider­
ation of a noncompromising effort to be faithful to the highest that 
one knows. In effect, he is saying that seeking to uphold ideals and 
sometimes having to compromise them is preferable to having no ideals 
at all. Likewise, when he elsewhere addresses Christians, he tells 
them to seek first the Kingdom of God (which involves a different 
dynamic than, the merely human effort to approximate ideals), but 
warns them that this is not easy (see above, pp, 77-82), In neither 
the humanistic nor the Christian case is Ellul trying to encourage 
compromise; in both cases he is being frank about the difficulties 
involved in a non-compromising approach,
3. A Critique, pp. 280ff.
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Christian terms, he is warning Christians against sacrificing radical 
obedience today for the sake of some more effective opportunity to­
morrow*
Ellul makes a similar point in opposition to political exped­
iency:—
The politicians spend all the todays telling us that in all the 
tomorrows we shall be free to engage in morality. They even 
threaten to allow us to engage in morality in all the tomorrows 
only if in exchange we allow them to engage in politics in all 
the todays. Vie formally refuse to submit to this perpetual 
blackmail. We must save all the minutes without exception, one 
after the other, if, as we must, we want to save all the time 
which pragmatically makes up our whole life,^
Prom his general understanding of New Testament eschatology, from 
his study of Jesus* temptation story, the Sermon on the Mount, Rom.
12:11, and from his study of II Kings (to mention only the obvious 
sources), Ellul concludes that Christianity must be decisively con­
cerned about the integrity of the. methods used, rather than being
primarily concerned with the attainment of goals, even goals judged 
2
worthy by God. He believes that unchristian methods distract from the 
Christian goal, because the Christian goal has to do with embodying an 
integrity of life, He believes that, if the central motivation for 
the Christian life is that of love, 'then love must not lead to acts 
contrary to love,^
1. A Critique, pp. 301—302,
2, “Theologie Bogmatique,” p. 147* We are always tempted to think 
that all means are good once they are subjected to the will of God 
(inwardly) or oriented to the end that God seeks, We fail to see 
that this always amounts to the fallacy that ’the end justifies the 
means*, and we justify ourselves hypocritically by invoking the 
dictum that *to the pure all things are pure.’ In fact, as these 
stories /Tn II Kings/ have progressively shovm, the choice of means 
is our grea.t responsibility” (The Politics of God, p. 116).
3 ’’Theologie Bogmatique,” p, 146
Christian "Styles of Life"
Ellul’s lifelong defence of the importance of Christian ’’styles
of life” is the application of his ends-means reasoning and the
expression of his belief that the Christian life should conform to the 
1
Gospel of Jesus Christ* He writes of his understanding of Christian
1. Presence of the Kingdom, pp. 81, 146. Ellul shares with Kierke­
gaard this concern for a Christian style of life, though he does not 
explicitly mention him in this regard and though Kierkegaard did not 
use these exact words, Kierkegaard believed that a Christian 
teacher must furnish guarantees of his teaching by his own life-
witness (Kierkegaard, Attack Ucon 'Christendom’_( 1894-18^9) > PP*
172, 271). He spoke of the importance of a correspondence between 
Christian speech and life, belief and conduct (ibid,. p, 209;
Journals, pp. 98, 174» 204, 207, 223). His famous distinction 
between an "admirer” and a "follower" is that a follower strives to 
be what he admires, while an admirer fails to realise that the 
object of admiration makes a claim (Kierkegaard, Training in 
Christianity, p. 234)* Kierkegaard accused the Lutheran Church .of 
Denmark of the apostacy of "playing at Christianity" (The Last Yearst 
p. 48). Playing at Christianity, the failure of one’s life to 
embody one’s belief, is precisely what Ellul is attacking in his 
emphasis on life-styles. In the light of the fact that Ellul speaks 
highly of Kierkegaard and explicitly refers to his Journals, it is 
likely that he has been influenced by him at this point *~f'EHu.l, 
"Between Chaos and Paralysis", p. 749» To Hill and To Do, p. 260; 
Prayer and Modern Kan, pp. 111, 139)» .
Kierkegaard also opposed Christian involvement in politics because 
he believed that politics is based on cleverness and denies the 
importance of "reduplication", the living out of one’s faith 
(Kierkegaard, The Last Years, p. 217; J ournals, p, 204)* "Politics 
consists of never venturing more than is possible at any moment, 
never going beyond what is humanly probable. In Christianity, if 
there is no venturing farther out, beyond what is probable, God is 
absolutely not with us..." (The Last Years, p. 162), Ellul is 
similarly suspicious of politics, as we see in Ch, VII (pp. 250ff).
Like Ellul. Kierkegaard’s central teaching was that the Christian 
must seek first the Kingdom of God (Kierkegaard, Attack Upon 
’Christendom], p, 210; The Last Years, p. 142). Like Ellul, he was 
critical of the worldliness of the Church (The Last Years, p, 167; 
Journals, pp. 130-131)» He resented and dedicated his life to 
resisting the lowering of the standard of what it means to be a 
Christian (The Last Years, pp. 47» 154)• Kierkegaard, though in 
near pathological form, affirmed the ascetic aspect of New Testament 
teaching ( journals, pp. 213, 24.0), He wrote, "The fault with the 
middle ages was not the monastery and asceticism, but that basically 
the world had won because the monk paraded as the extraordinary 
Christian" (The Last Years, p. 66). He also criticized medieval 
asceticism because the Christian ideal was not embodied in the 
world, but was "situationless” (The Last Years, p, 269; see below, 
pp. I92-I93).
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styles of life in a way which reflects his Barthian "One Kingdom”
reasonings- .
How, as its name indicates, the whole of life is concerned 
in this search, Tt includes the way we think about present 
political questions, as well as our way of practicing hospitality.
It also affects the way we dress and the food we eat ,,, as well as 
the way in which we manage our financial affa-irs. It includes being 
faithful to one’s wife as well as being accessible to one’s neigh­
bour, It includes the position one ought to take on current social 
and political questions, as well as the decisions which relate to 
the personal employment of our time, I could multiply these . -
examples, which are mere suggestions, to show that absolutely 
everything, the smallest details which we regard as indifferent, 
ought to be questioned, placed in the light of faith, examined 
from the point of view of the glory of God.\
Ellul says that faithfulness to revelation can become a reality
in daily life only as Christians recover this "missing link”:-
To speak quite frankly, without beating about the bush, a -
doctrine only has power (apart from that which God gives it) to 
the extent in which it creates a style of life, to the extent in 
which it is adopted, believed, and accepted by men who have a style 
of life which is in harmony with it.
He points out that Christians today are frequently virtuous, they do
1o Presence of the Kingdom, p, 14-8. Ellul, in conscious agreement 
with Barth~(3arth, fl/2, pp. 535 and 610, cited on pr 275 of T'cJWill 
and To Do), tells us that there are not indifferent actions nor 
autonomous domains of activity.. All of life is to be subjected in 
obedience to Christ—not just man’s inner being (To Will and To Do, 
pp, 29—30; see also False Presence, p, 177; "Theologie Dogmatique,” 
p, 146). He' tells ns that to argue that nothing matters but the 
interior life is to engage in the very hypocrisy condemned by Jesus 
Christ (Presence of the Kingdom, p, 14). "Especially, let us not 
say that there are two distinct domains: Cod’s, and Caesar’s;- for 
example, the spiritual for Cod and the temporal for Ca.esar, The 
kingdom of God, the whole Bible ceaselessly tells us, is universal,
total, unlimited, without exception” ("Rappels et Reflexions” p, 165)4 
Ellul quotes I Cor. 10:31, "Whether you eat or drink, or whatever you 
do, do all to the glory of God” (To Will and To Do. p, 29), He cites 
his agreement with Barth on the trinitarian basis of this "One 
Kingdom”reasoning. Both men believe that there is only one will of 
the Creator and that will can be determined only by reference to God’s 
revelation in Jesus Christ (To Will and To Do. p. 73), Man at all 
points is claimed by the God revealed in Christ. For a seeming 
contradiction by Ellul of his own point see below, pp. 197-208, 299-300
2. ’ Presence of the Kingdom, p. 145*
•their jobs well, hut their pattern of life .is imposed on them by their
social environment: "It is not their spiritual condition which affects
their style of life: It is their political and economic condition, and
from this point of view, they are an overwhelming demonstration of the 
. 1 - •truth, temporary and temporal, of Marxism.” p
He believes that- unless Christians can begin to express their
Christian convictions in life, the Church in the West will simply
- 90 - ••
2continue to be integrated into the world and will continue to die.
1, Presence of the Kingdom, p. 146) see also False Presence? p. 4-5.
"There is no life-style, either individual or collective, which 
is showing forth the Christian faith. The Protestant lives like 
everyone else, works like everyone else, thinks like everyone else 
and reacts like everyone else” (False Presence, p, 46). "The fact 
is that for a long time the Church has been nothing but an artifi­
cial gathering of essentially worldly people, which brings ’the 
world' into the Church (without, unfortunately, bringing in people!).
Christians who are conformed to the world introduce into the 
ChwvtU the value-judgments and concepts of the world. They believe 
in action. They want efficiency. They give first place to economics, 
and they think that all means are good (for the spread of the Church, 
goes without saying’.). They are defined by their sociological milieu, 
The Protestant thinks to adopt the means which the world employs.
Since he finds those means useful in his profession, or in his leisure 
time, they stand so high in his estimation that he cannot see why he 
should not introduce them into the Church and make the things of the 
spirit dependent upon them. He never faces the problem of these 
means. They are there. They are effective. Hence they tare good. 
Since they are in a sanctified world and are effective, why not make 
use of them in the Church? The criteria of his thinking as a 
Christian are so vague, and the demands of his faith are so ’inward,’ 
that he is unaware of any contradiction between the world’s means and 
the life of faith, One adopts television or radio without hesitation, 
’without questioning the psychological effects of these devices, or’ 
the validity of the witness borne through these media. Such concerns 
carry little weight where there is assurance of efficiency and 
utility" (False Presence, pp. 47-48). Ellul admires the Furitans 
for their willingness to stand up and be counted. He thinks that 
modern Protestantism has rejected Puritanism only to choose mere 
conformity to the world (False Presence, pp. 45-46). He asks 
whether the reason Puritanism has been rejected is that "after all, 
not everyone has the courage to wear a salvation army uniform ”
(Fals e Pres eno e, p, 46; see also The Politics of Cod, p» 106).
2 * Presence of the Kingdom, pp. 146-147»
Ellul’s words about the importance of Christian life-styles fit 
consistently into the general pattern of his ethic. He argues for 
the importance of a visible side to the Christian life because he 
believes that the Christian life should be the unique embodiment of and 
witness to the Gospel.1 He believes that the inner and outer aspects
1. Ellul’s belief that the Church must utilize methods consistent 
with her Gospel is applied in his rejection of the Church’s right • 
to use methods of propaganda. He sees propaganda as involving the 
psychological manipulation of the subconscious for the purposes of 
changing outward behaviour (The Technological Society; pp. 363—375; 
"The Obstacles to Communication Arising from Propaganda Habits”, 
Student World, p, Z102). He writes, "Propaganda is not the defense 
of an idea, but the manipulation of the mob’s subconscious" (The 
Technological Society, p. 373). He thinks that propaganda "(and he 
means propaganda in this sense of the word) must not be used by the 
Church because it is inconsistent with the very nature of the 
Christian Gospel; "What happens is that the church will be able to' 
move the masses and convert thousands of people to its ideology.
But this ideology will no longer be Christianity" (Propaganda, p,
230), The Church can indeed acquire an influence in the world 
through the utilization of the methods of the world, but in so doing 
she ceases to be the Church of God and becomes merely another 
sociological organization (Propaganda, pp. 230-231), (Ellul’s words, 
of course, could have a far-reaching effect on the Church’s style of 
evangelism.) .
He does admit that the Church may use the mass media to transmit 
worship services (Propaganda, p, 231), or for the out-poses of giving 
documentary information ("P.apports Presenter Par K. Ellul/’ in 
Eglis e Reformee'de Prance Evangelisation Information, Ho, 1 (January- 
February 1968"), p. 85)". He apparently thinks that such a use of the 
media c-an occur without using propaganda, though he doesn’t think 
that it can be really popular or successful on a widespread basis.
In order to understand Ellul’s position here, we need bo say a 
few more words about his understanding of propaganda. He thinks 
that propaganda has disastrous effects no matter who uses it and 
for what purpose (Propaganda, pp, xiv - xv ), Some of the effects 
are these: the suppression of the critical faculty by the creation 
of collective passions, the creation of an easy conscience with 
respect to whole areas of life, the establishment of a new sphere of 
the sacred outside criticism, the creation of predispositions to act 
in certain ways, and the establishment of an abstract "verbal .
universe" (The Technological Society, pp, 369-371)?
Ellul describes the phenomenon of propaganda a.s being in large 
part based on the fact that there is an enormous gap between what 
people say they believe and their actual practice (Propaganda, pp,
27, 179-180; A Critique, pp, 200—201), Propaganda exerts a lever 
to change people's behaviour, while leaving the content of their 
thought intact (Propaganda. pp. 27-28, 207-208). He admits that 
Church members also dissociate their Christianity from their 
behaviour and are thus easily manipulated by propaganda (Propaganda, 
pp. 201, 228-229; Presence of the Kingdom, p, 145)♦ He writes 
. of the Church, "It is true that the Spirit should have given us up 
1ong/,.,
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of the Christian life should manifest a quality of faithfulness to
Christ. He is not saying that all Christian acts must be absolutely
different from non-Christian acts. He is arguing that the outward
shape of the Christian life should be the consistent reflection of
obedience to Christ. All Christian lives need not be outwardly 
2
similar; each Christian life should in its own unique way express
long ago, so invariably do we fall for propaganda” (Violence, p. 155)«
As yet Ellul has not dealt with the way in which the resources of 
the Christian faith can protect Christians from the disastrous effects 
of propaganda (Ethics of Freedom will probably deal with this issue). 
Even so, from his general ethical position and from what he says about 
propaganda, we can make our own deductions. If the Church could begin 
to live the Christian faith to which she claims belief, this would be 
a factor working to minimize the effect of propaganda on Christians — 
because the gap between thought and practice would begin to be 
closed. Of course, many other things would be needed to overcome • 
this gap, such as the recovery of a sense of history, to overcome 
modern man’s tendency to live only in the present (Propaganda, pp. 
43ff.). A sense of true community would also be needed to overcome 
a basis of propaganda’s appeal: the lonely individual isolated in 
the mass (Propaganda, pp. 8-9). Also, the individual would need to 
feel so strong in his convictions that he would not feel the need to 
be a "normal" member of a mass society (Propaganda, p. 49? "Obstacles 
to Communication," p. 402). Though popular Christianity may not be 
capable of meeting these problems, a more serious Christian commitment, 
along the lines proposed by Ellul, surely could.
1, See above, pp. 36-4-1 • .
rP° Hill and To Do, p. 210. Ellul can speak of the Christian way of 
life directly in connection with freedom ("Between Chaos and 
Paralysis," p, 750). He believes that the uniqueness of Christianity 
does not lie in the "fixation of a Christian morality" nor in the 
establishment of "a particular cultural construct". He even admits 
that Tillich is right in saying that Christianity has rightly found 
different forms of expression in diverse cultures ("Theologie 
Dogmatique," p. 145)* "The Church is neither a society which has a 
certain political constitution and which obeys certain juridical 
rules, nor a movement whose members observe the same precepts with one 
moralistic purpose" ("Note Problematique Sur h’Histoire Be L’Eglise", 
Eoi et Vie (July—August 1949)» P* 310). It is interesting that, 
though he writes a whole book on the Christian attitude toward money, 
in the same book he warns that he is not trying to impart a code 
(L’Homme et L'Argent, p. 165)• In this regard, he advises parents 
to try to help their children to gain true freedom to make responsible 
decisions regarding money. He warns against the moralism involved in 
spelling things out in too much detail (I?Homme et L’Argent, p. 158)*
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the'common Christian convictions of the Church about God and the
unique requirements of God for that particular life. At the very
centre of Ellul’s concern is his anxiety that modern Christians have
had their lives all too much determined by their environment and all 
' 1too little determined by the Gospel, Thus, in his discussion of life 
styles', his major concern is that there be enough visibility to the 
Christian life that Christians may outwardly, as well as inwardly, . 
break loose from conformity to the patterns of the modern world. He 
knows that there is a variety of ways of going about this; he is not 
seeking to prescribe a set mould for the Christian life.
Because subordination to Jesus Christ is very much a matter of
allegiance to a free and personal Lord, there is a necessary degree • 
2
of vagueness in Ellul’s discussion of Christian life-styles, He is
not offering a casuistry, which would codify the Christian life, take 
3
God’s place, and deny the dynamic nature of the Christian life. We 
must not, however, forget that Ellul has given numerous concrete 
suggestions concerning the Church, politics, work, technology, 
propaganda, violence, etc. When he discusses these areas from a 
normative perspective (and he does), that should be seen as an aspect 
of his concern to help Christians recover more faithful ways of life.
1, Presence of the Kingdom, p, 146,
2, ibid,, p, i4O,
3« See below, pp* 94-325*

CHAPTER IV
THE CONCRETENESS OP OBEDIENCE
, , • 1Prom a study ox Scripture Ellul and Barth have come to an
understanding of God as the living God who makes personal demands
in history. Even more than the specific content of any scriptural
command, they have learned from Scripture that God is a living God
’who demanded concrete obedience in the past and who thus makes con- 
2
crete demands today. Both rnen accept a dynamic and personalistic 
understanding of God’s relationship to man (though they relate this 
to a salvation history model, as we will see later). Ellul writes,
’’There is never a divine requirement which is abstract, general,
3
inherent, but only divine requirements which are concrete.”
1. Ellul very much attempts to base his understanding of the Christian 
life on the interpretation of Scripture. On the first page of his 
major book on Christian ethics he writes, "I...confess that in this 
study and this research the criterion of my thought is the biblical 
revelation, the content of my thought is the biblical revelation, the 
point of departure is supplied by the biblical revelation, the method 
is the dialectic in accordance with which the biblical revelation is 
given us, and the purpose is a search for the significance of.the 
biblical'revelation concerning ethics (To Will and To Do, p, 1; 
see also ”Le Pauvre". koi et Vie, p, 12?)• Elsewhere he tells us that 
Christian auction should be specifically Christian, and by this he means 
that the Christian life should be based on the application of the Y/ord 
of God (Violence, p, 47)/He quotes Barth to the effect that ethics 
must never cease to bear witness to the reality from which it proceeds, 
the biblical Word. He agrees with Barth chat the Christian ethic is
to be based on the biblical witness and is not to be^phenornenological 
description of the Christian man (ibid., p. 265; quoting Barth Il/2 
(p. 537) 3.ate:r on page. 310). (This of course, is not to say that a 
biblically based ethic cannot have phenomenological consequences),
2. • Barth, Il/2, p. 676.
3. To Will and To Do, p. 7* "The Christian ethic is an ethic of life 
and life is dynamic. Each situation, like each person, is novel. 
Casuistry-is necessarily static and never exhausts the ingredients of
a situation, The command of God is not a general rule, or a collection 
of rules. It is always particular for a person at this moment, in this 
situation,” /,,,
94 -
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The Will of God is not ”immobilized in an objectively perceptible
content, continuing without change.” God does not limit himself .
”to re-willing ceaselessly the same thing...like a record playing 
2
the same groove over and over again.”
God * s Commandment and' Biblical Law
Prom Karl Barth Ellul has learned a distinction between God’s
present commandment and biblical lawsand this distinction is of 
utmost importance at this point. (This distinction is really the 
outworking of Barth’s reversal of the traditional order Law-Gospel) 
Ellul agrees with Barth that the good is God Himself in His commandment 
and thus the good must not be dissociated from the personal activity •
5
of the Commander.
situation ” (To Will and To Do-, p. 209). Barth writes, '‘‘There is no 
divine claim in itself. There are only concrete divine claims”
(Barth Il/2, p. ^>66). ”Gcd always utters a c on ere 11 s si mum. But 
this divine concretissimum can as such neither be anticipated nor 
repeated. What God utters is never in any way known and true in 
abstraction from God Himself. It is knovm and true for no other 
reason than that He Himself says it, that He in peron is in and 
accompanies what is said by Him” (Barth i/l, p. 155)•
1• To Will and To Do. p. 7.
2. To Will and To Bo. p. 7.
3. Prayer and Modern Man, pp. 102ff.
4. See Prayer and Modern Kan, p. 104.
5. To Will and To Bo. p. 275 citing Barth, ll/2, pp. 708-9. “if, in 
fact we formulate a good which is ours, a good which expresses God’s 
will in permanent form, that implies that God is an object whose will 
is not living but is crystalized once for all, unchangeable to 
eternity, and that we know what it is. We are then faced with a 
conflict between God and his will, a sort of subordination of God to 
the good. Again, an objective good existing as law binds God and 
prevents him from acting, except as we have decided...11 (ibid., p,, 242),
Ellul admits that his position is close to nominalisms 'Commandment 
is not based on the divine essence but on the sovereign will of God. 
Taken in and of itself the commandment makes no sense. It only has 
meaning because God has spoken it ” (ibid . . p. 268). "In the Bible 
the good is not prior to God. The good is not God. The good is the 
will of God. All that God wills is good, not because God is subject 
to the good, obedient to the good, but simply because God wills it. It 
is not the good in itself that determines the will of God. It is the 
will of God which determines what is good, and there is no good which 
exists/..•
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“As Karl Barth has said, what man should do and should not do is not
described for him by the ten commandments or the Sermon on the Mount,
but he must hear it by a personal order of God,"
Barth1s position does seem accurately embodied in Ellul’s 
2thought here. An interesting feature of Barth’s hermeneutic is that
he tends to interpret'more general moral teachings, such as the Sermon 
on the Mount or the Ten Commandments, in the context of God’s concrete 
commanding activity elsewhere embodied in Scripture. He sees such
collections as summaries of divine commands which were not intended
exists outside of that decision ” (ibid,, p. 6). His position is 
not entirely nominalistic; he insists that God’s revealed will’is 
not arbitrary or tyrannical, but the expression of God’s being as 
love (ibid,, p. 268). For a discussion of rela-ted issues see •
Heinrich Heppe, Reformed Dogmatics, trans, by G.T, Thomson 
(London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1950), pp. 93-97).
1. h’ill and To Do, p. 222. "God’s commandment should, remain a 
commandment — that is to say, a personal word,.." (ibid,, p, 101), 
"Law is always objective, universal, neutral, impartial. ...The 
law is an object, external to my life. It takes no account of the 
circumstances in which I find myself" (Prayer and Modern Man, 
pp. 102-103). ’’The commandment is the reverse of all that. It Is 
a personal word addressed to me. A commandment is always an 
individualized word spoken by him who commands to him who should 
obey. It expresses the will of the superior, yet in addressing 
itself to a person in his individuality it takes into account the 
circumstances in which he finds himself, the human reality. It is 
always formulated hie et nunc« It is always a circumstantial word, 
which is never a sort of permanent, eternal presence, even when it 
is God who formulates this commandment. It is always registered in 
terms of the concrete facts, and must necessarily be interpreted in 
relation to them. It is a person-to-person relationship" (ibid.,, 
p. 103). Ellul is entirely opposed to the legalistic or objectiv- 
istic understanding of biblical commandments. "What is spoken by 
God to man in biblical history, a holy history of the walking to­
gether of God and man, cannot be transformed into a law which is 
valid of itself and universal" (ibid,, pp. 103-4)•
Emil Brunner also develops a similar distinction to Ellul’s dis­
tinction between God’s commandment and biblical laws. See The 
.Divine Imperative, pp. 111ff,? 135r 204-5).
2. See Barth, Xl/2, pp3 67'Iff,
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to supersede or replace God’s particulai' address to individuals. 1
A Rejection of the Rational Application of Biblical Codes and 
Principles
Because Ellul and Barth are committed to the living God, because
they see the Christian life as involving direct obedience to the Holy
Spirit, they are not willing to understand the Christian life as a
2 .
rational application of a biblical code, Ellul cites Bonhoeffer
approvingly to the effect that obedience does not have to do with 
rules and exceptions.^ Ellul, like Barth and Bonhoeffer, also opposes
1. Barth Il/2, pp. 679-682; see also p, 700; IIl/4» P» 12.
"It can hardly be disputed that in this question of God’s command 
in the Bible the obvious thing is to keep first and primarily to these 
series of direct commands which abound profusely in all parts of the 
Old and New Testaments. ... Bo we not have to infer as a decisive 
principle of biblical ethics the fact that primari iy the divine 
command does not take the form of universal and general rules, but 
that of individual concrete and specific orders and directions, so 
that man is not required to assimilate general rules, himself 
deciding about the good and the bad when he comes to apply them, 
but rather to keep steadily before him the special and definite 
thing that God enjoins him to do or not to do?" (Barth Tl/2, p. 679)*
2. To Will and To Bo, p. 215• "When we attempt to make precise 
rules for the Christian life, to build a moral code, a model ’which 
one must imitate and accomplish, we betray Jesus Christ himself.
...The Christian life is not a moral life, precisei.y because it 
does not obey a law, but because it belongs to Christ, because it 
is communion with the will of God and because this will is not Law, 
but Love and Freedom". ( "Le Sens de la Liberie", pp, 16-17; see 
also "L’Hurnilite Precede la Gloire," p. 29). .
3. To Will and To Bo, pp. 273-4, citing Bonhoeffer, Ethics, pp. 
I85ff; see below, p. 114 et see., n. 2.
Bonhoeffer tells us that "the will of God is always concrete, or 
else it is not the will of God. ... The will of God is not a 
princip from which one has to draw inferences and which has to be 
applied to ’reality’. A 'will of God’ which can be recognized • 
without immediately leading to action is a general principle, but 
it is not the will of God " (Bonhoeffer, Ethics, p. 252). Barth writes, 
"God’s commandment is the speech of God to man. Both in its contents 
and in its form it is concrete speech to the concrete man, God’s 
commandment leaves man no room for application or interpretation.
It leaves room only for obedience or disobedience, God’s commandment 
cannot be found and known in detachment from time and place; it can 
only be heard in a local and temporal context. If God’s commandment 
is not clear, definite and concrete to the last detail, then it is 
not God’s commandment" (Barth Hl/4, p. 14)♦ Barth wrote of 
Bonhoeffer*s concept of "simple obedience": "Obedience is simple 
when/.,.
I
those efforts to build a Christian ethic from the rational
application of biblical principles. ,He, for example, thinks of 
Christian love more in terms of a spiritual relationship of obedience 
to God; Reinhold Niebuhr thinks of love more in terms of a natural 
striving to approximate a biblical ideal, after having rationally 
assessed the available choices by this norm.
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when we do just what we are told —nothing more, nothing less, and 
nothing different” (Barth, IV/2, p. 540)• (For the development of 
this theme see also Bonhceffer, The Cost of Discipleship; Barth,
II/2, pp. 663-671; III/4. pp> 11-14;” IV/2, p. 542; The Humanity 
of God, p. 86),
Barth, Bonhoeffer and Ellul stress the importance of rational 
situational analysis. These men do not represent an "intuitionism" 
which ignores the reality of the world. What they deny is that any 
such analysis can of_iteself determine the will of God for our lives. 
The will of God is ’’dialectically” related to such analysis. Such 
analysis is necessary as instructional preparation for hearing the 
Word of God, but cannot of itself speak the Word of God (To Will and 
To Do, p. 310, citing Barth, Il/2, pp. 634-5? see also Bonhceffer, 
Ethics, pp. 7, 161"3; Barth, Against the Stream, pp. 152-4, 159)•
Ellul says, ’’Contrary to widely held opinion, faith in the Holy 
Spirit does not mean that we may act imprudently, close our eyes and 
refuse to think; rather, it means that we must use our heads and try 
to see ’with clarity. True, the Holy Spirit—who is clarity itself — 
may propel us into the greatest imprudence; but then we shall know 
it" (Violence, pp. 82-3, see also Blaise Presence, p, 2),
The difference between Barth and Ellul at this point may be that 
Ellul applies in practice what both men affirm in theory. Ellul’s 
ethic decisively relates to his very sophisticated and thorough 
knowledge of the modern world. It is doubtful whether Barth really 
possessed this kind of a depth' knowledge of modern society and 
hence it is doubtful whether he was really in a position to apply 
what his theory allowed. For a deep knowledge of the modern world, 
one must do more than read the Bible and the newspaper (John D. 
Godsey, "Portrait of Karl Barth", in Karl Barth, Hoxv I Changed rny 
Mind, Introduction, p. 12; see also Barth, Romans, p. 425J7 
It is Ellul’s additional sociological knowledge that here sets him 
off from Barth.
1. Ellul writes, "We must be convinced that there is no such thing 
as ’Christian principles’. There is the Person of Christ, who is 
the principle of everything. But if we wish to be faithful to Him, 
we cannot dream of reducing Christianity to a certain number of 
principles... the consequences of which can be logically deduced"
(The Presence of the Kingdom, p. 52; see also To Will and To Do, 
pp, 83-41 219), "God’s commands never aim at bringing a man to 
realize an ideal, which all moralities of the world tend to do.
God’s commands always relate to an action connected with the estab­
lishment and proclamation of his covenant, with his promised kingdom 
which is close upon us. Therefore, in Christian ethics it will never 
be a matter of doing some good or other, but of carrying out a certain 
task relating to the kingdom of God and to the witness which God calls 
upon/.,,
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Ellul’s insistence on a kind of “contextualism" is based mainly 
on his understanding of God as a living reality. It is, however, also 
the case that he argues that a legalistic ethic is irrelevant to life, 
because life is dynamic/ He believes that a Christian ethic should 
stand in relation to the concrete circumstances of life and hence be
subject to change. He thinks that works on Christian ethics should 
seek to help Christians to be present in the actual world in which - 
they live. He agrees with Heinhold Niebuhr that ethics involve a
upon us to bear” (To Will and To Do, p. 84), He believes that if it 
were possible to formulate the will of God in principles, these 
principles would in effect be superior to God and there would no 
longer be the need for a relationship between God and man, Man 
would then in effect be claiming to know of himself, what Ellul ■ 
believes can only be knovm through personal revelation (ib_idx, pp. 
203-4). (it is interesting that he criticizes idealism precisely 
because he thinks that in idealism the "good” becomes superior to 
God and thus empties the belief in the Holy Spirit of all content.
He thinks that idealism establishes the superiority of morality over 
religion — ibid,, pp, 134-5, see also p, 20z$.
In like manner Barth writes, “How strangely would the Bible deviate 
from its proper theme and content,,.if it were to describe the will 
of God as the establishment and proclamation of general precepts and 
rules which can be filled out only on the basis of the reflection and 
decision of inanj” (ll/2, p„ 678),
The difference between Barth,. Ellul and Bonhoeffer as compared with 
Heinhold Niebuhr is that the former men emphasize the present activity 
of the Holy Spirit and interpret biblical moral teachings in this 
context, whereas Niebuhr stresses the example of Christ on the cross 
(and the earlier Niebuhr the teachings of Jesus), and leaves the. 
application pretty much to natural reason. Barth and Ellul pose an 
important question for Niebuhr’s thought as to whether his ethic has 
an adequate place for the activity of the Holy Spirit and thus whether 
Niebuhr has avoided the criticisms levied against idealism. In 
Niebuhr’s thought, does not the human effort to approximate a 
principle assume the role of the Holy Spirit?
1• To Will and To Bo, p. 209•
2. To Will and To Do. pp. 225, 247, 250, 265? The Presence of the’
Kingdom, pp..21—22,.
3« To Will and To Do, p. 251. Ellul is here in conscious dependence
on both Barth and Bonhoeffer. He cites his agreement with Bonhoeffer
that ethics have to do with actual people in real history (ibid.. p. 
25O; see also Bonhoeffer, Ethics, pp, 232, 238~9). Likewise he 
agrees with Barth that ethics have to do with the relationship of God 
and man in history (ibid,? p. 250). ’
Though Ellul argues that the Christian ethic ought to be contin­
ually “revised, re-examined, and re-shaped by the combined effort of 
the Church as a whole" (The Presence of the Kingdom, p. 22), he is 
not/...
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1
relation to the given facts of the world.. He agrees with Niebuhr’s
not saying that the world has the right to determine the content 
of the Christian ethic. He criticizes "a situation ethic—-an 
ethic that condones any objective society decides on” (Violence, 
p. 56). His position is much more difficult and subtle than either 
orthodoxy’s timeless code morality or liberal theology’s identif­
ication with cultural trends, It is related to the modern world, 
but is not determined by the modern world (The Presence of the 
Kingdom, p. 28; see also The Political Illusion, p,. 53). (Ellul’s 
"in the world but not of the world” reasoning is here being applied). 
He is arguing for the importance of sensitivity to the will of the 
Lord as it relates to the actual issues of the world in which one 
lives (To V.’ill and To Dp, p. 310), He criticises Sartre, not 
because Sartre takes modern circumstances into consideration, which 
Ellul also wishes to do, but because he believes that Sartre’s 
thought is excessively determined by those circumstances (The 
Political Illusion, p, 53). Ellul knows that the living Word of God 
can no more be determined by the situation itself than it can be 
determined by a mere reference to a code from the past. It is the 
spirituality of the Lord of God which separates his situational 
approach from those which really have to do only with immanental 
possibilities, •­
1 • 'lo Will and To Bo, p, 250. He, however, disagrees with Niebuhr 
precisely at a point where Barth’s theology is different from
Niebuhr's, He insists that the Christian’s relationship with the 
world must occur without Christian revelation turning into a 
possibility immanent ’within the historical process. In other words, 
he does not think that Niebuhr has succeeded in preserving the 
autonomous nature of the Christian ethio in the face of the world - 
(ibid,, p, 2p0)e He thinks that Niebuhr has succeeded in relating - 
Christian ethics to the world at the cost of having lost some 
important Christian content. What Ellul is striving to express 
about Christian ethics was very well said by Barth with reference to 
dogmatics: "In the present and for the sake of the present, dog­
matics will not inquire about the voice of the day, but about the voice 
of God for the day.,." (Barth, l/2, p. 843). Ellul, like Bar th, is 
concerned that ethics relate to the modern world, but both men are 
much more concerned about the dangers of cultural adaptation than • 
was Heinhold Niebuhr,
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critique of "orthodox" theology. Niebuhr accused orthodoxy of 
bypassing the problems of modern men by its simple identification of
the will of God with biblical codes. Orthodoxy offers "irrelevant
1
precepts", creating a break between the imperative and the real.
1, To Will and To Do, p. 299* Niebuhr writes of Christian .
orthodoxy, "Its morality is expressed in dogmatic and authorit­
arian moral codes. It tries vainly to meet the social perplex­
ities of a complex civilization with irrelevant precepts deriving 
their authority from their — sometimes quite fortuitous — inclusion 
in a sacred canon. It concerns itself with the violation of 
Sabbatanian prohibiti ons,,. ’’ (Reinhold Nicbuhr, An Interpretation 
of Christian Ethics, p. 14; see also p, 18). Of the Refo.rmers 
themselves Niebuhr writes, "The scriptural authority, below the 
level of love, is less valid in the realm of law than the 
Reformation assumes because there is always an element of histor­
ical contingency in the allegedly absolute norms of Scripture 
context (St, Paul’s attitude toward women in the Church is a 
case in point)" (Reinhold Niebuhr, Christian Realism and 
Political Problems (1953), p. 172)»
Ellul, like Niebuhr, cites the Reformers as examples of the 
inadequate use of biblical moral teachings (To Will and To Do, 
p» 245). the identification of the transcendent will of God with 
canonical moral codes (ibid,, p. 308). "One confused, then, the 
definite seriousness of theological formulations concerning the . 
truth of revelation with the moral commandment, which was no 
longer distinguished from them, Once adopted, the ethical 
structure is just as untouchable as the theological propositions". 
(ibid., p. 246), (Prom this last statement we can see that Ellul ' 
regards the .Bible as primarily a theological book, a book indicating 
God's revealed nature, and only secondarily and in a more relative 
way a book about morality).
Ellul says that Paul presents a fairly complete theology but does 
not even intend to present a complete ethic. He says that Paul 
offers moral examples, describing only aspects of the Christian 
life (ibid., p. 299)* He points out that the Bible itself, presents
several different moralities, which are not all consistent with each 
other: "The commandments as a whole do not possess that splendid 
unity which we would like to attribute to the work of GodJ" (ibid., 
p. 300; see also p, 48) He points out that not all moralities of 
the Bible speak with equal authority today. In fact, he thinks some 
biblical moralities are not and should not be authoritative today.
He refers to such embarrasing Old Testament stories as Abraham’s 
call to sacrifice his son, the polygamy of the patriarchs, Abraham’s 
attitude toward Sarah, Tamar's seduction of her father-in-law, and 
the dreadful requirement of the herem to make his point. He also 
refers to Elijah’s slaughter of the prophets of Baal (To Will and 
To Bo. pp, 99, 205-7; Violence, p. 161).
Ellul recognizes that all biblical moralities are time-conditioned 
and must be understood within the context of the particularities of 
the past age and historical situation in which they were written 
(To 14ill and To Bo, >. 300), He does seem a bit inconsistent to 
insist on .such commands as the herem having been God’s will (ibid., 
pp. 206-208), while at the same time claiming to agree with Niebuhr on 
the/..,
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Ellul is too much of a biblical theologian to base his case primarily
on historical relevance the way Niebuhr does; he is too much of a 
sociologist to ignore the factor of relevance entirely.
Theocentric Relativism
Ellul’s covenant understanding of the Christian life leads to
what might be called "theocentric relativism”, "A thing is never -
good or bad in itself, not even by the use men make of it. A thing
is only good or bad in its own time, according to its situation in
the light of the Kingdom of God, according to its conformity to the
work of God,,,”* 1 lie tells us that the revelation of God personalizes
and causes each life to become singular and unique and open to the 
2particularities of God's will. He cites his agreement with Barth, 
that all that man is, does and wills must be constantly called into 
question by God.^
the relativity of canonical moral codes, Ellul seems to think, of the 
relativity of such codes in a different way from that of Niebuhr, 
Niebuhr thinks that a large amount of scriptural morality never was 
commanded by God, but was merely a reflection of "primitive social 
standards," Ellul thinks that most biblical morality was once based 
on God’s will for a particular situation, but he thinks that some 
biblical morality no longer embodies God’s will*
1 • frhe Presence of the Kingdom, p. 55 >
2, "There is not one Christian life. There are as many Christian 
lives as there are Christians. There are not Christian works, except 
insofar as the Holy Spirit pushes a man to make decisions and to ful­
fil holiness. Thus one lives in a world endlessly deployed along 
paths which open up step by step as one follows them, without their 
in any sense being mapped in advance. One lives in ever-surprising 
novelty. There is not, to be sure, an absence of continuity, breaks 
between yesterday and today; but today's innovation could not have 
been deduced'logically and rationally from yesterday’s decision since 
it does not obey a human logic, a rational conduct of life" (To Will 
and To Do, p. 219).
3* To Will and To Do, p. 215. Barth tells us that we must be willing 
to accept the "inevitable relativisation of all our own hypotheses 
and convictions ” (Barth, Il/2, p. 65.4)*' He insists that openness to 
the command of God means bracketing and holding in reserve what we 
think we know about the rightness and goodness of our past and present 
decisions, and the rules and axioms of the past (±1/2, p, 6/1.6). "None 
of these has an unlimited claim to be valid again today as it 'was 
valid/...
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Casuistry and Practical Casuistry
Barth and Ellul oppose '’casuistry”. By casuistry they mean a
moral approach which confuses its own words of witness with God’s 
absolute will and which claims to offei' an infallible interpretation
of God’s will. They oppose this casuistry because it denies the
concrete and historical nature of man’s obedience to God and because
it confuses the Church’s voice with the voice of the Church1^- Lord, 
thus denying God the freedom to reveal his own will,
While rejecting "casuistry”, Ellul follows Barth in affirming a
"practical casuistry". The difference between casuistry and practical 
2
casuistry is that the latter is aware of its own relativity, Ellul
valid yesterday. None of them is identical with the divine command'* 
(Barth Il/2, p. 646). For Barth's thought on this point as it re­
lates to politics see Against the Stream.pp, 85~9* 1 2i 114. See below, 
pp. 283-284, •for Barth’s and Ellul’s related positions on politics.
1, To Will and To Do. pp. 208-214, 241—2, 303. Barth argues that 
casuistry destroys Christian freedom. It interposes something be­
tween the command of God and man's free obedience. Casuistry con­
ceals from us the character of our conduct as our own direct respon­
sibility to God (Barth III/4, pp, 13-14)» "It spares him what he 
should not be spared •—the knowledge that it is not merely his 
external conduct, nor his will, purpose and intention, but himself 
that is demanded" (Barth III/4, p. 14; see also III/4, pp. 6ff.,
31; The Holy Ghost and the Christian Life, p, 24),
Barth's rejection of casuistry may itself be influenced by
Dietrich Bonhoeffer. Bonhoeffer wrote, "an ethic cannot be a book 
in which there is set out how everything in the world actually ought 
to be but unfortunately is not, and an ethicist cannot be a man who 
always knows better than others what is to be done and how it is to 
be done. An ethic cannot be a work of reference for moral action 
which is guaranteed to be unexceptionable, and the ethicist cannot 
be the competent critic and judge of every human activity " 
(Bonhoeffer, Ethics, p, 236).
2. Ellul believes that a true Christian ethic must stand under the 
judgment of God, with the hope of God’s blessing but without the 
claim of divine authority. He sees Christian ethics as involving 
human debate and dialogue, rather than having to do with infallible 
pronouncements (To Will and To Do, p. 247). "Every ethic formulated 
in the church wears by that very fact its relativity, its need for 
constant renewal, for one knows very well that it is the product of
a human search; whereas the ethic which pretends to be the immediate 
application of the commandment claims to be unalterable because 
directly inspired by God.,.Thus the first conspicucus service which 
the clear and precise formulation of an ethic renders to the church 
and to Christians is to remind them of the relative, even fluctuating 
character/.•»
writes, "As Karl Barth quite rightly says,
there can he a casuistry of practice, in which a person faced with 
a case of conscience can encounter another person who helps him 
resolve that problem, but there cannot be a casuistic ethic, nor 
any technical method for applying the text to a. multiplicity of 
cases, nor for drawing an inference of good and evil on the 
basis of the truth of the text,”^
The distinction here is a vital one. Neither Ellul nor Barth is
defending an individualism. Both think that God’s Word occurs in the
context of the conversation in which fellow-Christians witness to 
2
their understanding of God’s present demand.
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character of morality...” (ibid., p, 247). ’’Ethical reflection, 
then, will be the knowledge which accompanies each of our decisions 
in relation to those which precede it or are to follow it, but 
nothing morel” (ibid., p. 305). According to him the only 
legitimate place for the Christian ethic is ’’within the limits . 
indicated by a servant role, beneath the cross and in the hope 
of its pardon " (ibld., p, 266).
Ellul believes that one reason that modern statements of Christian 
ethics should be formulated is precisely to help preserve the relat­
ive nature of all human formulations about the content of God’s 
demand (ibid., p. 246). He thinks that in the absence of contemp­
orary restatements of Christian ethics, Christians tend to misuse 
scriptural teaching in literalistic ways. The Church’s ethical 
thinking becomes fixated and unrelated to modern life (ibid., p.245)
1. i*0 Will and To Do, p, 210.
2, Ellul thinks that in the absence of contemporary moral conversa­
tion in the Church, the Holy Spirit tends to become an abstraction, 
having little moral bearing on people’s lives (To Will and To Bo, 
p, 246), He believes that the relative is important (ibid,< p.26O). 
lie thinks that in the absence of such important, though relative, 
conversation the Church has no answers to the complex moral problems 
of life —and Christians simply conform to their social conditioning 
(ibid., pp, 246-8). Without moral conversation, Christians lack 
initiative and imagination. They uncritically accept the social and 
political views they have held for twenty years and cling to out­
worn forms of churchly organisation. Ellul sees the Christian ethic 
as a vital tool fox* jarring Christians out of complacency and con­
formity. It helps to suggest new and creative responses to moral 
problems (ibid., p, 253), "To be sure, ethics is no substitute ' 
for individual decision. It cannot be put in the place of the 
Christian, nor be a screen between him and God, but it can bring 
support to a lack of discovery. It can set forth ’models', not in 
the sense of examples to be imitated, but in the economic sense of 
the word. These models would be examples of possible forms of 
expression of the faith (and not ready-made solutions), as a point 
of departure from which a person could reason and come up effect­
ively with something else ” (Ibid.. pp. 253-4)*
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What both men are saying is that though human witness is essential,
it is relative and it is relative precisely because the Word of God
is God’s free and personal claim. Christians offer advice, not
absolute imperatives,Barth at one place suggests that Christians 
2
are not to set up laws, but to ask "arrow-like questions". The 
asking of "arrow-like questions" very adequately summarises 'the role •
Barth and Ellul assign to the Christian ethic and the Christian
ethicist.
The Use of Moral Bevel ation From the^Past
As surprising as it may seem from the foregoing statements in
this chapter, Ellul, and 3arth both attribute an important place to 
God’s past moral revelation. Having seemingly oversta.ted their case 
in terms which verge on a denial of the importance of past moral 
revelation, they correct themselves by emphasizing precisely what they
1. To Wil?L and To Do, p» 252. ’’Evangelical ethics will leave the
pronouncement of unconditional impera.tives to God... This does - 
not exclude the possibility of conditional imperatives addressed 
in concrete situations by a person to a brother. It is part of 
the risk of obedience involved in the encounter and communion 
between Christian brothers, and it is part of the risk of action 
according to the God-given freedom, to be called to invite, even 
to urge, a brother to a concrete action in a concrete situation, 
and to ask from him a concrete decision. Wan will do so with his 
eyes lifted up to the living God who is also his brother's God " 
(Barth, The Humanity of God, p, 86). .
Ellul writes of the Christian ethic, "At heart, this is a 
fight of faith; individual, and.in the presence of God.., It is 
never a series of rules, or principles, or slogans, and every . 
Christian is really responsible for his works and for his con­
science, Thus we can never make a complete and valid description 
of the ethical demands of God, any more than vre can reach its 
heart. We can only define its outline, and its conditions, and 
study some of its elements for purposes of illustration ’’ (The 
Presence of the Kingdom, p. 20 )* "But this elaboration must not 
be substituted for the fight of faith, which every Christian 
must wage; that is why it is indicative, not imperative. We 
must not imagine that this ethic will give us the permanent 
solution of all problems ” (The Presence of the Kingdom, p. 22).
2. Barth, Hl/4, p. 71. '
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previously seemed, to minimize. Ellul tells us that because God. is One 
there is a consistent relationship between God’s demands in the past 
and His expectations today. Because God is One the Christian moral
life is not "unadulterated incoherence1’. Christian actions do not
succeed one another disconnectedlyf. blindly, nor in contradictory
2
wa,ys, He tells us that though he lays great stress on God’s freedom
to reveal his will, he does not understand God’s freedom as arbitrary
or absurd or inconsistent with past revelation.'^
The preceding propositions do not imply a personal conduct 
directly inspired by the Holy Spirit at every moment, nor a 
•disjointed ethic sometimes defended on the basis of the text 
’The Spirit blows where it ’wills.’ In this Karl Barth criticizes 
Soe who gives in a little too much to inspiration hic et nunc 
(Barth III/4, sec 52) „4 1 2 3
1. He also argues that God’s concrete commanding relates to His 
being as love, though the implication is clearly that we could 
not determine concrete commands by a logical deduction from our 
understanding of God’s nature (To Will and To Do. p. 268).
2. Ts Will and To Do, p. 23. "The command of God is not a sequence
of isolated, absurd revelations, for he who issues the command is 
the one, eternal God, Each prescription is linked with other 
prescriptions because they are part of the divine order a.nd cannot 
be separated ” (ibid,, p, 2’59; see also p, 263), ’’Even though it
is always a matter of particular commandments the command of God 
never degenerates into a sort of incoherent chaos of special and 
contradictory directives addressed to ever different individuals.
Man in the presence of Gcd’s command does not dissociate into a 
series of situations without common ground with his fellows and 
without continuity, for the command comes from God and God himself 
is consistent ” (ibid., p. 301)» For Barth’s statement of the same 
point see IXl/4, pp. 15~17« See Emil Brunner, The Divine 
Imperative, p. 135f Oor a similar understanding of the givenness and 
flexibility of biblical law, based on the Reformation understanding 
of the relationship between the biblical Word and the Spirit.
3. p. 262.
4* To Will and To Bo, p, 304» That Ellul sometimes seems wildly
paradoxical in his formulations can be seen by setting another quotJtborv 
next to the one just given. He wrote earlier in the same book, "Now 
the Spirit blows where it wills. He is unpredictable in his entrance 
as well as in his effects. He cannot be bound. He cannot be poss­
essed. He comes and he goes. When we walk in his light we cannot 
be assured that it will not suddenly disappear. As a. result, we can 
put nothing together which is consistent, continuous, predictable, 
neither in our work nor in cur conduct, nor in our striving for an 
ascetic morality,..because in the first place this intervention of 
the Holy Spirit alone renders us apt for hearing and obeying the 
commandment of God. It alone makes us hear the commandment as
really/...
- 107 -
Ellul notes his agreement with .'Barth that "What God wants of man is 
only revealed to. us in what he wants and has already done for us (Barth 
Xl/2, p. 538)." 1
Both Ellul and Barth retain as decisive the Belief that God speaks
here and now, yet both also affirm the significance of past moral revela-
tion.*~ Though neither man very explicitly relates his intention here to
a doctrine of the Trinity, a trinitarian belief is affirmed by both men 
3
and seems to be the underlying assumption for their style of Christian ethic. * 1 2 3
really addressed to us personally, and in so doing it, gives us the 
power, the capacity, for carrying it out" (To Will and To Do, p. 213). 
Barth also makes overstatements at this point. For example, compare 
what Barth says about the law in Ul/3, pp. 254-255? with what he says 
about the law as a lower limit (which we will discuss on pp, 109-116).’
1. To Will and To Bo, p. 309* "God is the same, yesterday, today and 
forever. He at no time deceives us about himself. That which he 
revealed yesterday is always completely valid. Therefore we count 
on a steadfastness, on a continuity on the part of God. V/e are not 
at all given over to a despot who would toy with us" (ibid., p. 263). 
From the time we come to know of God’s love in Christ, we know that 
God does not intend to deceive us or lead us in a capricious way 
(ibid., p. 263). See The Politics of God and the Politics of Man, 
p. 47? for a dialectical pairing of two aspects of God’s activity:
God as the disturber of theological formulations and God as the God of 
tradition who has spoken and revealed His will in the past. In the 
light of these two aspects of God's activity, Ellul defends the 
importance of both Christian innovation and Christian tradition.
2. To Will and To Bo, p. 3C4-
3. In one footnote Ellul refers to the doctrine of the Trinity in 
this context (To Will and To Bo, pp. 3O3~5)» He points out that 
the Holy Spirit has no autonomy with respect to the Trinity. The 
Holy Spirit relates to the objectivity of God's past revelation in 
Jesus Christ—thus, there is a oneness about God’s activity (ibid., 
p. 3O4). Barth, of course, has placed the doctrine of the Trinity 
at the beginning of his dogmatics and regards it as normative for 
the understanding of God's revelation (Barth i/l, p. 346). "The 
doctrine of the Trinity thus becomes normative for the development 
of every part of dogmatics, and, by virtue of the unity established 
by Barth between dogmatics and ethics, for the development of a 
theological ethic as well" (Robert E. Willis, The Ethics of Karl 
Barth, pp. 114-115)*
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In contrast to the extreme situational ethicists, both men stress the 
1
significance of past revelation; yet past revelation is seen to be
concretized by and in seme cases severely relativized by God’s present 
2
activity. The trinitarian God is seen to oe consistent, but not 
3‘monotonous,' God commands in ways consistent with his past activity, 
but does not merely repeat himself; at least, he does not necessarily 
do so. Ethics in a trinitarian style involves openness to change 
because the Holy Spirit is alive today. It also involves continuity,
1. Paul Lehmann’s Ethics in a Christian Context is in the Barthian 
tradition of emphasizing the freedom of God, but it does not 
recognise the significance of past moral revelation. One searches 
in vain in his work for references to moral guidelines drawn from 
past revelation, Lehmann writes, "The theonomons conscience is 
the conscience immediately sensitive to the freedom of God to do 
in the always changing human situation what his humanizing aims., 
and purposes require. The theonomous conscience is governed and 
directed by the freedom of God alone " (Paul Lehmann, Ethics in
a Christian Context, pp. 358~9)« I agree entirely with Paul 
Ramsey when he writes, "Barth can take ethics more seriously than 
Lehmann precisely because his theology is more adequate. While 
for Barth God is free, He has also made Himself known quite hist­
orically in Jesus Christ. Jesus Christ becomes the datum for the 
moral life of a Christian in Barth in a way that He does not for 
Lehmann, .While there remains the possibility in Barth of 
entirely novel, free acts of God, there is a shape to the gospel 
of God and a shape to His action that enables us to reflect upon 
it for our knowledge of God and for our knowledge into the shape 
of Christian moral action ’’ (Paul Ramsey, Deeds and Rules in 
Christian Ethics, p, 51)•
2. Ellul chinks that Bultmann neglects the continuity of God’s
will and reduces the Christian life to obedience in the moment 
(To Will and To do, p, 300). In short, he fails to recognise the’ 
significance of biblical law. "Let us always remember that 
’whenever the grace becomes event and revelation it ends in the 
institution of the law (ibid., p, 205, on P» 302 citing Barth 
Il/2, p, 562)» Bultmann’s underemphasis on the importance of the 
lav; for1 moral guidance is certainly due to his existentialism and 
also probably due to his Lutheran background. Ellul is in the 
Calvinist tradition in emphasizing the importance of the law for 
moral guidance and certainly does not intend to be an existentia­
list. (However, compare To Will and To Do, p, 219; se® also 
the appendix on pp, below,)
Ellu'l shares with Bultmann a fear that the development of full 
- ethical systems can lead to Pharisaic easy consciences and to a
failure to depend on grace (Ibid., pp. 174-5» 222-223). Though 
Ellul does not seem to eliminate biblical law in the way Bultmann 
does, Bultmann’s motive for being suspicious of ethical systems 
is most decisively shared by Ellul,
3. Barth IJ.l/4, p. io-.
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because God has spoken in the past.
The Law as a Lower Limit *
Ellul and Barth are quite clear that the Christian is to live 
in personal obedience to God here and now. They are both less clear 
as to the precise way in x-ihich we are to use biblical law in the 
fulfilment of this task. That is, they are less clear as to the way 
present obedience to the Holy Spirit is related to God's past moral 
revelation. It seems that the confusion here goes back to the basic 
Bar*fchian subjective understanding of the Word of God.^ To say that 
the Word of God is dialectically related to Scripture does not mean
tha.1 the moral message of Scripture cannot as such become the VJord of 
God, at least as a lower limit showing God's demand.
1. Oscar Cullman gives hints concerning a salvation history ethic 
along these same lines. See Salvation in History, pp, 304, 328-338.
2. This aspect of Barth and Ellul’s thought can be called "the law 
as a lower limit” only if we recognize that in Barth’s discussion 
of The Sermon on The Mount he indicates that the demands contained 
therein are anything but lower limits (Barth Il/2, p. 689), We 
could change the title to "the law as a relatively firm guideline", 
but we would be missing the main point. Most of Barth’s discussion 
here and all of Ellul’s has’to do with seeing the law as expressing 
God’s minimal demands, If Barth's discussion of The Sermon on The 
Mount is bracketed, the general topic here is the sense in which 
there are lower limits indicated in biblical law and the related 
recognition that God’s absolute demands are more exacting than 
biblical law, and can only be understood by the activity of the 
Holy Spirit. In order to avoid confusion, we leave the heading as
it is, and will footnote Barth’s reference to The Sermon on the Mount 
The fact that the demands of The Sermon on The Mount are closer
to an "impossible ideal" than a "lower limit" indicate that there 
are various types of biblical laws and that they cannot all be 
treated in the same way. Barth and Ellul also recognize the exist­
ence of biblical legal diversity, since they at other places speak 
of the law more as instructional preparation than as a relatively 
firm lower limit, (See below, pp. 116-120 ).
3. See below, p. 124., n. 1.
/{., Barth is quite clear that the words of Scripture are never
identical with the Word of God, The question is asked, "If you are 
studying the words of Paul, will, there be any given moment when the 
words of Paul become identical with the Word of God for you?" Barth 
replies, "No. For you there may be a unity, but not identity ”
(Table Talk, p, 35) «
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Barth and. Ellul as Believing Christians see some aspects of biblical 
law as representing a considerable degree of givenness, a kind of 
lower limit below which Christian morality must not fall, but above
which only the Holy Spirit can indicate,
Barth, for example, says that the fen Commandments do not
1
contain concrete commands, but do mark out certain delimitations.
"We are simply told what must not in any circumstances take place in 
this sphere, In concreto many other things not excluded by these
terms are illegitimate. But what is excluded by them must not be done 
in any circumstances." /my underlines/Thus, biblical law does 
not exhaustively describe God’s will, but at some points does provide a
rather firm guideline of some outer limits beyond which Christian
3
conduct must not stray.
Like Barth, Ellul tells us that there is no question of doing 
less than the law requires, but rather more. "There e,re consequences 
of faith which can be objectively indicated.""Faith does not set
1. Barth Il/2, p. 684* .
2. Barth Il/2, pp, 684-5• absolute firmness of this statement
is uncharacteristic of Barth, as we have seen in the preceding 
pages and as we will see in the .following, .
3. While not seeing The Sermon on The Mount as a lower limit, Barth
does insist that the Christian life cannot be constructed merely 
by reference tc such teachings; yet, he thinks that such teachings 
are essential for understanding some of the contours of the Christ­
ian life (ll/2, p. 688). '
4* The Presence of the Kingdom, p, 21. One reason Ellul thinks that 
the objective side of the law must be indicated is that he believes 
that we are sinners, all too prone to conform to our own sinful 
nature, and hence we need moral guidance (ibid., pp, 21-2), He is 
in agreement with Calvin in his reasoning at this point, though he 
would not accept Calvin’s rather non-selective use of biblical law. 
(For the contrast between this Calvinist position and Luther’s see 
Reinhold Niebuhr, The Nature and Destiny of Man, Part 2, pp. 188­
204* For a position similar to Ellul’s, see Emil Brunner, The 
Divine Imperative, p, 148), Ellul believes that Christian spontan­
eity is more likely to be an expression of social conformity than 
an expression of obedience to the Holy Spirit (False Presence, pp. 
84-5; "Theologie Dogmatique," p. 150). Along related lines Victor 
Paul B'urnish writes, "Paul does not...presume that the Christian's 
obedience is a ’spontaneous’ expression of the new life. The Pauline
indicative.
Ill
us free from the lav; in order to allow us not to carry it out.”
Ke even says that there is a place for habit and custom in the
Christian life, as long as we do not use these to evade the radical 
2
claim of the Holy Spirit, Ellul’s main example of what he means by
the lav; as a lower limit is the Old Testament practice of tithing;-
The tithe was one of the requirements of the law, Life in 
faith liberates us from that requirement, but not so that we 
may avoid paying the tithe. To the contrary, it faces us with 
the problem of the total dedication of our possessions to Cod 
which should be translated into an actual gift of much more 
than the tithe,"3
He also gives the example of prayer. Though he knows that prayer 
he
must be inspired by the Holy Spirit,.nevertheless bases prayer in 
part on the objective biblical command to pray,^
Ellul appeals to the apostle Paul for the biblical precedent 
for the practice of emphasizing a Spirit ethic and yet having concern 
for the law as helping to give shape to the Christian life. Since 
Christians of the first century often behaved as though they did not
live by the Holy Spirit, Paul enunciated certain requirements for the 
Christian life, though he did not see his advice as an exhaustive 
description of Cod’s expectations*"2 (Ellul would not accept ail of 
Paul's recommendations, but agrees in principle that we must pay 
careful attention to the structural aspects of the Christian life as 
indicated in Scripture)
indicative and imperative are both to be taken seriously. Indeed, 
the apostle's exhortations seek to summon believers to that kind of 
deliberate response to Cod's claim without which faith forfeits its 
distinctive character as obedience " (Victor Paul Furnish, Theology 
and Ethics, p, 227).
1* To Will and To Ho, p, 254.
2. Ibid,, p. 255■»
3. . Ibid,, pp, 254-5.
4• Prayer and Modern Nan, pp. 102, 109, 115.
5* To Will and To Do, pp. 227-228.
6, Victor Paul Furnish points out that Paul appealed to the binding 
force of the law's command (Rom, 13:8-10; Gal. 5:^» I Cor, 7:19) 
(Victor/,,.
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When Ellul speaks of the law as a lower limit, he means in part
that Christian freedom should lead the Christian infinitely beyond the
requirements of the law.' ' He is concerned that Christians not use
their freedom as a way of choosing the easy life, but as an expression
of obedience far exceeding the letter of the law, "It is easy to
criticize the ascetic' attitude. But one may do this only if he is 
2
prepared to go beyond it and do better.”
Ellul cites his dependence on Barth for the development of his
idea of the law as a lower limit and for the idea that the Christian
ethic is to describe the lower limits indicated in Scripture:-
Karl Barth has a striking formula on this subject: the task of 
ethics cannot be to decide the content of Cod’s commandment, nor 
to judge man’s action, but to describe the limits of God’s command­
ment and of man’s corresponding action. We are indeed faced with 
one of the principal functions of that ethic, which cannot formu­
late the imperative addressed to a man, nor fixate the will of God
(Victor Paul Furnish, Theology and Ft hies, p. 199» 228; see also 
Hom. 7:12,14). Furnish also notes that Paul’s concrete exhortations 
were not an attempt to define God’s maximum demands, but only God’s 
minimal requirements (Victor Paul Furnish, Theology and Ethics, 
pp, 75, 77; see also p. 192), Of the synoptic tradition, Furnish 
writes, "As a command, then, love stands over every particular 
requirement or set of requirements, This is what it means to say, 
as we have said, that love was understood in the Jesus-traditions as 
the critical measure of the law itself. ... The earliest church 
constantly particularized the love command by formulating specific 
rules of practice for its life. But in general (although not without 
exceptions) the church avoided reducing the commandment to such rules 
or using these rules as if, collectively, they exhausted the meaning 
of the love command itself” (Victor Paul Furnish, The Love Command, 
p, 205).
1. False Presence of the Kingdom, pp, 77™8» An example he cites is 
that Christians should use Sunday to glorify God in innovative ways, 
rather than using the day as simply a day for relaxation, (ibid,, 
p. 78).
2. The Politics of God and the Politics of Man, p. 106. He can 
even use language in defence of the law which is hard to reconcile 
with what he says elsewhere about the freedom of the Christian man.
He writes, ’’Jesus is not evading the problem of law and order.
There is a divine law, which is a commandment, and which is addressed 
to us. Hence we have to fulfil it to the letter. We have to do all 
that is commanded ” (The Politics of God and the Politics of Man,
p. 195).
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fop all eternity, bat in displaying the continuity of the 
revelation it can remind man where the commandment granted 
hie et nunc enters in,
One aspect of Ellul's understanding'of biblical lav; is partic­
ularly different from an existentialist ethic, He argues that the 
Christian, law and the Christian ethic can provide continuity in the
Christian life when the direct revelation of God is not being spoken a 
2or heard. In order for this point to make sense, the person 
would have had to have known God's personal revelation previously; 
otherwise, the structural aspects of biblical law would not be regarded 
as authoritative, A commandment becomes authoritative only when by 
God's grace it becomes a personal command. The issue is whether there 
is a givenness to the commandment once it is received in this way,
Ellul and Barth seem to answer yes, at least for some aspects of bibl­
ical law, and thus they are not willing to make the content of the 
Christian life a mere function of momentary inspiration,
1Hill and To Do. pp. 248—9, °n P* 309 referring to Barth IIj/4, 
p. 31; see also The Presence of the Kingdom, p, 23.
2, ?° Will and To Bo, p. 256, Though the Christian is to remember 
God's lav; at all times, rernemberance is seen by Ellul to be part­
icularly important m the context where God seems to be silent
(ibid,, pp, 255-7)• He also agrees with See (Christliche Ethik, sec, 
17") that a memory of God’s past revelation in our life is necessary 
for the proper reception of the Holy Spirit's guidance today. When 
the Holy Spirit speaks to us today, He does not find a tabula rasa 
(ibid,, pp. 259-260, 309). ’ •
3. See Prayer and Modern Man, pp. 57, 102, 104, 109-111; "Watch
and Pray", in Eternity 22, No, 10 (Oct. 1971) PP» 26-7* Ellul 
even insists that we must guard against the notion that we should 
passively wait for the Word of God and refrain from acting until 
we have the clear and conscious certainty of God's will. He points 
out that in the Acts of the Apostles, Peter and Paul are said to 
have undertaken missionary journeys without the clear instigation of 
the Holy Spirit, He notes that Paul is said to have been prevented, 
from going to Asia by the Holy Spirit after he had already set out 
in that direction (Acts 16:1-10) (To Will, and To Do, p, 257). "The 
attitude which consists in saying that one acts solely at the 
instigation of the Holy Spirit (and this means a clear and conscious 
instigation, of which we have explicit knowledge) is a dangerous 
attitude, for it can easily lead to doing nothing, on the pretext 
that the Holy Spirit has not spoken. It can also lead to carrying 
out/... •
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When Ellul speaks of biblical law as a lower limit, he is not 
intending to say that the major aspect of the Christian life can be 
determined by the structural demands of the Bible. These are lower 
limits. The Christian life goes far beyond these minimal demands. He 
is,quite ’clear that what he has in mind is only the barest outline of 
minimal conditions. He can even refer to these structural guidelines-
as ’’illustrations1’. That he can refer to laws as illustrations
indicates that e/en when he refers to the law as a lower limit, he is 
not intending to deny God the right to grant exceptions. That this is
out our own. desires, because the word of the Holy Spirit is spoken 
to us in a manner so secret that it is not subject to auy examination 
whatsoever by one’s brethren and by the church. But in that case 
how does one distinguish what is truly the Holy Spirit from one’s 
subconscious?” (ibid,, pp, 257-8). Ellul applies his own practical 
insights to the issue of prayer, calling Christians to pray actively 
to God even when God seems silent. He stresses the activity of man 
so strongly as to refer to prayer as "combat against God” (Ellul, 
Prayer and Modern Han, p. 153)•
I can't entirely a.gree with Richard Ray’s criticism that Ellul 
bases prayer solely on the biblical command to pray (Richard Ray, 
"Review of Prayer and Modern Man”, In teroretat.ion XXVI No. 1 (Jan, 
1972), pp. 117-118). Ellul's discussion of prayer does suffer from 
ambiguity. Particular passages confirm Ray’s criticism, but surely 
his book taken as a whole does not unambiguously support this con­
clusion. Ellul strives to base prayer on the continuing significance 
of the biblical commandment to those who have received grace. This 
is why at places he sounds as though he is basing prayer on grace 
and at other places as though he is basing it on obedience to the 
biblical command (see Prayer and Modern Man, pp. 57, 62, 102f 109­
111; ""Natch and Pray", pp. 26-7). In fact, he is basing prayer on 
the combination of these two factors. We must never forget that he 
does accept Barth’s reversal of the Law and the Gospel, and having 
done so could not base prayer solely on the biblical commandment.
Ellul sometimes seems to relate the basis of prayer as obedience, 
to a reluctance of God to reveal His presence, rather than man’s 
response to God’s free revelation (ibid., pp. 140-142). At these 
points Ray’s words ring true, but what Ray has uncovered is an 
internal contradiction, not a simple and straight forward effort on 
Ellul’s part to base prayer on duty rather than grace.
1, The Presence of the Kingdom, p. 20.
2. One wonders if Barth and Ellul are entirely consistent in saying 
that Christianity has nothing to do with rules and exceptions,
(See above pp. 97-98 & fn) * When they refer to the law as a lower limit, 
they seem to refer to relatively firm rules, which seem to hold true 
pending some radical reversal by the Holy Spirit. The following 
statement about Barth’s ethic is instructive in that it indicates how 
close Barth’s ethic at places comes to being an ethic of divine rules 
and divine exceptions, Robert E. Willis writes, "Negatively, the 
usual/...
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the case is indicated, when he tells us that the Holy Spirit can bring 
' -j
about a ’’suspension of ethics”. He explicitly rejects the under- 
2
standing of biblical law which sees it as an inflexible given. All
these considerations lead to the conclusion that Ellul in the final
analysis does not intend that the law as a lower limit be understood 
in an absolutely inflexible way, but rather as a relatively firm 
guideline for the perception of God’s will,
Likewise, Barth in the final analysis emphasizes tbe flexibility 
of the Christian ethic and does not regard the law as a lower limit as 
being a kind of inflexible absolute. That this is the case for both 
Barth and Ellul is obvious when we remember that even the determining
of what constitutes the lower limit itself involves Christian subject­
ivity or, rather, obedience to the living God, When Barth and Ell-ul
usual direction in which obedience lies might be formulated this 
way: As a rule, or generally, or for the most part.Christians 
do not divorce, kill, go to war, commit suicide, condone capital
punishment, or renounce (even temporarily) solidarity with their 
fellow-men. There are, for the most of these usual directions, 
limiting or exceptional cases where the normal ’rule* of human ■ 
behaviour undergoes a kind of teleological suspension under the . 
impact of the immediate action of Christ in the Holy Spirit ”
(Robert E, Willis, The Ethics of Karl Barth, p. 425? see also 
James M. Gustafson, "Context Versus Principles: A Misplaced Debate 
in Christian Ethics^” New Theology No, 3, ed, Marty and Peerman (1966), 
pp. 88, 90* & reading of Barth’s volume on special ethics (III/4)
surely verifies Willis’ statement.
1. To Will and To Dp, pp. 205-6, 304* "The intervention of the Holy 
Spirit can push us to action which is quite outside the rules and ' 
norms, It can incite us to novelty, to innovation. And on that 
occasion no moral judgment should enter in. We do not have the right 
to erect a morality for the purpose of preventing the intervention of 
the Holy Spirit,.,” (ibid., p, 214), "Ethi cs should include this 
prohibition of the a priori response, and thus should leave complete 
latitude to enable the response that we give today to be different 
from that of yesterday, which does not mean that yesterday’s was
bad " ( ibid,. p. 259),
2. The Theological Foundation of Law, pp, 65-6.
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speak of the law as a lower limit, they are only claiming this for 
some aspects of biblical lav/ which seem authoritative to them for now. 
Both men regard the content of the law as open to discussion within the 
Christian community. In practice, Barth holds open the possibility of 
divinely granted exceptions to almost every general moral teaching of 
Scripture which he discusses» .
The_ haw As ona 1 Preparation
Barth has another way of utilizing biblical moral teachings.
Here biblical moral injunctions are used more as instructional prep­
aration for hearing God’s concrete Word than as lower limits of the 
law. Here he speaks of biblical commands as the context in which God 
speaks a Word which is likely to have a different range of meanings 
to different people, Barth’s use of biblical injunctions in this way 
is quite in harmony with much that Ellul has said about the flexible
nature of the Christian life. Ellul does refer approvingly to this
aspect of Barth’s thought. He cites Il/2, pp, 634-5 and concludes
that the biblical requirements of God must be understood as points of 
2departure and not tangible givens,
Barth utilizes this aspect of his thought mainly in the context 
of giving an exposition of the meaning of Jesus' call to discipleship 
and the meaning of various specific commands Jesus is said to have
1. See Barth Hl/4 We cannot claim that Barth’s statements are 
always selfconsistent. For example,he at cne place says that the Ten 
Commandments indicate that which must not ”in any circumstances” . 
be done (ll/2, p, 684-5)* How could these words be differentiated 
from the ’’casuistry” which Barth and Ellul reject? See also III/4, 
pp, 423fffor another example of a more legalistic statement than 
we would e.xpect. All we can claim is that when we look at the 
general thrust of what Barth and Ellul say it seems that they do not 
intend to offer infallible absolutes,
2, To Will and. To Bo. p. see also p, 248* Ellul tells us that
there is no conflict between the objective revelation in the Bible 
and the revelation hie et nunc. He admits, however, that though 
the Holy Spirit makes contemporary past revelation and though past 
revelation/.,.
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addressed, to particular individuals* Here Barth’s concern to emphasize 
the concreteness of God’s commanding activity comes to the fore. He 
exegetes the historical meaning of concrete commands, then lifts up a 
general direction indicated by several such commands, and then invites 
the reader to ask himself what, specifically, God is commanding in
this regard today.
Here Barth does not tell us that our conduct should he above a
lower limit of the lav/. He tells us that our discipleship must be
shaped by the picture of discipleship defined by Jesus' calls to
1
particular men in the past. In this aspect of Barth's thought, he
even speaks of the Sermon on the Mount not as an aspect of Christian
tradition which indicates lines of action which we ought to take into.
2consideration as we seek directly to be obedient to God, Here the 
emphasis is even more on concrete obedience to a living Commander, 
rather than on allegiance to past commands; thus, his distinction
between the law and the commandment comes to the fore. Past commands
become valuable as they help us to listen for God’s concrete command 
today.The commands of the past, are not seen to be legally binding,
revelation is to be used to help interpret God's command today — it 
is nevertheless the case that the moral revelation of the Bible does 
not have a direct ethical meaning for today (To„,Iiill_^nd1Jla_£a, 
pp. 263-4) • nre not to use the Bible in a way which implies a non 
belief in God's guidance here and now. God does not in most cases 
command us in precisely the same way he,commanded men in the past. 
But he commands us in precise ways today only as we are alerted to 
the shape of His commanding activity by a careful study of His 
revelation as witnessed to in Scripture, ”We are not only called to 
act by analogy with biblical circumstances, but it turns out that 
the God who spoke to men in the Bible is also our own God, and 
directly ours, thanks to their witness " (ibid,, p, 2-74; see also 
p. 204).
1. Barth IV/2, p. 552.
2. . Barth Il/2, pp. 699-7OO.
3. James M. Gustafson argues that Barth imderstands biblical ethics 
as pointing more to the revealed reality of God rather than as 
indicating a revealed morality (James M. Gustafson, G hristian 
Ethics & the Community (197^) PP» 4^-51)• ’Tor Karl Barth, the 
Bible first of all points toward the living God, known in Jesus 
Christ/...
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bub instructionally necessary. We are not to imitate past patterns 
of conduct, but to respond appropriately today as men responded approp­
riately to Christ in the past s-
To be sure the call of Jesus will be along the lines /my underlines/ 
of the encounter between the Kingdom of God and the kingdoms of the 
world, ... But this does not mean that the living Son of Man is 
confined as it were to the sequence of his previous encounters, or 
that his commanding moves only in the circle of His previous command­
ing and the obedience which it received. It is not for us simply to 
reproduce these pictures. That is to say, it is not for us to 
identify ourselves directly with those who were called then, and 
therefore to learn directly from what they were commanded what we 
are necessarily commanded, or from their obedience what our own 
obedience must be. We will always know that it is His voice which 
calls us from the fact that in what is demanded of us we shall 
always have to do with a break with the great self-evident factors 
of our environment, and therefore the world as a whole, ’which will 
have to be made in fact, both outwardly and inwardly along the lines 
indicated in the New Testament, corresponding to, and attesting, the 
irruption cf the kingdom of God. In other words, we shall have to 
do with a form of the free activity, which Paul describes in the 
imperative of Rom, 12;2,,, 2 ..
Christ, and thus what is required of ethics is obedience to a Person, 
not a proposition, or in the language of H. Richard Niebuhr, response 
to a person, and not to a rule ’’ (James M. Gustafson, Christian 
Ethics & the Community, p, 495 see also p, 99). We can accept 
Gustafson’s observation if we add the proviso that for Barth there 
can be no response to the Person of Christ without a serious 
wrestling with the theological and moral propositions of Scripture 
about the ways of Christ. Gustafson, though an astute .interpreter of 
Barth’s efchic, has the tendency to emphasize Barth’s existential side 
and minimize the salvation history aspect of Barth’s ethical thought, 
Gustafson does not discuss the way in which Barth uses the law as a
her firm lower limit.
We can also basically agree with the following statement by Robert 
E. Willis, if we add the proviso just mentioned. Willis writes,
"The accent in the notion of command thus falls consistently on the 
way in which God in Jesus Christ is present to man as the living 
and acting God whose impingement on the human is immediate, con­
tinuous, and explicit... The command brings us face to face with 
the person of God himself. It is thus impossible to interpose the. 
command between man and God as though it were an independent 
third entity, a kind of formal receptacle whose elaboration and 
application is left to the discretion of human self-determination” 
(Robert E. Willis, The Ethics of Karl Barth, p, 184).
1. Barth Hl/4, p. 18,
2, Barth IV/2, PP. 552-3.
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Barth indicates that the study of biblical examples is the
necessary homework for hearing God’s Word today, but that God’s Word
today is not a mere repetition of biblical examples. He admits that
Christ might demand the same of us as He demanded of those first
disciples/ "But again — along the same lines-—He may just as well
command something different, possibly much more, or the same thing 
in a different application and concretion. In these circumstances 
it might well be disobedience to be content to imitate them, for 
if we are to render simple obedience it must be to the One who, as 
He called them then, calls us today."1 2
James K, Gustafson has a generally excellent understanding of 
Barth’s use of the moral teachings of Scripture, though he does not 
mention the fact that Barth sometimes speaks of the law as a kind of
1, Barth IV/2, p, 553»
2, Barth IV/2, p, 553. An example of Barth’s more relative use
of biblical law is the way he utilizes various biblical teachings 
about wealth, Barth realizes that Jesus is said to have on occasion, 
asked men to totally abandon their possessions (Mk, 10:21), but 
Barth does not believe that such a teaching should be offered as a 
general ideal. Rather, he discovers a general direction present in 
all of Jesus* words about wealth. He tells us that Jesus* call to 
discipleship asks us to renounce our "general attachment to the 
authority, validity and confidence of possessions, not merely in­
wardly but outwardly, in the venture and commitment of a definite 
act " (Barth IV/2, p, 548)•• After having stated an array of 
biblical teachings with reference to wealth (Mtt. 5i42» 6:24;
Mk. 10:21,28) he concludes: "Th§ drift of them all is clearly 
that Jesus’ call to discipleship challenges and indeed cuts right 
across the self-evident attachment to that which we possess. The 
man to whom the call of Jesus comes does not only think and feel 
but acts (here and now, in this particular encounter with his 
neighbour) as one who is freed from this particular attachment’’ 
(17/2, p, 548). Barth does not use the biblical teachings about 
wealth to establish 5. Christian law. Rather, he deduces a kind 
of generalization as providing the context in which we are to 
listen for the specific Word of God for our own lives. He does 
the same thing with reference to other synoptic moral teachings. 
Concerning fame and honour, he concludes; "All this can hardly be 
formulated, let alone practiced, as a general rule for improved 
social relationships. It is again clear that these sayings assume 
the existence of men who are freed by the concretely given command 
of Jesus from the usual dominion and constraint of ordinary con­
ceptions of what constitutes social status and dignity and
importance. ” (Barth IV/2, p, 549; see below, p, 32.6, n. 3).
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lower limit. Gustafson rightly refers to Barth's use of biblical law
to determine the general direction of God’s commanding activity as 
]
using the Bible as a source of analogies;
The formula might be expressed in the .following terms.
As the act of Jesus in. cleansing the temple was an obedient 
act of witnessing to God’s gracious power in that situation, 
so my act of obedience in a comparable modern situation might 
be similar. But it might not be I The key is ^not what was 
done, but the obedience in which it was done. c~
Jesus' teachings ai’e, in a sense, pointers; they show the 
direction in which human behaviour that is consistent with the 
message of salvation will go. They are not seen as rules 
absolutely authoritative and immediately applicable in every 
situation. They do not provide the sole nouns in the light of 
which moral action is to be judged and guided. Rather, their 
authority is more instructional than legal, mors informing than 
prescriptive. The teachings do not call for copying; one does 
not model his life after them in an external way ... The 
teachings of Jesus point to the kinds of behaviour that will 
be consistent with the message of redemption. 3
Evaluation • ■
Looking back over what Barth and Ellul have said about the 
concx’eteness of obedience, we might agree that everything that they 
say about the Christian ethic they understand a3 instructional
1. James M. Gustafson, Christ and the Moral Life, pp. 48-48.
2. Ibid., p. 47*
3* Ibid.., p. 204? see also Gustafson, "Context Versus Principles," 
p. 87. "The use of the teachings as direction is more by way of 
analogy than deduction, more by way of illustration than applica­
tion, more through how they help one to perceive and understand 
what action is appropriate than through explicit definition or 
delineation of appropriate action" (James M. Gustafson, Christ 
and the. Moral Life, pp. 204-5). Barth, without denying the 
particularity of biblical teachings, is trying to show that the 
meaning of biblical moral teachings is more general than the 
specific statements made under specific historical conditions that 
no longer prevail (ibid., p. 236).
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preparation for man’s direct obedience to God. This is true, but
there is a complexity which lies hidden within this general statement,
We might begin to understand this complexity by looking at a statement
which Emil Brunner once made, Brunner argued that ethics, like the 
2
law, can only prepare the way for hearing the divine command. He
wrote:-
By itself ethics can decide nothing beforehand; nothing at all. 
But, by the consideration of all the points of view which have to 
be considered by.one who knows God’s grace and God’s demand, the 
Divine revelation in the Scripture and the Spirit, ... it can 
prepare the decision of the individual as carefully as a 
conscientious legal advisor prepares the decision of the judge 
by the most careful consideration of all possibilities,
Using Brunner’s illustration we can address questions to Barth, Ellul,
and even Brunner himself.
Every attorney knows that his defence of his client is in seme
1. Barth says that special ethics has to do with a consideration 
of the constancy and continuity of the divine command and human 
action (Hl/4, p. 17-~18), yet he goes on to say of special ethics: 
’'Its function or service in this formed reference is not to pro­
nounce an anticipatory judgment on the good or evil of human action 
in encounter with the command of God, but to give definite instruc­
tion with regard to this event, ,Special ethics may thus serve 
as instructional prepara-tion for the ethical event. And as such 
instruction it will plainly be distinguished not only from all 
casuistry but also from an ethics which is satisfied with a form­
less reference to the God who claims, decides and judges in the 
ethical event, to the Holy Spirit, or to the ’command of the hour* 
and such like” (Barth III/4, p, 18), "Ethics will still have to 
leave the final judgment to God. ... It will certainly offer no 
less than guidance if it adheres to the text prescribed. But more 
than guidance will not be expected from even the most particular 
ethics, just as more than guidance to a knowledge of Christian 
truth, more than an Institutio religionis Christianas, will not be 
expected from even the most precise and detailed dogmatics. In 
both cases what is more than guidance will be either arbitrary 
human assertion or the event of the revelation of which only God 
Himself can be the subject. True dogmatics and true ethics steer
a middle course — between what they must not be and what they 
cannot be. They do what can and should be done by man in the light 
of revelation. They give well-founded and legitimate witness, and 
therefore training in Christianity, and in the particular case of 
ethics training in keeping the command " (Barth Hl/4, p. 31),
2. Emil Brunner, The Divine Imperative, pp. 9O~91.
3* Ibid,, p. I39.
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cases on firmer ground than in other cases. That is, sometimes he is
relatively certain what the judge’s verdict will he; in other cases
he is far from certain. In all cases the attorney and his client must
await the judge’s verdict. Just as there can be degrees of certainty
attached to the legal preparation before a case is heard by the judge,
so in Barth’s and Ellul’s ethical thought there seem to be degrees of
givenness attached to past biblical commands. Though in the final
analysis both agree that only God’s verdict renders an act right or
wrong, they imply that they sometimes have a more certain case than
other times. Working in all cases from an appreciation of biblical
commands, they seem to utilize them in at least two fundamentally
different ways. In cases such as adultery and murder (Barth), or
even tithing (Ellul), they seem to think that the possibility that God
will take exception to His past commands is rather remote. In other
cases, past commands are read more like provocative illustrations.
Because there is a wide spectrum of givenness attached to past commands,
one sometimes gets the feeling that Ellul and Barth are extreme con-
textualists; at other points one gets the feeling that they are quite
firm. Most of all, one is puzzled how they can say things which sound
so different and seemingly contradictory. At some points they sound
more like existentialists and at others more like salvation history 
2ethicists. •
1 . The dividing line between these two ways of understanding the 
lav/ is not sharply defined by either Barth or Ellul, nor is this 
distinction itself spelled out to any great extent. Our argument 
is simply that when one studies what they have said about the law, 
this sort of distinction is a legitmate inference.
2. Gerhard von Rad greatly influenced Barth and influenced Ellul to 
some extent (and certainly influenced Ellul indirectly through 
Barth). Many of the ideas we have been talking about can be traced 
back to von Rad. Ellui cites his agreement with von Rad that 
ultimately the concepts and commandments of the Old Testament have 
to do with a relationship with God and thus do no I represent primar­
ily moral content and certainly not moral content which could become 
the basis for a Christian casuistry (To Will end To Bo, PP«216,3O5)
Actually/.,.
123 -
Though it would be tempting to argue that the complexity 
evidenced in Barth’s and Ellul’s position is a sign that they are
wrong, I think that it is, in the final analysis, a sign that they
1 ... are right I They end up where they do because they are striving to 
be faithful to the God of Scripture. The God of Scripture has spoken 
in Christ, and His moral revelation cannot be brushed aside in the 
manner of a radical situation ethic. The God of Scripture is also 
the Holy Spirit, who did not stop speaking with the canonization of 
the Bible. To be faithful to this God, we have to be responsive 
both to His past revelation and to His freedom to speak a new Word of 
moral guidance. If God is a living God, Barth and Ellul are surely 
right in thinking that all ethical formulations must be relativized
Actually, von Rad evidences the same ambiguities that we are 
trying to make sense of in Barth and Ellul. He points out- how 
ancient Israel regarded the will of God as extremely flexible, 
as again and again adjusting itself to meet new situations 
(Gerhard von Rad, Old Testament Theology, Vol. 1, p, 199)* Barth 
and Ellul follow him by speaking of the commandments as God’s 
specific commands to particular people.
Barth and Ellul are also of one mind with von Rad in arguing that . 
the whole of God’s demands are not embodied in the law. Von Rad 
pointed out that in ancient Israel there was a wide field of moral 
action left unregulated by the law. He said that ancient Israel 
lacked precisely what was necessary for law in the narrow sense, 
namely a positive filling out of God’s expectations. He observed 
that, with two exceptions, the Ten Commandments confine themselves to 
basic negations and amount to mere signposts, showing God’s minimal 
demands (von Rad, Old Testament Theology, Vol, 1, pp, 194—5)*
Like Barth and Ellul, von Rad seems to take back a bit of what 
he said about the flexibility of the law when he speaks of the lav/ 
as a kind of inflexible lower limit. He frankly admits that in the 
Old Testament God’s saving event was seen to be ’’indissolubly bound 
up with the obligation to obey certain norms," He observed that the 
same held true in the early Church (von Rad, Old Testament Theology, 
Vol. 2. pp. 391-392).
If one is to consistently interrelate von Rad’s exegetical 
discoveries, one needs to correlate a kind of existentialist identif­
ication of God’s will with the present event of God’s demand, with a 
salvation history understanding of the givenness of past lax/.
1, This is not to overlook the fact that both men have the annoying 
habit of first overstating one side of their case and then the other. 
For example, see Barth’s rather legalistic statement in Il/2,pp, 684-5* 
See an equally legalistic statement by Ellul in The Politics of God, 
p» 195* We are not claiming that every statement can be consistently 
related to every other statement, but that when one looks at the whole 
of/. ♦,
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and stated in such a way as to leave open the direct guidance and 
judgment of God, If the living God has spoken in the past, they are 
right in insisting that- the Christian ethic must be more than a 
formal reference to God’s ability to command in the immediate
situation, •
In addition to being responsive to the biblical understanding of
God, Barth and Ellul are also responsive to the actual diversity 
2
present in various biblical moralities. As those who live before God,
of what Barth and Ellul write about ethics, it begins to make 
sense in the way we will presently suggest.
1. 1*0 Will and To Do, pp. 259-305•
Having learned of the freedom of God in Scripture, Barth insists 
that scriptural inspiration has to do with the event in which God 
encounters man (Barth i/1, pp, 123, 151—5j P» 5^7)» The
Bible is the necessary means of grace for this encounter (since it’ 
alone witnesses to God’s revelation in Christ), but it is not itself 
seen to be revelation (Barth, l/2, pp, 512, 530ff,; Jerome Hamer, 
Karl Barth, pp, 94-5)» "For me the Word of God is a happening, not 
a thing. Therefore the Bible must become the Word of God, and it 
does this through the work of the Spirit ” (Barth, Table Talk, p.26).
Both Ellul and Barth understand the Word of God as more dialect­
ically related to the words of Scripture than does orthodoxy. The 
difference has to do with a greater appreciation of the freedom of 
God in personal revelation on the part of these men. Though the Ten 
Commandments, the Sermon on the Mount, and other biblical moral 
teachings help us to perceive God’s will, God’s will is seen to be 
the personal and concrete claiming of our lives—which only the 
living God can effect (To Will and To Do, p. 222),
On the doctrine of Scripture, both Barth and Ellul seek an inter­
mediate position between a spiritualism, which minimize the biblical 
message, and an orthodox, literalism, which freezes the mea,ning of 
God’s demand in a code from the past (Jerome Hamer, Karl Barth, 
p. 24). From the doctrine of Scripture shared by them we would 
expect a Christian ethic which strives to be deeply biblical, while 
at the same time seeking to avoid legalism. The ethical position 
both men arrive at is an integral aspect of their understanding of 
the proper-way to interpret Scripture. They believe that the 
message of God is truly to be sought in the words of Scripture, not 
behind the words of Scripture (contrary to Barth’s more Platonic . 
method in his early commentary on Romans). Thus the Christian ethic 
has to do with a careful listening to the message of Scripture in 
its moral and theological aspects. Since the words of Scripture are 
not equated with the Word of God, not all biblical moral words are to 
be given equal authority in determining the Christian ethic. Spirit­
ual judgements are called for. Likewise, since the words of Script- 
ture are not equated with the Word of God, God’s Word today is not 
seen to be a mere repetition of His past words.
2. The diversity of biblical moralities raises the problem of the 
subjective choice from among various biblical moralities, at least as
to/•••
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they are Christian witnesses. They seek to repeat what they have heard, 
from God. as they have studied the Bible, What they believe they have 
heard, is in some cases that there is very little likelihood that God 
is going to grant exceptions to the Ten Commandments, the Sermon on 
the Mount, etc. They cannot rule out unusual borderline cases — still, 
they want these to remain borderline cases. Here they come very close 
to affirming divine rules with the possibility of divinely granted , . 
exceptions. What they believe they have heard in other cases is much 
more relativistic and flexible, a command which, when interpreted, means 
different things to different people. Yet, in the final analysis, both 
Ellul and Barth, want us to know that their findings are but the report 
of what they believe they have heard from God as they have studied •
Scripture. Thus, we are invited to critically assess what they have 
said in the light of our own openness to the God of Jesus Christ.
For Ellul and Barth, the whole effort of Christian ethics is very 
much a spiritual task. Obedience is involved in the selection of 
biblical moral commands which stillembody God’s claim for today. Obed­
ience is involved.in seeking to distinguish between these commands which 
seem relatively firm and those which are of a more relative (though 
important) nature. And obedience is involved in seeking to live in the 
wide area of human life which is not directly covered by past biblical 
injunctions•
to which aspects are to be regarded as authoritative for today, Ellul 
ethical theory cannot avoid this problem of subjectivity, but then 
neither can any Christian ethic which attempts to take seriously the 
freedom of God and which rejects the doctrine of biblical inerrancy.
The Christian must differentiate between the valid and the non-valid 
in the law. The obligation to practise such criticisms is surely 
implied in Paul’s statement that we must prove what is the good and 
acceptable will of God (horn. 12:2)^ that we must distinguish what is 
truly important from what is less so. (Phil. 1:10) (Bultmann, Theology, 
Vol. 1, p. 341). Likewise, the obligation to discern the important 
from the unimportant is implied in Jesus* rejection of aspects of Old 
Testament legal tradition.
1 * We must remind ourselves that neither man believes there is 
a rational hermeneutical method which can enable one to move from a 
study of Scripture to a statement of God’s will for today (To Will and 
To Bo, p. 210).
CHAPTER V
CHAPTER Y
THE PURPOSE OP THE CHRISTIAN LIPS;
FAITHFUL WITNESS TO JESUS CHRIST
The Christian’s Unique Planner and Purpose
Jacques Ellul believes that the purpose of the Christiaan life is 
to be radically obedient to Jesus Christ and in so doing, to vzitness to 
Christ in word and deed. It is true that in a formal way he, like many 
other Christians, defines the goal of Christian existence in missionary 
terms. However, what fills his formal definition with content is his 
belief that only that conduct consistent with the Gospel can truly 
witness to it." His position can be understood only if we keep in mind 
both his definition of the purpose of Christian life and the way he . 
interprets that purpose. Were we to speak of the Christian’s evangeli­
cal goal apart from a stress on the necessity of using means consistent 
with that goal, we would be representing the very stance Ellul opposes!
To understand Ellul’s missionary position we need to relate it to 
what he has already said about the eschatological nature of the Christian 
life. From his eschatological understanding, we know that what he see’s 
as important is Christian integrity, a quality of faithfulness which
2manifests the reality of the future Kingdom to which Christians adhere. 
Likewise, he interprets the task of Christian witness in this context, 
insisting that Christians witness by striving to represent the presence 
of the Kingdom in history. Ki3 ends-means reasoning asserts that the
1. Presence of the Kingdom, p. 22.
2. Ibid., pp. 50-51•
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end sought must be present in the means used.^ Just as Jesus did not 
2use ungodly means to attain even worthy ends, likewise Christians are 
obligated to pursue the goal of witnessing to the future Kingdom with 
methods consistent with that Kingdom.Just as Jesus’ life revealed 
the realised presence of the Kingdom and thus provided the true witness 
to the Kingdom, the Christian's life is to represent the. realised 
presence of the Kingdom — so that others may come to believe in Christ. 
Methods inconsistent with the Gospel do not provide a true witness, even 
if they are outwardly ’’successful”. Unless God’s revelation in Christ 
is mistaken, only those methods reflective of the Kingdom truly witness 
to it. Along these same lines Ellul argues that it is above all the 
means which we use which are most visible to others, and which thus 
provide the real centre of evangelical concern.^
Ellul can at one point totally separate the purpose of Christian
witness from everything other than the manifestation of Christian 
5
integrity. At this one point, he denies that the Christian life 
involves the pursuit of any objective, but is entirely the manifestation 
of the life of grace. In the light of his numerous statements defining 
the purpose of Christian life as witness, this statement perhaps could
1. See above, pp. 83-87.
2. The Politics of God, p. 114; False Presence, pp. 41~42.
3. "Theologie Doginatique et Specificite du Christianisme,” Foi et Vie 
(April-Sept. 1971), p. 147­
4. ”We must always be aware of the important truth that our means are
the thing which creates opacity between God and men, far more so than 
our person. What constitutes the veil, the misunderstanding, is what 
we choose as the instrument of action, of mediation, of intervention, 
of influence. For it is by this that men finally judge. This is what 
men see, resent, understand, and experience; nothing else, and cer­
tainly not our intentions” (The Politics of God, pp. 117-118).
5. "God loves us because he is love and not to get results. Our works 
are thus given a point of departure and they are not in pursuit of an
objective y$iy underline/. If we act, it is because God has loved us, 
because we have been saved, because God's Spirit dwells in us, because 
we have received revelation, and not at all in order that we may be 
saved or that others may be converted ...” (The Politics of God, pp. I97~c)»
, .... , , .. ... '3
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have been more-carefully formulated. What he apparently means .is that 
the Christian life pursues no objective other than that of manifesting
the reality of grace. His genera-1 thought is that God can and does •
1
lead people to faith in Christ through Christian witness, but that |
'’conversion1’ is God’s responsibility and the quality of witness is the
Christian’s concern (not that the latter can be done apart from the
guidance of the Spirit), One might say that the Christian goal is to ,
provide a faithful witness to Jesus Christ and God's goal is to use this .
1witness in His own way to bring people to faith. Ellul recognizes "?
that there is a broken or dialectical relationship between Christian 1
1
words and deeds and the convincing power of the Holy Spirit. This re­
cognition is very important to his thinking. If man thought he could '
convert others, he would be tempted to use methods which seem humanly
"effective”, rather than those most faithful to the Gospel proclaimed.
If man could convert others, he would be tempted to use immoral means 
2to attain such a worthy end.
When we discussed Ellul’s eschatological interpretation we noticed 
that it leads to a stress on conduct which is uniquely Christian. He 
speaks similarly of the evangelical purpose of the Christian life. He 
argues that the Christian’s unique role in everything that he does is to 1 2
1
i
SS
1. "If the man to whom we bear witness is saved, it is neither by 
encounter with us, nor by our words, nor because of our self-giving, 
but because God has chosen to love man as the expression of his self­
love" (The Politics of God, p. 180).
2. Because Ellul puts such emphasis on the quality of Christian wit­
ness, his position is entirely different from a kind of superficial 
obsession with the statistics of salvation. He is concerned about 
the quality of witness, chat conversion may be truly Christian. His 
stance is diametrically opposed to those who minimize the importance 
of the integrity of witness for the sake of getting the largest 
possible number of people happily registered on Church rolls.
Karl .Barth pointed out that great membership rolls and good Church 
attendance are not necessarily a sign that a faithful Christian 
witness has been made. He, however, went on to argue that an empty 
Church is not necessarily a sign.of faithful Christian witness either 
(Barth IV/l, pp. 7OQ..7IO).
J
si
1
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be a missionary who introduces that which is specifically Christian 
into the life of the world.Because the Christian is so single­
mindedly committed to this one task, he can be freed from the “realism” 
which dominates the world’s way of acting. Were the Church’s task to
improve the* wo rid, she would need to use the most ’’effective” means 
' 2rather than the means most faithful to the Gospel. '
Reinhold Niebuhr was no more "realistic" than Ellul in his assess­
ment of the world. However, because he was committed to the goal of 
world improvement, he was willing to define the social purpose of the
Christian life as that of seeking the relatively best options offered by 
the world (of course, as measured by the “norm” of love). Ellul, the 
social realist, is a Christian evangelical, who understands the Christ­
ian’s missionary purpose in "perfectionistic” terms. (This word is 
never used by Ellul and is used by us only to denote a stress on the 
importance of consistency between the witness and the One to whom he 
witnesses, the belief that we can witness to Christ only insofar as we 
strenuously strive to be obedient to His will.) Unlike Reinhold 
Niebuhr’s theology and even more unlike secular theology, Ellul’s whole 
ethic is the expression of hi3 conviction about the unique role of 
Christians in God53 relationship with the worldand his belief that 
Christian methods must conform to the Gospel proclaimed. Put the .
opposite way, Christians are to realize the meaning of Christian exist­
ence and in so doing witness to Christ.
Since wq have begun this section by stating the context in which
1. Violence, p, 28.
2. Propaganda, p. 231.
3. “If ... means cannot be invested with povrer except as they are 
congruent with the gospel, we are always obligated to raise the 
question ’why’ and 'for whom’ (The Politics of God, p. 137)»
4. Presence of the Kingdom, pp. 3-9, 23-4; Violence, pp. 26, 45-6.
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the Christian purpose must ba understood (perfectionism) if we are to
do justice to Ellul’s thought, we must now go on to show that he most
definitely does believe that the sole purpose of Christian life is to
witness faithfully to Christ, that God may lead people to obedient
faith.'5' The Christian life can take on a quality of "otherness” over 
1
against all worldly options, precisely because Christians are called 
and enabled to pursue a unique task which others do not know. With 
methods imposed by the task itself, Christians are to reject the
realistic methods of the world, not because Christians are unrealistic
or naive, but because they are to witness to a transcendent possibility, 
a Kingdom not of this world.
Ellul insists that the Church must claim the right to proclaim 
2the Word of God in deed as well as in word. Though he stresses the 
hidden covenant basis of the Christian life, he nevertheless thinks that
Christians are to be visible signs of the new covenant God has made with 
the world in Jesus Christ. Though he puts great emphasis on Christ as 
the source of all Christian meaning, nevertheless he says of Christians, 
"You are the light of the world."’Even so let your light shine 
before men, that they may see your good works and glorify your Father 
which is in heaven.’”^ When Ellul says that Christians have an
1. "We must insist rigorously that the preaching of the Gospel has as 
its sole meaning the hope that a person should come to know the grace 
available to him in Jesus Christ, that through this he should come to 
recognise that Jesus is truly the Christ, the Saviour, the Lord, in 
other Y/ords, that this person might be converted to the true God. The 
presence vis-a-vis the world of Christians and the Church, the presence 
in the midst of men, has no meaning, no value, no truth, unless it 
brings a person to this conversion" (False Presence, pp. 105-6). This 
sentence is not carefully worded; .read in isolation one might get the 
impression that Christians convert others. Head in the context of 
Ellul’s total thought, it is certain that he does not mean that Christians 
convert, but only that through Christian witness God converts.
2. Theological Foundation of haw, p. 132. '
3« Presence of the Kingdom, p. 9­
4* Matthew 5 s 16, cited in Presence of the Kingdom, p» 22.
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‘’apologetic1’ task, he means that they by their life-conduct are to
reflect the Gospel so that others may come to know the God in whom they
. 1 believe.
Though Ellul stresses the importance of proclamation through life
example, he does not minimize the importance of verbal interpretation.
(He does, however, insist that such witness can be humanly convincing
only as people can see that the witness is striving to be obedient to
the One to whom he witnesses.)1* In. good Reformation tradition, he
insists that the Church's purpose is the preaching of the Word.^ He
believes that the Word which the Church has to announce is the "revealed
truth" of Jesus Christ,or, more specifically, Christ's death and 
5resurrection. Because he believes that the content of the Christian
witness is Jesus Christ and not the Christian's own moral life, verbal 
interpretation is seen as important, so that others will be pointed away 
from the Christian to Christ, the source of the Christian's being. Only 
Christocentric verbal interpretation can guard against moralistic self­
glorification.
Ellul forces no choice between evangelism through words or deeds, 1 2 3 4 5
1. Presence of the Kingdom, pp. 22-23.
2. Ibid♦, p. 145•
3. "Note Probleraatique sur 1'Histoire de l'Eglise," Eol et Vie (July- 
August 1949)? p. 30Q* Ellul criticizes the notion that the verbal 
proclamation of the Gospel should wait until the problem of world 
poverty is solved (A Critique, pp. 179-180). "When a theologian de­
fends this doctrine, he is explicitly condemning Jesus Christ, who 
should have waited until all men had enough to eat before, he came and 
preached, or should at least have proclaimed his Gospel to someone 
besides the poor people cf Judaea*'" (ibid., p. 180). Ellul is not 
denying that Jesus had concern for.the poor nor is he denying that 
Christians should have such concern. He, for example, criticizes the 
rich who refuse to help the poor but send spiritual aid (Violence,
p. 38). He is simply insisting that the preaching mission of the Church 
must continue no matter what the external situation of the world. The 
man who is hungry has moral and spiritual problems as well a3 physical 
ones (A Critique, p. 180).
4. "Note Broblematique," p. 305 •
5. False Presence,, p. 33.
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but insists on the importance of both, while recognizing that God is 
free to utilize our witness (of both kinds) as He sees fit.
By saying that the purpose of the Christian life is to witness,
Ellul stands diametrically opposed to those who see the purpose of
Christian life as self-contained. He, like Barth, believes that the 
purpose of Christian existence is missionary existence for others, not 
the glorification of one’s converted state. That is, the purpose of 
the Christian life is witness, not self-realization. Or, more precisely,
Christian self-realization occurs as a by-product (not the purpose) of
. l
Christian existence.
Without attempting to evaluate the many aspects of Ellul’s position 
which we have only hinted at as yet and which will be further developed 
in the following sections, it can be said that he offers a helpful 
corrective to the tendency of much current theology to conform to the 
world and to deny the significance of the Church’s mediatorial role with 
reference to the world. In the New Testament the Church surely does 
have a significant role and a good deal of New Testament tradition can 
be marshalled to support Ellul's belief that that purpose is precisely to
1. "Now when God speaks to a man, it is never for his personal satis­
faction, for the sake of his soul or'his happiness. The announcement 
God makes to him is always connected with an order God gives him, a 
service he expects of him, a mission he lays upon him. And the reply 
of faith that God expects is that the man will accomplish this mission 
and service, that he will enter into God’s design" (The Politics of 
God, p. 55)• "The call of Jonah, God’s patience with him, the pursuit, 
the order given, the grace accorded, the conversion, were not for 
Jonah's sake, but for the sake of Nineveh. We sometimes confer too 
great importance on our individual spiritual or religious life. To be 
sure, each of us is of infinite worth before God, for he gave his Son 
to save us. But above all each of us is important for the work which 
God demands. The Christian is not just the man who is saved by Christ? 
he is the man whom God uses for the salvation of others by Christ ... 
The special care which God takes of Jonah is finally, then, hi3 care 
for the salvation of Nineveh. If Jonah receives a call, if he is truly 
saved, it is for ethers. From the moment faith develops in us, we must 
be permeated by the conviction that if grace is conferred on us it is 
primarily for others. It is never for our own personal satisfaction. 
Our salvation and our adventure are functions of the salvation and the 
adventure of the men around us, and ultimately of the world" (Jonah, 
pp. 88-89). . -
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witness to Jesu.s Christ (Matt. 28:18-19; Acts 1:8; Gal. 1:15-16; I Pet. 
2:9).
Working with a common New Testament definition of the Church,
Ellul has shown the truly radical nature of this understanding. In 
his approach, the whole of the Christian life is simplified to a remark­
able degree. Of course, Christians are sinners and they are involved " 
in a lifelong struggle to allow Christ to free then fi'om sin, so they can 
’witness in word and deed. Still, what a difference it would make if 
Christians could realize their unique raison d'etre. What a simplifica­
tion of the Christian life could occur if Christians 'realized that amid
every activity they must strive to do one thing and one thing only, and 
to do so in a manner consistent with the goal sought.One wonders if 
part of the confusion about the Christian life is not due precisely to 
a lack of clarity about the purpose of Christian existence, a confusion 
which Jacques Ellul certainly dispels for those who accept his remedy.
It is interesting to note that Karl Barth’s understanding of the
•purpose of the Christian life (while lacking the full development of .
Ellul’s kind of ends-means perfectionism) is basically similar to Ellul's 
2position and provides some theological expansion. There is no doubt
that Barth did believe that the controlling purpose of the Christian 
3
life is solely that of witnessing to Jesus Christ. He insisted that .
1. "It is not in doing exactly the same as other people, and in carry­
ing out technical work, that the Christian 'participates effectively' 
in the 'preservation of the world’, but in fulfilling his specific 
role ... This does not mean that technical work ought not to be done, 
or that it is useless, but this work is done by everybody, and it has 
no meaning unless it is guided, accompanied, and sustained by another 
work that only the Christian can do, and that he often does not do" 
(Presence of the Kingdom, p. 24).
2. Ellul does make one reference to Barth's thought on evangelism,
which has to do with Barth’s understanding that the Christian life 
must attest and confirm the action of God, but not seek to continue 
or reproduce it (To Will and To Bo, p. 258, on p. 309 citing Barth 
Il/2, 577)- . ’ " . •
3. Earth IV/3, Second Half, pp. 563ff., 767-3.
]
every Christian is a missionary by virtue of his Christian calling.
He was unhappy with what he called "egocentric Christianity", Christian­
ity which sees the purpose of the Christian life as self-contained — • 
the possession of gracerather than as having to do with missionary
wx tne ss. • „ .
Barth was also critical of those who understood the whole purpose '
of Christian existence in mere moral terms and who failed to ask the
question, "Why be moral? For what purpose?"Both Barth and Ellul 
insist on the necessity of loving the neighbour, but both interpret love 
for the neighbour in the context of glorifying God, rather than in a 
mere humanitarian context. For both men, all Christian activities are
to be understood as aspects of the Christian missionary enterprise.
Barth said of Christians, "With their whole being, action, inaction and 
conduct, and then by word and speech, they have to make a definite
declaration to other men. The essence of their vocation is that God
makes them His witnesses."And again, "The distinction of a human work 
5
is to declare the occurrence of the good work of God." Both Barth and 
Ellul stress the importance of verbal witness, as we would expect of
those who hold a Christ-centred faith. Neither man can be faulted for
separating witness in word from witness through deeds. Words are needed
to interpret the meaning and purpose of deeds, and to point away from . 
6ourselves. Deeds are needed to authenticate and to incarnate the
Gospel in which we believe. Words and deeds interrelate, each interpret 
ing the other. Barth even stressed the same synoptic metaphors as Ellul
1. Barth III/4, p. 505­
2. Barth IV/3, Second Half, pp. 5°7, 767-768.
3* Ibid., pp. 558-561.
4. -Ibid., p. 575. .
.5. Barth IV/2, p. 589? ces also IV/3, Second Half, p„ 622.
6. Barth 1/2, p. 442. * ' *
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recognizing the visible aspect of life-witness, while not denying the 
hidden ba3is of the Christian life.1
Barth gave a clear theological rationale for the necessity of
proclamation in words and deeds. He pointed out that in God’s act of
salvation iiq Jesus Christ, proclamation occurred in words and deeds,
and the two integrally interrelated. Likewise, he said that Jesus .
2called His disciples to this dual proclamation:
According to Mt. 1Q:7 they, too, instructed by Jesus, are to 
proclaim: ’’The kingdom of heaven is at hand." But their pro­
clamation is also to have the other form: ’’Heal the sick, 
cleanse the lepers, raise the dead, cast out devils" (v. 3). And 
these two things are what they actually did when they were sent 
out, as we learn from Mk. 6sl2f. and also from Ek. 9J6: "Preach­
ing the gospel and healing everywhere." 3
Christian Social Witness
In keeping with the general thrust of Ellul’s eschatological under­
standing of the Christian life and his insistence that a witness must seek 
to conform to the One to whom he witnesses, it comes as no surprise that 
when he turns to the social realm he once again emphasizes the importance 
of a uniquely Christian form of witness. Positively, this means that 
the Christian has an important task here as elsewhere. Negatively,
because Ellul believes that there is no standard frame of reference
between Christian and non-Christian, he cannot offer a Christian "social 
ethic"; he cannot give advice to the world because he believes that the 
world does not share a Christian perspective. Though he defends the 
importance of Christian obedience to God in the social realm, he cannot 
argue for the kind of indirect application of Christian values to the 
social order that is commonly associated with the "social 1 2 3
1. Barth IV/3, Second. Half, p. 763; IV/2, p. 593*
2. Barth IY/3, Second Half, pp. 662-3.'
3. Ibid., p. 863.
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gospel”3 However, though he cannot offer Christian advice to the 
world, the logic of his position allows Christians to join with non- . 
Christians at particular points, if non-believers, acting for their own 
motives, are in agreement with Christians, acting in faithfulness to God.
In this section we will seek to document our contention that Ellul
' 2 does affirm the importance of a unique form of Christian social witness. 
We will also indicate the line of reasoning which lies behind his •
rejection of the indirect application of Christian values to society, 
hut which sometimes allows Christians to join non-Christians at the level 
of concrete action. (in our analysis we will simultaneously have regard 
for these two issues, often considering both in the same connection.)
The only way to show that Ellul does affirm the .importance of a ’ 
uniquely Christian form of social witness is to deal with some of the 
concrete social proposals which he makes on the basis.of uniquely Christ­
ian beliefs, or which he argues have been so made in the past. One such 
example is the abolition of slavery, which he believes was due to the 
Christian conviction of equality before God based on faith in the second
1. He says quite frankly that wa must have no illusions about the poss-
bility of influencing institutions by Christianity (”3ur le Pessimisme 
Chretien,” p. 177)• "Jesus Christ has not come to bring a schema for 
the ideal society, and it is a deceptive sentimentalism that believes 
in an infusion of love into economic or political institutions” (ibid.; 
see also Protestantisrne Franpais, p. 142). •
2. Prom the perspective of Reinhold Niebuhr’s social realism, one might 
accuse Ellul of minimizing the importance of loving the neighbour by 
stressing the purity of the ethical agent. However, Ellul is not in­
different to the importance of helping those in need, feeding the 
hungry, etc. It is, of course, true that he rejects the legitimacy of 
using what one regards as unchristian methods for the sake of attaining 
these goals. He reasons that when the Christian does that he denies the 
neighbour the one true need of his life, a witness to Christ which can 
lead to faith.
He differs from Niebuhr both in emphasizing the evangelical purpose 
of the Christian life and in relating this purpose to a concern for the 
consistency of Christian conduct with the Gospel proclaimed. It is 
interesting that Niebuhr himself admits that Jesus bad a concern for 
the purity of the ethical agent (see above, p.Sj,n.3)» If those in the 
Niebuhrian tradition are to accuse Ellul of a lack of concern for 
Christian love because of concern for the purity of the ethical agent, 
they/...
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1coming of Christ. Though he does not see the changing of society’s
institutions as the Christian goal, he cites this example to indicate
that genuine Christian faith can sometimes have social repercussions.
Ke says that it is quite acceptable to discover institutional reforms,
”on condition that this research is the product of our fundamental
attitude, and that it is the expression, pure and simple, of the presence 
2
of the end of the world ...” In the instance of abolition, Christians 
simply by adhering to their faith were also able to give a social
witness on behalf of Christian truth.
A modern example of Christian social witness has to do with
integration. Ellul tells uss-
V/e should not ... scorn or disregard the material battle. For 
example, in the racial conflict, how idle it is to talk about the 
’’integration of hearts” as long as millions of blacks are not 
integrated into economic life. Thus Christians must reject 
psychological integration and insist on the importance of economic 
integration; but their specific task is to carry on the spiritual 
battle against the demonism of racism. 4
His argument is apparently that the Christian belief in equality before 
God necessitates a denial of racism and one aspect of this denial must 
take the form of support for economic integration. Here again, on the 
basis of uniquely Christian convictions, one is called to make a social
witness.
Ellul does not discuss the fact that non-believers have also sup- 
5
ported abolition and racial integration. However, in Chapter One we
they are in the strange position of having to accuse Jesus of the same. 
But then who, after all, determines what constitutes Christian love? Is 
the synoptic witness to be so lightly set aside or compromised?
1. Presence of the Kingdom, pp. 84-85*
2. Ibid., p. 84. ' ■
3. ’’Since Christ was about to come, it seemed both useless and unjust .
to.have slaves! Institutional reforms, therefore, ought to spring out 
of the faith of the Church, and not from the technical competence of a 
few experts, whether_they be Christians or not” (Presence of the 
Kingdom, p. 85. .
4- Violence, p. 163•
5. Pp. 36-41 above.
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noticed that he does recognize that Christians can sometimes agree with 
non-Christians at the level of concrete action. What is important fox'
him is that Christians make their decisions on the basis of radical
obedience to God. Having done so. they are then free to stand with 
non-Christians at the points where non-believers, for their own reasons, 
support the same policies.
There is still a duality in Ellul’s position, because he rejects ' 
Christian moralistic preaching to the world. If there are particular 
activities at which Christians and non-Christians can join, because both 
for separate reasons agree, he believes that there are also many other 
points where Christians will find no support from the non-believing 
world. At these other points, the uniqueness of the Christian goal and' 
method will stand out in sharp contrast to the way of the world.
Another example of Ellul's advocacy of a uniquely Christian form 
of social witness is what he says about Christian involvement on behalf 
of the poor. Though non-believers may, for1 their own reasons, also have 
concern for the poor, it is unlikely that the exact form of Ellul ’s 
proposals would appeal to them. Here is an example of where the uniquely 
Christian basis of his social position would seem to have the effect of 
leading Christians to advocate a position which is not likely to gain wide 
support from other groups in society.
When speaking of Christian concern for the poor, Ellul is very 
careful to base his position on a normative Christian conviction.
Instead of appealing to 3ome mere humanitar.ianism, he says that the ,
motivation for Christian concern for the poox* is the belief in the 
Incarnation and a following of the specific ways of Jesus Christ. The 
Christian should stand with the poor, because of "his cc-mraunion with the 
Poor One. who knew total poverty, total injustice, total violence. But 
when the Christian consciously keeps faith with his Lord, he is led to 
the least of these, the brethren of the Lord, and to the Lord himself
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(Matt.
Having accepted a Christocentric motivation} Sllul immediately 
begins to say things which are offensive to many who have other motives 
for concern for the poor. lor example, he rejects an idealizing of 
the poor, whereby norms are derived from them, rather than from Jesus 
Christ. When the poor are idealized, the Church no longed? has a
critical stance with reference to the use of non-Christian methods,
violence in particular. Having rejected the idealizing of the poor, 
Ellul is free to reject violence. For normative reasons he believes
2
that Christians must stand with the poor without resorting to violence. 
Many ''leftists” will accuse Sllul of indifference to the poor, because 
he is not willing to resort to violence on their behalf. His answer is 
simply that he has a Christian concern for the poor, which means that he
can help the poor only in those v/ays which are consistent with his 
ultimate loyalty to Christ and which enable him to accomplish the purpose
for which he exists.
"Leftists” will also be offended at Ellul's insistence that -
Christian concern must be for the "really poor” and not for the "interest 
3ing poor” whose aid furthers the interests of the political left. He 
argues for the very opposite of a politicized definition of the poor. He
1* Violence? p. 135> see also p. 30* See belovz, pp. 327-333*
2. Violence, pp. 24? 38? 135, 153. "1 hold that in every situation of
injustice and oppression, the Christian—who cannot deal with it by 
violence — must make himself completely a part of it as representative 
of the victims” (ibid., pp. 151-152). Ellul points out that the 
Church has a.1.1 too often counselled the poor to be submissive, without 
at the same time "constraining the rich to serve the poor” (ibid., 
pp. 150-151). ,
3- Ibid., pp. 66-7? 153. "The interesting poor are those who.sa defense 
is in reality an attack against Europe, against capitalism, against the 
U.S.A. The uninteresting poor represent forces that are considered 
passe. Their struggle concerns themselves only. They are fighting 
not to destroy a capitalist or colonialist regime, but simply to 
survive as individuals, as a culture, a people” (ibid., p. 67).
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thinks the really poor are those v/ithout defenders;, those whose interests 
are of concern only to those who .love, not for the sake of political 
advantage? but because of Christ. He believes that for political 
reasons the ’’interesting poor" will always have defenders; he calls the 
Church to the unique task of defending the forgotten poor.'*'
Ellul goes on to offer three specific strategy proposals of ways
to stand with the really poor today. First, he thinks that Christians
should be the spokesmen for the poor, representing their needs to the 
2rich. He believes that Christians are called to be defence attorneys 
for the poor, doing such things as talking with corporation heads about 
the plight of their workers.The recommendation here is a good one, 
but hardly applicable to the whole Church. A Christian so involved 
would have to be a highly educated person gifted in verbal abilities.
What Ellul suggests is an activity more applicable to Church leaders
rather than all Christians.
That this proposal is applicable only to the highly verbal segment
of the Church is indicated by the fact that he makes the very same -
proposal to Christian attorneys. He argues that Christian lawyers
should realize love for their neighbours by defending those clients who
have little chance of having their legal rights represented, the poor,
4
minority groups, and those without power. •
1. See below, pp. 197-203, for Ellul's tendency to interpret Christian
love in a one-sidedly personalistic way. As related to the issue 
under consideration, the problem is that he tends to divorce Christian 
concern for the poor from Christian participation in social groups 
seeking to help the poor and from support for social programmes ("be 
Pauvre," Foi et Vie (March-April 1951)> p. 124)• •
2, "If the Christian acts as mediator or advocate, as representative of 
the poor ... it. is to plead the cause of absolute misery before abso­
lute power (power is always absolute!), and to do this in a spirit of 
imperturbably calm and loving intransigence, without animosity or 
violence" (Violence, p. 152).
3* Ibid.,‘pp. 151-21 ,
4< "Propositions concernant 1'Attitude Chretienne envers le Droit," Foi 
et Vie (Jan.-Feb. 195?), PP* 42-43, "L'Humilite Precede la Gloire," 
PP* 32-33. - •
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One might think that Ellul is a bit inconsistent in arguing that 
the Church should preach to rich and poor alike,but that Christian
lawyers should be so one-sidedly concerned to help the poor. ‘He,
however, is not inconsistent at this point. He affirms that Christian 
attorneys should be one-sidedly concerned for the poor because he is 
convinced that those who have money and power will be able to gain a fair
defence without Christian aid. The rich, of course, could not receive 
Christian proclamation were the Church simply to preach to the poor.
A second recommendation Ellul makes for standing with the poor is
that if a particular' group wins .its revolutionary struggle for power,
Christians must .immediately switch sides. He believes that once in 
2
pov/er the victors will cpprsss the victims. If one is to stand with the 
really poor, one cannot idealize some particular group of people. The
poor are the oppressed, and once people cease to be oppressed, they are 
no longer truly poor.
Ellul has a third line of reasoning, a third suggestion for the way- 
in which the Church can stand with the really poor. He believes that • 
Christians ought not to identify with groups which number their support­
ers in the millions. for example, since the Negroes in America have 
millions of supporters for their cao.se, he thinks that the Church should 
seek to help the more forgotten groups — such as the American Indians.•
1. ”Le Pauvre," p. 117j see also false Presence, p. 35*
2. Violence, pp. 138-9­
3- In order to make this point Ellul has to admit that Christians some­
times find that for human reasons they must engage in violence, thus 
sinning against God. It is interesting that though he is neither trying 
to give a Christian defence of violence, nor encouraging Christians to 
support violent movements, he still offers concrete advice to Christians 
who find themselves in the position of having supported violence (which 
on Ellul’s terms can never bo given a Christian defence). Of course, 
Ellul found himself in this very position after World War II (Violence, 
pp. 138ff.; see below, pp. 366-371)* . ... ■
4* Ibid., pp. 154-5. Oddly enough, earlier in the saxiie book Ellul seemed 
to include the American negro in the category of the really poor. He 
wrote,/...
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His argument is related to his belief that the Church should give a 
creative lead in social action, rather than merely tagging along v/ith 
the world's programmes. Related to his position is his belief that 
the Church’s social action should move beyond ideological bondage. A 
group, such "as the older people of a society, may desperately need the 
Church’s sponsorship. Such a group may not possess the revolutionary 
glamour of the interesting poor.
Also related to Sllul’s position is his belief that the Church
should seek to be freed from bondage to propaganda. The interesting
•poor are those who have propaganda instruments actively eliciting support
for their causes. He calls the Church to defend those who have no such 
1
propaganda machinery acting on their benalf.'
If we were to take Sllul’s third point literally, the Church would, 
in fact, be negatively determined by the world's propaganda. She would 
be resolved only to advocate those causes which have no public advocate.
As a warning, his point is well taken. As an inflexible rule, it is 
dangerous. If Christ is the Lord of the world, He may be active through 
large causes as well as standing in identification with those groups 
which have few members. Large causes may continue to need Church support
as do less popular ones. The fact that a group has public propaganda
working for it doss not necessarily mean that its needs are being met nor 
that Christians ought not bo have concern for such a group. It may be 
proper to reverse priorities. It would seem abstract to ignore all
movements which number their members in the millions. For example, it 
would surely be a pity for the Church in America to lose interest in the 
problem of white racism against the black precisely at the time when even
wrote, "It is obvious that for the Christian American the black American 
is 'the poor’; and it is equally obvious that the Christian American 
must struggle with and for his black brother" (Violence, p. 63).
I. ibid., pp. 153-4*
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white ’’liberals" are generally losing concern for the black man’s plight 
and when the vision of an integrated society is being abandoned by both
white and black. The blackness of the Negro makes his problem of 
cultural relatednes3 (due mainly to white prejudice!) uniquely difficult. 
(Of course, we can agree that the American Church should also express 
concern for the American Indian.) ;
Ellul's argument may contain a self-contradiction. His second 
point had to do with identifying and changing identification with refer­
ence to revolutionary groups. Revolutionary groups, however, usually 
represent large masses of people, numbering their members in the millions
Whatever the promise and problems of Ellul's position on Christian
support for the poor, the point we must not lose sight of is the 
uniquely Christian angle from which he approaches this subject. Though 
his advocacy of economic integration will meet with wide support from 
many humanitarians, the specific proposals he makes concerning Christian 
involvement with the poor are unlikely to meet with such favourable 
response from non-Christians. (Perhaps not even from Christians!) We 
can see that his concern is simply to articulate what he believes to be
faithful Christian obedience. He wants to remind Christians of their
responsibility, rather than make an indirect application of Christian
"values" to the social order. '
3
We now turn to a different issue, that of human, law, and look at
1. We earlier pointed out that the second point was already in contra­
diction to Ellul's general thought. The fact that it contradicts 
point number three may be even more of an indication that point number 
two is not really a Christian suggestion, but reasoning concerning that 
situation where the Christian has acted in disobedience, supporting a 
revolution.. _
2. Another aspect of Ellul's thought which will meet with immense re­
sistance is the notion that Christians must manifest a style of life 
which manifests an identification with the poor (see below, pp. 327-328)
3. By "human law" we mean the legal tradition embodied in society, which 
Ellul.. sharply contrasts with biblical lav/.
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some aspects of Ellul's reasoning about human law, which indicates the 
duality between the ways of the world and Christian obedience, and 
shows the inappropriateness of seeking to apply Christian values to 
secular legal traditions.^
Before we proceed, it is important to remember some of the ideas
we have discussed earlier, which, when thought through, have the effect 
of denying the applicability of Christian values to the social order.
Why is it that Ellul rejects the indirect application of Christian va.lues 
to the social order? Why is it that the only point of contact he will 
allow is that of occasional agreement afc the level of concrete activity? 
His reasoning here basically goes back to his belief in the personal God 
revealed in Jesus Christ. It is impossible to speak of the application- 
of Christian "values1' to the secular order, if Christian values are them­
selves dependent on the personal activity of the Commander who speaks
His law in the context of revealing Eis presence. If the law is but
flexible instructional preparation for hearing God’s personal command,
it would be a secularization of biblical law to seek to apply it to 
2society at large. .The basic God-centredness of Ellul's Christian ethic 
prevents him from being able to offer a Christian "social ethic" to 1 2
1. We are in no way seeking to give a full exposition of Ellul's many 
statements about human law, its history of development, etc. Our 
work is confined to dealing with those aspects of his thought which 
specifically help us to understand the meaning of the Christian life.
2. He believes that it would be a mistake to follow Calvin in his 
effort to apply the decalogue to the state (hes Chretiens et l'Stat, 
pp. 155-6). Ellul, however, thinks that modern social Christians have 
misunderstood Calvin’s intention. He argues that Calvin was not try- 
i-ng to reform the world, by applying Christian standards to non­
believers, and was not confusing the Church with the world. He points 
out that non-Christians were simply excluded from Geneva (Protestant- 
isffie Prangaia, pp. 145-6). Ellul does differ from Calvin in inter­
preting Old Testament legislation in terms of the particularities of 
time and place ("Droit," Eoi et Vie 19, Nos. 2-3 (1939), pp. 264-5). 
Ellul and Barth both rebel against a timeless interpretation of bibli­
cal commandments and surely do so in part because of the influence of 
the modern historical study of the Bible (see Barth 11/2, p. 684)«
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society at large. He could offer the latter only if he were willing 
to understand Christian morality as the application of rules or the 
effort to approximate principles.
The Christocentric focus of his ethic also eliminates the possibi­
lity of the indirect application of Christian values to the world.
Ellul believes that the Christian good springs from faith in Jesus Christ 
Iand thus is different from the moralities of the world. Those who do
not have faith in Christ cannot be expected to fulfil the requirements
which flow from that relationship. He writess-
One of the essential rules of the Christian life is never to ask 
a non-Christian to conduct himself like a Christian ... If 
obedience to the Christian ethic is the loving response of the 
recipient of grace to him who has shown his love by bestowing 
grace, then how can one ask a man who has not received, ox* who 
did not know that he was under grace, to act as though ... his 
person were renewed, as though he had experienced grace bestowed 9 
upon him, as though he knew that he was the object of God’s love?
We also need to note that what Ellul says about human law is really but 
an application of what he has already said about human morality. We
1. To Will and To Do, ppa 90, 101.
2. Ibid., p. 104 • ’’What is Christian springs from faith in the person 
of Jesus Christ. It is impossible to impose the resulting consequen­
ces on those who do not share this faith. The desire to create a 
universally binding law on the basis of the law of God or even on the 
basis of the Gospel is undeniably heretical. Such an attempt pre­
supposes the possibility, for non-Christians, of accepting the will
of God or of living the Christian life” (Theological Foundation of Law, 
p. 13). "The Christian life can only be the expression of the faith. 
Whenever you make Christian morality a universal requirement you cut 
that morality off from its own root and you ask those who do not have 
the faith to live as though they had it, which means in the last 
analysis condemning them to hypocrisy” (To Will and To Do, p. 101).
”We are in the same dilemma in the scene of public action as in private 
action. Why should we ask an alcoholic to give up his vice for the 
sake of Jesus Christ? When you broach this question you realize that 
there are only two answerss either you appeal to the current morality 
which is accepted by all — with its extreme weaknesses and tendencies 
to change—or indeed you witness to Jesus Christ, and you pray for 
this man’s conversion which would be translated into a new way of life” 
(ibid., p. 106). Ellul agrees that when we proclaim the Gospel we must 
also proclaim God’s demands. He agrees that God’s demands are addres­
sed to everyone. But he insists that it is no less true that the 
Christian way of life is “impossible, incomprehensible, literally 
meaningless, and unlivable” for those who do not live in Christ (ibid., 
p. 104). .
J’ti-.-s. _ jjXar__
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have seen that he regards human morality as having been created by sin­
ful men; in his view human morality does not transcend man, but 
expresses various human necessities.^ In fact, ho argues that this
autonomous knowledge of good and evil is the very thing that the Bible 
2calls sin. Though non-Christians may sometimes happen to commit acts 
in agreement with God’s intentional will, Ellul is in the dualistic 
tradition in totally denying that human morality as such has any connec­
tion with the Christian good.^ He sharply contrasts natural ethics 
(based on mere human choice) with Christian ethics (based on life lived
from grace).His conclusion about human morality is that it is both 
5
of the order of the fall and of the order of necessity. Though Ellul 
does not use these exact -words with reference to human law, what he does
say shows that his opinion on human law is consistent with his view on 
human morality.
Having considered what seems to us to be the background for Ellul’s 
understanding of the duality between the Church and the world, and the 
inapplicability of Christianity fco the world, we now move to the specific 
issue of human law (which we believe evidences both the idea of duality 
and that of inapplicability). When he talks of law he argues that it
* g
is strictly human, created by man and not coming from God. He says 
that just as in the Christian view the state is secular, likewise la,w is 
secular. He does not believe that human lav; expresses either a religi­
ous value or divine justice:1 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1. To Will and To Ho, pp. 103, 112-113.
2. Ibid., pp. 5-19? 42, 271.
3. Ibid., pp. 44-45*
4. Ibid., pp. 297-298.
5. Ibid., pp. 3911.? 5911.
6. nPropositions,” p. 36.
7. Ibid., pp. 36-37. Ellul disagrees with the line of thought which 
says/...
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says that man has an innate sense of divine justice (Theological 
Foundation of haw, p, 85)- (By divine justice he means personal con­
formity to God’s will — ibid. > p. Q'J.) "Our justice has really 
nothing to do with the justice of God ..." ("Droit,” p. 263). He 
doss not deny that there is such a thing as human justice, but insists 
that human justice is based simply on relative human standards 
(ibid., pp. 263-4) which vary widely depending on time and circum­
stance (Theological Foundation of Law, p. 86). (We recall that he 
said the seme thing concerning human morality generally.) .
Ellul rejects most theories of natural law, with their claim that 
man naturally knows the content of divine justice. (He seems to have 
no objection to those views which recognize the relativity of human 
law and do not claim to define absolute law—ibid., p. 22.) He sees 
such beliefs as inconsistent with the Christian claim that the good 
has to do with the receipt of grace and faith in Jesus Christ ("Propo­
sitions," pp. 32-33,* Theological Foundation of law, pp. 65-68). He 
thinks that such beliefs imply a deistic concept of God (ibid., p. 65). 
He concludes that "Natural law does not provide any meeting ground 
for Christians and non-Christians. Although it claims to be a rational 
creation, it is subject to the divergencies and fluctuations of reason 
in its concrete application. The only meeting ground for men is found 
outside themselves, in the everlasting compassion God shows to all of 
them" (ibid.., pp. 69-7G). He thinks most natural law theories permit 
man to escape from the necessity of receiving revelation. Through 
such theories Christians and non-Christians may come to a common under­
standing, but they do so by regarding the living God as an irrelevant 
factor (ibid., p, ll). .
To see how far Ellul is from an idealistic interpretation of law, 
one has only to observe how utterly critical he has become of human 
law. He says that today law is little more than the expression of the 
will of the government. He thinks that "normative" law has been lost 
and he has no hope that it can be recovered. Writing of France he says, 
"If the facts collide with the laws, we change the laws" (The Political 
Illusion, p. 74). "The law and the police become identical, for law 
is no longer anything but an instrument of the state" (The Technological 
Society, p, 295)* The slogan for this modern understanding of law is 
"Better injustice than disorder" (ibid., p. 295)* Efficient order, as 
determined by the will of the state, becomes the basis of law rather 
than justice, even relative human justice (ibid., pp. 110, 295-299)*
He points out that governments abandon law when it is necessary for 
their survivals "It is a well-established tradition of government to 
observe the law when nothing is happening; but if something happens, 
a, state of emergency is declared during which special laws will be in 
force. This happens precisely at the moment when some group tries to 
use force for its own ends. At that moment the state's reaction is 
pitiless! it abandons the framework of law and engages in a contest 
of force with the group in question until it has quelled the rebellious 
group and made it reenter Z.sipZ the ranks. Put differently, when the 
state is led by circumstances to employ force, it never observes the 
law, and we find ourselves in the presence of naked violence. The 
state is ready, of course, subsequently to legitimize the use of such 
violence" (The Political illusion, p. 74)* He cites as an example the 
French practice in Algeria of internment without trial (ibid,, p. 75)*
Ellul's earlier statements about the lav/ are different from his later 
social and political cynicism. In his early statements he even went so 
far/...
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As there is for us no Christian state, because the state has been 
ordered by God for tasks other than the propagation of faith, 
likewise law in our understanding cannot have a Christian content. 
Law, indeed, lias been established for all, for those who believe 
and for those who don’t.
2In short, there cannot be a Christian law for the secular order." He 
criticizes the Middle Ages for thinking that Christian law could be 
applied to the state. Against this he asserts that biblical morality 
is a consequence of and insepai'able from faith in Jesus Christ.He 
affirms that human law does not have anything to do with the decalogue
far as to criticize Barth for his failure to realize that law stands 
over the state and hence the state is not the measure and promulgator 
of law (Theological Foundation of Law, pp. 122-123). Later he sounds 
just like the Barth he was then criticizing. He later wrote, "V/hat 
the state can do, the state will do, and what It does will a priori ‘ 
become just and true. In stating this fact we are not far from the 
theory stipulating that the law is what the state decides" (The 
Political Illusion, p. 81; for Ellul's more optimistic earlier view 
see Theological Foundation of Law, pp. 95-96, 123-131)•
William Stringfellow’s views on the law are very similar to Ellul’s 
and are decisively influenced by him. Stringfellow not only argues 
against natural law theories, but also against those who would seek 
to christianize the law by using grace as a kind of norm for the . 
state. He, in keeping with Ellul, rejects this because he believes 
that it is based on a misunderstanding of grace. He believes that 
grace is not a norm of law, but an act and a gift. He claims that 
only Barth and Ellul (and one might add Stringfellow himself) take 
seriously this extreme tension between grace and human law (William 
Stringfellow, “The Christian Lawyer as Churchman," The Vanderbilt Law 
Review 10 (August 1957)> PP* 957-8). Because of this tension between 
law and grace, Stringfellow concludes that there can be no Christian 
jurisprudence. The Gospel is seen to stand in judgment over all his­
toric forms of human law, because they are all based on circumstances 
resulting from the fall. Having said all this, he does not argue that 
Christians should be indifferent to the law, but he does insist that 
they should always be looking for opportunities to witness to Christ. 
The vocational task of the Christian lawyer is to be a Christian in 
that context, and to break through the order of necessity, in which 
human law operates, with the proclamation of the Gospel. He-argues . 
that only by retaining this tension between grace and human law can 
the evangelical issue really be posed (ibid♦, pp. 964-5)*
Stringfellow's words are very interesting and he would probably not 
deny the fact that he has said nothing here which was not previously 
said by Jacques Ellul.
1. Theological Foundation of Law, pp. 12-13.
2. "Propositions," pp. 40-41*
3. Protestantisms Prancals, p. 141.
or with the Kingdom of God. He asks Christians how they could expect
non-Christians to foi’mulate laws related to the Kingdom of God.^ He
insists that when Christians think of human law they must have existing 
2law in view, not some ideal law derived from their religion.
Ellul explicitly rejects the possibility of founding a juridical
system of Christian values. He writes, "Realism leads finally to 
admitting that it is unthinkable to found a juridical system on Christian 
love or to translate Christian love into formulas of law."^ Undoubtedly 
this rejection is related to his understanding of Christian love as based 
on a relationship to God. Only if Christian love were some abstract 
principle could it become the foundation for the secular order. Ellul 
admits that Christians can apply the law in a loving spirit and for the ’ 
sake of witnessing to God’s love, but he totally denies that secular law 
can itself be based on Christianity. He says that the regulatory and 
imperative nature of law contradicts the spontaneous and free nature of 
Christian lovs.^ Since vte have already examined Ellul’s call for 
Christian attorneys to serve the poor, we have seen the sense in which 
non-Christian lav; can be applied in 'a Christian manner.
In order to understand Ellul’s attitude toward human law, we must 
be aware of his understanding of the purpose of human law. (The purpose
1. "Propositions," p. 37•
2- Ibid.., p. 35. In a parallel way Ellul argues that Christians should 
be less concerned about the ideals behind the state’s laws and more 
concerned about the way juridical principles actually work out in 
practice. He points out that at a theoretical level laws often seem ' 
favourable tovzard justice, but are not so in actual practice (ibid., 
pp. 41-42).
What if Christians themselves were to have a hand in establishing 
the state's laws and principles? Ellul says very little concerning 
such a situation, perhaps partially because of his utter realism about 
the seeularity of the modern world, perhaps partially because he is 
vepy dubious that Christians who embody the kind of perfectionism he 
suggests will be likely to attain such lofty positions (see below, pp.
3» "Propositions,” p. 36. 174-166).
4. Ibid.
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of human law is itself understood as consistent with the purpose of th© 
state.From a strictly human perspective? he believes that the 
purpose of law is to manufacture? through the use of natural reason? a 
relative and time-conditioned justice which? when embodied in legal 
tradition? has the effect of preserving human life. He thinks that man, 
by the very fact that he exists in society? must establish some form of ‘ 
law for the sales of the common preservation of society. ‘ From the 
Christian perspective?' he argues that through the use of secular law 
God preserves society so that the Church may announce salvation to the 
world.Just as the meaning in life is to come into fellowship with 
Jesus Christ? just as God’s purpose in creation is covenant fellowship, 
so secular law? unbeknownst to itself? has its own role to play in the 
salvation of mankind.^
1. See below, pp. 269-272.
2. Theological Foundation of Law, p. 109; '’Droit.” p. 274> “Proposi­
tions?" p. 33. “He must work in order to eat? and he must exercise 
... judgment in the process of establishing law in order to prevent 
the relations with his fellow men from being exclusively violent" . ‘ 
(Theological Foundation of Law? pp. 109-110). See Ian T. Ramsey (ed.), 
Christian Ethics and Contemporary Philosophy? The Library of Philo­
sophy and Theology {London; SCivl Press? Ltd., 1966), pp. 385-396? for 
an identical point of view subsumed under the heading of natural law.
It is? nevertheless, important to remember that Ellul does reject all 
theories of natural law which see natural man as aware of God’s demands
3* Theological Foundation of Law? p. IO4. He refers to John 19«11 and . 
says that in Jesus’ acceptance of the verdict of death he has trans­
formed human law into an instrument for the justification of man and 
has given the law a purpose and meaning that it does not possess in 
itself (ibid.? pp. 57-58; on p. 58 Ellul refers to Barth’s Recht- 
fertlgnng und Recht).
4- Theological Foundation of Law? pp. 77-78? 104; “Rappels et Reflex­
ions?” p. 138; “Propositions?” pp. 38-39* See Barth IIl/l for an 
identical point of view. Creation is seen there as being “the exter­
nal basis of covenant" and covenant “the. internal basis of creation"
pp. 94ff», 228ff.). Ellul refers to Barth Il/2, Chapter 8, 
and his statement based on Barth’s thought helps to summarize both his 
own and Barth’s position. He says that ‘Barth has shown “that the good 
defended by the state is certainly not the good which the latter could 
have created or preached of itself* but consists in the fact that the 
state insures a law and order which permits, makes outwardly possible? 
the preaching of the knowledge of the good willed by God, This state? 
xn/...
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From Ellul’s biblical and Barfchian definition of the purpose of 
the state and human law as providing the external framework, for the 
preaching of the Gospel? one very important result is apparent. Both 
the state and human law are relativized. They are seen as incapable
i
of providing meaning for life or of establishing the values which make 
life worth living. All that is to be expected from them is the estab­
lishment of a relatively fair and stable order? whereby other groups may
be free to realize values on their own. terms.He insists that legal 
2
decadence begins with the absolutizing of the law. He opposes both 
the omnicompetent modern state and its legal totalitarianism? precisely 
because he believes that the Gospel and it alone offers true meaning in 
life.Arguing that law is based on human rules, made by men and 
applied by men, he affirms that the specifically Christian task with 
reference to the legal framework is to do battle against legal idolatry.
in safeguarding the common life of man, in preserving it from dissolu­
tion, makes the Christian community possible and consequently the 
eventual presence among men of the good according to God. It is a 
matter of a temporary order which does, not carry grace within itself 
but which allows the expression of it” (To Will and To Bo, p. 288).
See also Barth, Community, State and Church, p. 129; Dietrich Bon- 
hoeffer (Ethics, p. 308) also represents a similar point of view.
1. Ellul tells us that though the law exists for the sake of providing 
the framework in which the Gospel may be proclaimed, human law does 
not itself have anything to do directly with salvation. Speaking of 
human lav/ he says, "It is not normative for the life of the soul, and 
the spirit ... Law, therefore, is of necessity secular ... It is 
designed only to provide the framework of the spiritual event of God’s 
speaking, and not to translate God’s word or to mummify it in legal 
formulas. This secularism of law implies, however, that the society 
organized by lav/ must be open. It must be the environment wherein 
judgment must be passed both materially and spiritually. This is all 
we can require of law, We cannot ask it to lead to a knowledge of the 
word, or to set up conditions favorable to its proclamation" (Theologi­
cal. Foundation of Law, p. 105).
2. Ibid., pp. 10z|-105.
3. "The demonic temptation of law consists of a vision of society without
a purpose, or of a purpose other than the judgment of God, realised hie 
et nunc in the preaching of the gospel. Again we must point out that 
when lav/ organises society exclusively for the sake of man’s happiness, 
of production, of power and glory or of riches, and not for the sake of 
judgment/..........
......_......... . A-isr
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He believes that Christians must fight against a legal absolutism and
authoritarianism, which sets itself up as an ultimate value and denies
social diversity and pluralism. He thinks that the Christian jurist 
X
must defend ’’tolerance'*, thus preventing the divinization of law.
Ellul’is even mors specific in describing the purpose of the law.
2 .He says that law is to insure concrete human rights, that the Gospel 
may be proclaimed, that men may come to covenant fellowship with God.
He points out that men cannot respond to the Gospel unless they have 
concrete human rights, among which he includes the right to hear the 
Gospel and the right to embody the Gospel in life. Insofar as the law 
fails to allow for such human rights, Ellul believes that the law's
authority is nullified.He thinks that the human rights which the law
must provide for have to do with "concrete freedoms" related to the
J
whole of life and not merely related to man's inner life. He believes 
that the Church has the right to claim the freedom to embody Christian
judgment, it ceases to preserve the world. For God preserves the . 
world only for the last judgment" (Theological Foundation of Law, 
pp. 104-165).
1. "Propositions." p. 37 •
2. Ellul points out that through the substitutionary atonement of 
Jesus Christ for the sin of all men, the human rights of all men 
have been established (Theological Foundation of Law, pp. 56-57)• 
"From now on man can say that he is not without rights, for he can . 
claim to belong to Jesus Christ. All can make this claim, since 
Christ died for all ... All are brothers of Christ, receiving in
him their rights" (ibid., p. 57)« He says that in the covenant 
realized in Jesus Christ, God recognizes man's rights, because the 
non-violation of human rights "is the condition God makes for 
preserving man's life" (ibid., pp. 79-80).
Ellul insists that the content attributed to human rights has 
varied from society to society and is "essentially variable and 
contingent" (ibid., p. 81; see also To Will and To Do, p. 124)> He 
stresses the fact that law is always evolving TTheological Founda­
tion of haw, pp. 75-76).
3. "Should law place man into a situation which makes the proclamation 
of the covenant futile, it Y/ouid nullify man's God-given rights, there­
by nullifying itself" (ibid., p. 102).
4. Ibid., p. 102.
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obedience and not merely the right to verbally proclaim the Gospel.
He also insists that the Church must claim the right of legal recogni- 
2
tion by the state.
We must be clear at this point that Ellul is not demanding rights
for the Church which he is unwilling to grant to other individuals or
groups. In his thought the defence of the Church’s right to preach
the Gospel in word and deed is also a defence of the civil rights of
others. He is not arguing for a theocratic society or for a churchly
imperialism, but for an ’’open society" which permits concrete freedoms,
one of which is the preaching of the Gospel.He tells us that "Law
must allow man to answer in the affirmative the question, ’-Do you want
to live, and do you want to let live. In Ellul’s later thought he
insists that the state must perrait the emergence of autonomous groups,
5
which seek to live in faithfulness to their own values and loyalties.
A real value in Ellul’s position is that the dualism he affirms
3* Theological, foundation of Law,, p. 133• "The state becomes an 
unjust state from the very moment it denies the Church the possibi­
lity of proclaiming the gospel. This has often been said. But to 
proclaim the gospel is not only to proclaim the good news of the for­
giveness o.f sin. It is also to proclaim all the concrete consequences 
of this good news. It is to announce that Jesus Christ is Lord of 
creation, with all the implications this entails. Proclamation and 
faith are therefore not ’private matters'. They are and they must be 
an action in which man’s entire life is involved. When a Church • 
takes a stand on a. political question or exercises judgment concern­
ing law, it really preaches the gospel, provided its political posi­
tion is not the expression of vested interests or moralism" (ibid., 
p. 132.) .
As Ellul’s political cynicism increased, he came to minimize, if 
not disregard, the importance of churchly stands on political and 
social questions and became one-sidedly concerned with Christian life 
witness. See The Theological Foundation of Law, pp. 132-137, for his 
earlier view and Violence, p. 159, and The Political Illusion, 
pp. 93-94, lor his later position.
2. Theological Foundation of Law, p. 132.
3. Ibid.f p. IO5.
4. Ib i d ., p. 103,
5» The Political Illusion, pp. 2O6ff.; see below, pp. 311-315*
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between Christianity and the world enables him to relativize the world 
and to fight against the idolatry of absolutizing the law, the state, 
technology, etc. By utterly denying the legitimacy of natural theology, 
he is able to be a Christocentric warrior against the deification of 
the secular order, and this itself is an immense social contribution.
Oddly enough, it is based precisely on the denial of the possibility of 
an indirect application of Christianity to the social order!
Though Ellul rejects any application of Christian values to the 
social order, his relativizing of the state and human law and his defence 
of the importance of human rights may meet with formal approval by many 
secular civil libertarians. Thus Christians can join with non-Christians 
in opposing the omnicompetent state, though non-believers could not 
possibly accept the Christian’s rationale for so doing.
We have now given several examples which seem to bear out our 
thesis that Ellul does affirm the importance of a uniquely Christian form 
of social witness, and, while being unwilling to apply Christianity to 
the social order, does acknowledge that Christians and non-Christians 
can sometimes agree at the level of concrete activity.1
1. It is true that we have made the suggestions as to specific points 
at which Christians might be able to join non-Christians. Since Ellul 
has not given such specific hints, one might be tempted to accuse him 
of indifference to this area of overlap. Against such a charge, one 
can answer that what we have done is merely to apply his general recog­
nition that there can be agreement at the level of concrete activity 
(see above, pp» 36-41)* Also, even the hints that we have made are 
only suggestions as to points where the overlap may occur. Whether it 
would in fact so occur depends on whether non-believers, pursuing 
their own motives, would happen to agree at these points. Whether they 
would or not would surely vary according to time and place.
Ellul might be accused of indifference toward the area of agreement 
between Christians and non-Christians because he thinks of Christian 
law in a decisively subjective context. In the broader' perspective of 
his thought it is doubtful that this charge will hold. It is true 
that he can write that ’’Only God can discern what is good in our works. 
That is not our business and we are not capable of it” (To Will and To 
Bo, P* 75)* What is even truer is that he does not deny the validity 
of a relative casuistry. Though, on his terms, our witness to God’s 
d emand/..,
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demand is not infallible, it is still important and necessary. Once 
one grants that such a practical casuistry is possible, there is no 
reason why Christians cannot enquire as to the activities at which 
they may agree with non-believers — as long as the relativity of this 
enquiry is fully recognized.
At one place Ellul seems to have recourse to a docti'ine of justifi­
cation as involving such divine judgment on the world that relative 
conversation as to the points at which Christians might be able to 
agree with non-Christians might seem to be invalidated (False Presence, 
pp. 23-26). When these passages are read in the context of what 
precedes and follows, it is doubtful whether they really carry this 
meaning. It seems that the main point that he is trying to make in 
the chapter in question is that Cod’s judgment always stands over both 
Christians and non-Christians and since this is the case, modern 
Christians who endorse the world’s morality and projects are making a 
big mistake. It is doubtful that he is denying that there can be 
concrete agreement at the level of acts, but is rather insisting that 
there must not be a systematic endorsement of the ways of the world.
YiThile we are on the subject of Ellul’s understanding of God’s judg­
ment, it is interesting to note that he does not argue for a kind of 
evangelical emphasis on the human awareness of sin as the prerequisite, 
for the receipt of grace. Ellul is Barthian here, for he speaks of the 
"No" as "included in the Gospel". He writes, "One cannot really 
proclaim the Gospel without also proclaiming the ’No* included in it, 
and which is also itself a Gospel" (False Presence, p. 25)« He rightly 
insists that the receipt of grace takes the form of judgment as well 
as assuring man of God's guiding presence and forgiveness. He is 
particularly insistent upon the importance of the receipt of God's 
judgment, for he believes that otherwise "the ’Yes' is a nice pleas­
antry, a comfort which adds to one’s material comfort ..." (False 
Presence, pp. 23-25)• He admits that the world wants the Church to 
proclaim God's "Yes" in isolation from His "No", for that means an 
endorsement of natural man’s existence (False Presence,pp. 25-26). He 
believes that the Church's true relevance involves a refusal to offer 
the world what it wants. Instead, the Church must proclaim the truth, 
which is both judgment and grace.
Ellul seems to be a bit more of an existentialist than the later 
Barth. While agreeing with Barth that God's judgment is itself an 
aspect of grace, he also recognizes that man is not likely to be.open 
to grace as long as he is unaware of his insecurity or as long as he 
is comfortably attached to modern idols (Jonali, p. 5S). Ellul thus 
argues that it is not enough merely to preach the Word. He insists 
that a part of this preaching includes a critique of the modern idol3 
which prevent man from receiving grace. Thus Ellul’s lifelong 
critique of the commonplaces of the modern world is really an aspect 
of his evangelical proclamation of the Gospel (Presence of the Kingdom, 
pp. 139-143). In criticizing the commonplaces, he is trying to help 
clear away obstacles which prevent man. from hearing the Gospel. He 
writes, "If the presence of the true God entails of itself the collapse 
of the false, the proclamation of the Gospel implies, for the libera­
tion of the person to whom it is proclaimed, the indictment of that 
which holds him captive" (False Presence, pp. 207-206). He tells us 
that when the Holy Other confronts human gods, the only possible result 
.is the "annihilation of the gods" (The Politics of God, pp. 15O~15l). 
(Barth obviously did not deny this, but ha spent most of his time 
clarifying the nature of the Gospel to be proclaimed, rather than talking 
about/...
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Before concluding this section, we need to recognize that, as is 
often the case in Ellul’s thought, there are some statements which he 
makes which seem to run counter to the main thrust of his thinking.
At these points he seems to envision the possibility of an indirect 
application of Christian values to the social order. One such example 
is where he reasons that because Christ died for all men, Christians
must defend the worth of every man. While admitting that no social
system really protects all men in this way, le affirms that ’’Christians 
1
must ceaselessly renevz this requirement”. If one is to talk of holding
a Christian requirement before society, one is in fact referring to the 
2 "indirect application of a Christian value to the social order.
about modern idols ripe for annihilation.) Ellul seeks to relate the 
Gospel to man in his concrete lostness (Presence of the Kingdom, pr>. 
139-140). He writes, ’’The cry which God hears comes from the depths 
of the abyss, from sickness and suffering, from the heart which is 
humbled, bruised and despairing” (Jonah, p. 56). "Obviously, when man 
has somewhere to turn he does not pray to God and God does not come 
to him. As long as man can invent hopes and methods, he naturally 
suffers from the pretension that he can solve his own problems ...
Only when man has lost the vast apparatus of civilization, in personal 
response, does maxi remember God” (Jonah, p. 57)*
Ellul is not a "correlation” theologian. He is not of the opinion 
that to expose the human dilemma, itself enables grace to be received. 
He only .insists that this is the context in which the receipt of 
grace is more likely. The difference between Barth and Ellul seems 
more one of emphasis and particular vocation than a basic theological 
difference. (One has only to read Barth's sermons to see that he 
does preach the Gospel in the context of a frank description of human 
finitude.)
When it comes to the eschatological understanding of God’s judgment, 
Ellul, like Barth, is willing to hold open the possibility that grace 
may prove universally triumphant, and the existential dialectic of 
"Yes” and "Ho” may give way to an eternal "Yes” (The Politics of God, 
pp. 20, 53-60; see below, p. 174? n. 2). (Ellul can even speak of the- 
salvation of the animal kingdom—Jonah, p. 95•)
1. "Propositions,” p. 4-1* He also refers to the Christian importance 
of individual responsibility and then makes a similar social applica­
tion, opposing the all-powerful state’s denial of the same and oppos­
ing certain penal practices, whereby the guilty are regarded as merely
sick (ibid., p. 42
2. Of course, if a society already affirms’ such a value, Christians 
could appeal to that point of contact. Ellul, however, does not 
mention that way of going about things in this context.
- 157 -
The clearest, example of an indirect application of Christian.
ethical principles to secular society come3 from an early writing, where 
Ellul applies the Pauline concept of the Body of Christ to the secular 
working situation. Just as in the Church there are to be different 
functions but equality among all members, so he reasons that in an 
enterprise there are different functions, but there must be identical 
x’ights for both management and labour. He recognizes that the employer
is to govern, but insists that this must be a function based on the 
ability to do the job and not on privileges of birth or fortune."
There are two places where Ellul implies an indirect application
of Christian values to the social order. In an early writing he refers 
2
to Switzerland as a "Christian country",‘ and in a very recent writing 
he refers to Britain as a nation especially influenced by Christianity 
It is hard to know what such statements mean if they do not imply the 
possibility of an indirect moral influence on society stemming from the 
application of Christian values.
Elsewhere Ellul seems to imply that Christianity can be applied
indirectly to the social order. .He writes, "The Christian must work, in
order that the will of Cod may be incarnated in actual institutions and
organisms."He speaks of plunging Into social and political problems
in order to have an influence on the world. He says that though the 
5 .
world cannot become a paradise, it can become more tolerable.
1. "L'Economie* Maitresse ou Servante de I’Homme," pp. 55-56*
2. "Vers un Houvel Humanisms Politique," p. 12.
3. Violence? pt 15 j see also To Will and To Do, pp. 292-293*
4* Pre s ence 0 f the Kingd pin, p. 47*
5* Ibid., p. 47• Ellul goes on to speak of this application as 
involving a concern to open up the social order for Christian pro­
clamation (.Presence of the Kingdom, p. 475 see also False Presence, 
p. 106). Still, he seems here to be arguing for more than the mere 
relativizing of the social order (though that is included).
In another early work he wrote, "The Church has left to others the 
responsibility for revolution. The Church exists in order to insist 
on / ...
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It is interesting that even here where Ellul uses language which
sounds like the social gospel, he 13 fundamentally pessimistic where
those in the social gospel tradition are optimistic. Having said that
the will of God can be incarnated in social institutions, he denies
what might seem the obvious conclusion, the possibility of moral progress 
1 'in history.’ Even where he uses the language of the indirect applica­
tion of Christianity to the social order, he annuls his own words by
on constant change in society and civilization, in order to bring them 
more into conformity with the order of God. This is a mission of 
’permanent revolution’. But the Church has completely lost sight of 
the fact that an order of God exists, and it has accepted the estab­
lished order of things. Hence instead of representing values of trans­
formation and judgment (justice, freedom, etc.) founded on Jesus 
Christ, the Church has merely stood for conservative values, and has 
left the revolutionary function in the hands of political parties”
(’The Situation in Europe,” in Man’s Disorder and God’s Design, Vol. Ill 
( 1940), pp. 59-60).
1. Ellul denies that the opposition between the world and the Kingdom 
of God can be diminished (Presence of the Kingdom, p. 47 )• Be totally 
relativizes any achieved results in society by saying that even if 
these are accomplished, they are temporary and from the Christian 
perspective imperfect. He says that such reforms are always infected 
by sin and thus the Christian must reiterate the claims of God over 
against the world’s disorder (seemingly ignoring his insight that that 
order might be relatively improved) (Presence of the Kingdom, p. 43)•
Just how self-contradictory is an affirmation of the indirect 
application of Christianity to the social order and the total denial 
of moral progress can be seen in another formulation from the same 
work. He writes,"We must give up believing that we can ’improve’ the 
world, that at least we can make man better, even if we cannot make 
ham happy” (Presence of the Kingdom, p. If). He then turns right 
around and says that we further the disintegrating tendencies of the 
world when we tell ourselves that nothing can be done to improve the 
world. He says that to talk like this is to play into the Devil’3 
hands (ibid., p. 17). He then writes, "Thus we seem caught between 
two necessities, which nothing can alter: on the one hand it is im­
possible for us to make the world less sinful; on the other hand it 
is impossible for us to accept it as it is” (ibid., p. I?).
One can hardly help but feel that Ellul here has recourse to dialec­
tics to cover up his own uncertainty as to whether society can or 
cannot be improved. Why, after all, shouldn’t one say that the world 
can’t be improved, if it can’t? It is a short step from this fundamen­
tally unsatisfactory formulation to a choice — either.,the affirmation 
that the world can be morally improved or the denial of the same. 
Ellul’s choice came to be the denial of this possibility and the estab­
lishment of a basis for the Christian ethic entirely divorced from 
either the hope of world improvement or the belief in the indirect 
application of Christianity to the social order.
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utterly denying that there can be moral progress. It thus seems fair 
to say that Ellul‘s affirmations of the possibility of an indirect • 
application of Christianity to the social order are rare? sometimes 
hedged with qualifications, and definitely in contradiction to the main 
line of his thought — which is the affirmation of a radical duality 
between the Church and the world and the belief in the inapplicability 
of Christianity to the social order. Perhaps his early statements on 
the indirect application of Christianity to the social order may be due 
to the fact that he was struggling to break free from the social gospel 
tradition. His later statements are probably due more to careless 
formulation than to any desire to criticize his own emphasis on the 
duality between the Church and the world.
Freedom from Preoccupation with 'Results
The issue under consideration in this section relates to what we
have been discussing in the last one. The issue of the indirect 
application of Christianity to society and the hope of world improvement 
interrelate. A theology which believes in the applicability of Christ­
ian values to the social order is also likely to believe in the moral 
improvability of the world. The denial of the moral improvability of 
the world seems to eliminate what would naturally be assumed to result 
from the application of Christian values to the social order. Likewise, 
a theology which does not believe in the application of Christian values 
to the social order is free to deny the belief in the moral. improvability 
of the world. If the unique motive and drive for the Christian life 
has nothing to do with the hope of the moral improvement of the world, 
the latter.can be totally denied without affecting the basis of the 
Christian life in the slightest. •
We have argued in the last section that Ellul generally denies the
applicability of Christian values to the social order. It thus comes
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as no surprise that he entirely rejects a belief in the moral improva- 
bility of the world. In this section we seek to come to an under­
standing of his rejection of the hope of world improvement and we hope 
to see how his understanding of the Christian life comes to expression
in this rejection.
We begin our discussion at a very unlikely place — Albert •
Schweitzer's description of Paul’s understanding of ethical motivation.
Schweitzer pointed out that Paul had no hope that the natural world 
could develop into the Kingdom of God. Schweitzer nevertheless argued 
that Paul expected the redeemed to manifest the Spirit of God's Kingdom 
which was in them:^
Purely from inner necessity, not with a view to success, there 
arises an activity which is determined by the Kingdom of God.
As a star, by the inner law of the light which is in it, shines 
over a dark world, even when there is no prospect of heralding a 
morning which is to dawn upon it, so the Sleet must radiate the 
light of the Kingdom in the world.
Schweitzer's description of Paul's position is also an accurate 
description of Ellul'3.^ Just as New Testament Christians felt called 
to love their neighbours, though they expected history to end in cata­
strophe and though they did not believe in the continual growth of moral 
goodness in history—so Ellul articulates a Christian ethic, while 
totally denying a belief in moral progress in history. For him the 
mora.l impetus for the Christian life comes entirely from the "realized" 
presence of the Kingdom in believers, the hope of the future Kingdom 
beyond history, end the belief that truly Christian conduct can be 
instrumental in leading others to faith in Christ.
1. Albert Schweitzer, The Mysticism of Paul the Apostle (l93l), P» 388.
2. lb id., pp. 388-389•
3. Ellul writes, "If we act, it is because God has loved us, because 
we have been saved, because God's spirit dwells in us, because we 
have received revelation, and not in order ... that society may 
become Christian or happy or just or affluent, or that we may overcome 
hunger or be good politicians" (The Politics of God, p. 198).
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Ellul explicitly rejects world improvement as the goal of the
Christian life3 He says that the purpose of the Christian life is
not the reformation of society, nor the increase of justice, but 
2witnessing that others may be converted to Christ* To accomplish
the Christian goal of witnessing, he believes that what is important
is the consistency between the Christian’s life witness .and the Gospel
proclaimed —~ not the improvement of the world. He tells us*~
We have not to strive and struggle in order that righteousness 
may reign upon the earth. We have to be "just" or "righteous” 
ourselves, bearers of righteousness ... Likewise we have not 
to force ourselves, with great effort and intelligence to bring 
peace upon the eai’th—we have ourselves to be peaceful, for 
where there are peacemakers, peace reigns.3
1, Presence of the Kingdom? pp. 17, 47> 80. Bonhoeffer likewise .. 
argued that the Christian goal is to conform to Christ and to witness 
to Hirn not to improve the world by means of programmes and plans: 
"What is of ultimate importance is now no longer that I should become 
good, or that the condition of the world should be made better by my 
action, but that the reality of God should show itself everywhere to 
be the ultimate reality" (Bonhoeffer, Ethics, p. 555 see also pp. 
17-23)» The difference between Bonhoeffer and Ellul at this point is 
that Ellul relates the insight about the purpose of the Christian 
life to a perfectionism, whereas Bonhoeffer in his later thought (in. 
contrast to The Cost of Discipleship) not only did not draw this 
conclusion, but stressed the importance of ethical compromise.
2. Violence, pp. 148-149•
3- "The whole object of ethics is not to attain an end (and we know 
very well that for a genuine Christian ethic there is no such thing 
as a striving for holiness), but to manifest the gift which has been 
given us, the gift of grace and of peace, of love and of the Holy . 
Spirit, that is, the very end pursued by God and miraculously present 
within us. Henceforth our human idea of means is absolutely over­
turned; its root of pride and of power has been cut away. The means 
Is /s i c 7 no longer called to ’achieve' anything. It is delivered 
from its uncertainty about the way to follow, and the success to be 
expected" (Presence of the Kingdom, p. 82).
Ellul is at one with Barth in emphasizing a "causal ethic", an 
ethic of grateful response. It is apparently this point which he 
underlines when he seems to reject a striving for holiness. He surely 
is not denying the importance of a Christian sharing in God's holiness 
That would be to deny his whole covenant ethic. Nor is he ruling out 
the importance of a Christian life-style which seeks to be faithfully 
obedient to God. This would be to deny his perfectionism. He is 
saying that the Christian life is the expression of the gift of God's 
own presence and not a feeble effort to procure salvation through our 
own works. .He understands the Christian life in the’ context of grace 
received rather than in the context of grace sought through works.
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The reason why Ellul rejects world improvement as the goal of the
Christian life has to do with his belief that the sole purpose of the
Christian life is to witness to Christ and to do so with methods con­
sistent with Christ’s demands. He writesJ-
The Holy Spirit will give true power and efficacy only to means 
which are in exact agreement with the actual content of the 
gospel. There must be intercommunication of means and end if the 
Holy Spirit is to use our means and invest them with his power.
He argues that just as Israel did not seek to conform to the world or to 
gain worldly approval, so the Christian goal is to represent the incar­
nate presence of the Wholly Other. The mark of the Church is to be her
".inassiinilability", her faithfulness In witnessing to the transcendent 
2God, not her success in improving the world. He reasons that just as 
God loved us freely as the expression of His own love, so Christian 
conduct becomes a parable of God's love to the extent that Christians are 
"released from worry about usefulness or efficacy /my underlines/",^ In
1. ^be Politics of God, p. 136. Ellul argues that the Gospel cannot 
be spread by the use of violence or propaganda. He says that if these 
means are employed, whatever "success", there may be is not truly that 
of the Gospel. He recognises that God's hidden sovereignty is not 
restricted to acting through pure Christian means. However, he 
believes that impure means do not witness to God’s intentional will, 
and hence Christians must seek to be’ faithful at the level of means 
(The Politics of God, pp» 136-13?).
2. Ibid., pp. 141-142. "To be controlled by utility and the pursuit 
of efficacy is to be subject to the strictest determination of the 
actual world, To want to attain results is necessarily not to be a 
witness to the free gift of God" (ibid., p. 19?j see also p. 134)’
"We are driven by the utility of the world and the importance of 
results. What counts is what may be seen, achieved, victory, whether 
it be over hunger or a political foe or what have you. What matters 
is that it may be useful. My desire in these meditations on the 
Second Book of Kings is to call our judgments into question" (ibid., 
p. 19?)’ "To do a gratuitous, ineffective, and useless act is the 
first sign of our freedom and perhaps the last. The men of the Second 
Book of Kings, each in his own place, played their part for God. But 
none of them was indispensable. None of them served in a decisive 
way the great plan of the .Father accomplished in the Son ... Hone of 
them did the radical deed, and each of them was free in his own way" 
(ibid♦, p. 19c)*
3* Ibid., p. 198.
his understanding, the Christian's obedient witness to the transcendent 
God has the effect of interjecting tine freedom into history, El.lul 
believes that this interjection of freedom would not be possible were 
the goal of life the improvement of the world, or the attainment of 
results, rather than the manifestation of Christian reality.^
Closely related to Ellul's rejection of world improvement as the •
goal of Christian life is his understanding of Christian ’’efficiency".
(He rather loves to take conventional words and give them radically new
Christian meanings.) He says that Christian efficiency is entirely a
function of man’s relationship with God. He believes that according
to the Bible, efficiency has to do with man's will being brought into 
2
conformity with God’s intention. He insists that such, personal union 
- 3 ••with God "implies an intervention in the historical nexus", and thus 
is net merely an inner feeling. For Ellul, such Christian efficiency 
involves the effort to be faithful to God at the level of means, and 
the willingness to trust the results into God’s keeping. He believes 
that if Christians seek to be faithful in this way, God can bring 
"results", but results which are hidden from general viaw.^ (Christ on
1. "If we do not pray, if we do not do the works of faith, if we do 
not seek after wisdom, if we do not preach the gospel, nothing in 
history, nor very probably in the church, would look much different 
... And yet. there would be lacking something irreplaceable and incom­
mensurable, something that is measured neither by institutions nor 
metaphysics nor products nor results, something that modifies every­
thing qualitatively and nothing quantitatively, something that gives 
the only possible meaning to human life ... This is freedom: man’s 
freedom within God’s freedom; ... Man's freedom which is free obedience 
to God and which finds unique expression in childlike acts, in prayer 
and witness ..." (The Politics of God, pp. 198-199)*
2* Ibid., p. 138* Ellul affirms that human means are meaningless 
unless man is led by the Holy Spirit (Presence of the Kingdom, ppo 86, 
88, 95)* purely human activity — all this work of man, which
today fills the field of our vision—is really a ’means' at all"
(ibid., p. 88).
3* The Politics of God, p. 138.
4» Ibid., pp. 137-139. "As regards effects and results, then, each 
must rest content with the Lord's promise. Results are promised if 
W Q j ...
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the Gross is the model for a Christian efficiency which appears to the 
1
world as the exact opposite. He is not encouraging a Christian
defeatism, for he believes that God can accomplish His purposes through
Christian witness: all he denies is that this "success" is of the nature 
p
of tangible ’proof,* or that it is the same as worldly success.
Ellul argues that "because we cannot ascertain any. evident or 
3
visible results, we may not stop and rest". He encourages a Christian 
"activism" precisely on the basis of the belief that man can never rest 
content with apparent results, but must be ever striving to be faithful 
at the level of means, that God in His own mysterious providence may use 
our witness as He sees fit. He also stresses the corporate context in
which Christian obedience occurs. Each Christian must contribute at his
own level, that his action may be woven by God into the larger context 
of the action provided by other Christians.
we keep to our own level and use the appropriate means" (The Politics 
of God, p. 139) • "If Christian action is effective, the effects or '• 
fruits are gathered by God and collected by him alone. ... This .
efficacy will never be evident to the world" (ibid., pp. 139-14C).
1. Bonhoeffer writes, "The figure of the Crucified invalidates all 
thought which takes success for its standard" (Bonhoeffer, Ethics, 
p. 15)-
2. The Politics of God, p. 139*
3. Ibid.
4. "If the efficacy of the man of God corneS to a halt, all is lost. 
Jeroboam ??uined the kingdom of David. If Appllos had not watered, what 
Paul had planted would never have grown. Every Christian, than, is 
strictly accountable, just as there must be continuity in prayer and 
continuity in effective action. When a Christian quit3, he annuls 
thereby all that preceding Christians have been able to do. Effici­
ency is written in the history of the church as well as the world. It 
implies that everyone play his part in the life of the church and be 
prepared to carry on whether* or not there is any tangible proof of 
results" (The Politics of God, p. 139; see I Cor. 3«5~9)»
In the light of such statements as this one, I regard Stephen Rose’s 
description of Ellul's position as representing "radical individualism" 
to be very misleading (Rose et al., Katallagete, p. 44)* Ellul denies 
having any interest in stressing the individual in a romantic sense.
He recognizes that individuals can be understood only in relationship 
to society, but he also insists that society is made up of individuals, 
•tie/...
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It is interesting how consistent Ellul’s emphasis on God’s 
initiative is with his perfectionism. Because God is seen to be the. 
only One responsible for consequences, Christians can be entirely pre­
occupied with concern about the faithfulness of the means used.1 Ellul, 
for example, applies this very reasoning to the issue of violence,
arguing that Christians need not resort to violence to procure results.
2
Why? Because God alone is in charge of results. .
He regards the debate about the priority of the individual vs, the 
priority of society to be entirely artificial. The t??uth of the matter 
is that Ellul has no confidence in either sinful individuals or in 
sinful societies. His confidence is in Jesus Christ! (“Un Nouvel 
Humanisme Politique,” pp. 15-16). He writes, ”A Christian ought to 
know how little interest attaches to him as a person. And he ought to 
know that it is better to talk about Jesus Christ than about himself” • 
(“Mirror,” p. 200).
Of course Ellul’s emphasis on God carries with it the recognition of 
the importance of individual obedience to God, but this is a stress on 
the importance of God’s command, not an emphasis on the individual as 
such. It is certainly true, in his understanding, that the Word of 
God is seen as being addressed to individuals and as leading to freedom 
from bondage to the crowd. However, this stress is nor. really an 
individualism, since he sees individual Christians as members of the 
Church (Jonah, p. 22) and as involved in a continuity of interaction 
with fellow-Christians and with Christians throughout the ages (The 
Politics of God, pp. 138--139.)* He recognizes that no individual’s 
action is indispensable, but merely one small part in God’s vast design 
(ibid., p. 193)’
It is true that Ellul argues that prayer is not “primarily communal” 
and says this by pointing out that Jesus is said to have sought to 
withdraw from the crowd and even from his disciples in order to be alone 
in prayer. He, however, is not denying that communal prayer is also 
important (Prayer and Modern Man, p. 118). •
It seems that there is only one sense in which Ellul can justly be 
accused of being an individualist, and that has to do with the fact that 
some of his words about Christian social witness seem to invalidate the 
importance of Christian participation in programmes and institutions 
(see below, PP» 2O7--8). If this criticism is what Rose had in mind, he 
might have been able to make his statement in a more careful way, rather 
than seeing Ellul’s and Barth’s (!) position summarized In the folk tune*
1 'You've got to cross that lonesome valle?f,
You've got to cross it by yourself.”
(Rose et al., Katallagete, p. 447. This is not the only point where 
Rose's journalistic style leads him to express inaccurate statements 
(see. above, p. vi (et seq.), n. 2, for an appraisal of his statement that 
Ellul has little concern for the organized Church, a charge which, of 
course, relates to this accusation that he is an individualist).
1. The Politics of God, p, 134*
2. Violence, p. 171. “The prophets speak against the rich, but they 
never / ...
~ 166 -
Ellul's words about Christian efficiency show that the goal of the
Christian life is not the attainment of results obvious to the world.
Thus his reasoning about efficiency supports his non-belief that the 
purpose of Christian life is visible world improvement.
Not only does Ellul reject world improvement as the goal of the
Christian life, he also explicitly rejects the doctrine of general moral
progress in history.'^ His non-belief in moral progress in history is
based on his biblical view that man is radically sinful and that the
immoral results of sin are so immense as to rule out any speculation
about moral progress in history: "The Bible expressly tells us that the
history of mankind ends in judgment. It does not give place to the 
p
Kingdom." * His rejection of moral progress in history is consistent 
with his apocalyptic thought,which affirms that history is marked by 
the presence of various immoral signs, which are the effect of man's 
rebellion against God. In the background of his rejection of moral 
progress in history is also his knowledge that God's incarnate love was 
not received by the world/ His reasoning seems to be that it is 
irrational to believe in the moral unprovability of the world, since the
never incite the poor to take justice into their own hands, to use 
violence. The prophets always promise God’s judgment on the rich, 
they speak the word against the rich, but at the same time they 
declare that justice is the Lord's and that trust must be placed in 
Him’* (Violence, p. I6l).
1. Presence of the Kingdom, pp, 48, 96.
2. False Presence? p. 20. "V/e must ... maintain the dialectic of the
'No' and the 'Yes', vzhich allows of no speculation about progress, or 
about history, or about successful participation in the political works 
of man today" (ibid., p. 24)• He says that the belief in progress
is inconsistent with the belief that the Kingdom of God comes at the 
end of time, not as the gradual ascent of humanity toward God (Presence 
of the Kingdom, p. 86; see also pp. 17, 47-48. For related material 
see our discussion on pp. 1B8-159 above)*
3- See below, pp. §41-249.
4* Meaning of the City, p, 37*
- 167 -
world then and now rejects its Saviour and thus the basis for true moral
renewal.'1' Though his rejection of the doctrine of moral progress in
history is biblically based, he also appeals to his own observations.
He writes, "I refuse to believe in the ‘progress’ of humanity, when I
see from year to year the lowering of standards among men I know, whose 
p
lives I follow, in the midst of whom I live ...” “
We said that Ellul rejects any philosophy of moral progress in
history. He even disagrees with Reinhold Niebuhr’s modest affirmation 
of the possibility of a general growth in good in history, which is 
itself offset by a continual growth of evil. All Ellul will admit is
that in each generation there may be moral gains at particular points,
which are offset by losses at other points. His position is different 
from Niebuhr's in that he resolutely refuses to believe in any general
growth of good in history.All he is prepared to admit is that at the 
level of particular action (for example, the abolition of slavery), 
there can be a moral gain. Beyond this he is not willing to speculate,
on the grounds that to do sc- is inconsistent with a realistic doctrine
„ 4 'of man. 1 2 3 4
1. Along similar lines he writes, “The world in fact cannot be reformed: 
the Church does not have to propose an ideal, requirement or program
to it, because the world is incapable of responding as long as it is 
not reconciled with God” ("Note Prob1ematique sur l'Histoire de 
1'Eglise,” p. 313). ‘
2. Presence of the Kingdom, pp. 119-120.
3. "Sur le Pessimisme Chretien,” pp. 170-171.
4. Ellul says that he disagrees with Reinhold Niebuhr’s view that there 
can be "social ethical progress". He argues that such an admission is 
inconsistent with an insistence on the radical fallenness of man (To 
Will and To Do, p. 289).
Niebuhr in his later thought came to believe that there can be moral 
progress within history (thus he acknowledged his debt to the Renaiss­
ance tradition). He insisted, however, that there is also immorality 
in history and that this wickedness also continues to grow (Reinhold 
Niebuhr, The Nature and Destiny of Man, Part 2, pp. 85ff-, 123ff., 155i 
see also N.H.G. RobinsonChrist and Conscience, pp* ll6ff.). "The 
total historical enterprise is not progressively emancipated from evil. 
The / ...
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Even from a purely human perspective there is much bo he said in
favour of rejecting the doctrine of general moral progress in history.
An. impossible moral calculus would be required to rate various moral 
values and then to evaluate various civilizations throughout history.
If no such calculus is possible and if no such application could possibly
be made, if a progressive world view cannot be based on empirical
evidence—It is puzzling that such a doctrine should be accepted, 
especially by Christians who hold a very realistic doctrine of man.
Perhaps the real basis for such a progressive ideology .is often, 
as Ellul suggests, the confusion between material progress and moral 
progress, as though the latter were simply a function of the former and 
followed inevitably on the heels of material improvement.^ The belief 
In moral progress may really be a belief and not a generalization from 
evidence, a belief invented by modern men who value material progress and 
•who want to think that spiritual and moral progress will follow suit.
Ellul believes, quite to the contrary, that affluence dulls moral sensi­
tiveness, though he is not prepared to argue that total poverty necessarily
The Christian faith expects some of the most explicit forms of evil 
at the end of history” (Reinhold Niebuhr, Faith and History, p. 136). 
’’Jesus anticipates the growth of evil as well as the growth of good in 
history. Among the signs of the end will be 'wars and rumours of 
wars’ and the appearance of false Christs. (Mt. 24:6)" (Reinhold 
Niebuhr, The Nature and Destiny of Man, Part 2, p. 49)• Niebuhr was 
thus concerned about the indeterminate possibilities of development 
within history, while being critical of pretentious claims of final 
fulfilment in history (ibjAt., PP* 2C7ff.).
It is interesting that Niebuhr is a bit confused as to whether he 
does or does not have biblical support for his view of history* He 
appeals explicitly to the Renaissance tradition, rather than to the 
Bible, for his idea about the possibility of moral progress in history. 
Yet he turns around and says that Jesus anticipated a "growth of good 
in history". Where is the evidence that Jesus speculated on anything 
as vague as this? (That He did so is especially problematic in the 
light of His apparent belief in the consummation of history in the 
near future.) A growth in Christian faithfulness would, of course, 
be another matter—for that does not have to do with "good" in general 
history, but obedience in the Christian life.
1. k Critique, pp. 179-195•
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increases such sensitivities.'
Ellul's eschatological understanding of the motivation for the 
Christian life (which involves his rejection of the belief in moral 
progress) relates to his affirmation of a ruthlessly pessimistic socio­
logical understanding of the modern world. Though a degree of socio­
logical pessimism is certainly an implication of the non-belief in
general moral progress, one suspects that the radical pessimism of his 
sociology is not necessitated by his theology. Without affirming the 
general moral perfectibility of the world, one could still give more 
recognition than he does to the fact that man can improve his external 
living situation and that such improvement is not without significance.
At places he does recognize that there can be an improvement in man's 
external situation," but in his three main sociological works he evidences 
a radical pessimism about the social improvability of the world, a 
pessimism not necessitated by the denial of the general moral improvabi­
lity of the world. In his three main sociological works he also seems 
to deny hi3 stated belief that Christians, by expressing their faith, 
might be capable of particular institutional reform (for example, the 
abolition of slavery).' Undoubtedly many readers will feel that Ellul's
1. See below, pp. 324-326.
2. Ellul speaks of the possibility of technical progress in the sense 
of progress in "the amelioration of man'3 condition or situation" 
(The Politics of God, p. 183)* Though he does not believe that 
history as such is progressive even in this sense, he does here seem 
to admit that a modest improvement in the social order is at least 
possible. Here Ellul argues that such technical progress is not 
necessarily good, but he does not affirm that it is necessarily bad 
G-bid., p. 183).
We can agree that recent technical progress does not prove that 
history as such is progressive in even this sense. (A nuclear war 
could change the whole direction of technical development, as could 
a scarcity of natural resources.) We can also agree that technical 
progress is not necessarily good. (For example, many ecologists are 
wondering if our over-production and consumption may not be leading 
succeeding generations to material regress.)
3* Presence of the Kingdom, pp. 84-95.
170
attitude toward the technological society and the city is at least 
partially the expression of his own bias, rather than the result of 
objective analysis.Many, including this reader, will prefer those 
few sociological statements where he recognizes the ambiguity of tech­
nological phenomena and the possibility of social improvement. To 
some it will seem an obvious fact that there can be social improvements 
(not that there always are). Most important of all, we must vigorously 
insist that Ellul's sociology must be evaluated on its own merit.
Whether the utter bleakness of his sociology is true or false, it is 
nevertheless the case that the Christian belief in sin does not imply 
the world's total incapacity for social and institutional improvement. 
Also, many, including myself, will want to hold Ellul to his theological 
word, that there can be particular moral results stemming from the 
application of the Christian faith. (We are not disagreeing with his 
denial of general moral progress.) ' It seems a demonstrable fact that 
at particular points there can be moral improvement in the social order.
We must now give a short exposition of Ellul's characteristically 
pessimistic sociology, which seems to evidence an utter hopelessness 
about the social improvability of the modern world. Though he occasion­
ally gives more careful statements, his general social view is that the
2technological society and the modern city are thoroughly bad. He 
generally offers no hope that the technological society can be' socially
3 rimproved. Likewise, he sees the city as the centre of the modern woild
1. See above, pp. 22-26.
2. See above, pp. 22-24.
3. Of the technological society he writes, "It is useless to hope for 
the modification of a system like this — so complex and precisely ad­
justed that no single part can be modified by itself. Moreover, the 
system perfects and completes itself unremittingly. And, except in 
print, I see no sign of any modification of the technical edifice, no 
principle of a different social organization that would not be founded 
on technical necessity" (The Technological Society, p. 116; see also 
pp. 428, 433-434; A Critique, p. 232).
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and has no hope that it can be even socially or institutionally improved, 
or morally improved at particular points3 He calls Christians to 
evangelical mission in the city, but utterly denies that Christian witness 
can change the city in the least. The meaning of the city is seen to 
have absolutely nothing to do with the hope of its social improvement,
but is seen to have to do entirely with the alien presence of Christian ’
. . . 2 missionaries.
1. "Let us harbor no illusions. No man will change the city—first 
of all, because he will never use it for good" (Meaning'of the City, 
p, 168; see also p. 57). "Man is not to be counted on to transform 
the problem of the city. He is no more capable of transforming the 
environment chosen for him and built for him by the Devil, than he is 
of changing his own nature" (ibid., p. 170; see also p. I69).
2. Ibid., pp. 76, 181. In the light of Ellul’s nearly nihilistic 
sociology, the reader can hardly cease to be amused that he occasionally 
makes statements which envision the possibility of a fundamental moral 
transformation of the social order. He is not here referring to a 
gradual moral improvement, but a kind of societal leap to a higher 
level. Though he is not here affirming a gradual moral improvement of 
the social order, what he says cannot be harmonized with his denial .
of moral progress in history and it certainly is inconsistent with his 
utter hopelessness about the social iinprovability of the technological 
society. These statements which affirm the possibility of a fundamental 
transformation of society are rare and are thus on the periphery of his 
thought—nevertheless, they are present and present even in his 
sociological writings.
When Ellul speaks of this possibility of a fundamental transformation 
of civilization, he is not thinking of the Christian conversion of the 
world, but of a miraculous social conversion as an indirect result of 
Christian influence. He spee.ks of the possibility of the "birth of a 
new civilization" originating in God’s will (Theological Foundation of 
Law, PP* 35-36). He refers to the possibility of fundamentally alter-’ 
ing the framework of civilization (Presence of the Kingdom, pp. 34? 44)* 
"We are confronted by a choicei either, a mass civilization, techno­
logical, ’conformist’ —the ‘Brave New World’ of Huxley—Hell organized 
upon earth for the bodily comfort of everybody—or, a different . 
civilization, which we cannot yet describe because we do not know what 
it will be; it still has to be created, consciously by men" (Presence 
of the Kingdom, pp. 41-42). "Concretely, we see that unless the world 
can re-discover, by a spiritual revolution, an end which i3 both 
transcendent and present, an end whose presence can be perceived even 
in the secret world of technique, it is lost" (ibid., p. 89; see also 
p. 139)* Even in a very recent article he writes that "we must work on 
earth ... to bring in a new civilization that cannot yet be imagined" 
("Between Chaos and Pe.ra.lysis,’’ p. 75^).
Of course, Ellul speaks of the transformation of civilization as only 
a possibility, but it is surely a strange possibility.to be held by the 
same man who is so utterly hoveles3 at other places (even in the sane 
books / ...
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We have already recognized that Ellul’s rejection of world improve­
ment as the goal of the Christian life has the effect of encouraging a 
Christian perfectionism. We now need to enquire as to additional 
ethical implications which stem from his position. While not agreeing
with the accuracy of his nearly nihilistic sociology, we can still see 
that he is of pastoral help to the cynics (of whom he is one). He is 
saying, in effect, that Christ can be the Lord even of those whose 
analysis of the modern world leads them to the brink of nihilism. By 
separating the motivation and basis of the moral life from the hope of 
world improvement, he gives ethical encouragement- to those who see the 
world as very harsh and tragic. Ellul affirms that one can be 
absolutely honest sociologically, and the pessimistic results should not
in the least affect the basis of the Christian call to love.
It is important to note that Ellul’s rejection of world improve­
ment as the goal of the Christian life, his denial of general moral 
progress, and his single-minded evangelical definition of the purpose of
books.’) about the possibility of changing the technological society. 
Strangely enough, sometimes even when he speaks of the utterly hopeless 
bondage of the modern state (The Political Illusion, p. 80), he para­
doxically (or contradictorily0 holds' open this possibility that if 
Christians end others offered radical resistance to the state (not 
violent, but the embodiment of autonomous values and the establishment 
of autonomous groups), the nature of the state might be transformed 
(The Political, Illusion, p. 223). (Thia thought does not seem very 
consistent with his apocalyptic thinking, which sees certain 'inevitable 
evils as the necessary characteristics of this final age.) One 
wonders how seriously he takes such a possibility, since his state­
ments to this effect seem smothered by massive sociological pessimism. 
For example, he argues that democracies must of necessity resort to 
the use of propaganda, which he regards as an inherently totalitarian 
method (The Technological Society, pp. 285, 288-9; Propaganda, pp. 126, 
134, 138, 250). Even without the sociological nihilism, the proposals 
seem a bit naive and even utopian coming from such a Calvinist theolo­
gian as Jacques Ellul. He must realize their naivete, for sometimes 
even in the same breath in which he utters such possibilities he seems 
to deny them. He says, ’’Finally, when communities with a 'style of 
life’ of this kind have been established, possibly the .first signs of 
a new civilization may begin to appear. At the present time, however, 
we are in no position to reflect on such possibilities, nor to be 
attracted by such prospects.'Jl (.Presence of the Kingdom, p. 60).
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the Christian life — are not intended to encourage a defeatist attitude 
with reference to Christian works. By brushing aside false hopes? he 
helps to give courage to Christians living in very discouraging times.
In a very interesting critique of a modern commonplace? he calls men to 
assume their modest roles as helpers. He criticizes the all-or-nothing 
approach to life? whereby people become discouraged because they cannot 
seem to perfect the world. His point is that we have no right to give 
up moral effort? using the impex'fectibility of the world as an excuse.
Rather? in gratitude to God? we are called to witness to Christ in our 
lives? even though the visible results of our good deeds may seem meagre.
The moral task of the Christian life continues no matter how difficult
may be the world situation in which we live? because the moral task is 
based on Christ’3 presence and command and not on the hope of world
improvement. A Christian ethic decisively based on the hope of histori­
cal progress is liable to have its very motivation destroyed when events 
prove the direction of history to be more tragic than hopeful. The most 
solidly based Christian motivation is precisely the Christ-centred ones 
"We love because he first loved us" (i Jn. 4J19)«
One of the most important ethical consequences of Ellul's rejection 
of general moral progress in history is that it encourages a critical 
stance with reference to any society in which Christians might live.
In his view, Christians are never to be satisfied with any achieved state 
of affairs. It is interesting that even with Reinhold Niebuhr's modest 
affirmation of the possibility of growth in history (offset by a growth 
of evil), his thought came to be the basis of an American pragmatism, 
which was extremely supportive of American foreign policy and certainly 
not radically discontented with American society generally. With Ellul's 
utter rejection of any general doctrine of moral progress in history, the 
Christian always finds himself in the position of having to be critical
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of any achieved state of affairs—because he is to represent the 
transcendent Kingdom in a world which continually rejects that Kingdom.
Christian Humility
In discussing Ellul’s understanding of Christian humility, we are 
still dealing with material related to the general topic, of Christian 
witness. What he say3 on this issue, as well as what he says on 
Christian suffering arid love, help to 'indicate his understanding of the 
general shape of the Christian life, which he believes is faithful to
Christ and able to witness to Him.
As always seems to be the case, Ellul’s normative position on 
Christian humility is based on his biblical understanding. Ha appeals 
to Luke 14*7-11, to make his point that Christians are not to put them­
selves in first place* "Every one who exalts himself will be humbled,
1 p
and he who humbles himself will by exalted" (Ik. 14*ll). Ellul also
1. "Even when the institutions, the laws, the refoi’ras which he has . 
advocated have been achieved ... he still has to be in opposition,
he still must exact more, for the claim of God is as infinite as 
His forgiveness. Thus the Christian is called to question 
unceasingly all that man calls progress, discovery, facts, estab­
lished results, reality, etc. He can never be satisfied with all 
this ..." (Presence of the Kingdom, p. 43)* "In reality all solu­
tions, all economic, political, and other achievements are temporary. 
At no moment can the Christian believe either in their perfection 
or in their permanence. They are always vitiated by the sin which 
infects them, by the setting in which they take place. Thus the 
Christian is constantly obliged to reintegrate the claims of God 
to re-establish this God-willed ’order’ in the presence of an 
order which constantly tends towards disorder" (Presence of the 
Kingdom, p. 48)•
2. It is interesting that Ellul refers to a humiliation in eternity 
which corresponds to one’s efforts at self-exaltation in life, but 
because of his Barthian openness to the possibility of universal 
salvation, he states this in a way which does not imply eternal 
destruction. He writes, "We must learn (or relearn ceaselessly) 
that to an elevation realized in our life and in the world corre­
sponds (because God has decided thus, and not because of any imman­
ent justice) our abasement in the Kingdom. We do not 3ay our 
exclusion from the Kingdom, It is not a question of.salvation ...
It is a question of the place that God attributes to us in the 
Kingdom" ("L’Humilite Precede la Gloire,"p. 31; see above, p. 1% fn).
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appeals to Luke 22?24~27 as the basis of his'position. Though national 
leaders are self-assertive and tyrannize others, Christians are to act 
in the opposite way. Instead of the self-s,ssertive possession of 
power and status, Christian greatness has to do with humble service J'
In addition "he refers to I Cor. 13:5? the belief that love does not
insist on its own way. He even sets his argument for Christian self-
effacement and humble service in Christological perspective by appealing
to Phil. 2:4} which encourages a Christian humility based on an imitation 
2of the humiliation seen when the Son became man. That the humiliated
Son was exalted shows that Christian greatness equals humility.
Ellul is very perceptive in his exposition ox these texts. He
points out that one is not called simply to refrain from taking first 
place when one does not merit it. The prohibition is against claiming
first place even if one merits it. He also notices that the texts do
not refer simply to an inner attitude, opposing the desire, for exalta­
tion. Bather, they call Christians to both an inner and an outer 
humility. .
With Ellul's insistence that humility has an outer as well as an
r*
inner aspect, we are at the very centre of his position.He is
1. "L’Hum.ilite Precede la Gloire," pp. 30-31* •
2. Ibid., p. 32.
3* "Let each of you look not only to his own interests, but also to 
the interests of others. Have this mind among yourselves, which you 
have in Christ Jesus, who, though he was in the form of God, did not 
count equality with God a thing to be grasped, but emptied himself, 
taking the form of a servant, being born in the likeness of men. And 
being found in human form he humbled, himself /my underline/ and 
became obedient unto death, even death on a cross. Therefore God has 
highly exalted him and bestowed on him the name which is above every 
name ..." (Phil. 2M~9)*
4* "L’Humil.ite Precede la, Gloire," pp. 30-31* "These decisions ...which 
must be interior, cannot remain only interior, they must be expressed 
by conduct ..." (ibid., p. 30).
5. "The law of Christ is the law of humility. This humility is not 
only/.*.
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expressing a theme dear bo his heart, the Barthian insistence that 
Christ claims both the inner and the outer allegiance of man. Just as 
we had no reason to fault Ellul and Barth for their ’’One Kingdom” 
reasoning,so we can agree that a humility which has to do only with an 
inner attitude is really a form of hypocrisy. If Christians are not to 
exalt themselves, this must result in outward conduct faithful to this
belief. •
Ellul’s position on Christian humility is dependent on other
aspects of biblical tradition. It is related to the belief in the
sovereign God who alone is in charge of results. The Christian can make
no boast on the behalf of his works, because the results of Christian
2 .action are not in Christian hands, but in God's."
Also related to Ellul's view of Christian humility is his belief 
that the true results of the Christian life are visible only to God.
In his opinion, part of the Christian confession of sin involves pro­
nouncing the verdict of ”inutility” on one's own’s works. The main 
textual basis for his conviction is Luke 17?1C, "So you also, when you 
have done all that is commanded you, say, ’We are unworthy servants; we 
have only done what was our duty.”^ Though the Christian is to 
relativize his own works by refusing to make claims as to their ultimate
only interior. The whole Gospel is there in order to remind us that 
we cannot believe in the humility of riches, of kings, of powers; 
for humility first of all is marked by the abandoning of riches and 
of power. All the rest is hypocrisy” ("L’Humilite Precede la Gloire,” 
p. 3l)» •
1. See above, pp. 88-90.
2. The Politics of God, p. 139*
3* Ibid,, p. 196. "If we are ready to be unworthy or unprofitable 
servants (although.busy and active at the same time), then our works 
can truly redound to the glory of him who freely loved us first”
(ibid .r, p. 197)« ”If we come before God. decked out in the glory of 
these lofty, grandiose, and successful works then ... ’Woe to you that 
are rich' (Luke 6:24)> for the rich man today is the successful man” 
(ibid■, p. 196).
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worth, by refusing &. self-congratulatory attitude, Ellul believes that 
God is free to pass a different verdict (Mtt. 25*2l).^ He is here 
really only applying his doctrine of justification by faith, insisting
that true success is neither success as others see us or as we see
ourselves — but only as God sees us. The affirmation that God alone 
truly understands what is and is not '‘successful" conduct, enables the 
Christian to have an attitude of humility with reference to the results-
of his own life.
Ellul’s biblical exposition at this point is well founded and is
capable of wide New Testament support. In support of his conclusion
derived from Ik. 14*7-11? we note that John Fenton argues that many of 
2
Jesus' teachings stress the idea of smallness before God. Fenton ' 
contends, for example, that the reason why it is difficult for the rich 
to enter the Kingdom of God (Mk. 10:25) is because their power gets in 
the way of the necessary recognition of their human powerlessness before
God.In this context, he refers to the fact that the theme of the 
first becoming last and the last first is a common one in Jesus' teaching 
(Mk. 10:31; Mtt. X9J3O; 20:16; Lk. 13*30).In the same connection, 
Fenton refers to the passage cited by Ellul (ik. 14*?ff.) and argues that
1. The Politics of God, p. 196. ' •
2. Wolfgang Trilling refers to Mtt. 23*12 (a parallel to Luke 14*11,
cited by Ellul), and argues that the meaning is that "Rank is assessed 
according to the law which says that the great is small and the small 
great" (Wolfgang Trilling, The Gospel According to St. Matthew, New 
Testament for Spiritual Reading, Vol. II (T969/7~PP« 84-85; see also 
pp. 172-3). •
3- John Fenton, What Was Jesus' Message? (l97l), P. 23; see also Rev. 
3*15-19.
4. Commenting on the Matthean Beatitudes (Mtt. 5*3-11), Fenton writes, 
"These sayings declare who is to enter the kingdom which is coming.
God will then reverse the positions and judgments which men have made 
fox' themselves in this world, and the last will be first, and the first 
last (20:16): so it is those who are least like kings and rulers — 
the least prosperous — who are the blessed. There is thus, running 
through these sayings, a contrast between present appearances and the 
future reality” (J.C.Fenton, Saint Matthew (1963), pp. 79-80).
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it means precisely that the disciple is to choose a place of lowliness 
now, that at the final judgment he may he approved by God. Similarly, 
he refers to Jesus* teaching concerning children (Mk. IO:14ff.) and say3 
that the point is that the child is a model for the disciple, because in 
Jesus’ day children had no status. Again, the point is the smallness 
and powerlessness of Christian disciples.His conclusion is that 
"Part of what Jesus meant by repentance is this: God is going to rule, 
so you had better abdicate. Turn from your usual course into the
opposite direction. Your usual course is self-aggrandisement: the
‘ 2
opposite direction is self-abnegation. ’’ Penton argues that this aspec' 
of repentance is stated most fully when Jesus tells His disciples that 
they must deny themselves and lose their lives.
Exegetical support can also be given for Ellul’s conclusions 
derived from his analysis of Ik. 22:24-27. Wolfgang Trilling, comment­
ing on Mtt. 20:25-7 (the Matthean parallel) argues that a most striking 
contrast is drawn between a despotic human ruler and a willing slave.
He writes:-
Worldly rule is exercised through oppression ... In sharp 
contrast to all this, Jesus tells his disciples: ’It shall not be 
so among you.’ Those who desire to have power roust renounce all
1. John Penton. What Was Jesus’ Message?, pp. 23-25» and Saint Matthew,
p. 291. In Mtt. 18:1-4 we read: "At that time the disciples came to 
Jesus-, saying, ’Who is the greatest in the kingdom of heaven?’ And 
calling to hirn a child, he put him in the midst of them, and said, 
’Truly, I say to you, unless you turn and become like children, you 
will never enter the kingdom of heaven. Whoever humbles himself like 
this child, he is the greatest in the kingdom of heaven.'" Penton 
commenting on this verse says, "The disciples ask, Who is the greatest 
in the kingdom of heaven? and Jesus tells them “that they will never 
even enter the kingdom unless they give up all desire for being great, 
and become like children, without any status or privileges. Those 
who do that will be great in the kingdom" (J.G. Penton, Saint Matthew, 
p. 290). -
2. John Penton, What Was Jesus' Message?, p. 25.
3. Ibid., p. 26: see Mark 8:34ff»; Ik. 14:25ff«
4. Wolfgang Trilling, Matthew-; Pol. II, p. 129»
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power; those who wish to he great must he small; those who wish 
to have the first place must take the last. The new spirit is the 
spirit of service. The new law is the law of self-abandonment for 
others ... Man’s natural feelings rise up in revolt, which only 
shows how far he is from having found himself and his true 
vocation as man. For he who loses his life will find it
Jvltuy (16 J 25).1
Fenton's appraisal of‘the same passage is identical. "
Returning to Ellul’s own analysis, 1 think we would misunderstand •
his intention if we were to interpret his words in a legalistic sense.
He offers general words, which do not themselves determine what in
individual cases would or would not constitute self-exaltation. Though 
he believes that self-exaltation is to be avoided, though the Christian 
way of life is seen t6 involve inner and outer renunciation of the quest 
for status, he does not appear to be offering a timeless formula as to 
what this will entail in individual cases. Rather, he is making a
general point end sounding a warning—an especially important warning, 
since Christians are all too determined by the status considerations of 
the worldThe general content of Ellul's thought argues against a 
moralistic interpretation of these words, as do some statements directly 
related to the issue of humility, as well as some ideas implicit in 1 2 3
1. Wolfgang Trilling, Matthew, Vol. II, pp. 129-130. Trilling points 
to the Johannine story of Jesus1 washing of the disciples* feet (Jn.
13si-17) and says that here we have the true example of the first 
become last, the Lord acting as a humble servant (ibid,, p. 13C). •
"For I have given you an example, that you should do as I have done to 
you. Truly, truly, I say to you, a servant is not greater than his 
master; nor is he who is sent greater than he who sent him. If you 
know these things, blessed are you if you do them” (Jn. 13*15-17)• •
2. "Among the Gentiles, greatness is demonstrated by power and author­
ity. In the Church it yrill not be so: those who hope for places of 
authority in the kingdom must be servants and slaves of the community. 
The pattern of slavery and glory is set by the Son of man, who is the 
first among the disciples, the ruler, and great one J&t. 2Q7 (v. 25). 
He came. into the world not to be served as a King is served by his 
attendants, but as a servant, to serve others ..." (J.C. Fenton, Saint 
Matthew, p. 325). •
3. See above, p. 119 n.2. for Barth’s position on fame and honour, which
is very similar. ,
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Ellul's own conduct.
What general Ideas argue against the notion that Ellul is simply 
asking Christians to renounce all positions whereby worldly status 
might accrue? For one thing, we remember that when h&^&aeusses*' 
Christian styles of life he stresses the flexible nature of Christian 
obedience, the idea that God's specific command takes different forms
for different individuals. We also recall that when he discusses the
use of Scripture and the concreteness of obedience, he is unwilling to 
offer a casuistry. Because of his belief in the personal God and man's 
direct responsibility, he could at most offer a relative "practical 
casuistry", instructional preparation for the event of hearing God's 
concrete Word3 Thus it seems likely that what he is here intending to 
do is to offer some general ethical convictions which form the context
in which individuals are to listen for the particularizing Word which 
only the Holy Spirit can speak. Were he saying that all Christian lives 
must be utterly devoid of -worldly influence, he would indeed be guilty 
of the very legalism he is generally so determined to avoid. ♦
Because of Ellul's perfectionism, he is convinced that Christians 
seeking to witness to Christ must be faithful to Him. Specifically, he 
thinks that this rules out a Christian tyranny and dominance, which he 
is convinced is the general way of world leadership. If the Christian' 
is to seek to be perfectly obedient and if the way of worldly power is
directly opposed to this, the simple and logical conclusion might seem 
to be that Christians, insofar as possible, ought to avoid contact with 
the world, especially participation in leadership roles. Ellul rejects 
this logical conclusion, for it would mean that Christians would seek 
to avoid being of the world by simply not being in the world. The whole
1, Will and To Do, p. 210.
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of his argument concerning agonistic existence refutes such an inter­
pretation, It is true that Ellul, because of his concern for perfec­
tionism, rejects seme forms of participation in society. However, it 
is doubtful that he really intends to encourage a Christian escapism.
It is, of course, very difficult to talk of an outer form of 
humility without sounding as though Christians are simply to abandon all 
positions whereby worldly power might accrue. Some words U3ed by Ellul, 
when taken by themselves, might seem to lend support to this interpreta­
tion. When he argues against exalting oneself through the acquisition 
of riches, social rank, and political power, when he says that Christians 
seeking to be truly obedient will receive "neither fortune nor honor", 
it seems that his perfectionism is leading him to a simple sectarianism. 
He even goes a3 far as to say that "humility ... is marked by the 
abandoning of riches and of power".It is doubtful whether such words 
are really intended to sponsor a Christian retreat from all positions of 
worldly responsibility. It is true that Ellul often uses extreme 
language, but he usually qualifies it later. (Our insistence is that - 
one cannot accurately interpret his thought unless one rethinks his 
extreme general statements in the light of his later qualifications.)
Of course, he is frightened concerning the Christian misuse of money and 
the failure of Christians to realize the dangers of acquisition. Yet "
after having written a whole book on this very subject, he qualifies his 
2extreme language by warning against the dangers of legalism. .
Though Ellul uses strong language concerning humility as involving
1. "L’Humilite Precede la Gloire," p. 31.
2. Ellul tells parents that they should help their children to gain 
true Christian freedom vzith reference to the use of money; he warns 
parents not to spell things out in too much detail (.L’Homme et
I!Argentt p. 153, see also pp. 165-6). For a similar rejection 
of legalism with reference co money see "L'Argent," in Etudes Theolo- 
giques et Hellgieuses XXY1I (1952), pp. 30-50, 63-65.
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the abandonment of power, he makes other statements which qualify a
legalism at this point. For example, we recall that he appealed to 
2
Christian lawyers to defend the poor.“ To pursue such a course 
involves, not the simple renunciation of all worldly influence, but the 
responsible use of one's position for the sake of the poor (of course, 
on the condition that the methods used are faithful to the Gospel).^ 
Similarly, he urged Christians to talk with corporation .leaders about 
the plight of their workers,a task which involves the Christian use 
of power rather than its total rejection. Though some of his language 
taken by itself might seem to encourage the utter renunciation of money 
and worldly influence, other statements clearly indicate that he does
1. At one place the hyperbolic nature of Ellul’s language is obvious,
for if the following words were taken literally not even another day 
of life would be possible for true Christians. He writes, "The 
fight of faith demands sacrificing.one’s life, success, money, time, 
desires" (Violence, p. 165 )• His real meaning is apparently that
obedience to Christ involves extensive sacrifices in 3uch areas.
2. "L’Humilite Precede la Glc-ire," pp. 32-33; "Propositions, ’’ pp. 42-43•
3. Ellul himself is not always clear on this point. In one context 
where he advises lawyers to act in this way, he goes on to say, "There 
is not power without oppression, even if the one who exercizes power 
is perfect. The law of power is oppression; we remember Jesus. And 
since the Christian must not oppress .any°ne, he cannot exercize power 
whatever it may be. Thus Satan offers Jesus Christ all the power of 
the world and, to this power Jesus opposes the worship of God" ("L’Hu- 
milite Precede la Gloire," p. 33)* Ellul's discussion of power would 
have been helped if he had distinguished between a worldly power, 
based on oppression, and a Christian use of power or influence, subject 
to the ways of the Gospel. The fact that he makes such a flat rejec­
tion of power here cannot disguise the fact that he asks Christian 
attorneys to use their influence (power) in the service of the Gospel 
and in a manner appropriate to the Gospel. It seems that what he 
really opposes is worldly power, power based on oppression. One wishes 
he had sa,id more about the power which we see active in Jesus, a power 
for good consistent with the methods of God. Ellul himself believes
in the sovereign power of God (see below, pp. 2O9ff.) and like tradi­
tional theology does see God as in a real sense all-powerful. That 
being the case, one wishes that he had been more careful to distingiish 
between Satanic power (which uses ungodly methods) and Christian power 
(subject to God’s methods). In Jesus’ temptations, do we not see the 
choice of the latter kind of power, rather than the simple rejection 
o.f power as such?
4. Violence, pp. 151-152.
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not himself draw a legalistic conclusion,
Perhaps the strongest argument against the conclusion that Ellul
is asking Christians simply to leave the world of power and influence is 
his own life example. He himself has not withdrawn from worldly 
influence. If, to Ellul, non-exaltation meant the utter rejection of 
worldly influence, it is hard to see how he could continue in good con­
science to have his books published,let alone be the editor of a 
prestigious Christian journal, or a professor! He could not do any of
these activities if he did not have a degree of worldly influence. Of
‘ 2course he has had many bitter experiences and much personal suffering.
This, however, hardly proves that he has had no worldly influence.
1. Surely the fact that Ellul’s books have gotten published is not in 
itself an indication that he has not been faithful to Christ. He 
explicitly warns against compromising the content of books for the 
sake of appealing to a particular reading public (The Technological 
Society, pp. 4T8ff.). I assume then that he has not thus compromised 
his beliefs in writing his bocks, yet his books have been published! 
This fact would seem to be contrary to a literal interpretation of some 
of his statements concerning the Christian’s absolute rejection by the 
world. For example, he writes that "no one will publish a book attack­
ing the real religion of our times, by.which 1 mean the dominant social 
forces of the technological society" (ibid., p. 418)* On the follow­
ing page he qualifies this statement by saying that such works can be 
published as long as they are siot having the effect of subverting the 
social order (ibid., p, 419)- What is beyond debate is that Ellul 
has written these very statements in a book which scathingly attacks 
the technological society and is probably having some effect on that 
society.
With reference to so-called "revolutionary" writers Ellul quite 
rightly remarks (with typical sarcasm!), "I am somehow unable to 
believe in the revolutionary value of an act which makes the cash 
register jingle so merrily" (The Technological Society, p. 41?)• Here 
he is criticising the way in which many writers write for the sake of 
pleasing their readers. This is true and is important to be said, but 
is a different issue from whether true faithfulness leads to total 
worldly failure.
2. See above, pp. vi-viii.
3. Even the very statements which seem to equate obedience with rejec­
tion by the world are written in books that would not have been 
published if Ellul, had no worldly influence. Of course success in 
getting one’s books published does not-prove that one’s books are 
successful in God’s eyes. The fact that many people buy Ellul’s books 
does not prove anything about what God may be doing through his 
witness/..•
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In our insistence that Ellul does not finally intend to advise 
Christians to withdraw from the world, we are not trying to soften his 
vzords. He definitely does believe that Christian humility must make a
difference in outward behaviour. Christians are not to seek self­
exaltation and this prohibition should have behaviouj?al consequences for 
all Christians. The only question is whether some degree of worldly 
Influence is necessarily inconsistent with Christian obedience. The 
broad context of Ellul’s thought, his own life example, and some particu
lar statements, lead to our conclusion that Cliristians can have some
' 1
degree of worldly influence.
witness. We have no argument with his re-definition of Christian 
success as hidden from general view. All we disagree with are those 
statements which seem to say that true obedience necessarily leads to 
total worldly failure.
1. Though we have cited weighty considerations supporting our interpre­
tation, Ellul at places seems to contradict himself by saying that to 
the very degree that Christians are faithful they will be total 
failures in the world’s eyes. (if 'this is the case, how can faithful
Christians have any degree of worldly influence?) He vzrites, '’The 
action we attempt will always be regarded by the world as a failure, 
and the more so the more it is authentically faithful. We cannot be 
faithful or shovz the Church to be effective in the world unless we 
adopt the world’s criterion of efficiency, which means adopting its 
means as well. As the world_sees it, action which is faithful to
to the cross. Such action always leads to a dead end. It is always 
a fiasco from the standpoint of worldly povzer. But this should not 
woriy us. It does not mean that our action is in truth ineffectual. 
Efficacy measured in terms of faithfulness cannot be compared at any 
point with efficacy measured in terms of success” (The Politics of God 
p. 140,• see also Meaning 0f the C5.ty, pp. 37? 182, A Critique, p. 192
The Technological Society, p. 84, and "L'Humilite Precede la Gloire.” 
P. 33). ~
One can do one of two things when faced with such an interpretative 
dilemma. One can simply admit that Ellul is not a consistent thinker 
here. Or one can de-Iiteralize his words, seeing his intent as that 
of underlining the necessity of Christian suffering, but not really 
intending the simple equation of faithfulness with total failure. V/e 
think that the latter choice has much to be said for it, though one 
can never prove an author’s intentions, when they have to be distingu­
ished from his literal words.
In support of a de-literalising is the fact that everything else in 
this section denies such a simplistic equation. Such ideas as the 
concreteness of obedience and the non-legalistic nature of the Christ­
ian ethic point to major themes of Ellul’s thought and thus are not 
lightly/... .
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It should be noted that at several places Ellul warns Christians 
to be on guard when they see money, honours, and high positions coming 
their way.1 We have no argument whatsoever with such warnings. In 
fact, the real value of his position is that he, unlike much popular 
(and easy) Christian tradition, affirms the importance of Christian 
suffering and recognizes that faithfulness to Christ involves a strong 
degree of conflict with the world. One admires Ellul for having had 
the courage to recover this aspect of primitive Christianity which is 
seldom stressed today. We can entirely agree that obedience to Christ 
must surely bring one into a position of receiving less worldly success
than one otherwise would. If the way of Christ does not conflict at 
every point with the actions of the world, it conflicts at many points. 
If Christians seek to use methods consistent with the Gospel and which 
witness to it in a world where “getting ahead" involves tyranny and 
dominion, Christians surely will not “succeed" like good secularists.
lightly to be relativized. Also, in support of de-literalizing is 
our discussion on pages 36-41 above, where we saw that Ellul generally 
admits that Christians can sometimes agree with non-Christians at the 
level of concrete action. How could Christians ever in good conscience 
do so if true obedience were always to necessitate total worldly 
failure? Since a literal reading of his words at this point reveals 
an immense contradiction with essential elements of his theology, we 
think it likely that he has simply been careless in his formulation.
Last of all, one of the statements seeming to equate faithfulness with 
total failure occurs in a context that itself seems to deny a. literal 
interpretation. He summarizes the thesis of The Politics of God and 
the Politics of Man by saying that in II Kings the “good and faithful 
kings were regularly defeated and the glorious monarchs were like Ahab 
and Ahaz" (The Politics of God, p. 140). If obedience equalled total 
failure, how could the good kings have been kings at all? Ellul is 
surely aware that to be even a good king one would have to have had a 
degree of worldly success. Likewise, he surely knows that Jesus had 
a degree of worldly success prior to his rejection on the Cross. (it 
is hard to even imagine what total failure might mean.) Ail in all, 
it seems likely that Ellul is simply guilty of using provocative language, 
which has the effect of overstating the real point he wants to make.
The real point seems to us to be that Christian existence necessarily 
involves a degree of suffering and failure and that God accomplishes his 
purposes in and through this — the Politics of God!
1. “L’Humilite Precede la Gloire,” pp. 37-38.
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It is surely the case that we often seek to avoid suffering because we 
are so committed to human ’’success”, popularity, advancement, etc. 
Ellul’s point is an important one and we should not minimize it. We 
can entirely agree that both inwardly and outwardly the Christian should 
not seek self-aggrandizement. Anything done for the sake of worldly 
status is surely an unchristian act.
In the tradition of Ellul’s own opposition bo legalistic ethics, 
we insist that the precise form of lowliness must be determined by the 
living God. Thus it seems to us to be possible to be in positions of 
responsibility and still to know the meaning of Christian humility—if 
such is the individual calling to which Christ leads. (We believe that 
it is impossible to be in such positions without receiving some degree 
of worldly recognition.) There Is something to Luke 14*• 7*~H to which 
all Christians must respond; part of the Christian way of life is to 
seek to avoid unnecessary worldly recognition. However, we interpret 
this particular teaching within the broader context of the New Testament 
emphasis on direct obedience to God. We are not prepared to interpret 
the text legalistically, as though God never calls Christians to leader­
ship positions. It is doubtful that Ellul understands the text this 
way either, for he admits that Christian faithfulness does not imply 
that Christians should seek mediocrity.^
Christi an Suffering
Jacques Ellul believes that suffering is a necessary aspect of the
Christian life. He thinks that a life that is faithful to Christ snd
able to witness to Him will necessarily be a life which includes a great 
deal of suffering. In additicn, he believes that the very task of
1. ’’L’Humilite Precede la Gloire,” p. 37.
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witnessing to Christ vdll bring suffering and persecution. 'tie will 
begin our analysis at this last point.
In Ellul’s understanding, one reason the Christian life involves
suffering is because the Christian is called to witness to a transcendent
Kingdom which calls the way of the world into question. Since the
world would rather proceed on its own course, rather than be disturbed
by lives and words which imply the necessity of repentance, the world
will necessarily be offended by the messengers of the Gospel. (Not
every aspect of the Christian life is offensive to the world, since there
can be some degree of agreement at the level of concrete activity.)
Allegiance to Christ involves a devaluation of many human values, and
this devaluation (based on a higher loyalty) results in persecution by 
2
the non-believing world. Ellul is quite clear that Christians are not
to seek suffering, but are simply to receive the suffering which comes 
their way when they seek to witness faithfully to Christ in a godless 
world.He is convinced that if Christians are loyal to Christ they
1. We have just seen a specific way in which Ellul believes that 
Christians are to suffer, through a diminishing of worldly success.
He gives another indication of the concrete shape of Christian suffer­
ing today. He writes, "In the United States, for instance, the fight 
of faith demands that blacks be accepted totally, that they be granted 
full equality and also — because they have been oppressed and insulted 
— that their arrogance, their insults, and their hatred be borne" 
(Violence, po 165)* This advice is quite general and certainly could 
not itself be applied to all specific cases. In specific cases it may 
not be the most loving action merely to bear such insults, though 
generally speaking the suggestion is helpful.
2. Ellul says that when Christians question the means society uses, 
this brings about a rupture between them and society and leads to 
Christian persecution ("Theologie Dogmatique," p«. 14$). "Whenever 
there is a conflict, or at least a tension between Christian morality 
and some other morality, it is the Christian, scad he alone, who 
provokes the tension. The non-Christian is in no way responsible, 
since he has no reason to see faith's requirement as a higher value"
(To Will and To no, p. 96; see also Presence of the Kingdom, p. 11).
3. "If we are faithful we must expect to be tr-ated by the world as was 
Jesus Christ. Persecution or failure (in our affairs, in our careers) 
vdll come by the action of the world and not by our thirst for martyzdcm 
which would be quite unhealthy" (Appel, p. 3?). An interesting example of 
what he means by not seeking suffering, is his wanning that the Church 
ought not to endo.rse political regimes which seek to destroy the Church 
(■False Presenoa, PP- 35—6).
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will receive their share of suffering.
A great deal of biblical support can be given to Ellul’s point.
D.E. Nineham, commenting on Mark 8:34-38, argues that the early Church
saw such a contrast between the holiness of the eternal Kingdom and the
sinfulness of the world, that Christians, representing the transcendent
Kingdom, -would expect to be involved in suffering and persecution by the 
2world. Joachim Jeremias* commenting on the synoptic witness, says:-
Suffering is part of the* service of a messenger, because the 
world’s hate is a normal answer to testimony. This is how it was 
with the prophets, and this is how it is with the disciples. Woe 
to you when all people praise you — that is what your fathers did 
with the false prophets (Luke 6.26). Suffering is almost a hall­
mark of serving as a messenger. Therefore it has great promise ... 
(Mtt. 5*12 par. ). 3
Jeremias argues that according to all strata of the synoptic sources 
Jesus again and again said that suffering forms an inevitable part of the 
service of a messenger:-^
To agree to follow Jesus means to venture on a life that is as 
hard as the last walk of a man condemned to death. In Mark 8.34,
Jesus is saying that this applies to all who follow him. For .
everyone, discipleship involves the readiness to tread the lonely 
road and to bear the people’s hatred. 5
Rudolf Bultmann, in his exposition of the Fourth Gospel, argue3 
that Christian hatred by the world is due to the fact that Christians
1. ’’L’Hurailit.e Precede la Gloire,” pp. 35, 37• '
2. D.E. Nineham, Saint Mark, Pelican Gospel Commentaries (1963), p. 
pp. 227-228.
3« Joachim Jeremias, New Testament Theology, Vol. I, p. 240. Notice, 
that in Mtt. 10:17-18 Christian suffering is related to the fact that 
Christians are to witness to Christ.
4» Ibid., P« 239; see Mtt. 10:16 and Lk. 10:3; Mtt. 5*10-12 and 
Mtt. 10:16-25.
5. Joachim Jeremias, New Testament Theology, Vol. I, p. 242. Referring 
to I Thes3. 1:6, Ernest Best writes, "The suffering of tribulation be­
comes almost the normal condition of the Christian (cf. Rom. 5.3; 12.12; 
Phil. 4.14)’* (Ernest Best, The First and Second Epistle to the Thessalo­
nians, p. 79). He goes on to state that in the New Testament, suffering 
is not at all seen to be .antithetical to Christian joy (see Acts 5*41; 
16:25; H Cor. 7*4; 8*Iff.? Phil. 2$17; Col. 1:24; X Pet. 4*13). This 
is the case because Christian joy is not regarded as the same as mere 
human/...
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relativize human standards and evaluations by their allegiance to a 
Kingdom not of this world (John 15*18-20; Jn. 17:14-16; I Jn. 3!13~14)» 
Just as Jesus' way led to death, so the way of faithfulness to Christ 
leads to persecution (Jn. 12:24-6; Jn. 16:1-4)♦ 1
Ellul’s reasoning about Christian suffering is not only based on.
the conflict which occurs when Christians witness to Christ. He also
appeals to Jesus Christ, who, as the "Suffering Servant", is the true 
model of human life. One must be careful to understand the exact sense
in which Ellul understands Jesus Christ as a model or example. Since 
his primary belief is that Jesus Christ is Saviour and Lord, his under­
standing of Christ as the Christian’s example must be understood in that 
context. If Jesus Christ is an example of true human life, He is not 
so as some merely external pattern, but as the present Lord who leads 
Christians in ways consistent with His past revelation. In Ellul’s
thought there are really two ideas which coalesce at this point: the.
importance of faith in Christ and the belief that faith leads to a life 
consistent with God’s past revelation. In terms of the first understand­
ing, which forms the context for the second, he refers to a Christian 
ontology of suffering, which is assumed to apply to all who are members
of the Church:-
We are all too much used to a Church which talks, and not used to 
one which witnesses (a witness is a inartyrl). We are used to a 
Church seeking comfort instead of ’’completing in the flesh what 
is lacking in Christ's afflictionsThe Church, the body of 
Christ, suffers the same afflictions which Christ suffered for 
mankind (Colossians 1:24)*^ * 1 2
human joy, but is thought to be based on a relationship to the Holy 
Spirit (Ernest Best, The Ei.rst and Second Epistle to the Thessalonians, 
p. 79). ' “ ‘ ...................................
1. Rudolf Bultmann, Theology of the Hew Testament, Vol. II, p. 76, and 
The Gospel of John, pp. 507, 555 > 563.
2. Theological Foundation of Law, p. 135* "This grace .which causes us 
to enter into the Body of Christ, causes us to participate in the very 
life/...
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In terms of the second understanding, which forms an aspect of the
content of Christ’s present Lordship, he reminds us that, unlike the
followers of Cain, Jesus Christ lived not from human security, hut from
confidence in God: "'Foxes have holes, and the birds of the air have
nests, hut the Son of man has nowhere to lay his head.'”Just as
Jesus' life was devoid of human security, Ellul believes that the Risen
Lord calls His disciples to sacrifice many comforts and securities of 
2life. Christ on the Cross thus becomes for Ellul the model whose
example reminds Christians that suffering is an integral aspect of
Christian, life.
Though Ellul's formulations are not always clear, his meaning is 
apparently that Jesus Christ is our example, hut is so only as He is
life of Jesus Christ. Now we must remember that Jesus Christ was 
miserable on earth, was rejected by man, was without hearth or home, 
was accused unjustly and put to death” ("L'Humilite Precede la 
Gloire,” p. 33). Referring to Phil. 2:3ff., he argues that just as 
the world did not accept Christ, so Christians as members of Christ's 
Body should expect to be persecuted by the world. Referring to 
Mtt. 10:24ff»> he says that the Christian servant must expect to be 
treated as was the Christian's Lord (ibid., pp. 34-35). (^e notice 
that faith in Jesus Christ as Saviour and Lord is for Ellul no merely 
individualistic matter, but involves participation in the Church.)
The following words of E. Earle Ellis are similar to what Ellul 
has just saidi "'The Gospel of Luke teaches, and the Book of Acts 
amply illustrates, that the fate of Jesus is the fate of his follow­
ers. If he is attested by God and rejected by men, so are they ...
If he has no resting place in this world (9»5Q)> they too are 
destined to wander, preaching the kingdom of God. The disciples are 
commanded to carry their cross after Jesus (9«23), and his persecu­
tion marks the beginning of their own (22.35TT*)- Even Christian 
martyrdom is described in terms reminiscent of the death of Jesus 
(23-34> Ac. 760). These parallels are not to be understood merely as 
an existential imitation of Jesus but as the working out of a corpor­
ate relation to Jesus. Jesus' disciples have his Spirit, proclaim 
his message, bear his cross and share his glory because they are, in 
Paul’s idiom, 'the body of Christ’ whose destiny is bound up 'with 
Christ'(22.28ff. ... 23.43)” (E. Earle Ellis, The Gospel of Luke, New 
Century Bible (1966), pp. 11-12).
1. Lk. 9!5Qj quoted in Meaning of rbe City, p. 121.
2. Ibid., p. 121.
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first and foremost our Saviour and Lord.
Ellul is of one mind with Barth when it comes to his understanding
of Christian suffering. This is not due to any explicit dependence?
hut is due to the fact that both take seriously the New Testament
witness concerning Christian suffering. Barth tells us that Christian
suffering is a matter of ontology:- .
'The disciple is not above his master nor the servant above 
his lord ... If they have called the master of the house 
Beelzebub? how much more shall they call them of his house­
hold' (Mt. 10i24f.).2
Real Christians are always men who are oppressed by ’the sur­
rounding world ... For the Christian nature of his existence 
would be doubtful to the degree that it experienced no afflic­
tion ... coming to terms with the world by means of appeasing 
compromises
1. "We in the Reformed Church have too much abandoned the imitation of 
Jesus Christ (which is one of the essential elements of the Christian 
faith), by forgetting that salvation by grace does not contradict this 
Imitation" ("Le Fauvre,"pp. 125-126). Ellul also refers to Jesus Christ 
as the model of the good and argues that we must both follow and imitate 
Him (1° Wil1 and To Bo, p. 2o). In the same book where this last state­
ment appeared, he seems to argue against the importance of an imitation 
of Christ. He writes, "Christ is not a model, nor an ideal, etc. He 
is the one who comes in us, and who makes us to be crucified and risen 
again with him" (ibid., p. 302).
Ellul is nob really contradicting himself in these two types of state­
ments. He gives priority to the emphasis on Jesus Christ as Saviour; he 
understands the teaching and example of Christ in the context of grace 
received. (The law is a form of the Gospel.) If Jesus Christ is an 
example, He is not merely an external one nor is that His exclusive or 
primary role.
Ellul also believes that the obedience expected of us ha,s already been 
accomplished in a representative way in Jesus Christ (To ’Will and To Do, 
p. 27, onp. 275 citing Bonhoeffer, Ethics, pp. 55fT«)» Our obedience is in 
grateful response to a salvation freely accomplished in Christ. He in­
sists that there can be no imitation of God's once-and-for-all act of 
salvation in Christ. Though we can participate in Christ's saving acti­
vity flowing from this event, we can neither imitate nor reproduce the 
salvation event itself (The Politics of God, p. 180).
From Ellul’s emphasis on the flexible nature of the Christian ethic, we 
know that he would not be pleased with any approach to the imitation of 
Christ which is nothing more chan an uncreative effort to inflexibly 
repeat Jesus' deeds and words ("Le Sens da la Liberte," pp. 16-17). 
Granted these reservations and these convictions about.the context in 
which imitation should occur, he does seem to affirm the importance of 
an imitation of Christ.
2. Barth IV/2, p. 264. ,
3. Barth 17/3, Second Half, pp. 613-619.
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Like Ellul, he sees Jesus Christ as the model to be followed through 
1
participation in Christ, rather than as a mere external example.
Barth, also decisively links the cause of Christian affliction with the 
Christian’s task of witnessing.^ Like Ellul, he is careful to warn 
Christians that they are not to go looking for suffering, but are to 
accept the suffering which comes their way in God’s gracious providence, 
as they assume their God-appointed tasks as witnesses. In characteris­
tic humour, Barth points out that Daniel in the lion’s den did not take 
it upon himself to vzalk over and pull the lion’s tailI Likewise,
Christians are not called to a life of unnecessary anguish, but to a
life of faithfulness.If we are faithful to God we will have our share
of suffering. No-one need worry that there will be no cross for him to
. 4 “bear.
A person who has generally influenced both Barth and Ellul and who
has probably Influenced Ellul at this point is SjeSren Kierkegaard.
(Ellul hs read his Journals and many references to suffering occur
therein.; Kierkegaard was obsessed with the theme of Christian suffer- 
&
ing. He saw the suffering Christ as the model of true human existence, 1 2 3 * * 6
1. Barth IV/3, Second Half, p. 638.
2. "The Christian is not hated as a human individual who is repulsive
to the one who hates him on account of his personal being and action. 
He is hated as the bearer and representative of a specific claim and 
cause ... They represent to all men and to the world the alien and 
intolerable cause of the kingdom, the coup d1etat of God" (Barth IV/3, 
Second Half, p. 625). "It is just because he is a witness of Jesus 
Christ, and to the extent that he is active as such, that affliction 
comes upon him from without, from the world in the face of which he 
stands" (ibid,, p. 615). "His affliction arises quite simply from the 
fact that the world cannot accept this demand and challenge, and the 
lass so the more clearly it realises what is at issue" (ibid., p. 621 j 
see also p. 64^)* -
3. Barth IV/2, p. 546.
4- Ibid., p. 613.
5» Prayer and Modern Man, pp. Ill, 139» ,
6. Kierkegaard, The Journals, pp. 89, 111, 171, 190, 225~7»
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but like Ellul believed that Christ must be first and primarily under-
1 2 stood as Saviour.' He also affirmed an ontology of suffering. *
'‘Little by little X noticed increasingly that all those whom God really 
loved, the examples etc. had all had to suffer in this world ... To be 
loved by God and to love God is to suffer.He also directly related 
the suf.fer.ing nature of the Christian life to the missionary purpose of
Christian existence.He believed that to resemble truth in a world of
5
untruth brought one into a state of lowliness, humiliation and suffering.
Christian Love
Ellul’s understanding of Christian love is the expression of his 
perfectionism. Xn discussing Christian love, he is again trying to 
describe the shape of the Christian life which he believes is able to 
witness to Christ, because it is faithful to Him.
He speaks of Christian love as qualitatively different from what 
the world knows as love. it is patterned on and is in response to the 
sacrificial love revealed on the Cross (see Hom. 5*8; 1 John 3*16; I Jn. 
4*9~13j19)« He fully accepts the legitimacy of the agape-eros distinc-
1. Kierkegaard, The Last Years, p. 745 The Journals, pp. I64, 166.
"Just try to imagine quite clearly to yourself that the model is called 
a ’Lamb', that alone is a, scandal to natural man, no one has any desire 
to be a lamb" (The Journals, p. 166). "Jesu3 Christ the Savior of the 
world lives in poverty and humiliation, then is persecuted and hated, 
finally is tortured in every way and crucified. His teaching is essen­
tially his life. So what he says is essentially, Follow me; hate 
yourself; forsake everything; crucify the flesh; take up your cross
..." (The Last Years, p. 86).
2. The Last Years, p. 109.
3* The Journals, p. 225- "The fact that one believes can only be 
proved in one way* being willing to suffer for one’s faith. And the 
degree of one’s faith is proved only by the degree of one’s willing­
ness to suffer for one's faith" (Kierkegaard, Attack upon 'Christendom 
p. 271; see also pp. 34-35)* -
4. Kierkegaard, The Journals, p. 173; The Last Years, pp. 51-52.
5. Kierkegaard, Training in Christianity, p. 191; The Last Years, p. 132.
___ . . __•„ . , _______.JW v .
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tion. Eros seeks to possess and dominate; agape 3eeks to give of 
o
itself. Ellul thinks that Christian love is precisely sacrificial 
love, agape love, the love of Christ for sinners, the love of Christ­
ians for their enemies.He, like Barth,stresses the priority and 
necessity of love for God if love for the neighbour is to be of a 
Christian nature (Mtt. 22:37-40; Mk. 12:28-31; Bk. 10:25-8)- He tells
us that man can rediscover the neighbour only when he knows himself as ' 
5
having been found by God. He believes that the Holy Spirit alone can 
overcome the separation between men and enable the humble love of our 
fellow-men. Ellul, however, aoe3 not deny that our fellowship with 
Christ is built up by our service to Christ, who is present incognito in 
the need of our fellow-men (Mtt. 25*40,45)-’ Though he stresses the ‘
priority of man’s vertical relationship v/ith God as determining man’s 
horizontal relationship with his fellow-men, he also recognizes and 
accepts the converse. While recognizing a real distinction between the 
command to love God and the command to love one’s neighbour, he insists 
that a proper relationship with God must of necessity lead to a love for 
one’s fellow-men.$ ■ ■
Ellul see3 Christian love as contradicting our natural tendency to 
9
prefer ourselves, thus he cannot agree with Reinhold Niebuhr’s dialectical * * 3 * 5 * * 8 9
1. Ellul cites his approval of Anders Nygren’s exposition of this theme 
in Agape and Eros ("L1 Argent,” p. 42; see Agape and Eros, pp. 91ff-, 
101-2, 132; see also Bonhoeffer, Ethics, pp. 173-5)- The supernatural­
ism of Ellul’s understanding of love is also shared by Barth (see X/2,
P- 373).
2. Violence, p. 167­
3- Ibid,, pp. 165-8, 172; Metamorphose, p. 117­
4. Barth l/2, pp. 3QXff-, 412.
5- Presence of the Kingdom, p. 95; To Will and To Bo, p. 85­
6. Presence of the Kingdom, pp. 127-8- •
7* Violence, pp. 123, 135- '
8- Prayer and -Modern Man, p. I64.
9- Violence, pp, 166-7•
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way of understanding the relationship between mutual love and sacrifi­
cial love. He can’t agree with Niebuhr's tendency to see the require­
ments of God as extensions of the morality of the world.The 
difference between the two men in their understanding of love has to do 
with Ellul's supernatural!sm. He thinks of agajoe not only within the 
context of the example of Christ’s love, but decisively within the con­
text of a personal response to C-od’s love in Christ, made possible by a 
participation in the Holy Spirit (Rom. 5*5, Gal. 5J22; Eph. 3*14~19)«
Once Christian love is understood in terms of a covenant relationship 
with the Holy Spirit, it is much more difficult to draw up a dialectical
relationship between natural love (even altruistic concern) and Christian
2 ' sacrificial love. Ellul does not deny the possibility of a degree of 
altruism on the part of non-Christians, but it is true that he doesn’t 
think that non-Christians love their enemies (Mtt. 5*43-9; Lk. 6:27ff»)
—and love for enemies is for him the essence of Christian love. He
is insistent that altruism of itself is not Christian love, for the 
latter assumes a relationship with God.^
Ellul not only speaks of Christian love as decisively love for
enemies,but also looks to the patient, forgiving love defined in 
. 5
I Cor. 13 as a model. His references to love occur in his book Violence
1. To Will and To Do, p. 289* •
2. See ibid., p. 289*
3. Earlier we pointed out that Ellul raises the question whether 
Niebuhr is not guilty of idealism (see above, pp. 97-98 and £n.). The 
question we raised there, as applied here, is whether the way Niebuhr 
relates eros to' agape does not leave the Holy Spirit with no real task 
to pei’form. If a^ape is merely the rational application of a love 
known to all men ^mutual love), what is the role of the Holy Spirit? 
(see also above, p. 30, n. 2). Of course, Niebuhr would add that 
agape is the norm for the application of this natural love. Our 
question is simply whether agape as a mere norm really measures up to 
the New Testament understanding.
4* Violence, p. 172.
5* Ibid., p. 58.
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vzhere he is striving to define the Christian way of life over against 
the tendency to love only those who stand on one side of an ideological 
•battle line.' The meaning of love for one’£3 enemies is thought out
precisely in this context and his conclusion is that it is sentimental 
nonsense to think that we can love an enemy we are in the process of 
killing.^ To love is to have sacrificial concern for all those for
whom Christ died. To Ellul’s mind, to reject this all-inclusive love
- 3for all men is to reject the incarnation of God’s love in Jesus Christ, 
it is to choose a theology of revolution, rather than a theology of 
reconciliation.”A theology of violence calls for discrimination for
or against certain men; therefore it must deny the Father who loves all 
5men equally.” Ellul links the theology of selective love with the 
r
theology which denies God’s incarnate love for the world. It is an
1. Violence, ppe 16-17, 99•
2. Ibid., p. 7*
3. Ellul admits that others may accuse him of condoning the violence of 
the oppressor because he is not willing to resort to violence to help 
the oppressed (Violence, p. 136). "Naturally, there are those who 
will protest*. ’But can anyone say that he loves the exploited poor of 
South Africa when he does nothing for them; and can anything be done 
without violence?” (ibid., p. 130)• He does not seem to answer directly 
these charges that he himself raises, but refers to the opposition 
between the order of necessity and the way of Christ (ibid., p, 130). 
Perhaps his real answer is to be found where he says that ”in the face 
of the tragic problem of violence, the first truth to be discerned is ' 
that, whatever side he takes, the Christian can never have an easy 
conscience and never feel that he is pursuing the way of truth” (ibid,, 
p. 133). In other words, he answers his own question by saying that 
even the Christian position of non-violence involves guilt. Neverthe­
less, he still feels that Christian truth lies with the way of non­
violence and that those who engage in violence also have guilt (even 
more?) on their hands.
4- Violence, pp. 74-75*
5. Ibid., p. 75*
6. Ibid,, p. 74* It is interesting that he finds the basis of modern 
Christians’ defence of violence in a denial of man’s vertical relation­
ship with God (ibid., pp. 60, 74-5), which in turn leads to a selective 
love for one’s fellow-men, a love defined by ideology and not by revela­
tion (ibid., p. 72). Eliul, like Barth, is opposed t'o the humanistic 
distortion of the Christian faith, He even thinks that humanism is 
related/...
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interesting indication of the situational setting of his theology that 
within the context of a discussion on violence, he utilizes the Incarna­
tion as the decisive factor and indicates that the Incarnation implies 
love for one’s enemies. A strength of Ellul’s approach to theology is 
precisely the fact that he sets theology within the context of dis­
cussions of particular moral problems.
The problem in Ellul’s discussion of Christian love is that he 
tends to define it in a one-sidedly personal way. That he does this is 
rather surprising, since he himself criticizes the revolutionaries for 
defending a love which discriminates against some men and favours others. 
One wonders whether Ellul is not somewhat guilty of his own criticism 
when he sees Christian love as having to do with only one group of 
people ~~ those who are near at hand. It's understandable that he would 
be critical of those who assure themselves of their own righteousness by 
having a general love of humanity, but who do nothing on behalf of those 
in need. It’s easy to love humanity and hard to love people.' This is. 
the positive point he has to make. He is arguing for the importance of 
individual responsibility and direct personal acts of love. * There is
related to an ideology which is only selectively humanistic. It 
neither teaches nor enables a love for enemies, though it may on 
occasion encourage altruism. •
1. Violence, p. 75•
2. "He Pauvre," p» 124. "We should not suppose that we have taken
action on the world's suffering because we have signed a petition on 
behalf of the Hungarians or the Algerians, or because we have demon­
strated in the streets, or have given the price of a meal to alleviate 
world famine. Those are evil little substitutes for grace. They are 
the not-too-innocent ploys of the devil" (False Presence, p. 7l)« He 
argues that Christians need not suffer by taking the whole misery of 
the world on their shoulders. He believes that Jesus Christ alone 
bears such vast suffering. Though Ellul admits that Christians are 
not to be indifferent to mankind's sufferings, he insists that the 
Christian's only concern is with human problems near enough for Christ­
ians to be able to do something about them (False Presence, pp. 70-71)* 
This formulation can be criticized on at least two counts: (l) If 
Christians are to pray for the needs of the world, then they ought 
also/... •
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plenty of biblical support for the notion that Christian love should 
include and perhaps even put great stress on individual personal 
activity on behalf of those in need. What we feel needs to be criti­
cized in Ellul’s formulation is the way he (to our mind) over-extends 
his argument by entirely rejecting the idea that Christians are also 
called to express love through less personal channels. • We wonder 
whether Ellul, in taking this further step, does not inadvertently 
superimpose a personalistic philosophy on the Bible, a philosophy which
does not seem to us even to do justice to the very texts on which he
bases his contention.
He criticizes what he calls the theory of "distant relationships". 
This theory affirms that Christians are called to love their fellow-men 
throughout the whole world. Of this theory Ellul writes: "It rejects 
the antinomy between one’s neighbor, the individual neai'by, and a co­
partner, that is to say, the person with whom 1 have only societal 
relations, to whom 1 am bound solely by sociological ties."^ This view 
believes that Christian charity relates to social institutions as well• 
as to personal encounter.^
Before Ellul totally denounces this theory (which is precisely what
also to have a feeling of suffering in concern for world tragedy;
(2) It can also be argued that Christians really can do significant 
things on behalf of distant neighbours.
Ellul says that Marxism rightly criticized the tendency to forget 
collective responsibility by hiding behind individual virtue. Though 
he thinks this criticism was justified in the nineteenth century, he 
thinks the problem is just the opposite today. He believes that 
people avoid individual responsibility by looking to politice.l 
mechanisms to solve their problems (The Political Illusion, pp. 188, 
IQO). While recognizing the importance of individual responsibility, 
we wonder if there is not still truth in the Marxist charge and truth 
over against Ellul’s own tendency to confine love to personal 
relationships. (For a related oversimplification see above, p. 64 n. l).
1. False Presence, p. 65.
2. Ibid., pp. 65-66.
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he does doi), he gives some words of qualification. He says that this
view is correct in its denunciation of "the shrunken view of charity in
the bourgeois outlook", the bourgeois tendency to use personal relation- 
2ships as a form of escape from responsibility for the downtrodden.
Here he admits that charity "sometimes operates through the copartner
3 .
relationship". "We can readily agree in denouncing an eschatology ... 
which condemns the world of the copartner in order to retreat into the 
dream of small prophetic communities."Ellul’s personalistic inter­
pretation of Christian love is different from the bourgeois view, in 
that it involves a much more costly and demanding form of obedience. 
However, his apparent admission that Christian love can sometimes operate 
through a copartner relationship flatly contradicts what he says a few 
sentences later when he writes, "It seems to us that the theory of dist­
ant relationships is quite heretical and anti-biblical." This latter
1. That he -will flatly reject this view, but a few sentences earlier 
appear not to do so, is typical of his tortuous writing style.
2. F al s e Pre sene e, p. 66; see also The Political Illusion, p. 188, and
L1Homme et 1 ’Argent, p. 18. "Charity, perfect love, without fault and 
without end—had, in the hands of the bourgeois, been reduced to 
charity. Your conscience was at peace when you had done charity. You
did it so you wouldn’t have to feel it. It was a screen for injustice
and a compensation for the oppression that the necessities of work, 
money, and progress forced us to inflict on others. The oppressor is
always ready to offer charity to the oppressed. In this way he demon­
strates his noble sentiments toward him" (A Critique, p. 288). Else- ' 
where Ellul criticizes the bourgeoisie for excluding love for one’s 
enemies from Christianity (Metamorphose, p. 117)•
3* False Presence, p. 66.
4. Ibid., p. 66.
5« Ibid., p. 66; see also pp. 69-70. Jurgen Moltmann’s description of 
religion as "the cult of the New Subjectivity" seems to apply to 
Ellul’s thought at this point (Moltmann, Theology of Hope, pp. Jllff.). 
Moltmann points out that in this view Christian love abandons all 
effort to relate to the social order and becomes confined to the irnmedi 
ate I-Thou relationship (ibid., p. 315)« "The’neighbour’ who is the 
object of Christian love is then the man who encounters us at any given 
moment, our fellow mail in his selfhood, but he can no longer be known, 
respected and loved in his juridical person and his social role. Our 
’neighbour’ comes on the scene only in personal encounter, but not in
• * •
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statement appears to represent his true position.
What is the basis of Ellul's belief that Christian love is an
entirely interpersonal matter, incapable both of motivating concern for
an unknown neighbour and of being able to operate through impersonal 
channels? ’His argument is based partially on his resistance to necessi­
ties which he believes the modern world is forcing on Christians and 
partially on biblical exegesis and theological interpretation. In the 
first aspect of his argument, he says that modern society is forcing
Christians to rethink Christian love in a broaden? social context than
was originally the case for New Testament Christians. While not denying
that a changed situation exists,x he says that it is a false question to
ask how Christianity can be rethought in terms of this new situation of
social interdependence. It is his belief that the fact that we live in
a society no longer based on personal relationships, but on the media
and on complex corporate realities, in no way justifies the Christian 
2modification of the biblical understanding of love. Over against the 
new view of love, which he believes is due to adaptation to the world, • 
he insists on the traditional view (oy which he apparently means tho 
Christian view).^ "The traditional idea was that this love had to do
his social reality. It is the man within arm’s length or at our door ' 
who is our neighbour, but not man as he appears in the social and 
juridical order, in questions of aid to underdeveloped countries and 
race relationships, in social callings, roles and claims" (ivloltmann, 
Theology of Hope, p. 315)* • .
1. Ellul refers to the interrelationships created by the mass media 
and the speed of communication, which lead to worldwide collective 
interests (False Presence, p. 63). He admits that events now have 
worldwide repercussions: "Every event throughout the world has its 
repercussions on all, and we can no longer remain indifferent, for we 
are subjected to the aftereffects of economic and political decisions 
the world over. Conversely, our decisions have their repercussions
on everyone else ... Henceforth our lives are truly bound up with the 
lives of all" (False Presence, p. 63).
2. Ibid., pp. 66-68. ,
3’ Ibid., pp. 62-63.
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with a person of one's acquaintance, to whom one was close, and that 
love would only take place in the proximity of person to person."
Ellul is, of course, correct that the wox’ld situation has drastic­
ally changed. The question which arises is whether the faithful 
Christian response is to meet this changed situation with a flat 
rejection of the use of social channels for expressing Christian concern 
or whether the Christian should seek to be faithful by creatively making
use of such channels, insofar as one can do so without compromising 
2
Christian obedience. Only on one condition can the response of 
absolute rejection of such channels be identified with the Christian 
response and that is if the Bible clearly articulates an ontology of love 
which defines Christian love as one-sidedly personal. (The mere fact 
tha/t he claims that this is the case does not prove that it is.) The 
decisive argument with Ellul's view has to be exegetical. Unless the 
biblical view is as he thinks, there is no reason why the form of Christ­
ian responsibility should involve such a head-on clash with modern 
developments. One might even argue that to ignore totally the changed 
situation may be an unfaithful response. If the world situation has 
changed, to confine love ro person to person relationships may be to 
unnecessarily limit the scope of love.
We will now consider Ellul's theological and biblical reasoning, 
which leads him to affirm a one-sidedly personal understanding of Christ­
ian love. His argument is that to try to love all men is to assume a 
task reserved for God alone."' "Love exercized through distant relation­
ship is simply hypocrisy, because it goes beyond the human possibilities,
1. False Presence, p. 63,
2. Perhaps Ellul assumes that any use of social channels necessitates 
Christian compromise, but is such a simplistic assumption really 
tenable?
3. False Presence, pp. 67-68.
and is an idealism which avoids the reality of the love shown forth in
scripture ... It is dreadful to confuse a ’public service* with the 
.1service of love.” On the basis of the parable of the Good Samaritan
he says that God does not command Christians to love mankind, but to love 
2the neighbour at hand. He generalizes that every scriptural act of 
love “involves causing a person to come out of his status of anonymity 
... in order, through a purely personal relationship, to transform him 
into a person known and distinguished by name.'*^ He believes that the 
Christian is not engaged in Christian charity as long as he is involved 
at the level of collective concern or institutional reform. Charity 
only “takes place when the collective misfortune becomes so personalized 
in this neighbor that it fades out as 'collective* and as ’status* in 
order to leave only the bleeding flesh and soul1’.^
We must carefully evaluate Ellul's point here, since if true it
does lead to the conclusion that Christian love has no interest in non-
personaJ- forms of expression. We earlier referred to his statement 
where he goes as far as to define the Christian view of love as having 
to do with a relationship with a close acquaintance. It- is true that 
the story of the Good Samaritan describes personal service, but it 
certainly does not describe a service bordering on friendship. The 
Samaritan is not said to have had any previous knowledge of the person 1 2 * 4
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1. False Presence, p. 68.
2. “The commandment which is given us is very clear. It does not 
have to do with ... mankind, nor even with neighbors, but with a 
single person, your neighbor. The explanation is also simple. Jesus 
shows how the good Samaritan transformed the relationship with a co­
partner (Samaritan—Jew, which is not a love relationship, and which 
love neither covers nor touches) into a relationship with a neighbor, 
exclusive of all others” (False Presence, p. 68).
3* False Presence, p. 68
4. Ibid., p. 6.9.
9. IbidjL? P* 63 •
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at the side of the road, nor does the Samaritan remain on tho scene 
after his service .has been performed (Lk. 10s25-37)* In emphasising
the personal nature of love, one wonders whether Ellul is not confusing 
his own careful distinction between agape and eros, and thinking of 
Christian love all too exclusively in the context of the self-fulfilment 
which comes from personal service. (Of course, personal service is 
important; we are only debating whether it alone is of Christian 
.importance. )
In examining the parable of the Good Samaritan, one also vzonders 
if Ellul, by his one-sided emphasis on serving the near neighbour, is 
not raising the very question the story intends to silence. The lawyer 
asked, "Who is my neighbour?" (lk. 10:29). The parable refrains from 
answering that question and in so doing seems to point away from any 
limiting definition as to who is or is not a Christian’s neighbour. 
Instead, the story talks about being a neighbour to those in need (Lk. 
10:36). It may be right to stress the personal nature of the Samaritan’s 
service to remind Christians that love needs to include individual acts 
of love. However, the rejection of' the question "Who is my neighbour?" 
seems to argue against a one-sidedly personalistic interpretation, which 
would define the Christian neighbour as those alone who are near at 
hand.l Of course it is true that first-century Christians did not have
1. Commenting on Luke 10:25-37 G.B. Caird writes,. "He tells the story 
of the Good Samaritan, not to answer the question ‘Who is my neigh­
bour?’ but to shovz that it is the wrong question. The proper 
question is, ’To whom can I be a neighbour?’; and the answer is, ’To 
anyone whose need constitutes a claim on ray love'. It is neighbour­
liness, not neighbourhood, that makes a neighbour" (G.B. Caird, Saint 
Luke, p. 148). Victor Paul Furnish writes, "As Ernst Fuchs 
perceptively notes, while the rabbis emphasized the periphery of the 
circle within which neighbor love should be operative and discussed 
the problem of a longer or shorter radius, this parable stresses the 
midpoint of that circle (love) and allows the periphery to extend 
endlessly outward. Concrete deeds of love, not casuistic definitions 
of love’s limits, should be of concern" (Victor Paul Furnish, The 
Love Command, p. 45,’ see also pp. 4^? 60, 64)»
■ — 2 Ozj.
the many opportunities we have to express love through impersonal 
channels. Their world was smaller; by and large they were not even 
aware of distant needs, simply because the means of mass communication 
did not exist. (Paul’s collection for the Jerusalem Church may be a 
kind of exception and we wonder what Ellul would do with Paul’s example? 
Surely the Christians who.made the donations for the Jerusalem Christ­
ians did not personally know the recipients. If the deed can be said '
to be personal, because it involved Paul as the direct mediator, it can 
also be said to be impersonal, because those making the donations did 
not know the recipients.) One wonders whether Ellul has not resorted 
to an extremely dubious hermeneutic, interpreting Christian love in the 
context of the social and technical limitations of the first century, 
rather than in the light of implicit theological meaning, which could 
later be legitimately expanded (in the light of the changed social 
situation) to encourage a wider Christian expression of love.
We also v/onder whether Ellul has not made a major exegetical mis­
take when he makes such a rigid distinction between the love which God 
has for all men and the Christian’s love, which is limited to the 
neighbour near at hand. He claims to a,ffirm the importance of a 
Christian love for one’s enemies. In fact, that is where he sees the
practical difference between Christian love and mere humanistic love.
If one studies Mtt. 5:43~3 (see also Lk. 6:27-8,32-6) it becomes apparent 
that the distinction Ellul draws between God’s wide concern and the 
Christian’s narrow concern is not present in the texts. Quite to the • 
contrary, the Christian is encouraged to love the enemy precisely because 
God the Creator sends His providential blessings on all men. The 
reasoning seems to be that just as God is indiscriminate in His love, so 
Christians are to imitate this kind of indiscriminate love (Mtt. 5!48).
If the intention of the texts had been to limit love for che enemy to
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those near at hand, it is puzzling why the injunction to love was set 
in the context of God's wide and inclusive providential care3 (it is 
very strange that he here rejects the notion that Christians are to 
imitate God, since at other places he emphasizes that very point.)
Not only are we unconvinced of the exegetical basis of Ellul's
thought at this point, we are puzzled why he regards love exercized
through distant relationships as necessarily hypocritical, because it 
2goes beyond human possibilities. Even the briefest acquaintance with 
his ethical thought indicates that he generally regards Christian 
obedience as beyond human possibility! In this very section we have
4seen that he understands Christian love as a supernatural possibility.
We are also unhappy with the absolute distinction he makes between 
5
the service of love and public service. Were Ellul really to maintain 
ouch a distinction, he would need to affirm a traditional "Two Kingdom" 
doctrine, since there would be no possibility that the regular affairs 
of daily life could become channels through which Christians might 
express their loyalty to Christ.
Another argument Ellul uses in favour of confining Christian love
to the interpersonal sphere is based on the fact that "in revealing to us
what love is, Christ precisely did not come as Pantocrator, but as Jesus,
that is to say, localized. He addressed himself to a very small number
of persons with whom he established personal relations, and he moved 
7
away from their socio-political culture." There seem to be three
1. See J.C. Fenton, Saint Matthew, p. 93.
2. False Presence, p. 68.
3. To Will and To Do, p. 267.
4. See above, pp. 194'-195»
9. False Presence, p. 68.
6. See below, pp. 299-3OO.
7* False Presence, p. 69.
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assertions in this statement. First, on Ellul’s own terms it can be 
debated whether the Object of faith is simply the woi'd3 and deeds of the 
Jesus of history.He customarily thinks of the Christ event in the 
broad context of salvation history leading to, including, and stemming 
from the Incarnation. If theology emphasizes Christ as the Risen Lord, 
and not merely as God’s past revelation, it is not so easy to argue for
a localism on the basis of the Christ event. The Risen Lord now
reaches out to the whole world. Secondly, one can ask again whether 
Ellul is not simply deifying first-century conditions. Of course Jesus 
addressed only a small number of people. Though He might have spoken 
to more people than He actually did, the absence of the means of mass
communication of itself contributed to a localism. Is not the assertion
that Jesus' localism must be ours a deifying of the non-technical
society? Third, Ellul assumes that Jesus was detached from the
socio-political culture of His day. ' It may be true that Jesus did not 
3
take an interest in political questions. We will deal with the issue 
of Christian participation in politics in Chapter Seven.Here it is 
enough to note that even if one rejected direct political participation 
(which Ellul doesn’t simply do, though he sometimes seems to), this would 
not necessitate confining love to the personal realm. The social realm
is broader than politics as such.
Wile keeping in mind the critical questions we have been discuss­
ing, we now look at some precise implications which flow from Ellul's 
argument. We notice that he talks of the importance of Christian 
stewardship on behalf of the poor, but insists that the gift of money
1. false Presence, p. 56J L’Evangile Hier et Aujourd'hui, p. I87.
2. We have seen earlier that Ellul sometimes declares technology to be 
inherently bad (see above, p. 23, n. 2).
3. See below, p. 263*
4. Pp. 250ff.
- 207 -
must never be anonymous. but must be an act of personal self-giving.”
If our criticisms above are correct, this is an unnecessary overstatement. 
The argument that all Christian stewardship must be of a personal nature 
rests simply on the prior assumption that Christian love can never be
expressed through impersonal channels.
A further implication of Ellul’s one-sidedly personal!stic under­
standing of the expression of Christian love is his rejection of Christian 
participation in society’s programmes and institutions. He is in the 
strange position of claiming great concern for the poor but, because of 
his personalistic philosophy, having to reject many channels through 
which Christians might express such concern. Even if one accepts his 
thesis concerning the purpose of the Christian life and the necessity of' 
using methods consistent with that purpose, one might still disagree that 
this absolutely rules out all involvement in .society’s programmes and 
institutions. Though many aspects of political reality may necessitate 
the compromising of Christian methods, is this true of all social parti­
cipation? For example, would Christian support for the welfare services 
of the state necessarily involve a compromising of Christian conviction? 
Might not a Christian even work through such channels as a direct express­
ion of his Christian love? Is Ellul right in arguing that a Christian 
support for programmes and institutions is necessarily a flight into the 
mass, a retreat from God? May not the total unwillingness to consider 
responsible participation in such channels be precisely a flight from God, 
because it unnecessarily eliminates a whole area where Christians could , 1 2
1. ’’L’Argent,” p. 63.
2. ’’Here, as on many other points, Christianity refuses the system.
The response to the poor will not find us adhering to any group or 
program. To seek to respond by entering a party, by accepting a 
program, by working in sn institution is a refusal of responsibility, 
is a flight into the mass before the question of God” (’’Le Pauvre,” 
p. 124; see also L’Homme et 11Argent, p. 210).
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be of service to their neighbours?
The conclusion seems inescapable that Ellul’s personal1stic .
philosophy has had a distorting influence on the outworking of his 
understanding of Christian love. In the first several pages of this 
section we stated some of his general views about Christian love and 
found no reason to criticize them. In the remaining pages we have 
dealt with the problem involved in Ellul’s interpretation, the fact that 
he narrows the scope of Christian love. We believe that the latter
tendency is not only not necessitated by the earlier insights, but 
stands in contradiction to a real emphasis on loving one's enemies.
CHAPTER VI
Ji1i
CHAPTER VI
CHRIST’S • LORDSHIP OVER A REBELLIOUS WORLD
Opposition to the Sacralicing of History
Ellul’s theology is very much a theology of the Lord, A 
theology of the Lord relates to history, hut is not a theology Oy 
history. The difference is that a theology of the Viord takes
seriously man’s radical sinfulness and hence cannot equate man’s
. 1
sinful history with God’s self-manifestation. In a theology of
the Lord, history is understood as the "battleground "between Cod and 
Satan, rather than as the natural revelation of God. The sovereignty
1, A modern representative of the theology of history position is
Wolfhart Pannenherg. He sees God's revelation, not as the prophet’s 
interpretive Word, hut as the whole world ni'ocess (Robinson and 
Cobb , editors, T'i;eology as His tory, pp. 15-12, 63, 185, 232)»
Likewise, he blurs the distinction between faith and mere rational 
knowledge, so much so that the very basis of the Christian faith ■ 
is seen as dependent or. the relativities of historical research 
(ibid., p. 274) • Though many of the things which Pannenherg 
says are both helpful and genuinely Christian, it is nevertheless 
the case that he is unashamedly a rationalist’. (ibid., PP • 226-7 A
It is imrortcint to recognize that Jurgen PoItmann’ s position is 
different from Pannenherg’s at this point (since they are often 
considered together). He Itmann writes, "The decisive question, 
is whether ’revelation’ is the illuminating interpretation of an 
existing obscure life process in history, or whether revelation 
itself originates, drives and directs the process of history; 
whether consequently as Barth has asked, revelation is a predicate 
of history, or whether history has to be understood as a predicate 
of the eschatological revelation and to be experienced, expected and 
obediently willed as such" (KoItmann, Theolog y 0f Hope, pp, 75-76; 
see also p, 71)• He explicitly disagrees with the school of 
Federal theology which understood the world as a progressive .
revelation of God (ibid., p» 69). He points out that the theology 
of progressive revelation led to the cultural 'Christianity of 
the 19th century, which identified the present stage of cultural 
evolution with the true manifestation of Christianity (ibid., p. 75)• 
He says that Pannenherg has himself moved away from the Old 
Testament insight that history happens between promise and 
fulfilment and has instead come to affirm the Greek view that 
God reveals Himself in the total process'of history (ibid., pp. 77-9)•
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of Ood is understood as the belief that C-od is able to work creatively 
even in the midst of sin to accomplish His purposes.' However, it is 
thought that Cod’s purposes cannot be read directly from r,he ho risen
of what is 'happening in public history.
Ellul is critical of those who say that the world is objectively
reconciled to Cod and ignore the negative .judgments on the world 
. 2
found abundantly in the Hew Testament." He is opposed to a
Christian idealism which minimizes the radical sinfulness of the 
world"5 because it wants to be in step with the times.
'It is a mistake and ore that is made again and again, to fasten an 
undue interpretation on the text ’C-od so loved the world*, to 
assume that it implies that the world is not so bad after all ...
I believe that the meaning of that passage is precisely the 
opposite. It is because the world is radically, totally evil 
that nothing less would do than the gift of C-od’s Son. 4
.'he Hearing of
oli___~
ViolsRoe, 
Violence, 
Violence,
ics of C-od,
71-2.up
P«
P.
the City, 
“ P» 99
132; The Judgment of Jonah, pp. 53-4?
122; A Critique, p. 252.
4, v » » 2o. "It must be 
Jesus Christ over the world does 
of the creation to its integrity 
in its concrete existence than I 
i srdoned ..." (False Pre sence, p
remembered that the lordship of 
not at all signify a restoration 
The world is no more restored 
cease to be a sinner because 
16). Ellul believes in the
sovereignty of Christ over the world, but he understands that 
lordship to be a deeply hidden reality. "If the incarnation has 
a meaning it can only be that Cod came into the most abominable of 
places (end he did not, by his coming;, either validate or change 
th<at place). The ’Lordship of Jesus Christ’ does not mean that 
everything that happens, happens by the decision of that Lord.
Ho, the world remains the world, but whether or not it knows it 
the world is subject to that Lord ” (Violence, p. 25).
Ellul believes that Christ's death and resurrection did not 
structurally eliminate sin from the world. "The death of Jesus 
Christ does not mean that a strangle power which has conditioned 
history thus fax' has been annihilated. History and society are 
still very much subject to constraints " (The Politics of Cod, 
p. 187). "Christ's victory is not visible in the world of reality; 
there is no obvious proof of it ” (The Hearn ing- of the City, p. 165). 
"This defeat is in Christ’s sight, not in ours " (ibid. t p. 166).
An important aspect of Ellul's criticism of Pierre Teilhard de 
Chardin is that he thinks Teilhard minimizes the real sinfulness 
of the world, deifying the natural process of history (see below, p. 221 
st 3eq.» n.4> for4 a different though related criticism). Ellul 
excuses the bourgeoisie of inverting the Incarnation. In place of 
the biblical view that tod came into a lost world, the bourgeois 
optimists claimed that the world was itself becoming divine 
(^lamorgho se/... .
TWp
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Instead of declaring the world to be good, he believes that we should
distance ourselves from the tendencies and movements of society,
1
’’being in the world but not of it.”
John Marsh has developed a distinction which may be helpful
for the purposes of understanding Ellul’s theology of the Kord. He
makes a distinction between what takes place and what God is doing 
2
amid what happens. ’’The advantage of the distinction ... is that
it does not establish two realms but remains one,””' This kind of
a distinction serves as a protection against the simple identification 
of external history with God’s intentional will. It supports a 
’’dialectical” understanding of history. God is seen to be truly 
involved in public history, but God’s purposes can be perceived
only in faith. This distinction also serves as a protection
(Metamorphose, p. 1p2). He believes that Teilhard represents
"the culmination of bourgeois thought” (ibid., p, 159)* He thinks 
Teilhard naively deifies trends by interpreting them in the light 
of evolutionary dogma. Ellul sees it as illegitimate to transpose 
evolutionary theory from the biological realm to the realm of 
human history. He thinks that there is no moral progress to 
correspond with the biological evolution of human life. he thus 
thinks that Teilhard’s theories are utopian and lacking in realism. 
Ellul cannot agree that the world is implicitly Christian (Violence, 
p. 123). ' ‘
Another example of the sort of thought which Ellul opposes is that 
of Paul Lehmann. (He does not criticize Lehmann as such, but does 
so indirectly by criticizing his pupil Richard SchaulL Violence, 
pp. 5O~56j)» James M. Gustafson’s summary of Lehmann’s position 
is brilliant and points to the very thing Ellul opposes.
Gustafson writes, ’’Paul Lehmann, for example, builds his Christian 
ethic upon the idea that in the lordship of Christ a new humanity 
has been given. The world is to be regarded in the light of the 
victory of Christ over the powers of sin, death,and law. Both 
believers and unbelievers are confronted by an environment ’being 
shaped by Christ’s royal and redemptive activity’” (James M. 
Gustafson, Christian Ethics, p. 60). (Of‘course, Lehmann’s ideas 
are themselves based on some provocative utterances by the later 
Bonhoeffer.)
1• Violence, p. 26.
2. John Harsh, Saint John, pp. 16, 47-48•
3. John Marsh, Saint John, p. 77*
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against a pietistic or existentialist approach, whereby God’s activity
is seen to be confined to the inner realm,
An awareness of John Galvin’s position on the sovereignty of 
Gocl also helps us to understand Sllul’s position. In the history of 
Christian theology, Galvin’s name stands out as one who emphasizes 
the sovereignty of God; yet, Galvin's theology, unlike Hegel’s, 
was a theology of the lord, not a theology of history. His position 
was based on the belief in a transcendent and personal God active in
history. He believed that God has an active intention in all that 
happens, but he also believed that the Devil and sinful men have 
active intentions in all events,^ Ihough Galvin was confident of the 
hidden sovereignty of God over the world, his belief in the fallenness 
of man prevented him from thinking that God’s intention could be 
determined by looking at world history as such, Per him, the clue 
for understanding the meaning of God’s lordship over the world is
the spiritual effort to listen for the Word of God’s intention and 
responding to that. Galvin was not at all saying that the demonic 
is inactive in history or that the whole movement or direction of
history is toward the self-realization of God’s will. He believed 
that God rnay indeed intend something in everything that occurs, but
that intention v/as not seen to be obvious or self-evident, Calvin’s
position, like Hllul’s, .is tenable only if one believes that in a
real sense God is more powerful and wiser than the evil which He 
2opposes.
1. John Calvin, Institutes of the Christian Religion, Vol. I (i960),
pp. 310-311. ~ ~
2. ’’The Christian heart, since it has been thoroughly persuaded that 
all things happen by God's plan, and that nothing takes place by 
chance, will ever look tc him as the principal cause of things, yet 
will give attention to the secondary causes in their proper place”
(ibid.. p. 218). Calvin tells us that the Christian can be comforted 
because the Devil is completely restrained by Cod’s hand ’’as by a 
bridle”. "The devil and his crew are not only fettered, but also 
curbed and compelled to do service” (ibid., p. 224)*
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We mention Harsh*s distinction and Galvin’s stance on the
sovereignty of God because we believe that Ellul’s position is 
identical. In discussing 2 kings 5i1-*19» Ellul (in the tradition 
of a theology of the Word) points out that each agent in the story 
acted according to his own intention and that no one of the human
acts can be unequivocally identified with God’s will — but that 
God was able to interrelate these human acts in such a way as to
work out His own will.
All the text tells us is that there is an express will of God in 
historical events for every people, whether it is a believing 
people or not. But this does not mean in the least that in 
some evident way historical events are a plain figure of the 
will of God, as, for example, in ... Bossuet’s Explication de 
1’Kistoire Universelie. We must resolutely resist any such
idea, even though we may find it again today in the formulae 
of modern theologians: 'Historical events express a Word of 
God to the church,' or: 'Christ lives in history'.”2
Against a theology of history, Ellul insists on the freedom of God
and the hidden nature of God’s sovereignty." He believes that
God’s intentional will cannot be determined merely by looking at
external events.^ He argues that in the Old Testament, the prophet
alone stands as the interpreter of the meaning of what God is 
5
accomplishing in what is happening. ’’This man gives the meaning 
of it all, the true significance of what has happened. He brings to 
light the relation that exists between the free determination of rnan 
and the free decision of God."^
1. fJhe Politics of God, pp. 32-4•
2. Ibid., p. 28,
3. Ibid^, p. 28.
4. Ibid., p. 153.
5. “The action of God can be grasped indirectly only by the unique 
one to whom God reveals and declares it himself. This unique one 
is the prophet. He alone knows there is an action of God there.
He alone is divinely qualified to declare it” (The Politics of God,
p. 21). “Thi s man has received the revelation of God’s intention ...” 
(ibid., p. 20). Eor an identical point of view see Barth, TII/3, 
p. 24.
6. The Politics of Goa, p. 21.
Ellul is opposed to the deification of popular movements or 
trends, in vzhich history is itself sacralized and where the inherent
meaning-fulness of history is confused with the Cod who is hidden in
1 '
Lis sovereignty. He is opposed to what he regards as a naturalized 
view of history, whereby the activity of the transcendent God is 
identified with the thread of meaning in history invented by 
politicized man. He sees such theology as, in fact, an ideological 
justification for political views already held. He is critical of
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1« Ellul frankly does not think that history has some inherent 
meaning which can he discovered hy human methods. The full and 
final meaning of history is seen to he God’s secret. Thus he 
writes that apart from the meaning which the coming Kingdom gives 
to history, present history is nothing hut an ’’outbreak of madness" 
(The Presence, p, 50)» He regards human ideologies as the 
imposition of simplified, artificial and false meaning on a history 
which has no such obvious visible meaning. He writes, "The only -• 
direction there is in history is the one we attribute to the past"
(A Critique, p.-3l). "In other words, man’s intelligence sees • 
and creates a thread in history; the events that confirm it are 
the g.ood ones, the ones worthy of being considered and retained as 
historical facts; the others do not make history; you can dismiss 
them without difficulty; they are not even worth a glance. 
Fundamentally all you need do is decide what history is: 1 call 
history everything that corresponds to a given evolution. ... The only 
trouble is that there can be three or four threads in history, each . 
just as valid as the next" (A Critique, pp. 22-33).
Reinliold Niebuhr was also critical of the ideological imposition 
of meaning on history. Ke wrote, "An eminent historian expresses 
his doubts as follows: ’Host philosophies of history ... appear to 
me to be grounded on an arbitrary end over-simplified selection 
of facts. I do not say that no clue to the ultimate significance 
of human action end suffering will ever be found in history. 1 
can indeed see evidence of design, but the pattern is on a scale 
beyond my comprehension. (2.L«Woodward, Short Journey, p. 12-6J’” 
(Reinhold Niebuhr, Faith and History, p. Niebuhr believed
that the meaning of history is revealed at Calvary, and Calvary he 
understood not as an explanation of the enigmas of history, but 
as the basis of Christian confidence that God’s suffering love 
is ultimately triumphant. .
2. A Critique, pp. 28ff. .
modern theologians who interpret eschatology in the light of history,
1
rather than history in the light of eschatology, Thad is, he is
critical of the view which sees history as a natural revelation of 
2Cod, which forgets that man's history is a fallen history, In 
the tradition of a theology of the hard, and in the Barthian 
tradition of the denial of natural theology, he affirms that
revelation is in history, but not of history, God is the subject of
revelation, rather than revelation being the predicate of the
immanent process of history, God is seen to be a free and personal 
■ 2
Agent, not the impersonal structure of history,
Ellul’s attitude toward history is illustrated by the advice
he gives the Church concerning the way in which she should listen to 
the world. He agrees that the world may have important things to 
say to the Church and that the Church must not be deaf to what she 
can learn from the world. He disagrees, however, with those in
the Church who tend to uncritically endorse whatever criticism the
world raises against the Church s-
That the acceptance of condemnation could be a sign of humility, 
a possibility for involvement or dialogue, a test of faith 
willed by God, that is all well and good, but it in no way entails 
the proclamation that the persecutors of the Church are right’.4
. /my underline/ .
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1. Gabriel Vahanian et al., Ratallagete, pp, 17-18, uWe have to 
remember that, even though the Eternal has entered into history, 
that is not in order to eternalize history. It is the. Eternal 
who has entered into history1 1 (False Presence, pp. 150-1*)* "If 
God enters into History, if he reveals himself at the heart of 
History, it is God, not us, and neither Marx nor Hegel, who by 
definition gives significance and worth to this history”("Notes 
en Vue d’une Ethique du Temps et du Lieu pour les Chretiens/
Foi et Vie (September-October 1960) po 3?l)« "God’s action is 
a history. But that in no way leads us to magnify, glorify, 
hypostasize history as we see it ceaselessly in the whole movement 
of Protestant thought, This hypostasis in no way comes from 
theological truth, but from Karl Marx’s influence" (ibid,, p.37O),
2. Ibid., pp. 270-1.
3. Etail Brunner expressed this position well (though he did not deny 
natural theology) when he wrote that "Jesus Christ cannot be 
understood from the point of view of world history, but world 
history is to be understood in the light of Jesus Christ" (Emil 
Brunner, The Christian Doctrine of Creation and Redeingtiou, trans, 
by Olive Wyon (1952), p* 237)*
4* False Presence, p, 34. ,
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A theology of history could deify the words offered by the world,
because the world is seen to be the self-evolution of God. A
theology of the Word cannot do so becEiu.se Satan is seen to have Ein 
influence in world history. For a theology of the Word, human 
words (in this case non-Christian ones) ‘^a-y becornje the instruments 
of God’s Word, but this involves a careful listening to see whether 
the words are merely human or whethei? God is personally addressing 
the Church through them. In Ellul’s terms, the world absolutely 
cannot 'Write the Church's agenda”? however, the world can counsel 
the Church, if this counsel is relativized by being heard in the 
context of the Church’s effort to be radically obedient to Cod.
What the Church must hear is what God is saying, not simply what the 
world is saying. There is a broken or dialectical relationship
between all human words and actions and the Word of God.
It would be a severe mistake to think that Ellul’s position on. 
the sovereignty of Christ is merely a disagreement with much modern 
theology at the theoretical level. The difference has to do
with ethical practice as well. His position consistently relates
to his understanding of the Christian life. If the Christian
understands himself and his world as radically sinful (Chapter One),
and if he knows that the only life pleasing to God is one lived in
conscious obedience to God’s will (Chapters Two and Three) <—then
a theology of history (as we have outlined it) leads to a distortion
of the Christian life. It minimizes the sinfulness of the world,
which in turn leads to a blurring of the difference between the 
' -J
Church and the world. When the difference between the Church and
1. Ellul says that the Bible expressly teaches that there must 
not be a confusion between the Church and. the world (John 15:19)- 
(Protestantisme Frangais, p. 142).
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the world is minimized, Christians are then free to conform to the 
world. The world is sacralized, because Christians minimize the 
world’s sinfulness; the Church is secularized, because the
transcendent will of Cod is identified with norms derived from the
world.
Ellul explicitly warns that confidence in Christ’s sovereignty
over the world must not be used as an excuse for not consciously
1
seeking- to be obedient to God’s will. lie says that to reason
that because "Cod can use anything, 1 can do anything" is to treat 
2
God with contempt. khile agreeing with Cullmann and Barth that 
Christ is the Lord of both the Church and the world, Ellul correctly^ 
recognizes that an important distinction between the Church and the 
world is involved.Secular Christians distort the meaning of
1. The Politics, of Cod, pp. 70-71. Vfhile not affirming a
psychological legalism as to the precise nature of the conversion 
process, Ellul, as contrasted 'with secular Christians, emphasizes 
the conscious decisional nature of Christian faith. Ke writes, 
"One dees not share implicitly in this new order, which is that 
of Jesus Christ, simply by acting like everyone else in the 
performance of one’s professional or political duties. One 
shares in it by the acknowledgment with the mouth and heart that 
Jesus Christ is Lord.
The tendency today is excessively to minimize the importance 
of the faith. With many of our intellectuals one gets the 
impression that since Jesus Christ is Lord, therefore all rnen, 
whatever their religion or intention, share in that order and 
their works are within the lordship of Jesus Christ. But the 
scriptures, on the contrary, insist on the fact that the acceptance 
of this new order is deliberate and intentional. Otherwise we 
are on the way to reviving the medieval heresy of ’implicit 
faith’V' (False Presence , p. 22) .
2• The Politics of God, p. 71.
3. By "correctly" we mean that Ellul is both biblically correct and 
also correct in his interpretation of Barth and Cullmann’s thought. 
It is interesting to note that throughout False Presence of the 
Kingdom, he criticizes not Barth, but the secular Christians who 
have distorted Barth’s dialectical thought (which Ellul regards as 
thoroughly biblical) (ibjjK, pp. 9? 19-16, 80-1), Ke can even 
refer to himself as a "Barthian", (‘Mirror", p. 202) though he 
surely does not mean this in a doctrinaire sense.
. 3ee
4* '-?9.^4 to Ijo, p. 103»Aalso Profcestantisme Frangais, pp. 1p9*“l6O* 
Ellul tninks that one of the most prevalent Christian heresies of 
our time is the- failure to emphasize the distinction between the ’ 
Church/...
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Christ’s lordship over the Church when they forget that the dynamic
of the Christian life is different from that of the non-Christian
life, when they forget that'Cod demands that Christians seek to he
obedient to the future Kingdoms-
The situation of the man to whom.the Word of Cod has not been 
explicitly declared, but whose decisions are .also taken up by 
God, is completely different from that of the man who lias received 
this knowledge, for the latter has no right to avoid an express 
attempt to fulfil the commandment,
’’Once the Word of God has been addressed to me it must be my
foundation on which 1 try to find out what can fulfil it and accomplish 
2it among my acts and decisions.”
Ellul criticizes those who interpret the sovereignty of Christ
as though this meant the elimination of sin and thus the endorsement 
of all human projects.^ he cannot accept the idea that freedom
Church and the world, the affirmation of Christ’s lordship over 
the world without an equally strong emphasis on Christ as Saviour 
(False Presence ? p, 105). In spite of the high Christo logy 
implicit in talk of Christ's lordship over the world, to minimize 
His role as Saviour is to turn Christianity into a mere humanism — 
for the norms arid content of the Christian life are determined 
by the world.
1 • The Politics of God, pp. 71 ~2. '
2. Ibid., p. 71. .
3. Ellul says that secular Christians believe that "Through the 
obedience of the Son, God has rendered disobedience .impossible"
(False F re s enc e, p. 15)• He accuses secular theology of being a 
theology of glory, whereby realized eschatology is applied to the 
whole of history, as though Christ’s resurrection re-directed 
history, eliminated sin, and made world history synonomous with 
the future kingdom of God (ibid., pp. 17-18). He sees the basi3
of this.error in what he regards as an unbiblical doctrine of man, 
going back to Roman Catholicism, He writes, "Since the lordship
of Jesus Christ is contemporary, since the Kingdom of God is present, 
all the works of natural man, of non-Christian man, are inscribed 
in this merciful plan of God, and hence they come into conformity 
with what he expects of us. On the individual level, after a 
harsh criticism and rejection of the idea of original sin, one 
is reduced to saying that man is merely fallible, which comes to
, the sane thing in the end as the Catholic proposition.
If one is led into this twofold error, it is for the same reasons
which progressively motivated the Catholi'c theologians. ’be have 
to manage to live in this world. We must legitimise what is done 
by man. ... We must reinstate a ’possibility’ for natural — ox* 
pagan man. Only in terms of that possibility can one take gny 
action in politics, science or the economy (ibid,, pp. *8-19)*
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means obeying human necessity because he believes that true freedom 
is eschatological existence, life lived over-against the sinful 
patterns of the world, life lived in and from grace. He believes
that it is a blatant theological error to think that Christ’s
lordship means that sin is eliminated and thus that Christians
can endorse the ways of the world," ’’The fact that Jesus Christ Is
truly the lord of the world in no way guarantees that the works 
perfoimed by man in this v/orld are expressions of that lordship...”^ 
3y recognizing the reality of sin and also God’s ability to creatively 
accomplish His purposes in the midst of sin, Ellul encourages 
Christians to strive to lead lives freed from the sinful ways of the 
world, ’while at the same time encouraging them to trust in God’s
h i dden w i s do rn.
It is no doubt true that Ellul, like the New 'Testament, uses
the language of dualism, insisting that Satan is to a large extent 
5
the ruler of this world. However, he, like the New Testament,
1. A Critique, pp.171ff.
2* false Fresence, pp. 13-16.
3. Ibid., p. 16. ’’Many hold the conviction that since the world’s 
man-made morality is also within the realm over which Jesus- Christ 
is Lord it is by that fact legitimized. Cut it is forgotten that 
that Lordship is affirmed over a world in revolt, whence the .rebel 
forces have not been eliminated. The fact of the lordship of 
Christ in no way justifies all the world’s projects. It means 
only that (a) those forces are potentially overcome} (b) whatever 
man’s enterprises may be, they will all come finally before God 
tc be judged; and (c) the end of history is determined, known, 
and inevitable. It is the reintegration of. the whole in Christ” 
(To hill and To Ho, pp. 102-^.
4» false Presence, p. 22.
5« Ellul can speak of the will of the world as a will toward death 
or suicide (The Presence, pp. 8 , 28 , 58, 116). ’’Living in the 
world we are living in the domain of the Prince of this world, of 
Satan, and all around us we constantly see the actions of this 
Prince...” (ibid., p. 16). On one occasion he even refers to 
the Devil as the creator of our modern civilization. ’’Thus, 
because our civilization is more than human, we must perceive 
that it is not made by ’flesh and blood’ but by the 'principalities 
... and ... powers ... the world-rulers of this darkness 
($ph. 6:12)” (The Presence, p. 124)» If the last quote sounds 
like/..•
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understands this dualism to be relative; Satan’s activity is seen 
as ultimately subordinate to Cod’s purposes, Ellul cannot 
legitimately be accused of offering a total dualism nor of denying 
the sovereignty of Christ over the world, What he has done is to 
insist that Christ’s sovereignty over the world is a hidden reality, 
which does not imply the affirmation of an optimistic world view.
like an all-out dualism, one must remember that he can elsewhere 
write that even the modern domination of the world by technique 
would not be possible were it not for God's permission (The Politics 
of Pod, p. 174). ~
• Protest end is mc_ Eranpais , p. 159* ’’The world is in God’s hands, 
and even Satan serves’his designs1’ (ibid., p. 144) • "Cod saves 
in such a wa.y that the prince of this world is subordinate to the 
salvation of man by the victory of the Savior who became lord” 
("Probleines de Civilisation1’, p. 680).
Karl Barth, even more than Ellul, stressed the belief that 
evil is ultimately subordinate to Jesus Christ (Barth, Ill/3, 
pp. 157-8, 289)* Ke said that evil is forced against itself to 
serve Christ (Barth XII/3» P* 887). "The world-governance of 
God extends even to the sphere of sin, yet not in such a way 
as to make God the author of it" (Barth, IIl/3, p. 163). 
Characteristically he wrote, "whatever evil is, God is its Lord.
We must not push our attempt to take evil seriously to the point 
of ever coming to think of it as an original and indeed creative 
counter-deity ..." (Barth, IV/’1 , p. 408). Ellul would surely 
agree with Barth in his insistence that evil should be rated as 
high as possible in relation to man, but as low as possible in 
relation to God (Barth lll/j, p. 295)* "There is the danger 
either of an uneasy, bleak and. skeptical overestimation of its 
{evil’s! power in relation to God, or of an easy, comfortable 
and dogmatic underestimation of its power in relation to us"
(Barth Hl/3, p. 293)* "In its relation to God chaos is always 
an absolutely subordinate factor, but it is always absolutely 
superior in its relation to the creature" (Barth, 111/3, p. 78).
Bonhoeffer’s position is similar to Ellul's and Barth's at 
this point. He wrote, "Christ and His adversary, the devil, 
are mutually exclusive contraries; yet the devil must serve 
Christ even against his will; he desires evil, but over and 
over again he is compelled to do good; so that the realm or 
space of the devil is always beneath the feet of Jesus Christ"
(Bonhoef f er, Ethics, p. 70).
The position of Ellul, Barth and Bonhoeffer is similar to 
Calvin’s thought, which we discussed earlier (see above, 
p. 212).
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He rightly believes that when the Bible talks about Cod’s sovereignty, 
it does not forget what it has already said about man’s sinfulness♦ 
Likewise, he resolves to keep the reality of sin closely in view
when he discusses Christ’s lordship. As a Christian in the
Calvinistic tradition (stressing the radical fallenness of man) and
as a sociologist in the realistic tradition, Ellul writes, "He
must dare to take human history as it is without changing its
substance or interpreting it as we fancy or throwing a Christian
mantle over the concrete facts." He points out that it is easy to
make an abstract affirmation that Christ is the Lord of the world;
what is difficult is to make this confession in the face of the actual 
2reality of the world.* "To say that God is the Lord when Sennacherib
is about to enslave you and put out your eyes is to say something of 
real significance Ellul helps the Church to recover a realistic
belief in the sovereignty of God, which sees the evil and tragic 
character of human history — while still believing that God can
A
use the wrath of men to accomplish His will.
1. Politics of C-od, p. 182.
2. Ibid., p. 170.
3. ibid., pp. 169“17O.
4. Mot only does Ellul criticize Teilhard de Chardin for minimizing 
man’s sinfulness, but also for undercutting the importance of • 
direct responsibility to the transcendent Lord. He believes that 
Teilhard’s thought can lead Christians to abandon their liberty 
acquired in Jesus Christ. Speaking of Teilhard’s thought, he 
writes, "It is one of the most dangerous anti—Christion enterprises 
of our day for its pseudo-demonstration of the accomplishments of 
the cosmic (?) Christ, by a kind of necessity intrinsic to nature, 
by its causing the Incarnation to disappear, and by its conftioion 
between freedom-and historical necessity" ("Le Sens de la LiberteJ’ 
pp. 17-18). Teilhard’s thinking, runs counter to Ellul's belief 
that Christ grants freedom from fatality (L’Homme Hesure, p. 21).
Ellul criticizes both Teilhard and Marx because he thinks they 
encourage man to rely on automatic mechanisms for solving his 
problems, rather than encouraging him to assume personal responsibility, 
He thinks that Teilhard’s thought is both based on conformity to 
popular worldly trends and also encourages conformity to the same 
(?\alse Presence, n. 55?’ Having. stated that the world is trying
to/.,«
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to assimilate the person and thus exclude God, he says of Teilhard:
"It is the scandal aid the appalling heresy of Tei.lhard de 
Chardin to pretend to "bless this totalisrn of the world in the name 
of Christianity; but that cannot be done, as is evident from his 
writings, without leaving to one side the incarnation of Christ in 
the person of Jesus, that is, by ultimately depersonalizing God, 
and by turning Christ into a point, into a complete geometric 
abstraction” (EaIse Pregence, pp, 2O6~9)» He says that in 
Teilhard's evolutionism, "technology, socialism and science play 
the role of factors which permit humanity to pass from the Koosphere . 
to fdsion Point Omega — just as, by simple evolution,' matter passed 
into life and the animal into man. To the same order of systems
belongs Marxism, which (at least in its most widespread interpretation) 
declares that the play of dialectical materialism in history will 
necessarily solve all contradictions, hence, all problems. These 
systems seem to me dangei'ous, because they demand of man a sort of 
renunciation of autonomous action. But this adaptation of man to 
the system is precisely the greatest danger inherent in a technologi­
cal bureaucratic society" ("Between Chaos and Paralysis,” p. 748; see 
also Ealse Presence, p. 20). Speaking of the inevitability of 
history's course, he says, "Whether in the Marxian or Teilhardian 
sense, the important thing was that people be assured that 'things 
take care of themselves' and that there is a happy ending to all 
experience; that secret mechanisms will produce solutions, without- 
effort, energy, morality, or civic virtue. The model is not:
'Ido', It is: ’Things develop.' This means that something- 
outside of man is relied on to make the social and political 
machinery function, regardless of the particular nature of mein. To 
be sure, this provides much greater security — if people truly 
’believe’ in these mechanisms — and allow us to ’reason’ without 
taking account of the uncertain human factor" (The Political 
Illusion , p. 225) • Rather interestingly, E’llul includes Teilhard • 
in the same category as The Reader's Digest, public relations men, . 
and personality tests. (One might add Horman Vincent Peale to the 
list). He believes that these all encourage man to take a 
"positive attitude" toward life, assuring him that everything 
will work out well; man need have no responsible concerns about 
the future (A Critique, p. 250).
Ellul also thinks that the kind of idealism encouraged by Teilhard 
leads Christians to have an easy conscience as long as they 
participate. in the world (which is implicitly Christian). Thus •
he believes that Teilhard's thought encourages the sponsorship of 
violence by Christians who are utterly unaware of the actual reality 
of violence (Violence, pp. 123-5)•
Teilhard de Chardin is the one man who clearly represents many 
of the things Ellul opposes and against whom he is in conscious 
rebellion (The Political Illusion, pp. 2141 23?)•
Ellul's disagreements with Teilhard in many ways parallel 
Kierkegaard's polemics against Hegel. Kierkegaard criticized 
Hegel for regarding the world as an inevitable development, which 
Kierkegaard thought led logically to the denial of personal 
responsibility (Kierkegaard, The Lost Years? p. 77; Gregor 
Kalantsohuk, Kierkegaard's Thought, pp. 61-2). Ellul, while not 
an existentialist(was Kierkegaard either?), agrees with the 
existentialist emphasis cn the importance of individual responsibility 
and the freedom to rebel against patterns of worldly conformity.
James M. Gustafson may be right that no social ethicist truly 
be?iieves that what God is doing can be determined by a glance at a 
mere/..»
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A Biblical Evaluation
As we have seen, Ellul rejects an understanding of God’s
sovereignty which sees Cod as the structure of history or which
thinks that the structure of history has keen changed as a result
of Christ’s resurrection.^ We have also seen that he thinks that
the Christian belief in Cod’s lordship is not to he confused with 
2
political ideologies. There is good biblical support for these
contentions.
Walther Eichrodt indicates that the Old Testament understands
creation as ’’the free institution of a spiritual and personal will.”
‘ ’ £neation..does not draw the deity into the flux of world-process,
but sets him over against it in complete independence.”0 He argues 
that the Old Testament rejects dualism (the assertion of a second 
god as the world's creator and lord).^ He also states that the
mere chronicle of what is happening. Indeed, as C-ustafson rightly 
asserts, moral action is impossible unless some distance is recognized 
between what is and what ought to be. Otherwise, a fatalism is 
encouraged. He rightly perceives that in practice some judgment 
is made as to what action fulfils Cod’s purposes and what doesn't 
(James M. Gustafson, Christian Ethics, p. 132).
Though Gustafson’s reasoning might seem to reduce Ellul’s 
argument that men like Teilhard encourage conformity to the 
world, in actuality it does not do so, for Ellul is critical 
precisely of the use of human ideology to determine what God is 
doing. He sees reliance on human ideology (in this case the popular 
ideology of the political left) to interpret the meaning of God’s 
action as necessarily the expression of conformity to worldly trends.
1. Violence, p♦ 25 •
2• A Critique , pp. 28 , 66.
3. Walther Eichrodt, Theology of the Old Testament, Vol. II, p. 98. .
4. Ibid., p.. 99*
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Old Testament rejects pantheism, "which identifies God and the world, 
and makes the deity an impersonal force, pulsing everywhere, yet 
everywhere eluding Man’s grasp. Hence in Israel the assertion that 
God created the world acquires a new meaning not to he found elsewhere:
creation is the free institution of a will which contains its own
nopm s ."Eichrodt’s analysis certainly confirms Ellul’s insistence 
that God’s sovereignty must he thought of as the free activity of a
personal Agent.
Walther Zimmer^li has persuasively argued that the Old Testament
does not believe that God’s purposes can he perceived merely by a
study of external history. What Zimmer^li says about the role of
the prophet is in keeping with what we have described as a dialectical
understanding of history, a theology of the Word. He recognizes that
the form-critical examination of the prophets’ speeches indicates that
the prophets’ task was the historical declaration of what was about 
2to occur. However, he then writes;-
V.e must not ... think that the prophets were simply interpreters 
of history, who kept their ears open to the historical situation, 
and adduced their message from it, and from the understanding 
which they had gained by reflecting upon it. History itself did 
not give the prophets their commission. It is their secret 
that, in spite of their close relationship to contemporary history, 
they were conscious of being the ambassadors of the God who stood 
above this history and who controlled it. ... Behind the word of the 
prophet was not the river of history, rushing with invincible 
force, and by its rigid laws forcing its way on and breaking do.wn 
all opposition. Behind their preaching stood the Lord of freedom, 
in whose hands all history remains a tool which can be wielded 
freely by him.3
1. Eiohrodt, Theology of the Old Testament, Vol. 11, p. 99* ’
2. Zimmer^li, The Law and the F rophets, pp. 65-6.
3. Ibid., p. 66; for an identical point of view see Barth, IIl/3,
p. 24; see also Kornelis H» Miskotte, When the Gods are Silent, 
pp. 193™4» 276.
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Turning to the New Testament, we note that Clinton I). Morrison 
argues that the New Testament does not see Christ’s resurrection as
involving a defeat and a re-commissioning of demonic powers in terms
1
of public history. "Rome was no different the week after the 
2resurrection from what it was the week before it.” Similarly
Ernst Kasernann defends the relative dualism of the New Testament,
against a simplistic monism. He points out that the apostle Paul
(see Rom. 5:12ff) did not understand history as a continuous
evolutionary process, but as the conflict between Adam and Christy-
Paul’s view of salvation history does not differ from Augustine’s. 
Salvation history is the battle field of the oivitas dei and the 
civitas terrena. ... Measured from human criteria, salvation is 
fundamentally rooted in disaster. That means that the Pauline 
proclamation of the reality of salvation history is deeply 
paradoxical.4
For there is no Christ without antichrist; there are no apostles 
without Judas, no prophets without enthusiasts, no fields 
ripening to harvest without weeds; and the letters of the 
Apocalypse have to tell the churches at all times what their 
Lord has against them.5
As we have just seen, biblical support can bo given for Ellul’s 
theology of the Nord. There seems to be one place where his thought 
can be criticized. We will raise this criticism by setting his thought
in conversation with Barth's and Galvin’s.
1. Morrison, The Powers That Be, p. 45»
2. Ibid., p. 115 •
3. Ernst Kasernann, Perspectives on Paul (1971), P- • Similarly 
C.K.Barrett says that any conception of Heilsgeschichte which 
imagines that history can be ’’represented on squared paper with the 
aid of coordinate axes” is biblically dubious (0.K.Barrett,
From First Adarn to Last, p. 4)* Of course, Ellul’s salvation 
history approach is not of this variety*.
4. Kasernann, Perspectives, pp.
5. Ibid., p. 69.
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Barth’s thinking serves as an important corrective to Ellul’s
at one point. Barth seeks to relate the activities of Cod as
Creator and lord closely to His activities as Redeemer,, While 
agreeing that God’s will cannot he determined directly from external 
factors, he insists that there is not complete discontinuity;
what God demands of a man has some relationship to the external
factors in which God the Creator and .Lord has allowed a man’s life
-to be placed.He writes, ’’The man who lives by his faith may
know that in everything which may happen to him he has to do with 
2God.” Barth is very careful to state that the external factors
of a man’s life do not determine conduct. Obedience is always
direct obedience to 0od.~ nevertheless, these external factors
are not to be understood as necessarily harmful.Barth believes
that to hear Cod’s voice we must listen both to what God is^saying
to us through the external factors as well as to what He is saying
which may contradict these factors. His assumption is that God 
5
is the Lord of both the outer and the inner world. Having said 
all this, he is still very much in the tradition of a theology of 
the Word. He entirely rejects the idea that God's will can be
perceived from simply looking at external historyj-
The situations and opportunities and possibilities and 
impossibilities of the world-process with which he is called upon 
to wrestle do not as such contain within themselves or proclaim 
any divine and infallible Lord. ... It is only the Holy Spirit 
who can command him, giving the orders and prohibitions which 
he must and can obey. It is only the Holy Spirit who can really 
guide him.6
1. Barth, 111/4, pp •595-6.
2, Barth, m/3, p. 18.
3. Barth, 111/4, pp .620-2, 628.
4. Barth, Hl/4, p. 622.
5. Barth, Il 1/4, p. 636.
6., Barth, 111/3, p. 25-8; see also pp. 19-20.
Though Ellul draws personal comfort from his belief in the 
sovereignty of Christ ("Mirror”, p, 203), it is nevertheless the 
case that his thought on the subject occurs in the polemical context 
of a rebellion against those who confuse Christ’s sovereignty with 
a '’positive thinking” ideology. He rightly does battle against 
those who minimize man’s sinfulness when they talk of God’s 
sovereignty. Barth, however, while agreeing with the truth of 
Ellul’s point, goes on to remind us that God can do positive things 
in public or external history. If God’s positive actions in 
public history are not self-evident, neither are they negligible.
Thus the Christian mood need not be one-sidedly critical (Ellul 
rightly knows it has to be that because Cod's sovereignty is over a 
rebellious world), but can also be that of gratitude for all that 
God does even in external history. (Ellul may have a slight 
awareness of this latter point when he recognizes that Christians can 
sometimes agree with non-Christians at the level of concrete
action. Still, this recognition does not come to the fore in his. 
discussion of Christ’s sovereignty). According to Barth, when 
man seeks God's will, he has to pay careful attention to these 
external factors. True, these are no more than instructional 
preparation for the event of hearing God's Word; nevertheless, 
they provide important instructional preparation, without which ' 
God's Word becomes an abstraction. Ellul, of course, recognizes the 
importance of situational analysis; it's just that his thought 
concerning God's sovereignty is governed one-sidedly by the 
importance of rebelling against the sinful ways of the world.
His point, while a needed one, must not dull the positive truth 
that in spite of man's sinfulness, God is able to do constructive 
things in outward history, things to which the man of faith must- 
pay careful attention, things to which one has cause to be grateful.
(.'i'llul’s tendency is to see only the tragic side of life. He is 
a Frenchman and the tragic sense of life embodied in French 
existentialism is in his veins, no matter how much he criticises 
existentialist writers.)'
1, In the light of the general similarity between Ellul’s and 
Barth’s understanding; of Cod’s sovereignty, we need to give a 
brief statement concerning Barth's basic viewpoint. Like Ellul, 
he points out that the meaning of what Cod was doing in Old 
Testament history was not obvious. The prophet was necessary 
as the interpreter of the meaning of God’s activity (Barth, 311/3, 
p. 24)• Like Ellul, Barth also sees the belief in pi'ovidence 
as a genuine article of faith, no less difficult to grasp than 
other Christian beliefs. He is quite aware that external 
history cannot prove that Christ is Lord (Barth, 111/3, pp. 15, 160). 
He-also agrees that- the belief in providence is strictly a belief 
in Cod, and hence one must begin not with a study of world 
history, but with faith that in the crucifixion and resurrection 
of Jesus Christ Cod was able to accomplish Kis purposes in spite 
of man’s sin (Barth, IIl/3, pp. 54-5)• He believes that it is 
only on the basis of "special" revelation that one can come to 
trust in God’s general benificence (Barth, 111/3, pp. 43-4,
140--2, 185). He thinks that a vague belief in providence has 
nothing to do with Christian belief. In the absence of faith 
in the Christo-centric sense, the idea of providence can be 
challenged by the tragedies of history or can lead to the endorsement 
of immanent demons (‘’providence” being one of Hitler’s favourite 
words) (Barth, IIl/3, p. 33). Ellul is also insistent that 
Christology must be at the fore for any belief in providence to 
be Christian (Protestantisme Fran^ais, p. 159)•
While admitting that man is never intended to see the whole of 
history from the divine perspective, while recognizing that much 
remains hidden, Barth insists that the believer may continually 
see something of the meaning of God’s providential activity in 
concrete events. Specifically, he thinks that the disclosure 
of the meaning of God’s providential activity is related to the 
practical insights necessary and helpful to Christians at specific 
points (Barth, lll/3, pp. 23~4)« Barth and. Ellul believe that 
the meaning of the lordship of Christ is generally hidden; 
however, as we have just argued, Ellul does not say what Barth does 
about the revelation of the positive meaning of what God is doing 
in history. Ellul’s recognition that the prophets were enabled 
to see God’s purposes, leads him to believe that an awareness of 
God’s providential purposes is also possible for Christians today. 
However, he almost always interprets this in a critical sense, 
calling Christians to be "sentinels" who sound warnings. One 
might say that he, like Barth, recognizes that through revelation 
the meaning of God’s activity can be revealed. The problem is that 
Ellul only talks of this in terms of the establishment of a 
critical stance.
Barth in his later thought came to have a positive and constructive 
attitude toward the world, while still being critical of the 
world to the degree that the demonic seems to be exerting its 
influence. Barth rejected the abstract dualism of his early 
thought/. • •
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Barth is really of one mind with Galvin at this point., As we
have seen, Calvin was well aware that thc-re are other intentions active
in public history than God’s. Nevertheless, he believed that man’s
response to world events should never be merely negative, because the
sovereign and benevolent Lord is working his purposes out in history;-
If Joseph had stopped to dwell upon his brothers' treachery, he 
would never have been able to show a brotherly attitude toward 
them. But since he turned his thoughts to the Lord, forgetting 
the injustice, he inclined to gentleness and kindness, even to . 
the point of comforting his brothers and saying: ’ It is not you 
who sold me into Egypt, but I was sent before you by God's will, 
that I might save your life.' (C’en, 45 * 5>7—8 ) 'Indeed you 
intended evil against me, but the Lord turned it into good*
(Gen. 50:20). 1
Kere Galvin living today, he might indeed share Ellul's concern about 
the technological bondage of modern life and the demonic intention 
active in this realm. It seems unlikely, however, that he would 
so casually brush aside the positive benefits of modern developments.
thought (see Barth, I.II/3, pp, 158, 292ff., 367; iv/l, pp. 403-9; 
lv/3, First half, p. 168). He said, "Christ is known as Lord 
only in the Church, so only Christians know what it means to be 
obedient to Hirn. But the same Christ also governs without the 
Church. That is what Paul means in Colossians 1, when he says 
that Christ is above all. This is the presupposition for Christian 
action in the civic community: that Christ is there also’’ (Barth, 
Table Talk, p. 79; see also I1I/3, p. 256) (Sllul does not use 
this kind of a theological rationale and certainly does not use it 
to encourage social involvement). In answer to the question,
"Is God's lordship over the state limited?" Barth answered,
"No, it is not limited, only hidden. We are awaiting the . 
revelation of God’s Lordship. It is hidden not only in the 
state, but also in the Church'." (Barth, Table Talk, p. 83). 
lie also come to see that ultimate hope does not invalidate the 
significance end possibility of penultimate hopes for the 
improvement of society, as long as these penultimate hopes 
do not take the place of ultimate hope and as long; as they are 
not linked with a utopian view of history (Barth, IV/3. Second 
Half, pp. 936-938) (Ellul seems to say little about genuine 
Christian hopes of a penultimate nature).
1. John Galvin, Institutes, Vol. I, p. 220.
2., H. Richard Niebuhr was in the Calvinist tradition of emphasising 
Cod's sovereignty over the world. He understood responsibility 
as man's response to the activity of the One C’od active in the many 
actions upon us (H. Richard Niebuhr, The Responsible Self, p. I70). 
"Responsibility affirms: 'God is acting in all actions upon 
you/•..
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you. So respond to all actions upon you as to respond to his 
action” (ll. Richard Niebuhr, ?he Ro-sronsible Self, p. 126). 
lie cited the story of Joseph, as did Calvin, to make his point. 
Like Calvin, he spoke of the activity of God in terms of a divine 
intention present amid various human intentions (ll, Richard 
Niebuhr, The Responsible Self, pp. I68-9) (Niebuhr interestingly 
does not refer to a demonic intention and this may be significant, 
as we will note). Referring to the Joseph story he writes, "here 
the. clear distinction is between the particular intentions that 
guide a finite action and the divine intention that uses or lies 
behind such actions. So Joseph can and does forgive, responding 
to the infinite in his reaction to the finite” (ibid., p. 169). 
Niebuhr wrote of the Assyrian invasion described in the tenth 
chapter of Isaiah, ’’The destructive intentions of Assyria are 
one thing; the holy, saving intentions of God are another.
The meet, the fitting response of Israel, must be to the infinite 
intention in the first place, to the finite intention.only 
secondarily. That means that the first response, the fitting 
action in the critical hour, is to be internal reformation; 
defense against Assyria is the secondary thing" (ibid., p. 169)»
Niebuhr spoke of the sovereignty of God as God’s creative 
involvement in history; however, unlike Calvin, lie did not use 
the language of predestination (ibid., p. 165). "The God and 
Father of our Lord Jesus Christ is the loving dynamic One, who 
does new things, whose relation to this world is more like that 
of father to his children than like that of the maker to his 
manufactures; it is more like that of the ruler to his realm 
than like that of the designer to his machines" (ibid,, p. 173).
The weakness of Niebuhr’s position is that, unlike Calvin .
(and Bllul), he did not do justice to the relative dualism of 
the New Testament when he referred to God's sovereignty.
(l?e recognise that in other contexts he did speak of man's 
sinfulness). He says, "If then we try to summarise the ethos of 
Jesus in a formula we may do so by saying that he interprets all 
actions upon him as signs of the divine action of creation, 
government, and salvation and so responds to them as to respond 
to divine action" (ibid., p. 167). Would not a more accurate 
reading* of the New Testament force one to admit that Jesus'
"ethos” was also based on a response of opposition to the forces 
of evil? It comes as no surprise that once Niebuhr has 
minimized the role of evil in the world, he can go on to tell us 
that Christians should feel at home in the world (ibid., p. 177) 
(How consistent is this advice with the New Testament conviction 
that Christians are "pilgrims and strangers"?). Nor does it 
surprise one that having minimized the role of evil, Niebuhr all 
too quickly accepts emerging trends as representing the will of 
God. (For example, in The Purpose of the Church and its Ministry 
4?ew York: Harper and Brothers, 195§\ he develops a doctrine of 
the ministry in close relationship to emerging trends in the 
United States). The danger in Niebuhr’s position is that evil 
is minimized, all of which nicely conforms to American optimism', 
(see John D. Godsey, The Promise of H. Richard Niebuhr, p, 100), 
(Part of Niebuhr's problem may be traced to the influence of 
Augustine's "Neo-Platonism", the confusion in which trust in God 
and trust in Being become synonymous: see H. Richard Niebuhr, 
Radical None the ism and best ct Cu ltu.re (196O), pp,, 32-34,
37-35', 47;. ' ' ... -
If/'...
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C hri s I5 c jb.?Q In t e Sovere ign t;£ and Freedom
In our discussion so far we have shown indirectly that Ellul
does believe in the absolute sovereignty and freedom of Christ in 
relationship to the world* Here we will seek to further establish 
this point by more detailed documentation. That Ellul believes in 
the absolute (though hidden) lordship of Christ over the world is 
indicated when he writes that "God is the God of all peoples. He 
reigns over all kings. He directs world politics.
More conclusive than Ellul’s abstract statements affirming
God's sovereignty are his personal references to the same. He
qualifies the possibility of completing his writings on
2 .theological ethics with the words "if God permits’* and qualifies 
the possibility of finishing his next volume on ethics with the 
words "God willing’. He draws personal comfort from his belief 
that Christ is the Lord of the world. He writes,
If H. Richard Hiebuhr seems to minimize the sinfulness of the 
world when he talks of God’s sovereignty, Paul Lehmann goes even 
further. when Lehmann refers to what is going on in the world, 
he sounds Hegelian — as though everything which occurs is the 
expression of God’s will — as though Satan had gone into retirement 
(Paul Lehmann, Ethics in a Christian Context, p, 82).
1. The Politics o f Go d, p. 11; see also p. 127; Violence, p.25* 
"Everything man does is within the global plan of God" (The
Politics of God, p. 69). ”L’othing, escapes his power, either in 
heaven or on earth" (Protestantisme Frangais, p. 159)* 
matter what may be the Assyrian's power, there is one who encloses 
him unceasingly, who knows him unceasingly, who both chooses and 
rejects him, who is both much more profound than he and also 
radically different. ... A.11 the power that modern man has gained 
can manifest itself in the long run only in the fact that God will 
use this very power against the man who hopes to dethrone God “
(The Politics of God, p. 177)* "modern man can say that God is 
dead, but this does not affect either God or his purpose nor 
does it allow modern man any effective autonomy" (ibid., p. 177)* 
Ellul even argues that God can use nature to accomplish His 
sicecific purposes (Jonah, p« 25)*
2. "Mirror," p. 201. .
3. Letter, May 24,1971*
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hTow we are in a period of dilution, of watering clown the expression 
as well as the content of Revelation. I personally find, myself 
caught in this crisis, facing it honestly and knowing that God 
is faithful and will not abandon us even when human folly becomes 
frenetic.
I face the crisis — including the theological crisis — for 
what it is, iz'. the assurance that on the other side of such 
crisis the truth of the Gospel is at last proclaimed in truth.
In his discussion of Christ’s sovereignty, Ellul emphasizes
Christ's absolute freedoma freedom which does not have to bend
before the bar of human judgment. He admits that the presence of
suffering in the world tempts one to become bitter and to blame the
all-powerful and free God.^ He does not think there is a theoretical
answer to this problem. "God does not explain his conduct and
decision to man when the latter demands an account, just as God 
5
does not justify himself before man.” The answer to man’s
questions about theodicy comes when man, like Job, realizes that 
he is in no position to pass judgment on God, that God does not 
have to give a theoretical reply to man's question, God’s reply 
is His personal revelation, whereby the questioner becomes the
one questioned, and is thus led to realize that he is in no position •
to argue with his Creator. God’s answer to man's questions about 
the ways of God's freedom is the gift of faith, the establishment 
of a relationship with God whereby man is led to trust in God in
spite of the inexplicable nature of the world. 1 2 3 * * 6
1. "Mirror/1 p. 203*
2. Ibid., p. 203.
3. /Pke Politics of PP* 57» 63.
4* Ibid., p, 59*
5* ibid., p. 59*
6. Ibid., pp. 99-60. "There is no theology of expiation, of testing 
o.r of the presence of Satan. All the hypotheses suggested and 
discarded by Jeb and his friends are discourses to wh:-ch no 
answer is given. God does not choose tc- set his stamp on any 
o f/... .
The problem is not a metaphysical problem. The existence of 
evilj its cause, God’s attitude to it, the relation of God’s 
omnipotence to it — these are all matters for an irrelevant 
metaphysical dissertation* To have knowledge of such things
changes nothing whatsoever in our life and suffering. The 
doctrine of evil and its origin may satisfy our curiosity but 
it is unimportant. God is not an encyclopedia whose task 
is to satisfy our curiosity. The true question is that of 
man’s attitude in the situation of suffering and the grip 
of evil.^
• Ellul may have said here the one truly important thing which
needs to be said concerning the problem of theodicy. It seems to
be time that man’s attitude tovurrd God is not a function of external
circumstances. This explains why a. toothache can lead some
people to deny God, whereas lifelong physical misery can lead
others to an ever deepening relationship with God. If man’s 
relationship with God is the key to the issue, rather than some 
philosophical argument about suffering, then the Christian answer 
to the problem of theodicy can only be an invitation to enter 
into relationship with the God who is beyond all human questioning. 
”An appeal is simply made to the changing of man in the presence of
God’s promise. You are in despair in a hopeless situation.
God’s Word is addressed to you.”
It is important to note that Ellul is not giving a
Christian existentialist answer. Ke. is not saying that God has 
only to do with man’s inner life and hence the issue of His 
sovereignty over the world is to be dropped. Ellul genuinely
of them. He reveals only one thing to Job, namely, that he is 
the free God, the unrestricted God, the God who gives account 
to no one. But he is also the God who speaks to this man and. 
who is thus with this man. This is enough to demolish all 
objections, accusations, theogonies, revolts and dramas. ’I 
have uttered what 1 did not understand’ (job z]2:3). This is 
all that man can ultimately say when confronted by the revealed 
freedom of God” (The Po 1 i11 os of God , pp.
1. Ibid., p„ 60.
2. Ibid., pp.60~1.
believes that God is the Lord of world history. Wliat he is saying 
is that God’s ways are in many respects unsearchable (horn. 11;33)» 
faith trusts in God as the ail-wise Lord of the world, though 
faith is not sight* Though man has no theoretical solution to 
the problem of theodicy, the encounter with God leads not to 
thinking that God is imprisoned in the .inner realm, but to a 
trust in God’s hidden wisdom which is beyond man’s comprehension,
but which relates to the whole world.
In Ellul’s emphasis on the absolute sovereignty of God, His
freedom, and the problem of theodicy as a problem of faith —• he
is on sound biblical ground. Bultmann cites some of Jesus’ sayings
which imply a childlike belief in providence (l,k. 12:22-31 or
Wtt. 6:25-32; Mtt. 10:29-31 or Lk. 12:6-7; Kit. 5:45).1
He writes of Jesus* attitude toward theodicy:-
That suffering gives reason for doubt of the power of God,
Jesus did not believe. This would have been irreconcilable 
with his idea of God, for the doubt presupposes that man in 
himself has a claim upon God and possesses a criterion by which 
to judg-e what is fitting for God and what is not. In the 
thought of Jesus the only doubt which has significance is the 
doubt which refers to man himself and shakes his natural security, 
the doubt which makes clear to man that he stands in the last 
hour, in the crisis of decision.2
Gerhard von Rad states that Job’s argument against his friends was 
an argument for the
incomparable freedom of this absolute Jahweh, whose deeds are. 
uncontrollable by any human reason. A special part of it is the 
divine freedom to root justice .where he pleases. It is not as 
if God were bound to some norm of right, so that there was, as 
it were, an umpire who, in the case of a dispute between God 
and man, could engage both to observe the rule (Job IX.32f.). 
Jahweh is so free and powerful that he himself determines what is 
right, and is always in the right against man. This is the root 
point of Job’.s supreme trial.3
1. Rudolph Bultmann, Jesus and the Word, pp. 160-161.
2» Ibid., pp. 170—1.
3.Gerhard von Rad, Old Testament Theology, Vol. I, pp. 412-413.
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Also von Bad points out that God’s answer to Job is completely differ­
ent from the answer Job had expected from the question asked J- .
Initially his answer consists in a storm of counter-questions, 
all of which point to the ludicrous limits set to human penetra­
tion. In answering Job's question God lifts the veil a little, 
just so far that Job may see how.many more and ... greater riddles 
lie behind it.
If Job's holding fast to his righteousness was a question put 
to God, God gives the answer by pointing to the glo.ry of his 
providence that sustains all his creation. Of course this 
justice of God cannot be comprehended by mans it can only be 
adored.1 2
The Freedom of God and the Independence of Natural Man
We have refrained from titling this section "The Freedom of God
and the Freedom of Man" because as we saw in Chapter Two, Ellul regards 
independence or autonomy as bondage to sin and not as true freedom.
We are, nevertheless, concerned here with the way in which he understands 
God's free lordship over the world to be related to natural man's 
independent action or natural man’s freedom of movement. For the
1. Gerhard von Rad, Old Testament Theology. Vol. I, p. 4-16­
2. Ibid., Vol. I, p. 417; -for a related discussion see Heinrich 
Heppe, Reformed Dogmatics, translated by G.T. Thomson (bondoni 
George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1950)> PP- 93-97• Ellul's position 
on the hidden though absolute nature of God's sovereignty is in 
line with the early Barth's emphasis on the "infinite qualitative 
distinction" between God and man. Barth wrote, "Again we ask the 
question, 'Is God unrighteous?’ and again we answer, 'No'. Since 
we cannot measure His action by our behaviour or by our expectations, 
we must abide humbly by the recognition that His procedure is 
altogether beyond our powers of observation" (Barth, Romans,’p. 35l)- 
11’^ay, but, 0 man, who art thou that repliest against God?’ /Rom. 
9s2Ch/ All that must be said about the objection is comprehended 
in the words — 0 man. The objector overlooks the infinite 
qualitative distinction between God and man. ... He speaks as 
though they were God's partners, junior partners .perhaps, but 
nevertheless competent to conduct an argument with Him" (.Barth,
Romans, p, 355)- -
Barth in his later thought continued to stress the absolute 
sovereignty of God (lIl/3, p. 13).
3- The Politics of God, p. 16.
*“ £ JU
sake of simplicity we will use here the word ’’freedom" in the way it 
is commonly used, being synonymous with independence or autonomy.
IVe must remember that we are not discussing what Ellul believes to 
be true freedom or Christian freedom (from sin through grace).
As we might expect Ellul does not intend to offer a theoretical
solution to the traditional problem of the relationship between God’s 
omnipotence and natural man’s freedom. He flatly asserts that man 
cannot fathom the mysteries of God’s will; God is transcendent and
i
thus His ways are above the reach of man's intellectual comprehension.
o
He admits that this problem is "rationally insoluble". ' His way 
around the problem is to focus on concrete biblical history, wher-e we 
see that both assertions are true: God is absolutely free and 
omnipotent and yet He does not accomplish His purposes by controlling 
man in a mechanistic wayP He insists that II Kings "displays con­
cretely the play of what Karl Barth has called the free determination 
of man in the free decision of God".^
1. 'The Meaning of the City, p. 174*
2. The Politics of God, p. 15- Ellul defines the metaphysical 
dilemma as follows: "If God is omnipotent, he cannot allow man 
any freedom, and man, when he acts, can only execute mc-cahnically 
what God has ordained. On the other hand, if man has freedom,
if he makes his own decisions, God is simply a theoretical, 
abstract, or impotent God." He goes on to say of II Kings,
"Now in the present stories this academic problem is certainly 
not solved in global or intellectual fashion. Rather, it is . 
transported into living reality which cannot possibly be 
schematized. This is why it is so important to keep the stories 
as they are" (ibid., p. 15).
3. Ibid., ppi 15-17, ^3; Jonah, p. 33*
4* The Politics of God, p. 15- Barth indeed does describe God’3 
sovereignty as involving no abridgment of natural man’s Independence 
(Barth 1J.I/3, pp. 92r 145-6 149, 16.5-6)• Both Barth, and iSLlul •
deny that history is a divine emanation; hence God’s creative 
sovereignty is not to be confused with an endorsement of human sin 
(Barth, II.I/3, p. 111). Like Ellul, Barth offers no theoretical 
solution to the problem of the interrelationship of God’s freedom 
and man’s freedom. Instead, he points to the biblical history 
which/...
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Ellul reasons that since God is transcendent, His freedom is on 
a different level than man’s. L'atural man pursues his own purposes, 
according to his own values and intentions; in spite of this, God 
works creatively in and through man’s freedom to accomplish His 
own will. Man can deny God's command, God's intentional will,
but he cannot escape from God’s creative freedom to accomplish His
1
purposes. Though God does not constrain man, man's independent 
2
decisions are placed "in the secret and vaster plan of God".
Ellul is really saying ti.o things. He is insisting that God
is actively at work in and through all events. He is also saying 
that not all events conform to God’s intentional will, not all 
actions are pleasing to God or are approved by Hirn. ]3y utilizing 
this kind of a distinction between God’s sovereignty through what 
He permits and through what He intends,"' Ellul is able to affirm
which shows this interrelationship. "If we look at this factual 
relationship, and therefore at the rule of the God of Israel, we 
see that it is actually true that in the world-occurrence of God 
everything has to be and is absolutely under God, and yet everything 
attains in freedom to its validity and honour" (Barth lIl/3, p. 189)•
Walther Eichrodt’s assessment of the Old Testament agrees with 
Ellul’s insistence that God’s freedom does not eliminate human 
freedom. Eichrodt argues that a remarkable thing about the Old 
Testament is that in spite of its fundamental belief in God’s 
effective action in all things, it ‘never affirms a flat determinism. 
"At all times the capacity for self-determination is insistently 
retained," (Walther Eichrodt, Theology of the Old Testament, Vol. 11, 
p. 179).
1. ,r^he Politics of God, pp. 20, 80-81; Jonah, pp. 32-3, 35..
2• The Politics of pod,p. 66.
3. Ellul does not explicitly articulate this distinction. However, 
he uses language supportive of it (’permission" and "intention") (The 
Politics of Cod, pp. 20, 153, 174)» More importantly, we believe 
that the content of what, he does say supports the legitima.cy of 
this distinction, as an interpretative aid to understanding- his 
meaning.
a belief in the absolute sovereignty of God, while also recognizing 
that sinful actions (while not outside the scope of God's 
providential wisdom) stand condemned by God.^ By using the 
distinction between God’s intentional and permissive will, h.e is 
able to call evil evil, free God from the charge of having intended 
evil, while at the same time affirming that God is sovereign even
there. Through the use of this distinction he is also able to 
discourage men from pursuing conduct unfaithful to the will of (tod, 
while at the same time insisting that in spite of man’s sin God is
1. f^\e Noil tics P* ^75; see also Heinrich Eeppe, Reformed
Dogmatics, translated by G. T. Thomson (London: George Allen end 
Unwin Ltd, 1?5Q)» PP» 27J-28O. The distinction between God’s 
intentional ani permissive will is not explicitly spelled out 
in .Scripture; it is, rather, an aid to interpreting what Scripture 
says. There is, however, biblical support for the legitimacy *' 
of this distinction. The distinction arises from the simple 
fact that Scripture teaches that God opposes evil and yet is active 
through it. God is not said to have created or intended evil 
(dualism), but permits it and is active in and through what he 
permits. Of course, this distinction can be given stronger New 
Testament than Old Testament support, for the New Testament more 
clearly recognizes a "relative dualism", the sovereignty of 
Satan which is ultimately subordinate to Christ’s sovereignty.
Yet even the Old Testament implies such a distinction. V/hen -
Joseph speaks of (tod’s effective sovereignty in and through 
his brothers’ treacherous conduct (which surely God did not 
directly intend, but permitted) such a distinction is implied.
"as for you, you meant evil against me; but God meant it for good 
to bring it about that many people should be kept alive, as they 
are today" (Gen, 50:20). God is seen to be absolutely sovereign, 
but sin is seen for what it is. Likewise, in the New Testament, 
Judas is held accountable for betraying Christ. Though God is 
seen to be active through Judas’ betrayal, Judas’ moral worth 
is not praised.
G-.B, Caird argues that a distinction between God’s intentional 
and permissive will is implicit in the theology of The Revelation 
to John. Caird writes of the author of Revelation, "He is not 
asking us to believe that war, rebellion, famine, and disease are 
the deliberate creation of Christ, or that, except in an indirect 
way, they are what God wills for the men and women he has made.
They are the result of human sin . „."(G.B. Caird, The Revelation
of St... John..the Divine (1966), pp, 82-3). "Throughout his
book John is constantly trying to show how Satan’s hand may be 
detected in the affairs of this world; but he is equally insistent 
that Satan can do nothing except by permission of God, who uses 
Satan’s grimmest machinations to further his own bright designs" 
(ibid., p. 36).
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still the Lord*
As a biblical example of God's sovereignty in anl through 
human disobedience, Ellul refers to the establishment of the monarchy 
in Israel. He says that though, according to the 01i Testament,
C-od did not approve of this development (because it would introduce 
confusion between God and an incarnate representative), He allowed 
the monarchy to develop and accomplished His purposes in anl through 
it?
1
Ellul’s discussion of ’’temporal" election is also an expression 
of the distinction between God’s intentional and permissive will. By
’’temporal election" he means that God can use a sinful nation to
accomplish His purposes, but that this involves no endorsement of 
the sinful conduct of that nation. Ellul argues that, in fact, 
after such a nation has done its task, it stands condemned by God 
for its ungodly methods.por example, he refers to the Old Testament 
belief that God used Assyria to punish Israel; yet the instrument 
of God’s wrath itself stood condemned by God (Isaiah 10:5ff.).
Vzhy did Assyria stand under God’s judgment? Because its intentions 
and methods were entirely different from God’s. Assyria simply 
sought to destroy Israel, with utter ruthlessness; it knew nothing 
of God and His purposes.Its methods of "butchery” and "terror" 
were only the result of God's "permission". Such methods contradict 1 2
1. When Ellul says that sometimes none of man's decisions enter 
into God’s plan, he surely means this in the sense of conformity 
to God’s intentional will (The Politics of God, pp. 16-17, 68-7O)» 
He is surely not affirming a dualism whereby God is seen to be 
sovereign only ovei1 certain aspects of human history, for he can 
write that "God grants man freedom to do other than God expects, 
i.e„, to do evil. He grants him the freedom to choose. All 
the same, everything man does is within the global plan of God"
(j P • 69) •
2. Ibid., pp. 17-18.
3 • lbiu«, p» 19*
4# Ibid., pp. 19“2O; False Presence, p. 34 •
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God's intentional will, but in a world of sin, God uses even these 
1
to accomplish His purposes.
1. Politics of God, p. 174. Wien Ellul speaks of God’s creative
adaptation to man’s sinful rebellion (as, for example, the monarchy), 
he clearly does not seem to be utilizing an idea of history as the 
detailed outworking of an eternal predestination. The entire 
thrust of The Politics of God and the Politics of Han is to 
stress the dynamic interaction between f/od’s freedom and man’s. 
History is seen to be real history, not only for man, but also
• for God. Ellul does believe that Gcd has a definite purpose in 
all that occurs and that this purpose is love (ib id., p. 68).
This ices not mean, however, that the exact shape of historical 
events was pre-formed. He explicitly repudiates such a doctrine.
He writes, "It is not that there is a preformed plan of God into 
which the actions of man fit as in a jigsaw puzzle"(ibid., p, 69) •
The whole logic of Ellul’s position seems inconsistent with a 
strict predestin&rian view of history. It is hard to see how 
one could, affirm, as he does, that Cod modifies His decisions to 
take account of man’s sin (the monarchy being an example), while 
at the same time affirming that every detail of history is the 
outworking of pre-temporal decisions. We have to remember that .. 
Ellul can even speak of God repenting-. He writes, "When Hineveh 
repents, God repents too: ’God repented of the evil which he 
had said he would do them; and he did not do it’ [Jonan] (3:10).
This is a surprising term to be used of God, and yet it is a 
common one in Scripture. God decides something, and then events 
change. Thus God changes his mind. He repents" (Jonah, p. 98 ) •
There are two places where Ellul uses the language of planning, 
but it is doubtful whether these should be interpreter as implying . 
a doctrine of predestined universal history. At one place 
where he refers to God’s plan, he seems to have in mind God’s 
intentional will active in history, but not a pre-temporal
determination of all events (The Politics of God, pp, 16-17)•
There is one other place where he seems to affirm predestination. 
The passage occurs in the context of his exposition of what he 
regards as.the second main point of II Kings, "the free determination 
of man in the free decision of God” (ibid., p. 15)• In that 
context, the intention to offer a predestinarian view seems most 
unlikely*. In addition, the sentence which precedes the passage in 
question refers to the subtlety of God’s governance of the world, 
God's respect for man, and God’s "successive adaptations", again 
hardly favouring a predestinarian doctrine. Then in. the English 
translation the following words occur: "Yet all this is also • 
inserted into God’s omniscience and omnipotence [my underline) 
which has prepared everything in advance no matter what may be the 
solution that each man finally adopts, that God leaves each man 
free to adopt" (ibid., p, 22). The underlined English word is 
an incorrect translation. The French word is ”1’omnipresence", 
(Politique de Dieu Politiques de l1Homme, p, 23) which, of 
course, means omnipresence not omnipotence. It’s understandable 
that the translator- made the interpretive substitution of 
"omnipotence" for "omnipresence", since admittedly it is strange 
to speak of God's omnipresence as preparing everything in advance.
But perhaps this is what Ellul means’. He may not'be referring, to 
God's omnipotence, which leads one to interpret the words which 
1 O 1 lO ...
The Apocalypt ic Problem
When Ellul talks of the sovereignty of God over the world,
he (like Barth; refers to the sovereignty of Christ, not to the
sovereignty of some unknown God. When talking of the way in which
Christ has become Lord, Ellul and- Barth both use language
associated with Few Testament apocalyptic tradition. hi conscious
dependence on Barth and Cullmonn, Ellul relates his thought about
Christ’s sovereignty to His death and resurrection and His defeat 
2of demonic powers. He writes, "By his death and resurrection
Christ has obtained victory over the powers which are henceforth 
submitted to him (Col, 2:15)» There is the point of departure 
fo r Hi s Lo rdship.”J
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follow as referring to an eternal and all-powerful resolution 
determining history. Rather, he may mean that God’s presence 
prepares things in advance, working to accomplish and make concrete 
God’s loving; purposes in present history. J.f this passage is 
recognized as a doubtful reference to predestination, there does 
not seem to be any basis for the charge that Ellul sees history as 
predestined in all details and there is widespread evidence 
which runs directly contrary.
W'e have been discussing predestination in the sense of an eternal 
predetermining of all historical- events. Barth uses the word in a 
different way, but Barth’s unique usage is not our concern here. 
Others use the idea exclusively to emphasize the gift nature of 
faith. That usage would be consistent with Ellul’s understanding 
of faith, but ag;ain that is not the issue under consideration here,
1 . The critical remarks that we make here concerning Ellul’s use 
of New Testament apocalyptic tradition in no way imply a total 
rejection of that tradition. For example, we have already spoken 
positively of the apocalyptic notion of the overlap of the two 
ages. Our criticisms do imply that apocalyptic thought must be 
theologically evaluated and used with discretion — and that not 
all aspects of that tradition are equally binding.
rejects certain aspects of apocalyptic tradition,
he is not at all of the opinion that the end of the world is near 
(Presence of the Kingdom, p. 325 Prayer and Modern Man, p. 14l).
Ellul himself 
For example,
2. ?h3 Meaning of the City, p. 164; Protestantisroe Fran?ais, p. 159
3, Ik id., p. 159. ’’Jesus Christ has conquered the world. He has 
stripped thrones, powers and dominions of their pretensions and 
their autonomy. He is now and in actuality the Lord of the 
world and of history” (False Presence, p, 13)•
What does Ellul mean by the use of such language? .Tor one thing
ho believes that the defeat of evil signifies that in the eternal 
1
Kingdom evil will be eliminated, Jesus’ resurrection means that 
evil, though active in history, has already boon eschatologically
defeated. Believers in Christ have faith that evil will not be
ultimately triumphant and they have this faith because the
ultimate result of history has been foreshadowed in Christ’s
resurrection. Ellul believes that another result of Christ’s
crucifixion and resurrection is that the Word of God is now
more actively confronting history and enabling men to come to faith 
and’thus find true freedomOne must not over-interpret him here, 
as though he means that God’s Word never encountered history prior 
to Jesus’ resurrection (a glance at The Po1 iti cs o f God and the 
Politics of Kan, a book on 11 Kings, will dispel that idea’,).
Ke apparently means simply that as a consequence of the resurrection, 
the Holy Spirit is now more directly confronting history than ever 
before —• a claim which the Hew Testament surely makes. Though 
Christ’s resurrection did not effect a structural change in history, 
evil is defeated in the sense that it cannot prevent the free and
powerful revelation of the Risen Lord.
Ellul can also refer to Jesus’ death and resurrection as
1. Jonah, p. 54• .
2. "Historical forces are, as it were, unceasingly repairing the web 
of necessity, and in different forms the web is being; broken, 
annulled, and disrupted afresh by the action of the power of 
freedom unleashed at the cross. For Jesus Christ has set in 
motion the power of freedom, and he has done this very concretely 
in the course of history, though this does not mean that history 
has become a kind of triumphal march, stage by stage, of victories 
for freedom. Our age shows the very opposite. What has been done 
and gained is that man or men can now acquire the power of freedom, 
and by them miracles may be done in history" (TTie_Politics of Jjod,
P- 187).
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involving a kind, of reclaiming of a lost world. He thus refers to
"the powers .»» hence forth [m'y underline) submitted to him (Col, 2:15)?^ 
not
(Of course, he isareferring-to an ontological elimination of evil 
from history). It is doubtful whether one should put much emphasis 
on this point, for in The Politics of Go d and tho Pc1itios of Man, 
he can discuss Old Testament history as though the Father of our Lord 
Jesus Christ has always been the hidden and mysterious Lord of the 
world* In that bock he is quite clear that Christ’s lordship over
the world is not a mere function of His resurrection. It must be
admitted that his discussion at this point evidences a minor
contradiction. We are left uncertain as to whether in his understanding
Christ’s lordship over the world is a function of His role in creation
2 ’ or redemption. Though Ellul does not sort out this contradiction, 
the way out of the dilemma may be to affirm that the meaning of 
Christ’s resurrection, in terms of His lordship over the world, is 
of noetic rather than ontic significance. That is, though the 
Father of Jesus Christ has always been the Lord of the world, this 
lordship is truly known only as we see it evidenced in Christ’s
death and resurrection.
Other statements which Ellul makes cut against the idea that 
Christ’s lordship over the world came more filly into existence at 
His resurrection. Elsewhere he seems to argue the reverse, namely,
1. Protestantisme Franpais, p. 1595 see also False Presence, p„ 13.
2. The new Testament can be quoted on both sides of this issue; 
hence no solution can come from biblical exegesis as such. Surely * 
at some points' the New Testament interprets Christ’s lordship in 
terms of His role in the creation of the world (Col. 1:16;
John 1:1-3 is along this line, though it doesn’t make the precise 
point). Other texts relate Christ’s sovereignty over the world to 
His resurrection (Sph. 1:19-22) or His exaltation (Phil. 2:9-11;
Acts 2:33-6; I Pet. 3:22).
that as a result of Christ's rosurrection the activity of the
defeated powers has intensified. Granted the hidden nature of
Christ’s sovereignty in and through evil, the presence of evil and 
even its intensification does not annul Christ’s ongoing 
sovereignty. Still, it would seem strange to affirm that Christ's
claiming of lordship over the world at the same time resulted in 
the intensification of evil's activities. Thus, it seems doubtful 
that we should attribute much significance to Ellul's words where 
he seems to make Christ’s lordship over the world a mere function
of His resurrect ion.
The more serious difficulty in his formation faces us when we
ask whether the result of Christ's ciucifixion and resurrection
can really mean that the activity of evil has intensified* There
is no doubt that at some places he says this very thing. It is
understandable that after evil's defeat, it still wields "e?-;tra-
ordinary power”. He appeals to Cullmann, Barth, and Visser’t Hcoft 
1
for1 this insight and it seems biblically unobjectionable * The 
problem arises when Ellul presses an illustration used by Cullmann. 
He appeals to Cullmann’s famous illustration of a battle won, but 
not finished. Ellul points out that the bloodiest struggle against 
the resistance movement came after 1943, after the Germans had 
virtually lost the war. Likewise, he argues that though the 
demonic powers have been eschatologically defeated, their activity 
has been stepped up as a result of Jesus' death and resurrection.
He appeals to Hew Testament apocalyptic tradition (3ltt, 24:151*1*5 
Rev. 20) to make the point that the demonic power of evil becomes
1. Presence, p» 16; The Meaning of the City, p. 164.
even more active in the last days* One wonders if Ellul has not 
taken Cullrnann’s illustration more seriously than Cullrnann hirnself. 
Cullrnann was convinced, that evil is still active in history and that 
Christ's sovereignty in general history is hidden — - but he did not 
put an emphasis on the apocalyptic notion that evil’s activities 
are actually increased as a result of Christ’s death and resurrection
N either did Barth.
new Testament apocalyptic tradition can be cited in support 
2of Ellul’s contention, but one wonders how theologically
meaningful this aspect of apocalyptic tradition is. It is
understandable that those who saw Christ’s resurrection as the
beginning of the end of the world, would apply the traditional 
apocalyptic signs of the end to the short interval they believed
TMAleamngpofJhe
1. / City, pp. 164~5» must accept the fact that the powers
defeated by Christ are still at work, that they refuse to admit 
their defeat and are struggling more violently [my underline^ 
than ever. They do gain local victories, and their violence 
forces us to believe in their power (still real over us), 
whereas in truth they are subject to Christ” (ibid,., p. 166),
2. Wolfgang Trilling argues that the signs discussed in Mtt. 24:3~8. 
belong to the "last days", but last days which are seen to run 
their course between the time of Christ’s resurrection and His 
Second Coming, not last days heralding the imminent end of the 
world. Also, he says that Matthew understood those signs not
as absolutely necessary evils connected with the whole of human 
history, but as signs identified with the birth of the Hew Age 
(Wolfgang Trilling, Matthew, Vol. 2, pp. 190-1).
Luke 21:5-24 certainly applies the apocalyptic signs of the 
birth of the New Age to the ongoing course of history, and sees 
these as in some unique way coming into existence as a result of 
the Christ event. The Lucan modification of Mark in verse 8 
makes it certain that Luke envisioned an indefinite period of 
history. Because of verse 8 one can appeal to Luke on this 
matter with even more certainty than to Matthew.
The apocalyptic signs desribed in Kk. 13:6-8, likewise, do not 
seem connected with the immediate destruction of the world. 
However, Kk. 13:30 appears to suggest tha,t the entire process 
("birth pangs” for an interim and then the signs of the end) 
would occur in one generation.
■■■• '____ ■___ ■ .V? ... . ». .. .... :
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would exist between Christ's resurrection and His return. With
the extension of history for lo these many centuries a theological 
problem has been created. Is it any longer tenable to see the 
apocalyptic signs of distress (wars, famines, etc.) as somehow 
uniquely called into existence by Christ’s death and resurrection?
Luke seems able to retain the apocalyptic signs and sees them as 
applicable to an indefinite period of history, beginning; with 
Christ’s resurrection. One wonders, however, whether Luke retained 
this idea simply because he was reluctant totally to jettison 
apocalyptic tradition at this point, so instead applied it to the
indeterminate interval between Christ’s resurrection end Kis return.
One wonders if this were not a half-way measure forced on him by
his utilisation of Karoan tradition. Cur question is simply
whether it is theologically tenable to say that history suddenly
became more degenerate as a result of the Christ event. Would
it not make better sense, granted the delay of the eschaton, to
affirm that all history has equally been under the influence of
the demonic? That is, must not 'whatever is said of the time 
• -5
after Christ also be said of the time before?
Ellul applies his Lew Testament apocalyptic thought when he
explains that the dire state of the modern city and state is due to
the fact that defeated powers are now more active as a result of 
2Christ’s coming. He writes, •
1. Sllul has not affirmed the opposite of an evolutionary view of 
history. He is not saying that with every tick of the clock the 
world becomes progressively worse (”Sur le Pessimisme Chretien^’, 
p. 171)♦ All he affirms is that as a result of Christ’s crucifixion 
and resurrection, history fell to a lower level, from which it 
has continued to operate.
The Menning of the .■.2/C~i ty, pp. nSfioo. It seems olatantly inconsistent to say 
that Christ’s resurrection means that the Holy Spirit is now 
more active in history (The Politics of God, p, 187) end then to 
write that the unique characteristic of our time and time since 
Christ’s/»..
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Down through the world’s history a certain restraint could be 
seen until Christ’s time. The powers observed the rules of 
war, working rathe?? by trickery end local attacks, and even by 
positive action. The world after the fall was trying to organize 
itself to live in its evil, and live "humanly”, even though its 
way was becoming more and more corrupt. hut .after Jesus Christ, 
with the beginning of the last events, the "Dominations" are 
beside themselves. ... There are no more secret offensives, 
there is no more respect for law, there is rather a free reign 
of every means.
A theological problem connected with the acceptance of this 
aspect of apocalyptic thought is the simple fact that if it is
true it should be capable of empirical verification. If the world
suddenly became worse as a result of the Christ event, secular
historians should be able to document that this is the case, 1
have seen no such validation of these apocalyptic categories and
Ellul himself offers no empirical evidence to support his
gene rali zation•
Christ’s resurrection is the absence of the Spirit. Ellul
writes, "Perhaps we are living in an age in which God ’turns 
away his face’, an age of abandonment. Such an age is described 
in the Gospel apocalypses as that moment ’between the times’ 
in which man no longer discerns any truth, in which power runs 
rampant, in which there is constant confusion between evil and 
good (You will call good evil, and evil good), in which man 
gives reign to every presumptdon and experiences every terror, 
in which anguish increases to the point where it is fatal of 
itself to those who come within its grasp. It is a time of 
frenzied persecutions, when the very best fall to the sword.
This is an age in which, in our shortsighted wisdom, we imagine 
that God is dead, because we had reduced to nothing our trumped 
up concept of the God who escapes us" (Prayer .. ., p. 140). His 
words of qualification ("if" and "perhaps") are discarded when 
he writes, "What is taking place in the heart of man is already 
the eradication of every measure and norm. ... It is the time of 
trial at the end of the age, in which man no longer feels any need 
to know God, in which the language of God has become dead, and in 
which God remains silent to those who call upon him" (ibid., p. 141). 
"The time of abandonment is something we live and feel within 
ourselves" (ibid., p, 142).
Ellul’s contradictory understanding is evidenced particularly 
in his book on prayer. At some places he understands prayer as 
man’s response to God’s free revelation of His grace (consistently 
applying Barth’s Law-Gospel reversal). At other places he 
speaks of prayer more as a "combat" to force God's .rather reluctant 
revelation.
glie .Meaning.of the City, p. 166.
There is another aspect of Ellul’s thought which stands in
contradiction to the apocalyptic interpretation we have been
discussing. At one place he refers to the apocalyptic signs of
distress, but then goes on to speax. of the whole of history as
being marked by these characteristics. He writes,
Jesus announces for the end of time a multiplication of misery 
and wars. And the Apocalypse teaches us that the whole of 
human history is made by the gallop of the four horses. They 
represent ihe constants of History, and are War, Famine, Sickness, 
and the Word of God.^
From the last two sentences about the Apocalypse one might get the 
impression that Kllul sees history as having always been similar; 
yet the first sentence speaks of an increase of misery connected 
with the period, following the Christ event. If this statement is
a borderline one, he has another one where he clearly affirms that-- 
history has always been marked by the very features the synoptic
apocalypses describe as the situation between Christ’s resurrection 
and His return.1 2 Likewise, in the major part of The leaning of
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1. "Sur le Pessimisms Chretien;’, p. 169 •
2. "For to us things are normal when they are going well. Health, 
affluence, peace —~ these are normal, so convinced are we of our 
own righteousness, of what is our due. But Scripture teaches the 
very opposite. Unfortunately what is normal now that man is 
separated from God is war find murder, famine and pollution, 
accident and disruption. When there is a momentary break in the 
course of these disasters, when abundance is known, when peace 
timidly establishes itself, when justice reigns for a span, then 
it is fitting, unless we are men of too little faith, that we 
should marvel and give thanks for so great a miracle, realising 
that no less than the love and faithfulness of the Lord has been 
needed in order that there might be this privileged instant"
(d’ke Politics of God, pp. 178 ~9) ♦
Prior to the 1948 publication of Presence au Wonde Hoderne
there is no evidence that Ellul had considered the apocalyptic 
interpretation we have been criticizing. In Le Fondement 
Theologique du Droit, he reasoned in the opposite way, as
though Christ’s resurrection meant the diminishing of evil’s 
influence. He wrote, "Even within history justice can sometimes 
express itself through human judgment. This is a sign that Jesus 
Christ has truly conquered the demonic powers. ... Hot only do all 
human judgments find their consummation in the judgment of God, but 
the validity and power of God’s judgment are already reflected in 
t he / •»•
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the City Ellul sounds pessimistic about the city from .its very beginning
If a pessimism is implied to have increased at any point, it seems to be
more in the modern period, not from the resurrection onward. Even when
he refers to the world as having become worse as a result of Christ’s 
resurrection, he appeals to modern history as evidence of this (The 
Meaning of the Cit.y, p. 166). If appeal is to be made to this aspect 
of apocalyptic thought, then the twenty centuries in the interim must be 
cited as evidence, not just the recently modern technological society!
Concerning his use of the apocalyptic category of history becoming 
worse as a result of Christ’s resurrection, we can only conclude that 
Ellul is self-contradictory. The impression one gets is that he has 
"flirted” with this aspect of apocalyptic thought, but has never become 
convinced enough to be able to offer a consistent articulation of the
same.
judgments of man. In other words, every judgment announces the 
coming, even the presence of this absolute judgment of God" 
(Theological Foundation of Law, p. 116). .
CHAPTER VII
CHAPTER VII
THE CHRISTIAN LIP’S AND THE POLITICAL ORDER
Over against theologians who make theological statements about
the political order without reference to social reality and.in
opposition to politicians who speak of political reality without
reference to theological considerations, Ellul believes that an
adequate understanding of the state can be obtained only by setting
theological affirmations in conversation or confrontation with 
1political reality. Since this is the case, we would misunderstand
what he says on our topic were we to deal only with his theological 
2
beliefs. However, theme and space' prohibit us from attempting 
a complete appraisal of his sociological analysis and his critique 
of political reality. We will consider such analysis and critique 
only insofar as it directly informs a normative view as to what 
Christians ought, to think and do. In following this procedure we 
are simply adhering to the methodological principle that we have no 
independent interest in Ellul's sociology or his critique of the
modern world.
Though we will not attempt an exhaustive analysis of Ellul’s 
sociological views on this topic, we will take account of the integral 
interrelationship of theological and sociological ideas. It would 
be a mistake to attempt here to separate theology from sociology. He 
certainly distinguishes between the two, but at most points he
1. "Rappels et Reflexions", p. 129.
2. Ellul has written so extensively on modern political reality 
that that in itself could be the subject of an entire dissertation,
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discusses the same issue from both of these angles. When we consider 
his analysis of political reality, we generally find, both theological 
and sociological considerations. Likewise, when he suggests
Christian responses, these are based on theological convictions, but
also take account of modern political reality as he understands it.
Since normative views are always based on biblical considerations, it 
is easy enough to see the distinction between what Ellul says as a 
believer and what he says as a sociologist. This being so, our 
structure is designed to show xhe interrelationship between theological 
and sociological ideas.
Our procedure will be to move from a consideration of Ellul’s
analysis of a particular political problem to his responses, taking
into account relevant theological and sociological factors at both 
points. (When dealing with the responses, we will sometimes be discussing 
attitudes, sometimes acts, and sometimes a combination of both} We 
will make this movement from problem to response three times, first 
dealing with the problem of politization, secondly, the issue of 
political autonomy, and thirdly, the related issues of the inability 
of modern citizens to effectively-control political affairs or to
effectively participate in political parties.
The Politicizing of the World and the Church
We now turn to the first problem area, politization. By
politization Ellul basically means the state’s tendency to make a
1. The problems of control and participation are discussed entirely 
from a sociological angle, but the proposed response is based as 
much on normative theological considerations as it is related to 
the particular sociological issues. When Ellul deals with the 
problem of politization and chat of autonomy, both analysis and 
response are based on theological and sociological factors. Since 
theological issues are involved at most points of analysis and all 
points dealing with response, he cannot be .justly accused of 
simply correlating theological answers to fit sociological 
problems. ,
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religion out of itself. He tells us that the Old Testament indicates 
that the state always has a tendency to sacralize itself, to step 
beyond its appointed limits. He says that Jeroboam’s sin 
(I Kings 12:26-33)
was precisely that he made theological and religious decisions 
regarding the true God for political reasons, thus subordinating 
the spiritual life of the people to political necessity, ... 
seizing control of the revelation of God ... We have here ... a 
political power which creates a state religion or which uses the 
... revelation of God ... for political ends.
We see here the intentional and deliberate establishment of a 
national religion in the service of the state and for the purpose 
of unifying national sentiment. There is nothing at all 
’’primitive” about this. It is just what we do too. . livery 
modern state thinks that it should establish in the same way a 
full-scale religion which will serve to unite the people and 
make it loyal to the political power, integrating the church 
so that it will be "national” and will fill this same role.^
The sin of Jeroboam which is repeated by all the Kings of Israel 
and by Ahaz, is not the result of a primitive view of the deity. .. 
It is rather the result of an enduring political necessity. A 
state is insecure unless there is a state religion. Politics 
demands religion as an ally. But Jeroboam’s problem is that 
the pure revelation of Yahweh cannot be integrated into politics.
It cannot be exploited in this way because it is the fact of 
the living God,^
At the very centre of Ellul's political concern, is his belief
that the state is a relative and limited thing. Though the state
is important for the establishment of order, equilibrium and a
relative justice, he insists that these are limited functions having
nothing to do with the establishment of the good revealed by Cod.
He even says that'-every time the state is attacked in the Bible, it
is attacked for its inordinate pride, its tendency to overstep its 
ZL
limits. He explicitly agrees with P.J. Leenhardt that Christians
1. The Politics of God, p. 125»
2. Ibid., p. 125.
3• lbid., pp♦ 125-6.
A. ’’Rappels et Ref lexions’’, pp. 163, 166.
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ought to oppose the inordinate pride of a state which claims the 
allegiance of the whole man. Both agree that Christians are called 
to honour the state, but that total devotion and love are reserved 
for God.^
Turning from exegetical considerations to sociological cues,
we see that Ellul’s awareness of modern politisat.ion occurs in the
context of a broad awareness that the modern world tends to sacralize
itself. In his view, the chief characteristic of the modern world
is not absence of religion, but the powerful presence of secular 
2religions, not secularisms, but idolatry. He thinks that what has
happened in the modern world is that Jesus Christ has been de-sacralize 
and secular gods have assumed the position of ultimate loyalty.
1. "Rappels et Reflexions", p. 151, 169; for an identical point of 
view see Barth, Community, p. 143.
2. "Les Religions Seculieres", pp. 64, 77; see also "Le Sacre dans 
le Monde Moderne", Le Semeur, No. 2(1963), p. 24» Ellul disagrees 
with those who think that the chief characteristic of modern man
is his secular rationality. He argues that "man come of age" is 
really an invention of rationalistic theologians (expressing their 
own opinions) and is completely out of touch with actual reality 
(A Critique, pp. 78-9)* He says that the modern world is a 
religious one, and.appeals to such, phenomena as the popularity of 
horoscopes, the widespread use of drugs, the religious veneration 
of Mao, and the worshipful quest for material abundance to make 
his point (A Critique, p. 78; "Les Religions Seculieres", pp. 69-75)
Ellul thinks that the strategy of proclaiming Christianity by 
appealing to "non-religious" man is misguided ('*Les Religions 
Seculieres", pp. 64, 77; A Critique, p. 78). He insists that 
Christian proclamation ought to proceed by challenging man’s 
idolatries, rather than by adapting; the Christian message to modern 
man: "It is not a question of announcing the message to a
scientific man who believes nothing, but to a religious man who 
believes another thing, who has put his faith ... elsewhere. And 
consequently it is a debate ’Truth of God — Religion’ and not 
’Kerygma— science*. It cannot therefore be either the scientific 
interpretation of Christianity, nor a Christian rationalism 
which would have the least chance of causing the Gospel to be 
heard. It is the intrinsic power of ’desacralisation*4 ’demyth- 
oligization* , * dereligiousization• (’. ) by revelation which can 
work ..." ("Les Religions Seculieres", p. 78). -Rather than 
demythologizing the Bible, Ellul accepts the- Bible' in a quite 
straightforward way and uses it to demythologize the modern world 
(False Presence, pp. 206-7; "Les Religions Seculieres", p» 78).
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Operating with a Barthian acceptance of the inevitable conflict 
between God’s revelation in Christ and all human religion, he 
undertakes a scathing attack upon the modern idols, in the hope that 
this might contribute to a re-sacralizing of Christian faith.
We cannot understand Ellul’s critical attitude toward politics
unless we remember that he is committed to Christ and hence resentful
of what he regards as modern man's veneration of politics e.s a 
2sacred area of ultimate truth, He writes, "Man now experiences 
faith and religious conversion thanks to his participation in 
politics, What was lost by the church has been found by the 
parties, at least those worthy of the name.”" Politization is the 
substitution of political concern for Christian commitment, the 
absolutizing of the relative
Though the form of state veneration today is not the same as 
that asked and refused by New Testament Christians, this does not
mean that the ultimate claim of the state is any less real. When
Ellul describes modern politization he is describing what he believes
to be a different form of the same claim. Today politization is
the tendency to think that all problems are political and can be 
5
solved only by political means. Since all of life’s problems
1. "Le Sacre dans le Monde Moderne", p. 24 •
• Ibid., p. 30.
3• The Political Illusion, p. 21.
4« Ibid., pp. 19-20. "I disagree with observers who believe the 
average citizen lacks political passion and exhibits general 
skepticism and indolence. On the contrary, some latent political 
passion appears- to exist which erupts on any occasion and at 
every event. What is lacking is truly reasoned opinions, 
certainly not passion” (ibid., p. 202). "The mass man is ’Immersed 
in the immediate present, disoriented, incapable of true political 
reflection’, but he by no means necessarily lacks political 
opinions”' (Lasch et al., Katallagete, p. 24, quoting The Political 
Illusion, p. 75)• .
5. The Political Illusion, p. 185*
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are seen to he political, more and more power is placed in the hands 
of the centralised state. The state becomes omnipotent, directing
all of the activities of the individuals within its borders.
We consider it obvious that everything must be^reservedly subjected 
to the power of the state; it would seem extraordinary to us if 
any activity should escape it. The expansion of the state’s 
encroachment upon all affairs is exactly paralleled by our conviction 
that all things must .be that way. ... It is not just the fact 
of the state being at the center of our lives that is crucial, 
but our spontaneous and personal acceptance of it as such. We 
believe that for the world to be in good order, the state must •
have all powers.2
The place we accord in our hearts to the state and political 
activity leads us to an interpretation of history which we regard 
primarily as political history. ... We cannot escape the strange 
view that history is ultimately a function of the state. Only 
where the state is, is history worth the name.3
What bothers Ellul even more than the fact that men today
commonly regard politics as al1-important, is the fact that the
Church to a large extent is following suit. To hirn the politicizing 
of the Church involves a relativizing of Jesus Christ as the tx’ue 1 2 3
1. *To think of everything as political, to conceal everything by using 
this word (with intellectuals taking the cue from Plato and several 
others), to place everything in the hands of the state, to appeal to 
the state in all circumstances, to subordinate the problems of the 
individual to those of the group, to believe that political affairs 
are on everybody’s level and that everybody is qualified to deal 
with them—> these factors characterize the politization of modern 
man and, as such, comprise a myth. The myth then reveals itself in 
beliefs and, as a resu.lt, easily elicits almost religious fervour.
We cannot conceive of society except as directed by a central 
omnipresent and omnipotent state. What used to be a utopian view 
of society, with the state playing the role of the brain, not only 
has been ideologically accepted in the present time but also been 
profoundly integrated into the depths of our consciousness. We 
can no longer conceive of a society with autonomous ’in-between* 
groups or divergent activities”(see The Political Illusion, pp. 12-13).
2. The Political Illusion, p. 13; see also p. 9* ’’This aspiration, ' 
this unconscious- assigning of the supreme role to the state leads us 
immediately to the consideration that everything is now its business. 
The question returns again and again, like some evidence that it would 
be absurd to protest: ’But after all, what is there that is not 
political?’ (ibid. t p. 14) • ”God is dead. He must be replaced’.
Only a creature invested with super-human powers, a multiple will,
and an intelligence born of several brains can give us enough 
confidence: the state1.” (A Critique, p. 106).
3. The Political Illusion, pp. 13--14*
Object of faith, from those who ought to know better. Just as 
politization involves the sacralizing of political reality, so the 
politicization of the Church involves such a sacralizing and an 
identification of Christian faith with political commitments or 
ideologies. He points out that for some Christians today, political 
involvement has become the major test of the sincerity of the Christian
faith. Biblical passages not related to politics are re-interpreted
to show political meaning. Political involvement becomes so
important that persons and Churches are judged (by Christians’.) 
according to political criteria. Those not involved in politics are
seen to be hypocrites. The Christian presence in the world is
identified with a political presence, as though the only way to witness 
2to Christ were to engage in political activity.‘
- 2% -
1. ’’The rabies politica has infected the best among Christians so 
gravely that for them the incarnation has become identical with 
political commitment, and all judgements passed are now political 
judgments" (A Critique, p. 104; see also False Presence, p. 96)•
"1 heard a typical Christian say, ’You can’t be a Christian if you 
don’t have a certain position on the Algerian problem.’ I was 
dumbfounded’. Thus one’s political opinion on such a difficult - 
question, characterized by such fluctuating information and criteria 
of judgment (one must also take into account individual capacities 
and knowledge), becomes the criterion for the authenticity of one's 
faith'.’’ (A Critique, p. 105).
2. False Presence, pp. 95~Ellul gives an historical assessment 
of the relationship of the Church to the state which points to the 
present bondage of the Church to the political order. He argues 
that in the'New Testament period the Church was independent with 
reference to the state. With Constantine there began a liaison 
between Church and state, but the Church still retained a degree of 
autonomy and usually claimed the right to control the state. He 
believes that a third stage is now being reached; as Christians • 
become politicized the Church loses her autonomy and becomes the 
state’s servant (A Critique, pp. 1O6~7). (Paul Ramsey writes, "The 
oddity is that contemporary ecumenical social ethics evidences less 
acknowledgment of the separation between the churoh and the office of 
magistrate or citizen than was clearly acknowledged by the great 
cultural churches of the past ...") (Paul Ramsey, Who Speaks for the 
Church? (1969), p. 20). The Church becomes a cheering section for 
the political goals of the state. "Truth is becoming political. 
Morality must be political. Faith is expressed in terms of politics 
The man who formulated this illuminating revelation would make a 
good Christian: ’When you grant priority to politics, actions and 
people become good. When you do not, people and their acts become 
bad/..•
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As evidence of the politigation of the Church, Ellul refers to 
the passion Christians interject into their speeches and articles on
political topics. He argues that politically motivated French
Christians are much more impassioned and excited concerning political
1
questions than are other Frenchmen. He says that if Christians 
engage in politics it is out of an agonizing compunction which causes 
their judgments to be sharply defined and their relations with others
strained.
It is easier, for example, to discuss communism with an intellectual 
belonging to the Communist Party than with a progressive Protestant, 
and to exchange views on a political issue with non-Christians of 
divergent shades of opinion than with Christians.3
One aspect of the politicizing of the Church, which Ellul 
particularly deplores, is the devaluation of a biblically based theology 
in preoccupation with what is regarded as more important, the political 
issues of the day,^
bad.’ Unfortunately, it was only Marshal Lin Piao” (A Critique, p. 107) 
Ellul accuses political Christians of being sectarians, of focusing
on one aspect of revelation in Scripture and making that single 
issue the either-or of faith. The only difference he sees is that 
the interpretative key is seen as politics, rather than as speaking 
in tongues, adult baptism, or non-violence (False Presence, p. 99) •
1. False Presence, p. 94* ’’They deliver their political speeches 
with an indignation, an uncompromising quality and a seriousness 
which are overwhelming. There must be total involvement'.’’ (False 
Presence, p. 94)•
2. Ibid., p. 95.
3. Ibid., p. 95. Of course False Presence of the Kingdom is written 
in response to the French Christian situation and specifically in 
response to the situation in the Reformed Church of France. However, 
Ellul believes that these problems are true of the modern Church as
a whole (False Presence, p. vi).
4» A Critique, p. 105* ’’Nobody gets excited about the divinity of 
Jesus Christ, but as for Algeria, now there’s a real question. ...
The question of salvation by grace is no longer important, of coursef 
but the question of the church’s position on political peace is 
essential” (A Critique, p, 106).
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One need only consider the great preoccupation of the churches 
today. Are they interested in better understanding and formulating 
the truth? In converting men to Jesus Christ? In discovering 
ways in which a Christian can live by his faith? These are merely 
minor preoccupations. The great thing is to know what political 
position to support, for the church to prove it is a political force 
to formulate a message to the world on its political problems.
Until the church has stated its position on decolonization or Berlin 
it has said nothing,"
He thinks that the current devaluation of theology and obsession with 
political issues is simply due to conformity to a modern world indiffer 
ent to theological truth."
Ellul criticizes Christians for taking political stands without 
reference to Christian theological conviction (and also for being 
inadequately informed on the political issues). He believes that 
the only thing that can make a Christian decision on a social or
political issue authoritative, is faithfulness to the God revealed in
Christ. Apart from some connection with revelation, he thinks that 
Christian opinions are as relative as those of non-believers.^ He 
recognizes that Christians, like all other people, hold human, opinions-
but he thinks that the Church distorts her own faith if she confuses
tentaxive and debatable human opinions with what can be said authorit­
atively, that is, on the basis of. scriptural revelation. He believes 
that by and large Christian thinking on political issues is simply 
the expression of the social milieu in which various Christians live
and has nothing to do with Christianity
1 • A Critique, p. 103.
• Ibid., p. 106.
3. Paul Ramsey makes the same point, saying that unless it can be 
shown that Christian teaching compellingly leads to a particular 
political conclusion, such a conclusion simply puts ’’the engine of 
religious fervor behind a particular partisan political point of 
view which would have as much or as little to recommend it if it 
had not emanated from a church council” (Paul Ramsey, Who Speaks 
for the Church? pp. 31-2).
4* False Presence, pp.141~5» 148, 178 » 182-3• He says that having 
read innumerable articles written by Christians (of the left and the 
right/*»•
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Ellul believes that the effect that politization is having on 
the Church is to increase division and hatred among Christians of 
differing political persuasions and between political Christians and
those Christians who take no interest in political involvement.
Whereas previously the Church was divided over questions of theolog­
ical truth, he believes that she is now becoming divided on the basis
1
of conflicting political credos. He questions whether politics is of 
2
such value as to warrant such division.
The difference between Ellul and the politicized Christians
that he criticizes is that he thinks that by and large political
issues are so ambiguous that Christianity cannot be said to stand on
right) on Algeria, he discovered only political choices made for 
entirely human reasons. Not only does he say that these judgments 
did not differ in the least from non-Christian ones, but he also 
states that it is easy to predict what a Christian will say on a 
political issue simply by a knowledge of what sources of information 
were taken into account (Fatse Pre senoe, pp. 140-1). Along these 
lines, he argues that Christian students make their political decisions 
more in terms of their identity as students, and less in terms of 
their identity as Christians (False Presence, p. 143).
1. Political 13lus ion, p. 20. Ellul writes, "If you throw the 
Suez question or the problem of Algeria in 1959 before a congreg­
ation of Christians, you will s.ee them tear each other to pieces like 
dogs over a bone" (A^Critigue, p. 106).
2. P&3se Presence, p. 97* ”1 would not hesitate to stake the unity
of the Church on a question of truth, but the political debate, the 
choice among political options, the presence to the world by way of 
politics is not a question of truth. ... Political questions can be 
burning questions in the world, but if they are burning questions that 
is the spirit of the world. The One-who-divides, the Deceiver, he
it is’ who makes them that way. To accept them as such into the 
Church is to obey that spirit" (ibid,, p. 98).
Along similar lines Paul Ramsey writes, "This identification of 
Christian social ethics with specific partisan proposals that clearly 
are not the only ones that may be characterized as Christian and as 
morally acceptable comes close to the original and the New Testament 
meaning of heresy. It introduces divisions into the life that may 
properly be a confession of the faith of the church. This, at least, 
was Paul’s meaning when he condemned the factions (hairesis) among 
the Corinthians (l Cor. 11:18, 19)««»” (Paul Ramsey, Who Speaks for 
the Church? pp. 55“^)« -
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one side of the issues involved. To the contrary, political Christians
think that on most political issues there is one definite side on
which the Church ought to stand. The difference between Ellul and 
those he cri-t jjedzes seems to be one of degree (though this difference 
of degree ip vitally important). For example, we have seen earlier 
that he believes that the Christian faith implies support for racial .
integration and that the latter leads the Church to defend economic
integration. On the basis of his reasoning, the Church ought firmly 
2
and unanimously to oppose explicitly racist policies. Ellul’s
claim, however, is that most political issues are not that simple.
In making this latter point, he criticizes what he calls the "Barmen 
complex". Before he does so he admits that the Church was right in 
what she said at the Synod of Barmen in 1934» though he thinks that *'
she should have acted sooner and should not have waited until the
Nazi state began to interfere with Church affairs. His major point, 
however, is to insist that most day-to-day political issu.es simply
cannot be pressed into the Barmen mould. He believes that the
political situation is seldom as clear-cut and decisive and he thinks
that political Christians make a major mistake in so thinking.
1. See above3 pp. 137^133•
2. Of course, it is still a matter of debate as to what policies 
actually favour racial integration and what ones oppose it. It’s 
just that on those occasions where a political choice is openly 
racist, the Church as Church can speak in opposition. In other 
cases, Christians are to discuss proposals and make individual 
decisions as to what policies do or do not favour racial integration.
3» False Presence, pp. 106—7• "Since 1945j French Protestant intell­
ectuals have been dreaming only of Barmen. The Reformed Church in 
France must manage to say something just as good. That, undoubtedly, 
is one of the unconscious reasons behind the urge to issue statements. 
One dreams of the day when he might finally say something as decisive 
in the Reformed Church of France. It is generally forgotten that 
we have never been in as decisive a situation as that of Germany in 
1933* This also explains the exaggerated and grandiloquent style 
used in statements about every event in French politics. In all 
good faith, parachutists are transformed into S3 troops, de Gaulle 
into/ ,..
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One may question whether Ellul has given an accurate statement 
of the degree of politization in the Church, since he studies 
statements by French Christian intellectuals and tends to forget that 
they represent but one aspect of the Church’s thinking, One may think 
that the traditional dangers of pietism are much more real than he
in his later writings seems to recognize. Even so, his warnings 
concerning the danger of politization in the Church are both timely 
and helpful and the problem he describes may increasingly become a 
majoi' one for the Church (though one suspects that the pietistic 
problem will linger on).
The Relativity of the Political Order
So far we have discussed Ellul’s biblical and sociological analysis
of the tendency of the state to sacralize itself and for politics to*' 
become unduly important (for men in general and for Christians in 
particular). We will now look at his Christian reasons for opposing 
politization, his biblical arguments for the relativity of the
political order and his biblical understanding that most political issues
are likewise relative.
Against those who find political meaning everywhere in Scripture
and assume that political participation is imperative, Ellul points
out that the passages in the Epistles dealing with politics are very
few in number in comparison with the great bulk of theological and 
2
ethical teaching. This in itself would argue against the devaluing
into Hitler, the CRS (the police units created in 1945 to maintain 
order) into the Cestapo, etc., etc. The Barmen complex naturally 
leads the French Protestant intellectual to take his stand with the 
left (a second boost in that direction), since Barmen was a great 
stand in opposition to fascism (hence in opposition to the right)” 
(False Presence, p. 107; see also A Critique, p. 104, for a rather 
unclear statement on the same sub ject).
1 • False Presence , pp . j-6 .
2. Ibid., p. 114. Ellul fails to mention that New Testament Christians 
were largely from the lower socio-economic classes (many being slaves). 
This/...
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of theology and the exaltation of political concerns. In addition, 
he says that even the passages which do deal with issues related to
politics do not provide a basis for the necessity of active particip-
4
ation (though he thinks that they do not prohibit such). He agrees
with F.J. Leenhardt that the Christian recognition of the importance of
the state must not be confused with the necessity of direct political 
9
activity. Ellul makes an interesting distinction between theological 
reflection, talk about the meaning of politics and political activity 
as such. He stgrees that the former is necessarily of importance to 
Christians, but insists that it must not be confused with the latter.^
This being the case, most early Christians were not in a position 
to be involved in political affairs (Ernst Kasemann, New Testament 
Questions, pp. 205-6). He reasons that because there was political 
activity in Jesus’ day, the Christian situation with reference to 
the state was similar to our own (False Presence, pp. 115-116;
"Rappels et Reflexions”, p. 161). The similarity breaks down, if 
many Christians (because of their class) had no access to political 
channels. (Paul, though a Roman citizen, was writing by and large 
to such Christians).
Likewise the eschatological perspective of the early Church was 
different from that of the Church today. Many Christians expected 
the imminent consummation and hence were not likely to be concerned 
to improve the social order. With the continuation of history for 
these many centuries, it is only natural that we should be more 
concerned to improve the social structures of the world than were 
the early Christians. Oscar Cullmann, on whom Ellul depends for 
much of his theology concerning the state, is aware of this point, 
though Ellul is silent here (Oscar Cullmann, Jesus and the Revolut­
ionaries , pp. 54”5» Salvation in History, p. 337)*
We do not claim that these two arguments destroy Ellul's case that 
political involvement is not imperative for Christians, only that 
they are factors which should be frankly acknowledged,
1 * False Presence, p. 114•
2. ’’Rappels et Reflexions", pp. 153, 166.
3« The Politics of Cod, p. 14» He writes, "Karl Barth himself 
confuses the state and politics when he says that since Christians 
recognize in the order of the sword, of constraint, and of fear a 
divine dispensation, they cannot be antipolitical or apolitical”
(The Politics of God, p. 14)» He opposes Barth's tendency to 
regard direct political activity as mandatory for Christians ("Rappel 
et Reflexions”, p. 162; see also Barth, Community, State and Church, 
pp, ‘145, '157, 159)* Barth, for example, asks how Christians can 
pray for the state if they are not themselves directly involved in 
political activity. He then goes on to answer his question, by 
saying that political participation is imperative, attributing this 
thought/...
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He also insists that biblical passages related to politics clo not
give concrete directives concerning voting, belonging to a party,
. 1 . etc.
Against those who would make political participation mandatory
for Christians, Ellul points out that Jesus and His disciples 
2represent a supra-political position:
One hesitates to bring up the obvious fact, which nevertheless 
is generally forgotten, that Jesus paid no attention to problems of 
politics. He definitely refuses to take the lead in the Jewish 
nationalist movement. He recognizes the authority of the invader. 
He advises the normal payment of taxes (which was then a burning 
issue with the Jews). He displays an indifference toward the 
questions of taxes, showing its unimportance by the story of the 
fish (Matthew 17’«24ff.)» He welcomes ’collaborators’ and traitors, 
and at no time does he take a stand against the numerous political 
scandals which were rampant in Judea.8
Ellul says that in Jesus’ conversation with Pilate He admits that 
power exists only because God gives it (Jn. 19i11 ), but manifests 
indifference with reference to the particular people who wield power 
(”’My kingship is not of this world’” (Jn. 18:36).^
thought even to Paul (Barth, Against the Stream, pp. 81-2). He
fails to realize that the fact of the matter is that New Testament 
Christians did pray for the state, but’ apparently were not involved 
directly in political activity.' Of course, on both Barth’s and 
Ellul's terms, the Christian would have to criticize the state if 
it denied the Church the civil liberties necessary for the preaching 
of the Gospel in word and deed (see below, pp. 270-72; see also 
Barth, Community, State and Church, p. 138). This, however, would 
not necessarily imply continuous political activity on the part of 
Christians.
Ellul can be criticized for failing to regard practical political 
discussion leading to voting decisions as a part of political 
activity. He seems to regard direct political activity as entirely 
a matter of assuming a leadership role within a party or state (The 
Politics of God, p. 14).
1• False Presence, p. 114.
2. “Rappels et Reflexions", p. 161; A Critique, p. 104.
3» False; Presence, p. 113- Ellul quite rightly points out that there 
was great political agitation in Jesus' day, especially among nation­
alistic Jews insisting on independence (ibid., p. 114; “Rappel; et 
Reflexions", p. 160; see also Cullmann, Jesus and the Revolution­
aries, pp. 4-5).
4• False Presence, pp. 113-114•
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Politics.! Christians often go to the Old. Testament to establish
the prime importance of political activity. Ellul very wisely insists
that the Old Testament politics of Israel cannot be used to justify
the necessity of Christian participation in politics today. The
theocratic situation of a state being both Church and state is totally
different from the modern '’secular” state and even different from the 
p
state in the New Testament.'
The politicizing of Christian thought is often supported by the 
assumption that the Bible can be used to defend the preferability of 
a particular form of modern government. Ellul disagrees with this
line of reasoning on biblical grounds. He thinks that the Bible says 
absolutely nothing about the relative preferability of a particular
form of governmental structure. If the Bible were committed to a
particular form of the state, he thinks that it would have spoken of 
institutions and regimes instead of authorities who ruled as individuals.^ 
He believes that the Bible gives no timeless verdict on this issue and 
that a decision in favour of one institutional form as opposed to
another is a human decision related to the particularities involved 
in available options.^ •
1• False Presence, p. 113.
2. Ellul also relies on other Old Testament passages to support the 
relativity of politics. He points to passages which condemn the 
establishment of political power in Israel (l Samuel; Zechariah 11:6). 
He reminds us that Ecclesiastes regarded political power as vain and 
futile (False Presence, p. 111). He says that though the prophets 
foresaw and spoke of various political actions and addressed the 
Word of God to particular situations, they seldom themselves engaged 
directly in political activity (The Politics of Cod, pp. 85-6;
False Presence, p. 113)•
3* False Presence, pp. 110-111; "Rappels et Reflexions", p. 160;
L*Homme et 1'Argent, pp. 26-29• . .
4. Ellul follows F.J. Leenhardt and Calvin at this point, in opposition 
to Barth’s view that one can use the Bible to establish the preferab­
ility of one form of government (in Barth’s case democratic socialism). 
("Rappelset Reflexions", pp. 132, 153, 160, 162-3; False Presence, 
pp. 147-8; see also Barth, Community, State and Church, pp, 144-5, 182 ). 
(It/... ............
Ellul has many additional biblical arguments concerning the
relativity of the state. Traditional theology has often used Rom. 13 
and parallel passages to support the necessity of Christian subservience 
to the particular institutional state existing at the time, E'llul 
has a way of dealing with Rom. 13 which enables him to adopt a more 
critical attitude toward the modern state. He relativizes the teaching 
concerning submission to ’’authorities” by the sociological observation
that Hew Testament submission to men in authority is different from
modern submission to an impersonal ’’state”. He says that biblical
texts do not refer to an abstract structure raid hence do not justify a
modern institutional and bureaucratic mechanism. Rather, the New
Testament sees authority as incarnate in a particular person or in several
1persons.
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(it vzas Calvin’s personal belief that ’’aristocracy, or a system com­
pounded of aristocracy and democracy, far excels all others." Yet 
he admitted that the preferability of a particular form of government 
’’admits no simple solution but requires deliberation, since the nature 
of the discussion depends largely upon the circumstances. And if 
you compare the forms of government among themselves apart from circum­
stances, it is not easy to distinguish which one of them excels in . 
usefulness, for they contend on such equal terms" (Calvin, .Institutes, 
Volume 2, p. 1493)• "Divine providence has wisely arranged that 
various countries should be ruled by various kinds of government"
(ibid.,, p. 1494)•)•
Ellul knows that it is an historical fact that Christianity has been 
used to justify the most diverse and contradictory forms of government. 
He points out that on this issue Christians are split today into two 
camps, reflecting not Christian freedom, but the simple political . 
division of the world (False Presence, pp. 133-135)* Behind his 
reasoning is his knowledge that Capitalism and Communism both reflect 
and deny particular Christian“values". To mention only the positive 
side, Capitalism can be said to emphasize the importance of individual 
freedom, but likewise Communism can be said to be sensitive to social 
justice and the cause of the poor (False Presence, p. 132)*
In support of biblical relativity concerning various forms of 
government, Kornelis K. Miskotte writes, "In the sources of the 
Old Testament politeia (the books of Samuel and Kings) the kingship 
is by turns rejected and approved, the theocracy is regarded as 
absolute or charismatic or placed in the Davidic dynasty, and in the 
setting of the ancient East it presents an almost complete relativ- 
ization of the possible forms a state may take" (Miskotte, When the 
Gods are Silent, p. 274)* .
. "Rappels et Reflexions’’, pp. 157~B, 160; False Presence, p, 110.
” Let/ a»,
Ellul draws an interesting practical conclusion .from his 
sociological critique of the traditional interpretation of Rom., 13«
Not only are Christians to regard the modern state as a relative
thing, but they are also to "look behind the abstraction, structure
and institution for who is the truly responsible person and bearer
of authority,” Since an abstract entity like the state is never
responsible, "the first operation of the Christian toward the polit-
2ical structure consists in rediscovering who must answer for authority.” '
Ellul brings his understanding of man as a sinner to bear at
this point. If it is tine that all men are sinners, then this is
also true of political men in their activity as leaders of the state.
The simple belief that all men are sinners should itself lead Christians
to avoid any uncritical sacralizing of the political realm or of
political decisions.
In defence of the limited scope of the state’s claim on man,
Ellul refers to Jesus’ attitude, as evidenced in the passage on . 
rendering unto God the things of God and unto Caesar the things of 
Caesar (Mtt, 22:17-22). He insists that this passage does not teach' 
that Christians are subject to two equally important Kingdoms, but 
that the whole man is claimed by God, though within this loyalty to 
God Christians can be expected to pay governmental taxes.He puts
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’’Let no one say: 'It is that way because that was an age in which 
power was personalized.’ The system of the Polls was still in 
existence, and the Respublica had not disappeared. It is an hist­
orical error to claim that if the Gospel writers spoke only of a 
personal power that was because there were no other kinds. The 
Romans had a fully elaborated abstract doctrine of the State. Hence 
we need to ask ourselves why these passages mention only the persons 
exercising the power, and never the regimes” (False Presence, 
pp. 110-1115 see also p. 67). .
1, ’’Rappels et Reflexions”, p. "We can accept neither the irres­
ponsibility of political men (hiding.themselves behind the organization) 
nor the idea of the ’supreme authority' of the state” (ibid,, p. 159)*
2, Ibid., p. 158.. ,
3, Ibid ♦, p. 159*
4* lbid., p. 165* •
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great emphasis on the fact that the state’s claim on man is small 
(the payment of taxes), whereas Cod’s claim is all-inclusive. "The 
State has the right to claim that, which is necessary for its mainten­
ance but nothing more; if it claims more, one must refuse and. resist
1
it because it oversteps its limits.''
Ellul believes that obedience to the ways of the future Kingdom, 
revealed in Christ, leads to a distancing from the ways of the world. 
Since the political order is of this world, it is to be relativized in 
the name of allegiance to Cod’s future Kingdom.' Me points out that 
New Testament eschatology sees political powers as destined for judg­
ment and annihilation (l Cor. 15:24), a point especially emphasized 
in the book of Revelation
Ellul is consciously dependent on Oscar Cullmann’s exegetical
understanding.^ Cullmann wrote of Jesus’ transcendent relationship
to the political movements of His day:-
It is my thesis that Jesus of Nazareth cannot be simply viewed 
as belonging to any of the principal movements prevailing in his 
land at his time. For his radical obedience to the will of God, 
which is anchored in the most intimate communion with God and in 
the expectation of his kingdom and in his prevailing justice, 
transcends the framework of those groups which supported the 
existing order in Palestine as well as those which opposed it with 
force
1. "Rappels et Reflexions”, p. 166} see also "On the Cultured and 
Social Factors Influencing Church Division”, Ecumenical Review, 4 
(April 1952), p. 274; Cullmann, The State in the New Testament, 
(1963), pp. 32-33, 44; Jesus and the Revolutionaries, pp. 46-7»
2. "Rappels et Reflexions”, p. 167. "Rigorous and total attention
to the Kingdom of God must lead us to minimize the importance of the 
state, which is not a definitive divine .institution, but a possibility 
for life which is given to us in this time. The state which claims 
to be eternal or which claims to establish an eternal .reign trans­
gresses its own reality...” (ibid., p. 167).
3• False Presence, pp. 111-112.
4. "Rappelset Reflexions”, pp, 165-6. .
5. Cu 1 Irnann, Jesus and the Revolutionaries , pp. vi i-vi i i.
.. . ..
’’The fact that Jesus called tax-collectors along with Zealots shows 
1
better than anything else that he stood beyond this opposition.*'
"Jesus’ attitude is to be sought beyond any uncritical absolutizing
of the Roman State, and at the same time beyond any thoroughgoing 
2
political resistance to it.” On the one hand Cullmann points to 
sayings which indicate that Jesus did not respect the rulers of his 
day (Lk. 13:32, 22, 25). On the other hand, he says that Jesus’ 
belief in non-violence (Mtt. 5:39ff») and His advocacy of love for 
enemies separated Him from all political revolutionaries.^
■ - 268 -
Cullmann’s interpretation is based finally on New Testament
eschatology, which is seen in Jesus’ own eschatological understanding
and elsewhere. Christians are to support the state, because it is
necessary in a fallen world. Yet Christians can be critical of the 
5
state, because their allegiance is to a transcendent Kingdom.
Jesus does not regard the State as a final institution to be equated 
somehow with the Kingdom of Cod.. The State belongs to the age 
which still exists even now, but which will definitely vanish as 
soon as the Kingdom of God comes. Accordingly Jesus’ disciples 
have both the right and the duty to judge the State on the basis 
of their knowledge of the corning Kingdom and of the will of God.
As long as this age still continues, however, the existence of 
the State is willed by God— even the existence of the heathen 
Roman State, although it is not of divine nature. Consequently 
it is not the business of the disciple of Jesus to assume the 
initiative in abolishing this State as an institution. Rather he 
is to give the State what it needs for its existence. On the other 
hand, as soon as the State demands more than is necessary to its 
existence, as soon as it demands what is God’s— thus transgressing 
its limits *— the disciple of Jesus is relieved of all obligations 
to this requirement of a totalitarian State. .
1. Cullmann, The State, p. 22; see Mtt. 2:15» 9^1°, 10**3; Mk. 2:15­
2. Cullmann, The State, p. 24.
3. Ibid., p, 21.
4. Cullmann, Jesus and the Revolutionaries, pp. 9"10.
5. Cullmann, Salvation in History, p. 335*
6. Cullmann, The State, p, 43; see also p0 21; Jesus and the Revolut­
ionaries , pp, 12, 45. It was Cullmann who pointed out that the Jewish 
theocratic ideal was expressly rejected in Jesus’ temptation (Cullmann, 
The State, p. 14; Jesus and the Revolutionaries, p. 39)• ”The 
Gospel/..♦
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As we continue to consider Ellul's theology of the state, we 
need to remember that when he expresses Christian beliefs concerning 
the state he is not offering an ethic for the state. What he says
relates to a Christian understanding of the state and has ethical 
implications for Christians only. He is not taking back anything 
he has previously said concerning the duality between the Church and the
world.'
The broader theological context for Ellul’s view of the state
has previously been discussed when we noted that he believes that Christ
is the Lord of the world, who in a hidden way works creatively in the 
2midst of human sin. In his study of II kings" he argued that C-od 
is sovereignly active in man’s political affairs, but that such sover­
eignty does not imply an endorsement of human conduct. Likewise,be 
sees the state as in many ways a sinful reality, but a sinful reality
Gospel knows nothing of that confusion of the Kingdom of God with . 
the State which is characteristic of the theocratic ideal of 
Judaism ” (Cullmann, The State, p. 14)»
1. "We cannot draw from the theological foundation of the State a 
valid ethic for that State. ... The functions of the state can be 
perfectly discerned from a human and sociological point of view, for 
example the necessity to maintain order and tranquillity, to defend 
the collectivity which is entrusted to it, to establish what men of 
its society call justice: but these tasks do not necessarily derive 
from the theological foundation. It could not be a question of 
imposing on a power which is ignorant of Cod a kind of morality or 
law coming from Cod" ("Rappels et Reflexions", pp. 155~6» see also . 
False Presence, p. 199j "Rappels et Reflexions", pp. 154»164).
One might object that Ellul has simply jumped from the Nexv Testament 
situation to the modern one, without due attention to. the "Christendom" 
era. In both of these former cases the secularity of society can 
be pretty much assumed, few Christians being in political leadership 
positions and society being basically hostile to Christianity. In 
the "Christendom" era in the West, society was at least nominally 
Christian, as were most politicians. Ellul, of course, is not 
unaware that Western society was at one time less hostile to Christ­
ianity than in the New Testament period or in modern times. However, 
he does not believe that politics was ever capable of the direct 
infusion of Christian "values".
2. The Politics of God.
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used by Cod for His own purposes.
Ellul and Barth are of one mind at this point. Both men take
seriously the present lordship of Christ over the world, which is
powerfully proclaimed in the primitive Christian hymns,Ellul.
explicitly agrees with Barth, that the sovereignty of God must be
understood as the sovereignty of Christ, The God who rules the world
is the God revealed in Jesus Christ and this God preserves the world 
2for the sake of bringing men into covenant fellowship with Himself.
Though the state is necessarily secular, it has a God~appoanted role
which relates to the salvation of the world. Though the state can
know nothing of its exalted purpose, Christians believe that that 
purpose is the preservation of a relative justice and order which 
allows for civil liberties^ — which in turn permit the Church to
1. Barth, Community, State and Church, pp. 111, 116-118, 156-7* We 
think that Ernst Kasemann is quite correct in arguing that the present 
lordship of Christ is the centre of gravity in Barth’s position, 
rather than the theory of angelic powers standing behind earthly 
authorities (Kasemann, New Testanient Questions, p. 205).
2. ’’Rappels et Reflexions”, p. 188; Theological Foundation of Lavr,
PP* 77-78, 104; see above, pp. 149-152.
3. Reinhold Niebuhr has suggested that the Renaissance and the 
Reformation conceptions of liberty move on different levels, but 
are not as opposed to each other as.the conceptions of life which 
underlie them (Reinhold Niebuhr, The Nature and Destiny of Man,
Vol. 2, p. 152). Interestingly enough, Ellul and Barth in fact 
combine both of these views of freedom. They see true freedom as 
involving the receipt of grace which begins to free man from himself 
and which leads to obedience. This biblical~Reformation understand­
ing; prevents freedom from becoming- self-centred and destructive of 
the rights of others. Like the Renaissance understanding of freedom, 
they are also concerned that human beings be freed from inordinate 
social, political and religious restraints and controls (see ibid., 
p. 152). They very much defend civil liberty and they do so 
because they believe that the Church must have the freedom to preach 
the Gospel in word and deed.
When Ellul affirms that groups within society must have the freedom 
to embody autonomous values (The Folitical Illusion, pp. 2O6ff.)r 
he in effect draws together both the Renaissance and the Reformation 
views on freedom. Because the Church must be free to be obedient 
tc her Lord (Reformation view), she must defend the rights of all 
groups within society to embody their own values (Renaissance view).
He believes that the right which the Church demands for herself must 
be granted to other groups as well.
Ellul’s/...
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1
preach the Gospel, that the world may come to faith in Christ.
Thus Ellul insists that Christians
can remind tho state, that though it be secularised and its officials 
he atheists, it and they are nevertheless servants of the lord. 
Whether they know it or not, whether they like it or not, they are 
servants of the lord — for the good. And they will have to 
render account to the Lord for the way they did their service.2
The Barthian understanding of the purpose of the state is different 
from the traditional Reformation view, in that the state is not seen
to be founded merely on the negative necessity of preserving the sinful
world from destruction. This task is seen to occur in the broader
Ellul’s understanding here is also the expression of his belief $
that man’s response to the Gospel must be free. If the Church 
demanded rights not permitted other groups, she would be trying to .J
force the Gospel upon people, rather than being content to witness.
She would be using the state for coercive propaganda purposes.
1. ’’Rappels et Reflexions”, p. 143; Barth, Community, State and |
Church, p. 147*
2. Violence, pp. 159“18O. Barth writes, ’’The State belongs to the 
order of redemption. ... It is pertinent to add that if we understand 
the State as an institution of the wisdom and patience of God and
do not split up the work of God into various departments but see 
it as an undivided whole, we shall see the State strictly related 
to the mercy of God. It is God’s intention to see that His mercy 
may have scope to unfold on earth. This is in fact the purpose of- 
creation in general, to provide a theat rum gloriae suae (Galvin).
In the sphere of nature there is intended to be an order of the 
grace of God, and this space is guaranteed by the State”(Barth,
Against the Stream, p. 94)* ’’However much human error and human
tyranny may be involved in it, the State is not a product of sin
but one cf the constants of the divine Providence and government of .
the world in its action against human sin: it is therefore an
instrument of divine grace. The civil community shares both a
common origin and a common centre with the Christian community.
it is an order of divine grace inasmuch as in relation to sinful 5?
man as such, in relation to the world that still needs redeeming, \
the grace of God is always the patience of God. ... It serves to i
protect man from the invasion of chaos and therefore to give him
time: time for the preaching of the gospel; time for repentance;
time for faith” (Barth, Community, State and Church, p. 156; see J
also p* 118). "The God from Whom all this concrete authority t
comes ... cannot be understood in a general way as Creator and Ruler,
as was done in the expositions of the Reformers, and also by the |
more recent expositors up to and including Behn and Schlier. When <
the Hew’ Testament speaks of the State, we are, fundamentally, in the
Christo logical sphere; we are on a lower level than when it speaks
of the Church, yet, in true accordance with its statements on the
Church, we are in the same unique Christological sphere” (ibid., p. 120).
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perspective of Cod’s saving purpose for the world.
We can agree with Barth and Ellul at this point. If the true
purpose of Cod is .revealed, .in Christ, then surely God preserves the
world for the sake of the accomplishment of this purpose, It seems
that the only way one could disagree with this argument is hy 
rejecting the belief that Jesus Christ is the true revelation of God, 
for if He is the true revelation of God, He is surely the revelation
of Cod's purpose in the creation of the world.
Having recognized the legitimacy of the Christian understanding
of the state as ruled by Christ and hence related to God’s purpose of
salvation, we now go on to deal with the fact that Ellul claims to 
2
follow Barth and Cullmann in their exegetical understanding of .
Rom. 13:1-7 (and parallel passages) as referring to both earthly 
’’authorities” and angelic or demonic intermediary beings embodied in
the political order.In accepting this line of reasoning Ellul's
1. "Rappels et Reflexions”, p. 143.
2. Violence, pp. 162—5- -
3. "When Paul says that the 'archontes’ crucified Jesus, the Lord
of glory (l Cor. 2:8), he sees at the same time the invisible princes 
of this world and their tangible instruments, Herod and Pilate”
("Rappelset Reflexions”, p. 139j see also p. 154). Ellul says 
that this double reference "explains the ambiguous character of
. the power of the state, agent of order and of disorder, of justice 
and injustice, of protection and of dictatorship. Correlatively, 
this is what explains very clearly the existence of two series of 
judgments on the state in the texts of the New Testament: at the 
same time the order willed by God, to which Christians must obey 
and the Beast of the Abyss, denounced by the Apocalypse” (ibid,, p. 140). 
Arguing that the state does not have the right to declare itself • 
a divine power, he says that this insight is brought out if we .
accept Cullmann’s and Barth's theory about the exousai (ibid,, p. 164; 
see also Barth, Community, State and Church, p. 114ff.; Cullmann,
Christ and Time , pp . 19T-2T0)"’
Just as it seems likely that Ellul accepts this theory because of 
its theological meaningfulness, rather than because technical 
exegetical considerations prove the point, so it seems likely that 
broader considerations of this kind motivated Barth and Cullmann.
Both men were seeking a systematic New Testament doctrine of the 
state which would reconcile Rom. 13 (and parallel passages) with 
Rev. 13 (Barth, Against the Stream, p, 96} Community, State and 
Church, pp. 115-116; Cullmann, The State, pp. 55-6)7 (Similarly,
thought is not without ambiguity* If Rom. 13 is seen as not referring 
to the institutional state, but to individual authorities, then Rom. 1.3 
is, as we have discussed earlier, simply inapplicable to the modern 
state. Conversely, Barth’s and Cullmann's reasoning at this point 
is precisely a way of interpreting Rom. 13 as applicable to the 
modern state. Perhaps the ambiguity in Ellul's position is evidence
that his real interest is less in the technical exegetical question 
of the double reference in Rom, 13 (though he affirms that) and more 
in the general theological necessity of a critical and yet appreciative
attitude toward the state. •
1
Since Rom. 13?3 reads so undialectically, it seems unlikely 
that the word "authorities" really has the double reference which 
Barth, Cullmann and Ellul claim. We may entirely agree that Christians 
ought to have a critical as well as an appreciative attitude toward 
the state. We may even agree that there are biblical ways of defending
this. However, this does not prove that Barth's and Cullmann’s 
exegesis of the word "authorities" is correct. Many scholars are
Ellul follows this theory largely because it makes sense of apparently 
divergent New Testament attitudes toward the ste.te.) ("Rappels ei 
Reflexions", p. 140)» Behind Barth's and Cullmann's quest for a 
systematic New Testament doctrine of the state was the fact that 
the rise of Nazi totalitarianism painfully revealed the inadequacy 
of the Church's traditionally conservative attitude toward "the 
powers that be" (Barth, The Church and the Political Problem of our ' 
Bay, PP • 38-39, 52, 55» Cullmann, Christ and Time, p. 203")", They 
recognized the importance of a critical attitude toward the state, 
as embodied in Rev. 13, and thus sought ways to soften the traditional 
interpretation of Rom. 13. •
Ellul agrees that the emergence of "the antichristian totalitarian 
state in a secularized society" was the existential context from 
which Barth and Cullmann discovered their new interpretation of the 
state ("Rappelset Reflexions", p. 138). He by implication agrees 
that this political development is important and necessitates a re­
thinking of Church tradition concerning the political order. This 
is not to say that a new doctrine of the state can be based on hist­
orical necessity or non-biblical factors. It is to say that histor­
ical developments can sometimes legitimately lead Christians to look 
deeper into the biblical sources, to find aspects of tradition long 
overlooked. .
1, “Rulers are not a terror to good conduct* but to bad." Ernest
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unconvinced of the accuracy of such an exegetical interpretation and
o
even Cullmann admits that his exegetical interpretation can't be proven.*"
Y«re think it unwise to base Christian doctrine on ouch a debatable
exegetical issue, especially when the basic point can be made in other
ways.
Those who argue against Barth’s and Cullmann’s exegesis nay be 
right that in Bonn 13 and parallel texts the state is seen simply as a' 
dyke against sin, a part of God’s benevolent protection against chaos.
The optimistic assumption of 13*3 seems to be based on some such notion. 
Sven if Barth’s and Cullmann*s critics are exegetically correct in their 
rejection of, or agnosticism concerning the double refer-ence in Bom. 13, 
we still think that in a broader perspective Barth, Cullmann and Sllul ’ 
are theologically justified in insisting that the state is morally 
ambiguous. It seems that in fact the demonic has always to some degree 
invaded the state. Surely no state has ever been as morally correct as 
Bom. 13*3 implies.
For good theological reasons, one might entirely agree that Christ­
ians must have this double attitude'toward the state, remaining critical, 
because Christ's lordship is over a rebellious world, being appreciative, 
because God uses the state to permit the preaching of the Gospel.
One can claim even more than this general biblical understanding ’ 
of God's sovereignty to back up this double attitude. If Bom. 13 
seems to favour a one-sidedly appreciative attitude toward the
Best writes of 'a parallel passage (I Pet. 2s13-17)? "The case is not 
considered where Christians may have to be disobedient because the 
law makes demands contrary to Christian faith, e.g. the burning of 
incense to express allegiance to the emperor...” (Ernest Best,
I2fe> p. 115).
1. See Morrison, The Powers That Be; C.K, Barrett, A Cemmentary. on 
the Epistle to the Homans (1957T7~*PP* 243ff. J G.B. Caird, Revelation, 
pp. I62ff. .
2. Cullmann, The State, p. 33 •
state, the broader context of Paul’s theology opens up the possibility 
of a critical response, C.K. Barrett points out that if (according 
to Rom, 13) Christians are said to owe obedience to the state, in 
terms of Paul’s general theology this obedience can be no more 
absolute than the subordination of a wife to her husband (Col, 3:13), 
Just as, on Paul’s terms, a wife could not obey her husband were he 
to order her to commit murder, so Christian obedience to the state 
must not conflict with obedience to God. Also, one can set Rom. 13
(and parallel texts) in polar tension with Rev, 13. Such a procedure
ti 2
is perfectly leg^mate if one believes, as Ellul does, that the Word 
of God can speak amid the conversation provided by diverse texts.
One might argue that both Rom. 13 and Rev. 13 are oversimplifications, 
yet that together they represent the truth.
Reinhold Niebuhr makes a similar move. He tells us that the
Bible contains two attitudes toward the state and that both of these
attitudes must be held in balance if we are to do .justice to the moral 
ambiguity of government. According to the first approach, government 
is an ordinance of God reflecting divine authority. Niebuhr sees
St. Paul as representing this understanding. The other approach he 
sees represented by the Old Testament prophetic tradition. He says
that in the prophetic tradition rulers and judges were seen to be
particularly subject to God’s judgment, because they so often deified
God’s majesty by oppressing the poor.^
These two approaches do justice to the two aspeots of government.
It is a principle of order and its power prevents anarchy; but its 
poi\rer is not identical with divine power. It is wielded from a ' 
partial and particular locus and it cannot achieve the perfect union 
of goodness and power which characterize divine order.4
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1. C.K. Barrett, New Testament Essays, p. 16.
2. T*16 Meaning of the City, pp. xvii-xviii.
3. Reinhold Niebuhr, The Nature and Destiny of Man, Part 2, pp. 269-270
4. Ibid., p, 269.
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Niebuhr opposes those Christians who isolate either of these two
traditions. He considers both traditions to be inadequate when ■ 
taken separately. For example, he criticizes what he takes to be 
Paul’s very undialectical appreciation of the state in Rom, 13. He 
believes that Paul could make his unqualified endorsement of government 
only by mistakenly assuming that government is no peril to virtue but 
only to vice (Rom, 13:3). He recognizes that Paul was writing in a 
particular context, but even so, Niebuhr thinks that history proves 
that the power of government is morally ambiguous. Even the best of
governments imperil good works. He agrees with the later Calvinists
who came to see that government has a covenant with God to establish
justice and in the absence of this fulfilment government must be 
2subjected to criticism.
Whether or not Ellul, Barth and Cullmann are right in all of 
their exegesis concerning the state, they are surely right in their
insistence that Christians should have a double attitude toward the.
state
Ellul tells us that the biblical perspective •
sees the state as ordained by God, in harmony with the divine order, 
and at the same time as the Beast of the Abyss, the Great Babylon; 
as the wielder of the sword to chastise the wicked and to protect 
the good, but also as the source of persecution and in justice.4
1. Re inhold Niebuhr, The Nature and Destiny of Man, Part 2, p. 2'JQ,
2. Ibid., pp. 282-3.
3. Ellul says that a dual attitude toward human law is called for, 
corresponding to the dual attitude Christians should have toward 
the state. On the one hand, Christians should oppose anarchy and 
the violence- of disorder, remembering that God has appropriated 
human law and that Christ is the Lord, of the world. On. the other 
hand., Christians should rigorously test and evaluate the law, in 
order that it may become a true reflection of justice, remembering 
that Christ is the judge of the world and the judge of human law 
(Theological Foundation of Law, p. 100).
4. Violence, p. 2.
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In a general way he is surely right that the demonic does incarnate 
1
itself in historical institutions — including the state. Because
this is so. Christians have a double responsibility, to '’obey and. to 
2resist” government, and these do not contradict each other. Ellul, 
however, puts most of his emphasis on the limitations imposed on the 
state, which flow from.Rev. 13 and similar passages. He believes 
that the omnicompetent state, the state claiming to be able to do
everything, stands condemned by Scripture as the demonic state, the
' 3state to which Christians must offer non-violent resistance-, Our
point here is that such resistance is encouraged by the recognition 
of the ambiguous character of the state. If God accomplishes His 
purposes in and through the state, this does not mean an endorsement
of the idolatrous policies of the state, any more than the belief in 
Christ’s sovereignty means automatic endorsement of the ways of the
world.
Karl Earth's understanding of government is likewise well balanced^ 
and is of value whether or not one accepts his controversial interpret­
ation of Rom. 13. Barth reminds us that one and the same state is
1. Violence, pp. 162-5. "When one approaches phenomena like the 
state, money, sexuality, law from another angle, one arrives at the 
idea that behind these phenomena there is something that cannot be 
reduced to rational terms, something that suggests a deeper exist­
ence and is not altogether explicable on the human level” (ibid., 
p. 163). Referring to demonic powers Ellul writes, "The state 
would be powerless and unimportant were it not for the something- 
mo re-than-it self that resides within it ...” (ibid.,, p. I64).
2. "Rappels et Reflexions”, p. 179*
3. Ibid., pp. 167-168.
4. Some people doubt whether Barth himself retained, this balance in
practice. They think that in practice he simply moved from being 
radically critical of the state to being totally accepting of it 
(Charles C. West, Communism and the Theologians, pp. 25?ff»). 
Insofar.as this is the case, the application of Barth's theology 
of the state may have been all too dependent on his own political 
inclination. ’
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described, in the New Testament as a divine institution (Rom, 13) and
as a beast from the abyss (Rev, 13). He concludes, in a way very
similar to Reihhold Niebuhr, that these are the two poles between
which we are to understand and criticize every state,1 "In fact
we shall never see the state either in its pure form as the ordinance
of God or in its entirely diabolical perversion. These two poles 
2
are the frontiers between which reality moves ,He does insist 
that we must reckon first with Rom. 13 and then with Rev. 13«^ He 
argues that it is not at all inevitable that the state become totally 
demonized, like the state described in Rev. 13- He even argues that 
recent political events have introduced an unnecessary pessimism into 
New Testament exegesis at this point. Yet he believes that every 
state has some kinship with the beast of Rev. 13.^
Barth's understanding encourages a constructively critical
approach to the state. "Christians will never be the easiest citizens
for any government ... But they will never be able to take the line 
5
of sterile negation." He writes, "I am no loyalist and am perfectly 
prepared to slam the table. But the occasion must be quite clear.
Barth does not lose his critical stance toward government, though he 
emphasizes the priority of Rom. 13. He tells us, "Jesus would, in 
actual fact, have been an enemy of the state if he had not dared, 
quite calmly to call King Herod a 'fox' (Lie. 13:32). If the State 
has perverted its God-given authority, it cannot be honored better 1 2 3 4 5 6
1. Barth, Against the Stream, p. 96.
2. Ibid., pp. 96~97»
3. Ibid., p. 96.
4. Barth, Community, State and Church, pp. 118-119.
5. Barth, Against the Stream, p. 82.
6. .ibid., p. 98* •
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than by this criticism which is due it in all circumstances
It is Barth's emphasis on Christ's lordship in and over every state 
which prevents him from adopting a purely negative attitude toward
government.
Like Barth, Cullmann encourages a double attitude toward the 
state, He insists that it is not divine, but that it has a dignity
because it preserves an order willed by God. The Christian is thus
to affiim the importance of the state, but is to be critical of it
insofar as it oversteps its role and makes totalitarian claims.
Cullmann quite rightly argues that though Paul does not deal with the 
situation in which the state makes divine claims, Paul would have
resisted a state which asked man to confess '"Caesar is Lord* and
'Anatham a Je sou s'". He writes of the state, "According as it remains
within its limits or transgresses them, the Christian will describe
it as the servant of God or the instrument of the Devil."'5 Cullmann* s
words in the following statement are in fact an excellent summary of
Ellul's understanding of the Christian attitude toward the statei-
The Church’s task with regard to the State, which is posed for all 
time, is thus clear. First, it must loyally give the State every­
thing necessary to its existence. It has to oppose anarchy and all 
Zealotism within its own ranks. Second, it has to fulfil the 
office of watchman over the State. That means: it must remain 
in principle critical toward every State and be ready to warn it 
against transgression of its legitimate limits. Third, it must 
deny to the State which exceeds its limits whatever such a State 
demands that lies within the province of religio-ideological 
excess; and in its preaching the Church must courageously describe 
this excess as opposition to God.4
We now turn from Ellul's biblical exposition of the relativity • 
of politics to consider his view of the modern meaning of this •
1. Barth, Community, State and Church, p» 139»
2. Cullmann, The State, p. 52.
3. Ibid., p. 66. •
4. Ibid., p. 69.
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Christian belief and attitude, We are still dealing with the 
Christian response to politization, but the emphasis is now less on 
the exegetical basis and more on modern application*
Modern politization leads to a confidence that the centralized
state can provide "solutions” to life’s most important problems. In
the light of the biblical relativizing of the political order, Ellul 
challenges this very assumption. He insists that genuine political 
problems are by definition incapable of solution; at most, all that
1
can be attained is a tolerable balance between conflicting claims.
He criticizes the myth of "solutions" not only because he believes it
is false, but also because he thinks that it eliminates "from our
conscience the sense of the relative, i.e., limited nature of all true 
2
political effort." He admits that "politics can solve administrative 
problems, problems concerning the material development of a city, or 
general problems of economic organization — which is a considerable 
accomplishment.”^ He thinks that politics absolutely cannot deal 
with man’s personal problems, such as the issue of good and evil, 
nor can it determine the meaning of life, nor the responsibilities
of freedom.He thinks that individuals often abandon direct
political responsibility because they expect the state to offer
“solutions" for problems that they themselves should be attempting 
5
to solve.
'Ellul argues that political choice is generally a merely human 
issue and that the Christian revelation concerning politics does not 
supply political answers, but treats the whole area as relative and
1. The Political Illusion, p. 190? “Rappe.B et Reflexions”, p. 173. 
2• The Political Illusion, p. 190. *
3. Ibid., p. 186.
Ibid., p. 186.
5. Ibid., PP. 187-190,
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secondary* Since Christians are to regard politics as a problem 
area, they are not to overestimate the importance of political decisions, 
nor to idealize political regimes. Very typically he writes that
"All points of view have their motives of justice and their burdens 
of injustice."" He thinks that guilt is generally involved no matter 
what political decision is taken."' Because he understands politics
1. False Presence, p* 150.
2. Ibid* t p. 151» Ellul shares with Reinhold Niebuhr and P.J. Leen- 
hardt the belief that politics is a relative and problematical area. 
(He cites his agreement with Leenhardt £’’Rappels et Reflexions",
p. 149] and refers to Niebuhr’s Moral Man and Iromoral Socie ty 
ETo Wi 11 and To Do , p. 278j.) He writes, "Democratic behavior 
presupposes that a man knows that opinions are unstable, that a pure 
system cannot be attained, that justice cannot be had in politics, 
and that he therefore admits the relatively limited scope of all 
political debate. To admit the relativity will prevent people 
from becoming agitated to the point of delirium as they become 
nowadays" (The Political Illusion, pp. 202-203). In a similar vein 
Reinhold Niebuhr wi'ote, "Democracy is a method of finding proximate 
solutions for insoluble problems" (Reinhold Niebuhr, The Children 
of Light andthe Children of Darkness, p. 118).
Ellul offers a corrective to Barth's "crisis" thought concerning 
political reality (see Barth, Against the Stream, pp. 152~4j Table 
Talk, p. 82). By Barth's crisis thought we mean his tendency to 
oversimplify political decision-making by assuming that God’s will 
is usually identifiable with one side of complex political questions, 
his tendency to see relative political decisions as representing 
ultimate decisions of faith, (He does qualify slightly his own 
crisis thought, by defending the Church's right to remain silent 
if that seems to be God’s will) (Barth, Against the Stream, 
pp. 92, 114)* Ellul's difference-is in part that he stresses to a 
far greater degree the difficulty involved in gaining full and acc­
urate information on which to make political decisions (A Critique, 
p, 105). In Propaganda he describes the near impossibility of 
attaining accurate information on social and politica.1 matters.
(The newspapers are not the accurate source of information-which 
Barth assumed'.) What makes political decisions so ambiguous is in 
part the fact that technical questions must always be thought through 
and the availability of information, its adequacy and the difficulty 
of interpreting it are always problematical factors.
Ellul differs from Barth in stressing to a greater degree the 
autonomous nature of political reality. (He speaks of a "dual moral­
ity" and Barth, still somewhat in the "Social Gospel" tradition, 
speaks of an "analogy of faith”), Ellul simply does not believe 
that any political choices offer Christian alternatives and hence he 
thinks that Christians should be very reluctant to identify God's 
will with one side of a highly debatable political issue (as did 
Barth concerning German re-armament).
3. "The only thing that counts in the end is the suffering of the 
people involved in these conflicts. That suffering is strikingly 
shared/...
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as a relative area, he insists that Christians can never take part in
a "final struggle", nor accept the demand, for a sacrifice of life,
"For example, we never have the right to participate in meetings or 
movements which ask the execution or the massacre of the worst poli­
tical enemies, because nothing decisive or final is ever involved, 
or gained, or risked in politics.” . •
In keeping with his view’ of the relativity of politics and its 
inability to offer solutions, Ellul believes that Christians ought 
to seek to help calm political passions and introduce cool rationality
into heated political controversy. As a part of this task he thinks
that they ought to help people on differing sides of political, issues 
to understand one another,* Such a mediatorial role, of course, 
would be impossible for those whose ultimate commitment is to a part­
icular political programme or ideology. The "otherness" of the
Church in relationship to all political options thus points to a unique
political contribution which the Church alone can make.
Even vfithin the Church’s o-wn common life she can and should live
out her understanding of the relativity of politics by being a forum 
for open, free and' relaxed political discussion.Ellul thinks that
shared on all sides. I cannot resign myself to the humiliation, the 
subjugation and the economic misery of the Muslims under French domin­
ation, but neither can 1 resign myself to the massacre of Europeans, 
Jews and harkis, or to their being dispossessed of their goods and 
torn from what was for them a fatherland" (False Presence, p, 151)*
He does not mean to imply that there are not important differences 
of degree between various political alternatives. He only insists 
that all such differences are only relative and hence politics should 
not be turned into an ultimate value (ibid., p. 152). On both of . 
these points Ellul's thought is in line with Reinhold Niebuhr’s.
1. Ibid., p. 150. Ellul differs from Reinhold Niebuhr in using the 
relativity of politics to invalidate Christian participation in 
violence. The deeper reason for the difference turns on the issue 
of Christian perfectionism.
2. Ibid., pp. 97-3, 192-3.
3» The Politics of God, p. 13*
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the Church should seldom take public stands on political issues, though 
individual Christians should he free to do so, if they do not identify 
their opinions with Christian truth. However, members of the Church 
can and should discuss political issues (rather than preaching on 
them). Christians can feel free to do so •— if it is recognized 
that the stakes are not high and that Christians of equal commitment 
to Christ may disagree widely on particular political issues.
Because of his Christocentric focus, Ellul believes that Christ­
ians have a unity of faith, in spite of their differences on many
human issues, politics included. Instead of dividing the Church
by a call to political orthodoxy of one sort or another, he believes
that Christians should recognize that what they have in common (their
faith in Christ) is all-important. This being so, Christians ought 
2
not to worry about political diversity among themselves.
This means, first of all, that whenever we join a party we should 
always be spiritually and humanly closer, more bound, more friendly, 
more trusting and more open with respect to our brothers in the 
Church, even if they be sometimes of a different opinion politically, 
than vie are with respect to our fellow party-members. Reconcil­
iation does not mean reuniting with those who have the same opinions 
we have.3
Since Christians share a common loyalty to Christ, they should
not be defensive or provincial about the viewpoints of the political
groups to which they belongs Instead, they should provide a
1. -’The Church can make no valid judgment in politics, ... she can 
only open an area of questioning. Apart from the most rare and 
exceptional instances, she cannot take sides” (False Presence,
pp. 120-1; see below, p. 317» n* -0 • Ellul does not here absolutely 
prohibit the Church from taking stands on political issues; he 
simply thinks that it should not do so frequently, precisely because 
it is seldom so obvious that a particular political decision is 
unequivocably preferable from the Christian perspective.
2. Ibid., p« 190.
3’ 3bid., pp. 190-1.
4. One reason why Christians should introduce understanding among 
those of diverse political views is because Christians are called 
to love their enemies and to introduce this transcendent perspective. 
"To/... •
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critical presence. In Ellul's view it is less important whether a
Christian is a Hepublican or a Democrat, a Tory or a Socialist, and
more important that he offer a critical presence in the group to which
he belongs. This applies also to the membership of Christians in
unions, corporations, universities, etc, By being critically present,
by pointing out alternative views on particular issues, Christians 
2provide a reconciling presence in the world. Ellul admits that it is
"To be reconciled is well and good, but with whom, if not with the 
person who is our enemy? The man of the right has no problem being 
reconciled with the army, nor the man of the left with the FLN. The 
capitalist has no trouble reconciling himself with the bourgeoisie, 
nor the union leader with the working rnan, but that is not reconcil­
iation’," (False Presence, pp. 197~8)»
1. "It would be c». a dialogue within each group through the medium 
of Christians in each of the opposing groups, who are deeply united 
among themselves because they are first of all in the Church" (ibid,, 
pp. 196-7). Ellul is not saying that political differences are 
simply matters of no importance. For example, he believes that 
from a human perspective socialism is preferable to capitalism.
Hox^ever, he is not prepared to preach his human preference as true 
Christian doctrine. He recognises that aspects of socialism are 
offensive to Christianity and that legitimate Christian arguments 
can be used in support of other forms of government. He writes,
"I absolutely do not say that capitalism is better than socialism, .
1 firmly believe the contrary. i absolutely do not say that 
defense of the poor through socialist movements is wrong. 1 firin 1 y
believe the contrary. I want only to show what a mistake it is to 
confuse Christianity and socialism; they are not the same. A 
while ago, people made the monumental error of saying that democracy, 
liberalism, competitive capitalism were all expressions of Christian­
ity. Today they make the same monumental error for the benefit of 
socialism" (Violence, p. 32; see also p. 68).
2. False Presence, pp. 195~6; Violence, pp. 45~6» 142. "It is good • 
that there should be Christians active in the various parties, even
the communist party or the OAS if need be, since that can be an occasion 
for demonstrating to the world that faith in the sarnie Saviour infin­
itely transcends those differences, and that Christians of opposite 
parties, or of enemy nations, are first and foremost brothers in 
Christ and completely understand one another spiritually and humanly.
If such is not the case, then involvement in a party has nothing to 
do with the ministry of reconoiliation. You cannot pretend to 
reconcile others if you are not reconciled among yourselves" (False 
Presence, p. 191). "We are not going to act like ‘true believers,’ 
absolutizing the doctrines of our party or of our business. On the 
contrary, we shall try within our group to be interpreters for others. 
Just as at the personal level we have to take into account the inter­
ests of others, so likewise we should try to give those in our own 
group an insight into the point of view of others. ... Thus it will 
not be a matter of reinforcing our party positions, of supplying new 
arguments/.•»
285
difficult to carry out this task and that Christians will he accused
1 This, however, should not distract them fromof being traitors,
arguments and new ways to win. It will rather he a matter of .i
humanizing situations, of playing the role of advocates for the ■ 
opposition, of being interpreters for all” (False Presence, p. 196).
Ellul’s position relates to his convictions about the concrete and §
flexible nature of obedience to God. He writes, "There are no Christ- &
ian political and social principles, defined in an abstract way” (fxnsnce 
of the Kingdom., p. 53)« "Thus it is not necessary to be loyal to an 
idea, to a doctrine, to a political movement. What is called
’ fidelity’ in the language of the world is too often only habit or 4
obstinacy. The Christian may belong to the Right or to the Left, 
he may be a Liberal or a Socialist, according to the times in which 
he lives, and according as the position of the one or the other seems 
to him more in harmony with the will of God at that particular time. -4
These attitudes are contradictory, it is true, from a human point of 
view, but their unity consists in the search for the coming Kingdom" a
(ibid., p. 54).
Barth also had an understanding of Christian political involvement 
as extremely flexible (likewise based on his belief in the living God).
(Of course, his assumption about the Church herself taking political 
stands is different.) He writes, "The Word of God is not tied to’any 
political system, old or new. It justifies and judges all of them.
It passes through, because it is superior to, all political change.
It is neither old nor new, but eternal. The Christian Church must 
be guided by the Word of God and by it alone. ... It must not forget 
for an instant that all political systems, right and left alike, are 
the work of men. ... It must not sell this birthright for any conserv­
ative or revolutionary mess of pottage" (Barth, Against the Stream, 
pp, 86-7)• "Only in the rarest cases will its {/the Church'sj posit-' 
ion be the same today as it was fifty or even ten years ago ... It ' 
cannot, have a 'program' because it has a living Xaster whom it has to 
serve in the most varied circumstances and situations ... Christian 
politics are always bound to seem strange, incalculable and surprising 
in the eyes of the world — otherwise they would not be Christian"
(ibid., pp. 9"!”2). "The Church must not concern itself eternally ,,f
with various 'isms’ and systems, but with historical realities as .-f.
seen in the light of the ’Word of God and of the Faith. (.It is debat- j
able whether Barth's words here are consistent with his later use of- 
the "analogy of faith" to defend the seemingly timeless preferability 
of democratic socialism.^ Its obligations lie ... towards its 
living Lord. Therefore, the Church never thinks, speaks or acts 'on 
principle’ . Rather it judges spiritually and by individual cases.. 4
For that reason it rejects every attempt to systematise political 
history and its own part in that history. Therefore, it preserves 
the freedom to judge each new event afresh. If yesterday it trav- 
elled along one path, it is not bound to keep to the same path today.
If yesterday it spoke from its position of responsibility, then today 
it should he silent if in this position it considers silence to be the 
better course" (ibid., p. 114)- Thomas C. Oden’s statement about 4?
Barth's thought applies to Ellul's as well. "In Barth we have a M
strongly historical conception of Christian political action, one 
which is concretely responsive to occurring history instead of some /
overarching law or political principle"(Thomas C. Oden, The Promise 
of Barth, p. 33; see above, p. 102 and fn.). §
1. False Presence, p. /J
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their course, since the Christian life by definition involves suffering. 
In keeping with what we have described as Ellul’s perfectionism,
he says that one specific aspect of the Christian’s critical presence 
in various groups should be his insistence on the importance of the
means used. Another specific feature of the Christian’s critical
presence should be his willingness to witness to the ties which he has 
' 2with fellow Christians, even if they be political opponents.
One may wonder whether Ellul has not involved himself in a contra­
diction. Having stressed the point that Christian participation in 
politics is not imperative, he goes on to speak of a unique task for 
Christians within diverse political groupings. Actually, he has not 
contradicted himself here. Though the recommendations he has just 
given apply to Christians within such groups, he is not saying that all 
Christians must be within political groups. All he is saying is that
if Christians do think that they as individuals should be. politically 
active, their Christianity should have the effect of freeing them from 
sacralizing the ideas of the political groups to which they belong.^
1. "We should make known our objections of conscience against methods 
of aggressiveness which appeal to hate and contempt, and which pass 
summary and inaccurate judgments; or again, against methods of bribery 
and blackmail, against the use of pressure by powerful interests, etc. 
That also constitutes part of our ministry of reconciliation”
(False Presence, p. 197).
2. Ibid,, p. 191.
3. Ellul denies that Christians must be involved in political affairs 
("Rappels et Reflexions”, p. 161"), but admits that they may be involved, 
if they are duly aware of the dangers involved (False Presence, •
pp. 102, 112, 114, 176-177). "I 80 not agree that the individual 
cannot fulfill himself except by political endeavor or that politics 
expresses his personality, i.e., that man does not become himself 
except by political commitment, that not to participate in politics 
is to be a person without substance. Man may eventually participate 
in politics, but on condition that he knows exactly what he is doing.
If a man does not maintain a distance — an objectivity — his very 
person will he absorbed by politics and dissolved in the sphere of 
political autonomy" (The Folitioal Illusion, p. 95)• "But when we 
speak of commitment on behalf of mem, we are not thinking necessarily 
of political involvement, or of social reform, or of, revolution.
That/...
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Another implication of Ellul’s relativizing of the political
order is that he thinks that Christians must not support nationalism,
the glorification of the nation as sacred./ He criticizes ’’the frantic
trembling" exhibited when ’’the political sacrament —• the flag, the 
2
chief, the slogan — comes near us."' He bemoans the fact that most
Christians seem to feel more bound to their nation than to the Church.
As evidence of this nationalism, he refers to the fact that Christians
will make sacrifices for the state which they will not make for the
•
Church i
V/ho would agree to pay the Church a subscription equal to what he 
pays in taxes? Who would agree to devote a year, two years, or 
three years of his life to the service of Christ, as he does to 
his term in the Army? But, even if we do not go as far as that, 
we find church members rubbing along quite happily with the cleavage 
in the Body of Christ; we write even on the highest official level, 
"Reformed Church of France," whereas the Church may in fact be in 
France, but can only be of Jesus Christ.4 ••
That is not impossible, but in spite of our current obsession with 
politics and social justice, it is not the most important feature.
As a by-product, on occasion, for this or that person, that path is 
good, but it is not the truth and the life. To the contrary, it is 
sometimes falsehood and death" (Prayer, p. 165). He thinks that 
Christian participation in politics should be an act of freedom, with 
the genuine possibility of not participating. He writes, "We are 
not in politics. It is there to get into, to lend ourselves to, as 
a pure act of will, as an outright decision, with the freedom not to do 
so or to do so, with a will born of independent thinking, with the 
concern to do something special in it, instead of merging with the 
crowd, with 'the people’" (False Presence, p. 183).
Ellul is quite aware that many people today claim to be politically 
neutral, when in fact they are supporters of the status quo’. He • 
agrees with what a humorist said of the apoliticism of the Fifth 
Republics '"According to the government, an association or a group 
is apolitical when it actively pursues the government’s policies’"
(The Political Illusion, p. 201).
1 * False Presence, p. 204; A Critique, pp. 220-225; "Les Facteurs 
Non Thbologiques de Division entre les Eglises de France" (September- 
October 1952), Foi et Vie, p. 418*
2. ‘IHe Political Illusion, p. 20.
3* "On the Cultural and Social Factors", p. 274«
4* P* 274*
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He believes that Christians must learn
that they belong to Christ before their country, that everything is 
God's and must be rendered unto Him, that only after this total 
gift has been made have they the right to render anything to Caesar. 
They must learn that a French Christian is, because he is a Christian 
first and foremost, more closely linked to a German Christian than 
to a French non-Christian. It is absolutely vital t<^ create in 
this way an international Christian attitude of mind.
Though Ellul sees the importance of the political order and thus is no
anarchist, he entirely opposes the combining of a Caesar worship with 
2evangelical Christianity, .
Because Ellul relativizes the state, he thinks that the only 
biblically acceptable form of the state is the limited or secular 
state. (Of course, he is under no illusion that the state will 
naturally be a secular one. He believes that it is one of the Church’s 
tasks to ensure that it understands itself in this ivay.) First, the 
secular state is independent of the Church, neither the Church's 
slave, nor seeking to enslave the ChurchP Secondly, the secular
state recognizes its own incompetence to judge theological truth.
It is not to proclaim the Church's Gospel nor to give the Church a 
favourable position.^ He writes
1. "On the Cultural and Social Factors", p. 274*
2. Robert A. Nisbet quite correctly writes that Ellul recognizes that 
in our world', human beings could not fend for themselves long "without 
a fairly substantial degree of political organization. ... It is not 
reform, much less a kind of anarchist revolution, that Ellul seeks.
It is, if I interpret him correctly, a withholding of some vital part 
of one's self from the presently consuming logic and rhetoric of 
politics" (Robert A. Nisbet, "The Grand Illusion", Commentary $0,
No. 2 (August 1970), p. 42). .
3. "Rappels et Reflexions", pp, 169-17O* "The Church must not attempt 
to establish herself by the state's support nor to use the state to 
spread the Gospel, nor use^state's force, nor live from the state's 
financial assistance, nor attempt to 'christianize' the state, nor 
try to reconcile the work of the church and state, nor try to 
derive from the state a privileged position, with reference to other 
spiritual movements" (ibid,, p. 170).
4. Ellul thinks that it is a good thing that the Church is no longer 
in a position to run society; he regards the Constantinian approach 
as one bought at the price of the Church's loss of her autonomy in 
relationship/•.•
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If we must not impose our Christian truth on it, we must at the 
some time refuse that it choose another truth. The state’s order 
is not that of truth. It is not instituted by God in order to 
decide what is the truth. It must therefore hold an equal balance 
between all the tendencies and orientations.
Thirdly, it is not enough that the state not choose one truth over 
p
another. It must also not proclaim itself as the true religion.'
The secular state refrains from creating a secular religion of the
state. Ellul insists that Christ's defeat of the exousiai means that 
the authority of the state is despoiled of its religious character.^
A state stripped of ideological pretence, a state which does not claim 
to be all-powerful, is a state which is content "to administer the 
things of man", a secular state.
relationship to the state (False Presence, p. 8). He believes that 
it was an effect of the Reformation that the synthesis between the 
Church and the world was broken down (Protestantisme Fran^ais, p. 147)• 
He says that Calvin believed that the state was not to interfere in 
the Church’s affairs. In this sense Calvin saw the state as limited 
and separated from the Church ("Rappels et Reflexions", pp. 133-4)»
1. Ibid., p. 171.
2. Ibid., pp. 172-3; False Presence, p, 200.
3. "Rappels et Reflexions", p. 172.
4. Ibid., p. 173* • Ellul's advocacy of a secular society is very 
similar to D.L. Munby’s position. Both men agree that the state 
should remain neutral with reference to particular religions, should 
not commit itself to a particular theological view of the world, 
should accept a pluralism of behaviour and should be a tolerant 
society (D.I.-.Munby, The Idea of a Secular Society end its Significance 
for Christians (196*377” PP <• 9~35)* In words reflective of Ellul’s 
own recognition of the duality between the Church and the world,
Munby writes, "It is one thing to hold a high view of Christian 
marriage; it is another to insist that this should be the law of the 
land" (ibid., p. 22). Of the secular society he writes in words 
reminiscent of Ellul’s criticism of the omnicompetent state: "The 
liberal secular society, by contrast with most previous societies, 
does not set itself an overall aim, other than that of assisting as ’ 
fully as possible the actual aims of its members, and making these * 
as concordant with each other as possible" (ibid., p. 27)• Behind 
his position, as behind Ellul’s, is a respect for the autonomy of 
various groups in society: - "The positive ideals that lie behind
the idea of a secular society are firstly a deep respect for the 
individual man and the small group of which society is made up" (ibid., 
P» 33). We think that a significant difference between the two men 
is that Munby seems to think that modern society naturally tends 
toward the ideal just enunciated; Ellul thinks that modern society 
tends/...
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Ellul believes that because the state's natural tendency is to 
sacralize itself (a tendency corresponding- to the exousiai' s effort 
to resume authority), the Church must seek to limit this tendency 
by providing true dialogue* Dialogue does not mean that the Church
2
always calls the state into question, but that the Church insists 
that she has something unique to say to the world which.the world 
cannot say to itself.3 The Church's social relevance relates to 
her duty to manifest an otherness, which the state itself needs for 
the sake of preserving its own relative character^
We have saved one statement until la,st, because we believe that 
it represents the essence of Ellul’s view concerning the relativity of 
the political order. What he says here is based in the final analysis
on the Christian relativizing of all things human. He writes:—
It is up to Christians to relativize social, political and economic 
activities, by the use of a sense of humor, for example. They 
should avoid the language of exaggeration, of melodrama, of excess­
ive indignation, approaches found so frequently in all the political 
articles by Christians. Rather it is a matter, in great friendlin­
ess toward the people who are implicated in these activities, of
tends to sacralize itself and must be brought back to the above 
ideal through the witness of autonomous groups reminding.the state 
of its relativity.
1. "Rappels et Reflexions", p. 174» '
2. "This dialogue which conveys the warning can both turn to the approv­
al of the state’s work (which is not at all excluded) and to direct 
attack when the state makes itself God” (ibid., p. 178),
3. Ibid., p. 175. "This dialogue, on the other hand, is not a relation 
of conflict nor of collaboration: it is a relation of tension, 
because the two partners are truly different ... The State acts by
the sword, force, violence; the church speaks of love and justice. 
Understand well that this tension can be truly dialectical and will 
be a fruitful source of political action itself. ... There is not 
any true political life outside of this tension, because it is that 
which can preserve the state from closing in on itself” (ibid., 
p. 176; False Presence, p. 179)*
4. "Rappels et Reflexions", p. 174» He is not saying that the Church
is the only limiting factor helping the state to recognize its 
relativity (ibid., p. 174) • In a general way he can speak of the 
formation of groups with autonomous values, which help to accomplish 
this same goal (The Political Illusion, pp, 206ff.; see below, pp. 
310-315). ..........
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helping them understand that the life is worth more than food and 
the body than clothing, and that in the end all political, economic 
or social forms, all institutions, all patriotic activity, all 
resistance movements, all conquests, all liberations, all socio­
logical structures and all businesses are mere clothing. In the 
last analysis they never attain to life.l
Had Ellul done nothing more than to argue in favour of the relat­
ivity of politics, his contribution to Christian thinking about politics 
would still be immense. He is surely correct that there is a great 
deal of politicized thinking and action in the world, and certainly this 
is having unfortunate effects on the Church. Whether or not the
Church is politicized to the degree that he imagines, it is no doubt
true that there is much misguided enthusiasm for politics in the Church
which borders on the sacralizing of political decisions and political
affairs in general. He has put his finger on one area where the world
has invaded and influenced the Church to the detriment of her own faith.
He is surely right that except in rare cases, political decisions are
not of such a nature as to demand a call for an absolute either-or
decision of faith. Secular political issues seldom confront Christians
with alternatives which can be identified simply with Christian truth.
Even which side is preferable from a Christian perspective is usually
a highly debatable matter, since there are often legitimate Christian 
2considerations both represented and denied on various sides.
1. False Presence, pp, 210-211,
2. When one thinks in terms of general ideas or values, it is easier 
for Christians to reach agreement. For example, whether or not . 
Christians should favour racial integration is a doctrinal issue.
The normative answer can be determined on the basis of exegetical and 
theological considerations. Though unfortunately it must be 
admitted that many Christians have racist attitudes, we think that 
there are convincing arguments which show that such attitudes are 
inconsistent with faith in Christ. When one moves from the consid­
eration of general values and ideas, to an assessment of available 
political options, the discussion becomes much more relative. v
Though particular legislation or particular candidates may seem to 
favour racial justice to a greater or lesser degree than othei* 
positions or candidates, this is seldom capable of Christian proof.
Of course, explicitly racist policies and politicians can and should 
be/...
Even if the political opinions of Christians are not changed, 
what Ellul says could have the. effect of teaching Christians of diverse 
political viewpoints to discuss the issues in a spirit of love and 
understanding. His thought cc-uld have the effect of helping to lower 
the temperature of much Christian political discussion, and could encou­
rage Christians of diverse political persuasions to be more careful
about distinguishing between their own relative human opinions, and 
1
what can and must be preached as pure doctrine. If the dividing
line between human opinion and Christian belief sometimes cannot be
defined with absolute certainty, it nevertheless is important to attempt 
to see the distinction and to attempt to apply it, lest the Christian
faith be tossed to and fro by every change of political opinion.
The Autonomous Nature of Politics and a Christian Response ••
As a consistent aspect of his understanding of the duality between
the Church and the world, Ellul stresses the fact that politics is
autonomous, having no connection with the way of life which flows from
faith in Christ. He even extends his argument by saying that politics,
has no relationship even to human values. (With this extension of his 
2argument we think he has overstated his case.)
As we turn to examine Ellul’s analysis of the autonomous nature
of politics, we notice that his convictions relate to his study of the
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be rejected, but this only serves to narrow the field of choice, It 
does not in most cases render an unequivocal Christian decision.
(The issue becomes even more complicated when legitimate goals of one 
sort collide with legitimate goals of another and when these collide 
at the level of concrete politics,! alternatives. Ellul thinks 
political issues are of this nature, thus incapable of true ’’solution”.)
1. Paul drew such a distinction, He wrote, ’’Now concerning the 
unmarried, I have no command of the Lord, but I give my opinion ...”
(I Cor. 7:25). Some cf us are quite happy that Paul had the wisdom 
to recognise the relativity of his view at this point*, ♦
2. Ellul elsewhere contradicts this point by saying that politics dees 
have to do with human morality (see below, pp. 302 et seq., n. 4).
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Old Testament, II Kings in particular. Of II Kings he writes, ”In 
fact these texts show the relativity of politics, which is the sphere 
of the greatest affirmation of man’s autonomy, of his revolt, of his 
pretentious attempt to play the role of God,” If ever a state were 
capable of operating on the basis of theologica,! and religious ideals,
it would have been the theocratic state of Israel in the Old Testa­
ment, Yet Ellul’s exegetical study uncovers the fact that Israel’s 
kings made their decisions on the basis of human reasoning and prudence. 
He thinks that what the Old Testament reveals about politics is realism
not idealism, The fact that God was able to accomplish His purposes
in and through various political dealings, based on human prudence, 
should not be confused with the notion that high ideals (even high 
human ideals) were applied to the political order. If the state in 
the Old Testament were in the final analysis autonomous, this is true
even more of the modern ’’secular” state. On the basis of such
reasoning he reaches the conclusion that "The Church never has to .
formulate a commandment of God in relation to political power, which
in principle cannot recognize God as the true God. It has never to -
say to the state: This must be done.”
Prom his sociological analysis of modern political reality, he
finds verification for his biblical argument. Not only is modern 
politics seen to be autonomous in the face of Christian "values”, ' 
but also in relationship to human values as well.^
1. The Politics of God , p. 14; see also p. 146; False Presence,
p. 180. ~ ”
2. The Politics of God , pp • 65-66,
3. Ibid., p, 85; see also Violence, p. 159*
4. The Political Illusion, pp. 86-7• In Ellul’s earlier thought he 
did not see the state as so entirely devoid of human values (.Thg,o~* 
logical Foundation of Law, pp. 123-124, 126). His social and 
political cynicism has increased over the years>
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Related to Ellul’s argument that modern politics is divorced from
even, human values, is his belief that what legitimizes a state in the 
eyes of other states is not its morality, but its capacity to stay 
in power/ Characteristically he writes, ’“The modern state is a
power group of institutional character seeking to monopolize force
. 2
within the limits of a territory
He also thinks that politics today has to do only with the values 
of efficiency:-’
I only maintain that whatever our intentions — our democratic 
morality, our liberal egalitarian humanism, our hopes for socialism, 
as a positive value — may have been in the nineteenth century, 
for our time (said for the foreseeable future) we have developed a 
mechanism whereby politics operates independently of any such values.”1^
1, The Political Illusion, p. 73.
2, Ibid,, p. 72; see below, pp. 342-3, for a more thorough discussion 
of this point. Ellul, of course, recognizes that a degree of 
consent is necessary for a government to stay in power. He believes, 
however, that this consent is more a function of governmental prop­
aganda than the expression of free human choice (see below, p. JO/). 
Such propaganda would for him fall under the category of force. .
One might disagree that man is victimized by propaganda to the 
extent he imagines.
3« Ibid., p. 70. It may be true that politics is to a large extent 
incapable of realizing high ideals. Still, it seems that politics 
is no more an autonomous reality than is the technological society.
In both cases Ellul thinks of "efficiency" as totally divorced from 
values, when in fact efficiency usually seems to be in the service of 
some human value, though from the Christian perspective the value may 
still warrant criticism (see The Technological Society, pp. 133ff.).
4« The Political Illusion, pp. 70-71. "The situation as found in 
dictatorships and communism has become the normal situation, and ...’ 
we must reflect on the political problem in relation to what happens 
there, and not on the basis of some ideal democracy that has no 
chance whatever of asserting itself. We already know well that the 
mores of the totalitarian states have gained footholds in the democ­
racies. Police regimes, internment camps, an uncontrolled, all­
powerful administration, systematic elimination of dissenting opinions 
and minorities are some of the signs ... If we examine the relation­
ships among political men or political groups in a democracy, we see 
very quickly that these are relationships determined by force, black­
mail, pressure, deals, prestige, careers, complicity— but that there 
is no moral rule whatsoever, no supremacy of values. Even in groups 
that are strongly ideological — I am thinking here of groups such, 
as the intellectual Left — relations are often sordid and. 
strikingly manifest this autonomy of the course of political events, 
even though in their public declarations these groups present 
themselves/...
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He insists that even if an individual does a political act for a
moral reason, the act enters the sphere of autonomous political reality
and takes on a political, rather than a moral meaning. "My mental
reservations and my personal motives will remain only v/ith me and 
2have no effect in the world of my political act.."’ He concludes 
that if men are to engage in political activity, they must weigh the 
probable consequences of political acts, rather than thinking in terms
of their own moral intentionsHe also concludes that an individual
cannot fully realize himself in politics:-
The autonomy of the political machinery not only does net permit 
individual acts to influence its operation, but individual acts 
and motives become completely submerged within it with the result 
that the individual, as such, simply ceases to be.4
For Christians in the idealistic tradition, it comes as a real 
shock that Ellul honestly believes that the state does a better job" 
of governing if it does so on the basis of human realism. He believes
that the effort to apply Christian values to the state has had
themselves as defenders of virtue, humanism, and morality. It must 
be understood that the vocabulary of moral and non-material values' 
is retained even in the most autonomous type of politics " (The 
Political Illusion, pp. 89-90).
1. Ibid., pp. 92-3.
2. Ibid., p. 92.
3. Ibid., p. 94- Of Ellul's position Christopher Lasch writes, "The
’moral revolution' does not consist of investing contemporary .
politics with passionate moralism. The only moral attitude toward 
politics, according to Ellul, is one of severe realism — one that 
tries to assess the probable consequences of political actions. 
Moralism interferes with this by contributing to the escalation of 
rhetoric; in the end, it merely provides additional fuel for the 
propaganda machine" (Lasch et al., Fatallagete, p. 24). Even if 
politics does have to do with the consideration of consequences, are 
not these consequences to be examined with human morality in view?
If this is the case, how can politics be said to be autonomous with 
reference to human morality? Ellul's realism seems here to border 
on cynicism. We can still agree,\however, that politics is largely 
autonomous with reference to Christian "values" and hence that 
political choices seldom offer Christian alternatives. Our criticism 
is thus only of one aspect of Ellul's understanding of political 
autonomy.
4* I’He Political Illusion, p. 95*
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disastrous consequences, blinding Christians to the actual reality of 
the state, and leading particular states to worldly imprudence, 
giving their enemies unfair advantage. Along lines very similar to 
Re inhold Niebuhr in Moral Nan and Immoral Society,^ Ellul writes the 
following,which we quote at length because the statement summarizes
his view so wells- •
1, ’’The gravest political errors, which have caused most of the blood­
shed and disorders in the last half-century, were committed by those 
who, denying the regrettable, detestable, yet irrefutable fact that 
politics in our day is autonomous, acted as thoug-h it was not, as 
though it was subject to definite rules and values. ... On the one 
hand we have, as a result, the rise of such doctrinaires as Stalin 
and Hitler, who took this autonomy of political matter as their 
point of departure, stating clearly and constantly what they 
intended to do. It was enough to take their statements seriously.
But democrats never did that, and therefore were always wrong (except 
perhaps for Churchill, who also ceaselessly affirmed the autonomy--
of political affairs). If democratic politicians, socialists, 
humanists, and Christians committed one error after another and 
believed that Hitler’s or Stalin’s declarations, like those of the 
FLN (National Liberation Front), Fidel Castro, or Nasser, were only 
speeches like those which they themselves delivered on Sundays, it 
was the result of their profound conviction that ’all this is not 
possible — politics is not independent of morality. Itisnot possible 
to have such ideas, to scoff at the law, not to keep one’s word, 
to engage in vast conquests, to provoke revolutions, to deport .
masses of people in order to acquire living space ---- all that is
not possible, nor is the establishment of socialism by force and 
conquest.’,.. The same error of judgement was committed by the leaders 
of Poland’s and Czechoslovakia's democratic parties, who estimated 
that it was necessary to collaborate with the Communists. This 
resulted from a certain ideaLism born in the Resistance movement, but 
mainly from the conviction that Communists obeyed 'the same morality 
as we, as all of us'; that they were searching for justice and . 
truth and were devoted to the good of the fatherland, and that one 
therefore could work with them. People hoped to be able to moderate 
the Communists, to make them democratic and receptive to the excell­
ence of ideological and political liberalism by accepting their 
socialist; economic planning methods. Unfortunately, as events ' 
have shown, all alliances, concessions, dialogues, and so on have 
only served the Communist tactic, which was neither liberal nor 
pluralist nor subject to values" (The Political Illusion, pp. 86-7).
2. Ellul refers to this work in To Will and To Do, p, 278.
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In the face of perfectly autonomous political action, no invocation 
of values can be of the slightest use. Love of peace, and part­
icularly the happiness of the people, promised by a political course 
not recognized as autonomous, assured Mussolini’s victory in Ethiopia, 
Franco's in Spain, and Hitler's in Czechoslovakia. Only at the very 
last minute do the idealists grab hold of themselves and call a halt, 
which is then terribly costly and bloody because none of the measures 
that a clear understanding of the autonomy of political matters 
should have necessitated was taken in time. To say in our day 
that war is just when it is truly the ultima ratio,'* and that it is 
acceptable only under such conditions, is once more to superimpose 
on a century without morals or values an essentially Christian • 
judgment, It is to leave a considerable margin of' action to the 
most realistic political course in the world in which politics is 
autonomous, which simply means that one accept the most violent and 
terrible war in return for not having acted in the beginning, for 
having been held back by scruples. I do not mean to say at all that 
war is good, desirable, or just. I reaffirm what I have often 
written, that "all war is unjust’1, No state can in good conscience 
wage war. But in a world where politics is autonomous, those 
engaged in politics must know that war or the threat of war is a 
normal political means, and that to deny this particular fact of 
autonomy is, under the cover of virtue and idealism, to make polit­
ical affairs ultimately the most ruinous for the community. In 
our day there are no "good guys” who are victors and represent just­
ice and right or "bad guys" who are politicians and are finally ” 
■defeated. If Hitler had won, a trial conducted against the Soviet 
Union and the Western nations and based on exact facts would undoubt­
edly have ended in death sentences for our politicians. It must 
not be thought that the autonomy of political affairs exists only 
in dictatorships. It exists in different degrees in the democracies 
also.
1. Ellul describes the ultima ratio reasoning (which he finds in 
Barth’s thought) as follows: ’’Granted that the state cannot be cond­
emned to disappear, its right to defend itself must also be granted — 
but not unless it has previously employed every means to solve the 
differences pacifically, has made every possible sacrifice and 
exhausted every possible procedure for a peaceful settlement. That
is to say, war cannot be just except as a last resort" (Violence, p. 7)•
2. The Political Illusion, p. 88. In a realism reminiscent of 
Niebuhr’s Ellul criticizes the United States for its "superficial 
idealism”, its pretension that the ways of nations can be solved "by 
law and good will" (Violence, pp. 89-90). "The United States has 
always been ridden by violence, though the truth was covered over by 
a legalistic ideology and a moralistic Christianity. Americans have 
it that the Civil War was an accidental interruption of what was 
practically an idyllic state of affairs; actually, that war simply 
tore the veil off reality for a moment" (ibid., pp. 88-9). Niebuhr 
even could use language which is close.to Ellul's language of the order 
of necessity! "To the sensitive spirit, society must always remain 
something of the jungle, which indeed it is, something of the world
of nature" (ReinhoId Niebuhr, Moral Man and Immoral Society, p. 81). 
Both Ellul and Niebuhr saw the brutal and coercive nature of social 
and political life (ibid., pp, xi, 266-273)* (The early Niebuhr 
seems more cynical than he became later in his life. It is his 
early thought which parallels Ellul’s.)
It is one thing to give a ruthlessly realistic description of
politics, if one is prepared to defend Christian compromise and 
realism (Reinhold Niebuhr); it is another to do so while at the same 
time seeking to defend an uncompromising Christian perfectionism 
(Ellul). Great turbulance results from the fact that Ellul will not 
turn back from either his realistic sociology cr his perfectionistio 
Christianity. This unique combination is one of the distinctive 
features of Ellul's ethical thought and one of the difficulties for 
the'interpreter. What, for example, is one to make of his suggestion 
that Christians involved in politics are to speak up concerning the 
purity of the means used,^ when here and elsewhere he says that polit-
p
ical decisions ought to be based on concern for probable consequences? ' 
He here says that states ought even to go to war, rather than, for 
moral reasons, waiting while another state prepares to crush them."1
One is tempted to accuse Ellul’s dual morality of being little 
more than an encouragement for a Christian schizophrenia. Is he not 
asking Christians to witness to Christ with means consistent with the 
Gospel and then turning around and telling them that they can be -
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1. Ealse Presence, p, 197*
2. The direct clash between Ellul's political reasoning and his Christ­
ian perfectionism could not be more severe. The Christian is to
be concerned about the purity of the means used, in the confidence . 
that God alone is in charge of consequences, The politician is to 
be concerned about probable consequences, all political means being 
more or less immoral anyway (The Political Illusion, pp. 91~*3;
"The Technological Revolution", p. JT).
3* Kith reference to Barth's use of the ultima ratio just war theory 
Ellul writes, "The fact is that such negotiations and efforts for 
peace often give the eventual aggressor time to prepare himself 
better. For example, we must admit that the Munich pact of 1938, 
or the nonintervention in Italy’s war against Ethiopia in 1935» 
bespoke v<ise and just attitudes on the part of France and England; • 
and yet it was precisely these settlements that made the war of 
1939"^945 infinitely more savage. All the world knows that if 
other nations had intervened against Hitler and Mussolini in 1934-1935 
those two regimes would have foundered — and millions of lives . 
would have been saved'' (Violence, p. '/)• t
•- Aj-U- _ m.j
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involved, in nearly Machiavellian political practices? As tempting 
as this criticism is, it seems to he false. Ellul’s dual morality 
basically points to the duality between the Church and the world, 
rather than to a schizophrenic duality within the Christian as such.
If there is a problem in his thought here, it has to do with the fact
that on his terms it becomes very difficult to see how Christians can 
t ruly share in political processes. If the political order is as 
autonomous as he says and if the Christian’s obedience is to be as 
pure as he insists, then whatever else Christians can do, they seem 
incapable of being true politicians. If one accepts Ellul’s under­
standing of the nature and purpose of the Christian life and his under­
standing of politics, then this conclusion follows and is not to be
criticized.
To understand Ellul at this point we have to be aware that, while 
not absolutely prohibiting political participation in the usual sense 
of the word, he encourages a unique form of Christian witness with 
reference to politics. Politics being what it is, Christians who
become involved in it find it impossible to express their obedience to
Christ within their political voca/tion. This is so because politics
is autonomous with reference to Christian influence. The autonomy of
politics means that it is even inadvisable for Christians to attempt
to lift politics to a higher level. What is called for is a more
prudent realism, not the futile effort to invest secular politics with 
Christian meaning. With this understanding, one can see why on 
Ellul’s terms it is virtually impossible to express Christian convict­
ions in and through direct political activity (surely mere voting would 
be possible). If Christians attempt to be politicians, they are faced 
with the dilemma of having to engage in ’’Two Kingdom” reasoning.
They are incapable of expressing their inner allegiance to Christ
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1 . .in their outer political vocations. Ellul is not happy with this
line of reasoning because he knows that Christ claims the whole of 
2the Christian’s life. Yet because of his aversion to legalism, he 
avoids making an absolute prohibition against Christian participation 
in politics in the usual sense of the word.
Ellul, however, generally has a more creative response. Rather 
than leaving the Christian in such a dilemma, he attempts to define 
new political alternatives, whereby the uniqueness of Christian existence
would not have to be denied. At some points he seems to favour a 
totally indirect form of witness. The Christian is not to participate 
in direct political channels at all, but is to make an impact on 
politics through activity not directly political. (We recall his 
insistence, we think biblically well founded, that Christians are 
not obligated to be directly involved in politics} At other points 
he refers to the possibility of a uniquely Christian presence within 
the political process as such. These two alternatives enable Christ­
ians to perform tasks consistent with their unique purpose, but 
without interfering with the necessary realism of the political process. 1 2
1. At one point Ellul seems to admit that if a Christian participates
in normal political activity, he is faced with the ’’Two Kingdom” 
dilemma. Ellul’s difference here from the traditional "Two Kingdom” 
approach seems to us to be so subtle as to be unconvincing. Referr­
ing to the Syrian general Naaman (H Kings he admits that
Naainan was guilty of the heresy of ’’mental reservation", but Ellul 
later seems to absolve him by saying that he (unlike the advocates of 
’’mental reservation”) recognized the guilt associated with his polit­
ical and military career (The Politics of Cod, pp. 35-40)• Though 
Naaman may represent this subtle difference from the traditional 
doctrine, it is still the case that his inner faith was divorced 1
from his outer conduct. As surprising as it may seem, at this one 
place Ellul says that the dilemma facing Naaman is identical with 
the dilemma facing all Christians involved in public service (ibid.,
P. 38).
At one point earlier in our work we found Ellul to be guilty of 
’’Two Kingdom” reasoning. When he privatizes Christian love and 
utterly divorces it from public service, he implies that many aspects 
of Christian daily life cannot become channels through which we 
express our. allegiance to Christ (False Presence, p. 68-69} see 
above , pp. 197-208).
2. See above? pp. 88-89, 266-267*
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We begin our discussion of these two approaches by dealing with
the alternative of a Christian presence within political channels. In
the next section we will consider the other possibility,
If one looks carefully at what Ellul says about direct Christian
participation in politics, it becomes doubtful whether he is usually 
speaking of political participation in the normal sense of the word.
In actual fact he seems to re-define the nature of political partic­
ipation in such a way as to give the Christian a task which is absol-
l&ct o£
utely different from,other people engaged in i?olitical activity,
A
Instead of seeking to gain support for one’s party, or for the issues
or candidates supported by one’s party, the Christian is to witness
to Christ. He is not so much to pursue political objectives, as to 
1
preach to those who do, in the hope that they might be converted:
The participation in politics and the presence to the world have 
no value in themselves. It is not the vocation of the Church to 
promote a political or economic regime, or the welfare state, or 
socialism. Likewise it is not her business to advocate political 
solutions or to take sides in debates, which are generally exciting 
but superficial. The sole duty of the Church (in politics as well 
as in all else) is to take her stand in relation to the question: 
’When the Son of man comes, will he find faith on earth?’ 2
Because the Christian task is to witness to the Wholly Other, the 
Christian’s presence in politics is that of a traitor and a spy, who 
witnesses to a higher order.In the face of the autonomy of politics,
1. False Presence, pp. 129-130; see also The Political Illusion, 
p. 94; Protestantisme Franpais, pp. 142, 155*
2 • False Presence, p. 177.
3. Ellul writes, ’’Because Christianity is the revelation of the Wholly 
Other, that action must be different, specific, and incommensurable 
with political or corporate methods” (Violence, p. 148). Christian 
participation in politics is like Christian participation in the city. 
The Christian is to use both only as preaching posts. The Christian 
task is so unique that it has little to do with political goals as 
such, or the building up of the city. Similarly, Ellul argues that 
Christian lawyers have the unique task of helping the poor, though 
the legal realm as such is seen to be autonomous in relationship to 
Christian values.”
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Christians speak of the importance of pure means. Thus Christians 
involved in politics perform a Christian ra/ther than a. political task.
In the face of political parties preoccupied with their own ideas, 
ideologies and practices — Christians are to speak on the behalf of 
divergent points of view, thus introducing transcendence.
In addition to the above statements supporting a re-definition 
of the Christian task in politics, there is additional evidence.
Our interpretation makes sense of the fact that he regards direct 
participation in politics as worthless" and yet can still speak of a 
Christian presence in such worthless political channels.- He can do 
so because the Christian presence really has little to do with what
is commonly called political participation.
Our interpretation also makes comprehensible the puzzling fact 
that as a Christian Ellul opposes violence, hut recognizes that'from 
a biblical point of view the state cannot do its job without using 
coercion, and violence."^ He is not encouraging Christian support for 
or participation in political violence. He is only insisting that 
in specific ways Christians ought to recognize that the way of the 
world is different from the Christian way. If the Christian is going 
to assess the state, he must do so from perspectives meaningful to. the 
state and not from the Christian perspective,^ (Here Ellul is in
1• False Presence, p. 197,
2. He writes, ”1 am convinced that any action we take ... in politics 
... is utterly useless” ("Mirror", p. 203; see also the following 
section). . . .
3» "Rappels et Reflexions", p. 164* He writes of the state, "It is 
equipped with the sword, responsible for punishing, reprimanding, •
and making a certain good reign (even if it is not the good revealed 
by God) and of making it reign by means of violence (disapproved 
by God)" (ibid., p. 166). . . .
4. Ibid., pp. 150, 156. "The state is called upon to apply a morality 
which is not the Christian morality. It applies the morality of the
world, hut still a morality; and it is from within that morality and 
in- relation to it that the Christian is called upon to judge whatever 
the/••.
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with F.J. Leenhardt). This does not mean, however, that the Christian 
2 .
as Christian can himself use violence, Thus Christian political 
participation is either being redefined or discouraged."
Though Ellul grants the possibility of a Christian witness in 
political channels, he says other things which show his discouragement 
concerning the possibility. For example, he tells us that he regards
the state does. To protest to the state against torture in the name 
of Jesus Christ is absurd. To protest in the name of the declaration 
of rights, a moral principle that the state itself has established, 
is legitimate” (To Will and To Do, pp. 105-6).
Ellul's words here contradict his statement to the effect that 
politics is autonomous with reference to human morality (see above., 
pp. 292-295)-
Ellul tells us that if Christians are to witness to God's demands 
in the social order, they must openly state the confessional basis 
of what they say. He offers only two choices. Either Christians 
appeal to the state on the basis of something the state accepts as. 
authoritative, for example, a constitution (To Will and To Do, p. 106; 
False Presence, p. 179) t or they make a Christian demand in the 
context of an explicit confession of Christ (To hill and To Do, 
p. 107; see also The Political Illusion, p. 94; see above, pp. 144-6*
1. "Rappels et Reflexions”, pp. 150-1 .
2 • l~b id., p . 166.
3* Ellul is of one mind with F.J. Leenhardt in recognizing the contrast 
between the methods of the Christian life and the methods necessari-ly 
employed by the state, with the resulting implication that Christians 
are not obligated to participate in politics (ibid., pp. 150-1)•
Ellul writes, "The magistrate uses means (those of violence) which 
are precisely forbidden to Christians. It is here that the devel­
opment of Rom, 12 and 13 is very clarifying; the Christian must 
not render evil for evil; in the face of evil, he must forgive. 
However, the evil done on earth in the social order cannot remain 
unpunished. The state is charged by God with the responsibility • 
of punishing evil; therefore it does that which is not possible for 
the Christian to do. It has this mission, which Christians obey 
find respect for this role; but they do not have to get mixed up in 
it: they have another way of action in the world. And we find . 
exactly the same attitude with respect to the juridical function; 
this is quite valid to do. But here again, Christians don't have 
to become mixed up in it. ... There is the word of Jesus who refused 
to .judge when they brought him a juridical affair to settle (Lk. 12:14) 
and on the other hand the text of I Cor. where Paul .recommends to 
the Christians not to have recourse to the law court. Thus this 
can clearly mean that even where the state remains within its legit­
imate limits, where it correctly fulfils the role assigned to it, 
its role must not be exalted. The state is nothing absolute nor 
definitive. 'Especially where the Christian can surpass it, without 
menacing its existence, he should do so'. (Cullmann)” ("Rappels et 
Reflexions”, pp. 166-7")*
___________ ....... .
- 304 -
the political ’’arena” as one of the least effective places to witness 
to Christ,’ If people are largely unable to hear the Gospel in a 
political context, perhaps Christians should seek more opportune places 
to witness to Christ, while avoiding the absolute legalism of rejecting
a uniqu.ely Christian witness in the political realm, Ellul severely 
discourages it, on the evangelical grounds that it is a poor place to make
an effective witness,
In another way Ellul indicates that in the final analysis polit­
ical participation on the part of Christians is to be discouraged,,
We have in mind his belief concerning the trans-political nature of 
2
the clergy. He tells us that a pastor should not be involved in a
1. He has various reasons for thinking that the political order is 
far from the most effective place to witness to Christ, He says •• 
that in Prance only 10 per cent of the people of voting age are 
members of a party and only a small percentage of workers attend union 
meetings. Thus, in Prance, even in a physical sense, one meets only 
a minority of the people at such meetings. In addition, he argues 
that those committed enough to attend party or union meetings are 
usually the very people who are least likely to be responsive to a 
genuine Christian witness, because they already are committed to 
stereotyped judgments (FaIse Presence, pp. 1O3™4)» Even if Christians 
are serious about speaking of Christian things, their witness will -
be neutralized because people at such meetings are psychologically 
incapable of hearing other than what they came to hear. Ellul thinks 
that what usually happens in such situations is that the Christian 
presence is used simply as propaganda for political goals having 
nothing to do with Christianity (ibid., pp. 148-9)* ”To the man 
in the street, the political presence of Christians does not signify 
a call to conversion, or a recognition that all issues are subject 
to the Lordship of Jesus Christ, but simply: ’The Christians are on- 
our side' ... If Christians are asked to be present among. politicians, 
that is for the sake of their moral certification, which helps avoid 
certain criticisms. it is also for the sake of the effect on seg­
ments of the population attached to Christianity, because the Church 
in the end represents a degree of power as an institution. As has 
often been said, Christians in this situation are hostages.- If it 
were merely a matter of our persons, it would not be important, and 
I would keep quiet about it. But, as a result of our intervention, 
it is God’s truth which is being held hostage, which is being used 
as a pretext, as a justification, as a means of propaganda. That is 
why we are driven to the point of no compromise. We have to say 
'No'” (ibid., pp, 149-150).
2. Prom what Ellul has said concerning Barmen, we need to a.dd that 
direct political participation could become imperative for .laymen 
and clergymen, but that such is rarely the case. .
i
political party, nor take public stands on outright political issues:
If the pastor is supposed to be the ’’leader of the flock”, he should 
not be injecting division. He should avoid being a stumbling block
to the weak, to the non-political, etc. He ought not to scatter 
the sheep, which is necessarily what would happen were he to take 
strict political stands. Surrounded by the various and multiple 
commitments of the faithful, he should be the one who remains 
impartial, outside the party, ready to hear all, to understand all, 
to have the confidence of all (which he no longer has once he 
becomes partisan); -ready also to reconcile Christians of opposite 
leanings.2
He says that the clergyman ought to seek to love and understand those 
of differing political viewpoints, a much more difficult and unnatural 
task than taking sides. He even says that if a pastor expresses 
partisan political viewpoints he is showing that his political commit­
ment is greater than his commitment to Christ. Ellul is not in the 
least worried that the trans-political clergy might set a bad example * 
for the laity. Quite to the contrary, he regards such to be a good 
example, for he thinks that all Christians should be .involved in 
seeking to love end understand those of diverse political persuasions.^
A difference between the clergy and the laity as seen by Ellul is
that he denies the former the right to seek a reconciling presence in
and through political parties, whereas he grant-s that the laity may do
precisely that. Though all Christians are to seek to love and under- 
of
stand those, differing political viewpoints, clergymen are limited to 
A
doing so totally outside political channels. One wonders why such 
a limitation should be placed on clerics (since they are basically to 
seek to accomplish the same thing as the laity).^ Perhaps the truth
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1• False Presence, pp. 191-2.
2. Ihid., p. 192.
3. Ibid., p. 192.
4. If, as Ellul has said previously, Christians should feel free to 
discuss political issues, it seems unfair vocationally to exclude 
clergymen from this calm and tolerant discussion.
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of the matter is that at this point Ellul is really referring to the
ideal of a non-political clergy end laity. One can't help thinking
that if the clergy is to set a trans-political ideal, Ellul can’t have 
much objection to a trans-political laity as well*
In the following section we will see that on the basis of a 
study of modern political reality, Ellul has come to regard direct 
political participation to be of little value, and instead encourages 
all men to seek to influence politics entirely through indirect
channels»
The Inability of Citizens to Control
the State or to Effectively Participate in Politics
We will now look briefly at Ellul’s sociological analysis of the 
inability of democratic citizens to control the state or to effect­
ively participate in politics. Then we will considex' some specific 
strategy proposals, which relate to this analysis, but which also relate 
to normative theological considerations.
Ellul regards it as an illusion to think that democratic citizens 
can any longer control the modern state. He has two major reasons for* 
thinking that this is no longer possible. First, he doesn’t think 
that it is possible for citizens to be adequately informed to do so.
He points out that the mere fact that citizens can vote does not mean .
that they actually control the state. He thinks that citizens do
not have time and often do not have the ability to become informed about 
2the complex issues on which they are expected to vote.
1• ^he Political Illusion, p. 161 • .
2* Ibid*, pp. 137) 163. One wonders whether Ellul is not guilty 
here of an all-or-nothing type of reasoning. Though it may be 
true that many citizens cannot become adequately informed on many 
issues, one wonders whether some citizens cannot become informed 
about some issues. .
t
- 30?
. The problem of gaining information is even more complex and
is related to the fact that citizens do not have access to unbiased
sources of information. In Ellul’s view, political affairs are
today transacted in an illusory "verbal universe" created by political
1
advertising technicians. It is they who determine the political
"facts" from which public opinion is formed. They create the world
of images through which people interpret political reality. The
political public relations men actually create public opinion, rather 
2than honouring a public opinion already existent. They utilize the 
3
techniques of propaganda to sell their candidates or programmes.
The second and major x-eason why Ellul thinks that popular control
of the state is a myth is because he doesn’t think that the elected
officials really govern. To the contrary, he thinks that government 
is basically in the hands of the non-elected technical experts who 
reside in the administrative bureaux of government.^ He believes 
that the politicians seldom make decisions apart from the advice of the
technical experts. He thinks that their advice usually is honoured 
uncritically, since the technicians are believed to have information 
which the politicians do not have or which the politicians do not have 
the ability, inclination or time to understand. Even when politicians 
do make rare decisions on their own, he thinks these decisions are left
to the bureaucrats to apply.
1. The Political Illusion, pp. 103-117, 125.
2. Ibid., p. 105. •
3. Though propaganda may exert a great influence on political decision 
making, one may think that man is not totally captivated to the influ 
ence of propaganda as Ellul thinks. Politicians may have to honour 
existing public opinion to some degree.
4. Ibid., p. 138; The Technological Society, pp. 268, 274*
5. The Technological Society, p. 162; The Political Illusion, pp.
36~9> 142-4, 152. He also thinks that the technicians in the 
bureaux of -government have a fundamentally undemocratic understanding 
"The/...
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A further argument Ellul adduces in support of the thesis of
The Political Illusion is his belief that the leaders of poiitica,l
groups, labour unions, parties, etc, do not represent the interests 
1
of their members, He believes that the political parties consist
of a "fossilized rank and file'* led by party directors only out to 
2
win money and votes. ' The technicians at the top of political organ­
izations are seen to be experts at handling arid rnanipulat ing people 
— not experts at representing the interests of their constituency.
"The technician sees the nation quite differently from the political 
man: to the technician, the nation is nothing more than another
sphere in which to apply the instruments he has developed. To him, 
the state is not the expression of the will of the people ... It is 
an enterprise providing services that must be made to function 
efficiently. He judges states in terms of their capacity to utilize 
techniques effectively, not in terms of their relative justice. 
Political doctrine revolves around what is useful rather than what 
is good. Purpose drops out of sight and efficiency becomes the 
central concern. As the political form best suited to the massive 
and unprincipled use of technique, dictatorship gains in power.
And this in turn narrows the range of choice for democracies: either 
they too use some version of effective technique — centralized 
control and propaganda or they will fall behind" (The Techno1- 
ogical Society, p. vii; see also Propaganda, p. 252),
It is interesting that when discussing the factors which lead to 
the illusory nature of politics, Ellul does not discuss the influence 
of supra-national corporations. ‘ One suspects that such an omission 
is due to his oversimplified tendency to blame modern ills on techn­
ology, a phenomenon common to Capitalism and Communism. In this 
particular instance it seems that Capitalism as such also contributes 
to the political illusion, though Communism in other ways may also do 
this.
1. "No national party or union congress reflects the will of the rank 
and file, and all use the classic tricks, now further refined by the 
knowledge of group dynamics" (The Political Illusion, p. 176),
The Technological Society, p. 41?« Ellul thinks that politicians 
are merely technicians specializing in the technique of getting 
elected and holding power (ibid., p. 257; The Political Illusion, . 
p. 151)* Politicians have to be wealthy, for otherwise they 
couldn’t buy the propaganda, services necessary for getting elected 
(The Technological Society, pp. 275, 374, 419)* The politician 
also has to be a committed member of the party machinery, for he 
will need additional financial help from the party (ibid., p. 419)• 
Ellul concludes that there is no connection between the ability to 
gain power and the ability to make wise and just political decisions 
(The Political Illusion, pp. 151~2)• '
3o9 ~
Ellul thus refers to organised democracy as the ''new feudalism”, not 
based on landed estates but otherwise similar, “The professional
organization of parties, unions, and movements perfectly represent the
1
hierarchy of the new lords.” He is here stating his general thesis 
2of the dictatorship of the technical experts,' but is applying it to
the internal workings of political organizations, rather than to the
relationship between politicians and bureaucratic technicians. He
calls this political illusion the illusion of p art i c i pat ion. Because 
of the dictatorship of party technicians who feed the rank and file 
on propaganda, he believes that citizens cannot effectively participate 
in political life.^
Without attempting a thorough sociological evaluation of the above 
points, it seems fair to say that many will agree that Ellul has 
touched on some vitally important problems which have the effect of 
undermining democracy. The criticism of his analysis will probably 
come from those who, while admiring the significance of his observations, 
may think that he has overstated the degree to which democracy has 
become an illusion, the degree to which these problems apply. What is
1. The Political Illusion, p. 180; see also p. 176; A Critique, 
pp. 110ff.
2. The Technological Society, pp. 160-162, 389-391* .
3. He also believes that sensitive and responsible individuals find 
work within a party to be too confining. He writes, ”lt cannot be 
stressed enough that commitment to a political movement or party 
entails the surrender of personal responsibility and freedom of 
judgment” (The Political Illusion, p. 171)• "It is even probable 
that those with the strongest conscience and the greatest knowledge 
of political affairs refuse to enter these machines, which fabricate 
conformism. The same goes for those who are very committed to 
professional or social activities and are afraid of the enormous 
amount of time lost in union or party meetings. ... Perhaps something 
can be done in such an organization, but at the price of how much 
lost time? After how many years? Eventually, the time spent in . 
such groups prevents a normal life and forces the participant to 
become a professional. And if he wants no part of that?” (ibid., 
pp. 179-180).
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of importance to us is to recognize that because Ellul feels that little
can be accomplished, through direct political means, he emphasizes the
importance of an indirect approach to politics.
Some Proposals Concerning _Indirect Political Actiyi ty
Since Ellul believes that democracy no longer exists, since he
thinks that all direct political channels are of no value to the •
democratic citizen, his proposed response to the political dilemma is 
not political, in the direct sense of tha/t word. For sociological
reasons he has no confidence that direct political activity as such 
accomplishes much. (Of course, a witness to the Gospel may still be 
possible, though he does not see the political order as the most 
opportune context foi’ that}
The first form of indirect political activity we will discuss is
the twofold recommendation that individual citizens assume personal 
responsibility by (l) finding autonomous values, over against the values 
dictated by the state; (2) by defining their existence by participation 
in autonomous groups not directly political. Since these two points
are integrally related, we will consider them together.
Ellul’s first suggestion is that we must begin with individual 
1
self-awareness. Since he understands the social and political
problem largely in terms of man’s adaptation to systems (technological
mechanism, the primacy of science, bureaucracies), so he stresses the 
p
need to rehabilitate the democratic citizen’s virtue.- He calls for
1. The Political Illusion, pp. 205-206, 224*
2. Ibid., p. 232; ’’Between Chaos and Paralysis”, pp. 747"749» ”For 
what is under attack in our present society is the autonomy of the 
citizen, his ability to judge for himself. He is up against a net­
work of information, public relations, propaganda in diverse forms”
( ibid., p. 749). "When I speak of the individual as the source of 
hope I mean the individual who does not lend himself to society’s 
game, who disputes what we accept as self-evident (for example, the 
consuming society) who finds an autonomous style of'life...” (ibid., 
?. 748).
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the establishing of autonomous values and traditions, the setting up
of a tension between the values of the democratic citizen and the pre­
vailing values of society, He calls for the building of a new daily 
life, which would enable the citizen to become critical of the "normal” 
ways dictated by .society. He regards such a distancing from society
as so difficult to achieve .that he believes that only Christians can 
attain it.^
Ellul's second proposal is that autonomous groups be foimed, groups 
defining their values without reference to the state. He is not 
calling these groups to any kind of direct political involvement. He 
tells us that the political illusion is precisely the illusion that we
can modify reality in our day through the exercise of political power.
1. ’’Between Chaos and Paralysis”, p. 749 •
2. Ibid., pp. 749“*75O» He acknowledges his debt to Kierkegaard,
who has influenced him in the line of reasoning outlined in this 
paragraph (ibid., p. 749)* Kierkegaard was suspicious of involvement 
in collective movements (Kierkegaard, The Last Years, pp, 33, 182) 
and committed his life to helping to establish the primacy of the 
individual over the mass (ibid., pp. 40, 132; The Journals, pp. 116, 
133-135)• "11 my genius can be said to be related to anything at •
all then it is to being in the minority” (The Journfils, p. 147) •
The real reason that Kierkegaard was concerned about the individual 
had to do with his belief in the Christian significance of an indiv­
idual’ s direct responsibility to God (Kierkegaard, The Last Years, 
p. 203) and the importance of a personal recognition of one's own 
sinfulness (ibid., p. 188).
Ellul represents a similar point of view (Presence of the Kingdom, 
p. 93), though we think that he, unlike Kierkegaa.rd, was not guilty • 
of individualism. He writes, "From the fact of the action of the 
Holy Spirit, each one’s work is thoroughly personalized, as well as 
his life. He is no longer just any man, this person laid hold of
by grace. He is no longer one of the mass of mankind. He is a .
person” (To Will and To Do, p. 219)• Interestingly enough, Ellul 
cites his dependence on Barth at this point rather than on
Kierkegaard. He writes, ”It is obvious that all this is regist­
ered in the doctrine of the determination of man by election, which 
nevertheless does not rule out this man's self-determination (on all 
this K. Barth, ll/2, p. 510)" (To Will and To Do, p. 3O5)»
3. The Political Illusion, pp. 135, 221-222.
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The hope must be surrendered that constitutional rules, good .instit­
utions, or socio-economic changes will modify anything in decisive 
fashion.' The hope must be abandoned that the citizen will be 
able to control the state ... The fundamental error in. 1789 {in 
France] ’was to believe that controls over the state could be found 
in the state, and that the latter could be a self-regulating mech­
anism. Experience has shown us that the state ’will retreat-only 
when it meets an insurmountable obstacle. This obstacle can only 
be man, i.e,, citizens organized independently of the state.2
He says that we must leave .politics behind, not because we are uncon­
cerned about collective and social life, but because we are seeking these 
goals by a different, a more indirect route
This means that we must try to create positions in which we reject 
and struggle with the state not in order to modify some element of 
the regime or force it to make some decision, but much more fund­
amentally, in order to permit the.emergence of social, political, 
intellectual, or artistic bodies, associations, interest groups, or 
economic or Christian groups totally independent of the state, yet 
capable of opposing it, able to reject its pressures as well as its 
controls and even its gifts. These organizations must be completely 
independent, not only materially but also intellectually and morally,
i.e., able to deny that the nation is the supreme value and that the 
state is the incarnation of the nation. ... They must, that is, be 
poles of tension confronting the state, forcing the latter to ’’think 
again” and limiting itself to considering the real political problems 
without being in a position of omnipotence.4
He suggests that the emergence of such groups ’’would in a certain sense
perhaps reduce the power of the nation, the growth of technology, the 
s
economic and military competition with other nations."
1 . Ellul cannot quite seem to make up his mind as to whether his own 
thesis of the totally illusory nature of politics is convincing. 
Elsewhere he tells us that "politics can solve administrative problems 
concerning the material development of a city, or general problems 
of economic organization which is a considerable accomplishment” 
(The Political Illusion, p. 186).
2. Ibid., p. 202. .
3. Ibid., p. 221.
4* Ibid., pp. 222-3• "These words clearly imply a defense of the 
existing autonomy, and.an attempt to enlarge the autonomy, of such 
institutions as the family and the school, in the face of all 
pressures to politicize them” (Lasch, Katallagete, p. .26).
5* The Political Illusion, p. 223. The goal Ellul sees for such
autonomous groups is not the destruction of the state (ibid., p. 223)•
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Here Ellul has offered. Christians a kind, of political "alternative 
service,” lie does not want Christians simply to remain passive, for
he believes that in an indirect way the Chivrch can find a true political
1
significance, It is no doubt true that there is an indirect approach
to political problems which may be much more significant than is common­
ly recognized. For example, the renewal of the Church in inner and . 
outer faithfulness to her Lord may indeed have the effect of cutting
down on the totalitarian omnicompetence of the state.
Though the above proposal relates directly to Ellul's sociological 
analysis, it wouldn't be correct to say that he has simply based a 
moral "ought” on a sociological "is”. We earlier saw that for theol­
ogical reasons he is critical of the omnicompetent state. He thinks
2that the Bible understands the state to be much more limited. We
also saw that for theological reasons he advocates a separation between
the Church and the state. His description of that separation was as
follows: the Church is not to use the state to establish herself
or to spread the Gospel; she is not to use the state’s means of coerc-- 
ion, nor its financial;, resources.^ Ellul believes that the Church 
has her own Gospel to proclaim and that the state is intended by God 
for the limited purpose of providing order and hence must not claim 
to be an ultimate value. These theological beliefs lead to the concl­
usion that the Church must be an autonomous group, obedient to her own 
Lord. Likewise, when he speaks of the importance of the Church’s dia­
logue with the state, he is insisting that for theological reasons the
poIiKcaJ
1. Ellul has pointed out the cultural side ofyactivity (Lasch,
Katallagete, p. 22).
2. He puts his theological point in sociological terms when he says 
that we wrongly conceive of society if we think of it "as a whole 
made up of dead pieces without autonomy, receiving an active place 
only in a coherent system, and obtaining life only from the supreme 
impetus of political power.,.” (The Political Illusion, p. 14)*
3. "Rappels et Reflexions", pp. 170-171
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Church must he autonomous in relation to the state.
Though Ellul has good theological reasons for advocating auton­
omy with reference to the state and though he has specifically Christian
reasons for appealing to Christians at this point, the first form of
indirect political activity we have discussed is applicable to both
Christian and non-Christian. The following recommendations are .
addressed only to Christians and are directly related to the self “-under­
standing which Ellul believes Christians alone possess.
The second form of indirect political activity he recommends to
Christians has to do with the task of criticizing the commonplace
' 2 assumptions from which political propagandists make their appeal.
Instead of being obsessed with political current events, Christians
are to probe and critically assess society’s underlying assumptions."
In his view this evaluation of commonplaces should involve not only
sociological analysis, but also an evaluation of underlying psychol­
ogical ways of interpreting life. Christians are to assess "the 
psychic and emotional thread running through politics”.
He thinks that Christians could be capable of this task; they 
would have time to become well-informed because they would be studying 
long-term phenomena, not the mere passing phenomena of current events. 
Also, they would have a genuine interest in such study, since it would 
contribute to their own continuing search for a faithful way of life
1. "Rappels et Reflexions", pp. 174~9•
2. He defines a commonplace as an unquestioned assumption and instru­
ment of judgment (A Critique, pp, 13-14)* "It is the common 
standard that enables people to understand one another when they 
discuss politics or civilization" (ibid., p. 13). In the biography 
we dealt with the related recommendation that Christian intellectuals are 
to sound early warnings, when political situations are still capable 
of just solution (see above, p-x),
3. False Presence, d. 185.
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1in the modern world
He thinks that if Christians remained free from bondage to
worldly views and partisan commitments, and free for obedience to God 
alone, they would be able to bring a uniquely critical perspective to 
bear on political affairs. Christians should take advantage of their
transcendent perspective by playing a critical role, rather than being
greatly concerned to take part directly in political affairs. Were
they to do the latter to any great extent, they would lose their cap- 
2acity to do the former effectively. Just as Ellul himself abandoned
his political career in 1947j but has spent his lifetime critically 
assessing political reality (in a general way) and modern commonplaces, 
so he recommends to Christians this same task of critical reflection, 
rather than direct political involvement. Ellul’s book, A Critique 
of the New Commonplaces, is really an example of the sort of thing he
has in mind. .
A third recommendation Ellul makes for an indirect form of polit­
ical witness is that if Christians seek to support a particular 
political policy they should personally converse with those in authority. 
The task of talking personally with those in authority is quite diff­
erent from the methods of direct political action. Such "discreet” 
activity does not at all assume participation in a party, a union, or 
any other political form. ,
1False Presence, p. 184.
2. "To put into operation that genuine perspective ... a great indep­
endence of judgment is indispensable. If, in fact, one remains 
bound to the day-by-day happenings, if one becomes engrossed in curr­
ent events, if one gets involved in the uncertainties of groups and 
political parties, ... then by that very fact one becomes radically 
incapable of all long-range political reflection" (ibid., p. 186; 
see also pp. I65, 182-183, 206).
Fbid*» P* 195» This recommendation reminds one of what Ellul has 
already said concerning Christians talking with corporation heads and 
attorneys representing the interests of the poor. Likewise, the 
criticism/..»
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Conclusion
As one looks back over this chapter, it seems easier to synthesize
what Ellul says of a theoretical nature, than to harmonize his
practical applications. His theological and biblical insights seem 
consistent, though we have criticized them at particular joints.
Political affairs are relative and hence ought not to be invested with
absolute commitment. To a considerable extent politics is autonomous,
at least with reference to values which could be called Christian.
(We do not agree that politics is autonomous with reference to human 
values, nor do we think that Ellul himself consistently affirms the 
same.) Granting these theological insights (confirmed by Ellul's 
sociology), the question still remains — what ought Christians to do.
Ellul has in effect given us a plurality of answers to this 
question, some seeming to stand in contradiction to others. The most. 
clear and obvious thing he says is that Christians are not obligated 
to be involved in politics. Granting this insight, which we think 
biblically defensible from the New Testament, there are still various 
alternatives for Christians, who are concerned about politics. There 
seems to be no doubt that the approach to which Ellul is most sympathetic 
is the one least political. The fact that he grants the right of a 
uniquely Christian presence in political channels cannot disguise the 
fact that he is discouraged concerning the prospects. What he says 
about the non-political clergyman and what he says about the psycholo­
gical incapacity for preaching to be heard within political channels
leads him to have a little confidence in politics as an effective
preaching post. Likewise, what he says in response to the problems
criticism that this activity is probably not possible for all Christ 
ians, but only for those gifted in verbal abilities, also applies.
m -
of control and participation shows his general ’willingness to abandon
direct political channels. He even 'advises this for non-Christians.
The language. he uses when speaking of the formation of autonomous 
groups indicates that he has in mind leaving behind all forms of direct 
political participation. We think, however, that this would not be 
necessary, since a uniquely Christian presence in politics would not
be inconsistent with total freedom with reference to human political
options, Likewise, Christian preaching in politics is not inconsis­
tent with the task of criticizing commonplaces or personally conversing
with those in authority. However, all of these forms of political
witness clash with political activity in the normal sense of the word.
Ellul’s anti-legalism forces him to retain the possibility of
normal political participation for Christians. Still, he does not 
encourage such participation, since the Christian’s evangelical purpose 
has to be denied. On numerous occasions, he refers to the Christian 
preferability of dropping out of politics, rather than making the
compromises required.
1, ’’The Church’s stance in politics (hence that of each Christian) 
should be specific and unique, not commensurate with the attitudes 
of the ’pagans’ . The pagans can take care of their own affairs 
very well without outside help” (False Presence, p, 177) < ”1
reject the habitual game played by intellectuals in which they project 
values and spiritual content into political facts. ... If a Christian 
insists on God’s absolute demand for some particular act, let. him do 
so; but he ought to know that he is not making a political demand. 
Herein lies the contradiction and the beginning of conflict; for a 
man ought to realize that there is no common frame of reference in 
the alleged demand of God and the execution of a particular political 
act. If indeed,we seek a place to make our fine feeling and our 
humanism count, let us not participate in politics: it is no longer 
capable of absorbing human warmth” (The Political Illusion, p. 94). 
’’But, someone is sure to object, if you absolutely-rule out dirty 
hands, don’t you rule out politics? ... I have hot yet found any 
proof that politics is the imperative of man’s salvation, although 
many impassioned declarations have, of course, been written on the 
subject” (A Critique, p. /jB). "To claim to lead Christians into 
political activity as an extension of love on a worldwide scale is 
to deny to love its own special expression displayed to us in the 
Bible, It-is to rob the Christian presence in the world of its true 
usefulness” (False P resence, p; 70). He says that it is an historical 
fact that whenever the Church as Church has become involved in politics 
she has betrayed the truth of the Gospel (ibid.., pp. 118, 121).
"We know how political
action/..•
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We also recall that Ellul does not absolutely prohibit the Church
from occasionally speaking out on .behalf of political options which 
clearly approximate Christian truth. What he says concerning Christ­
ian opposition to racism and concerning his support of the Barman 
confession — allows for the Church as a corporate body to occasionally 
speak out on political issues» Still, granted the autonomous nature 
of mostApolitical reality, it would be very rare that the moral ambig­
uity of political choices would clear long enough for the unequivocal 
Christian preferability of one alternative to be obvious.
Through a process of offering various alternatives and criticizing 
all but those of the totally indirect kind, it becomes obvious that 
Ellul's preference has to do with those discussed in the last section.
action, which is a thousand times justified on the human plane, leads 
to heresy ..., how it leads to a scandalously anti-Christian behavior 
and to a loss of the sense of charity" (False Presence, p. 122).
"In the final analysis, every time the Church has gotten into the 
political game, no matter what the manner of her entry, no matter 
what her opinion or opposing choices in a political situation with 
regard to an institution, she has been drawn every time into a betray­
al, either of revealed truth or of the incarnate love. She has 
become involved every time in apostasy. When all is said and done 
it seerns as though politics is the Church's worst problem. It is her 
constant temptation, the occasion of her greatest disasters, the 
trap continually set for her by the Prince of this world" (ibidn, 
pp. 125-126). He thinks that when we treat problems as political, 
rather than human, we find .immoral solutions more tolerable (The 
Fo1itioal 11lusion, pp. 190-1). "The Third Reich had no doubt that 
the Jewish problem had to be 'solved'. In the eyes of the Nazi 
chiefs it was a political problem. Therefore they could give an 
abstract order for the massacre. But all historians of the Third 
Reich report that Himmler fainted when he saw a few dozen Jews shot.
At that point, the matter had suddenly become brutally human again.
But in the ordinary course of the political process, the human aspects 
are generally hidden. Actually, the political point of view allows 
people today to escape values, to obliterate the reality of human 
situations which are.individual.situations and*therefore no longer 
of interest" (ibid., p. 191). ;
1. If politics is as autonomous with reference to human values as 
Ellul .sometimes says, it is hard to see how the Church could ever 
be called to a confessional stance on a political issue. .
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One may entirely agree that , this indirect form of witness is important 
We believe, however, that one could affirm the importance of this and
still make a unique witness to Christ within political channels. We
can see, however,- that the objectivity required for criticising
commonplaces would be lost to those Christians involved in politics
in the usual sense of the word.
The real choice seems to us to be between direct political part­
icipation in the usual sense of the word and all of these other forms
of political witness, In spite of the "Two Kingdom” difficulties
involved in direct political participation, we should still hold this
open as a vocational possibility for some Christians — though one 
which faces them with many agonizing difficulties. Ellul has made a 
good ca.se for the importance of indirect forms of political activity-, 
since these can be undertaken with less necessity for compromising the
content of the Christian Gospel. These other forms also point to a
unique contribution which Christians could make, but which may be more 
difficult for non-believers. (We are thinking of the eschatological 
freedom which should help to give Christians an objective distancing 
from various political claims.) We think, however, that in the final 
analysis the whole spectrum of possibilities offered by Ellul must
be left as real possibilities before which each Christian must decide
in responsiveness to God. Though Ellul has indicated his own pre­
ference, he would surely not have discussed the other alternatives, . 
if he did not regard them as genuine choices open to Christians.
CHAPTER VIII
CHAPTER VIII
THE CHRISTIAN UNDERSTANDING OP MONEY
Mammon
Though modern men think of money as a neutral object, Ellul .
argues that Jesus saw money as an active power of temptation.He 
points out that Jesus personified money by calling it Mammon (Mtt* 6:24; 
Lk. 16:13)» Jesus saw money as an active subject, rather than a 
neutral object. This means that the Christian question concerning 
money is not simply that of its proper use. Money must first of all 
be desacra.li2ed, relativized, stripped of its attributes of divinity.
Only in this context can the question of Christian stewardship occur.
Just as Ellul sees natural man as in bondage to sin, so he sees man as
in slavery to a false understanding of life which (among other things)
2
puts money rather than God at the centre.
Ellul surely is aware that money in and of itself is simply •
paper and hence is not itself evil. (if he saw money as itself evil, 
it is hard to see how he could go on to argue that money for Christians 
can become a material instrument, rather than a demonic power)
Though a literal interpretation of his words at the above points might 1 2 3
1. ”L‘Argent”, pp. 35-6. ’ Ellul admits that at some places the Old 
Testament regards riches as the reward for obedience. However, he 
insists that at many other places the Old Testament judges and con­
demns riches. He is ’emphatic that in the New Testament riches are 
condemned (L1Homroe et L'Argent, pp. 39~4O). In actuality Ellul is 
here using the New Testament""^and the teaching of Jesus in particular) 
as normative and is evaluating the Old Testament teaching accordingly. 
This practice is possible because of a Christocentric emphasis and 
because the words of Scripture are not simply equated with the Word, 
cf God.
2. nL’Argent’1, pp. 31-2.
3. See below, PP* 323-324*
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seem to support such a naive assumption, he surely is speaking of some­
thing far deeper. He apparently means that the natural relationship
of man to money is one which is destructive of true life. The demonic
has so perverted man's relationship to money that money exerts an
attractive power which leads to preoccupation with the things that it 
can buy. (Because the demonic leads to this false relationship 
between man and money, Scripture refers to money as "unrighteous 
mammon" (lie. 16:% 11) «) The problem of money, from & biblical per­
spective, is first and foremost that of gaining freedom from the 
demonic; it is not simply the moral problem of gaining-wisdom con­
cerning the proper use of money. " (We recall that Ellul sees Christ 
first as Saviour and only secondly as a teacher.)
Ellul’s exegetical point is biblically defensible. Money is _ 
indeed personified as Mammon in Mtt. 6:24 and Lk. 16:13. With refer­
ence to this fact Wolfgang Trilling writes
Jesus knows that wealth is not a neutral thing. Wealth has a seduc­
tive power which seeks to enslave men. Hence he speaks of Mammon 
as being actually in competition with God j_Mtt J (6:24c). Ho one 
car. escape its seductive pull unless he turns away completely to give 
his heart to God.3
Professor Hauck comments that in Jesus' teaching Mammon has derogatory
connotations ("materialistic, anti-godly, sinful")
in the earthly property which man gathers (Mtt. 6:19ff»)> in which 
he erroneously seeks security (Lk. 12:15ff»), to which he gives his 
heart (Mtt. 6:21), and because of which he ceases to love, Jesus finds the 
very opposite of God (Mtt. 6:24). Because of the demonic power 
immanent in possessions, surrender to them brings practical enslave­
ment (Mtt. 6:19ff»). The righteous must resolutely break free from 
this entanglement and stand in exclusive religious dependence on 
God (Mtt. 6:24). 4-
1. "L'Argent", pp, 44-5 •
2. Ibid., pp. 32-33.
3. Wolfgang Trilling, Matthew, Vol. 2, p. 118; see also Vol. 1, 
pp. 122-123.
4. Hauck, Theological Dictionary of the New Testament, Vol, IV,
G. Kettle, ed., p. 389. Joachim Jeremias v/rites"Jesus has a 
loving/...
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So c l<3 io gioal Conf i rai at ion
Though Ellul’s point is established theologically, he finds
sociological confirmation. lie says that modern man sees money as
all-important anti sacred. He believes that this is true of all 
1 2classes in society and of all societies. Though, on his terms, 
materialism is no uniquely.modern phenomenon, he does think that the
economic aspect of life is now becoming more dominant than ever before.
Man is more and more becoming absorbed in an economic network and 
losing his autonomy with reference to the economyHe thinks that
man now understands himself as ’’economic man", man, the ' producer-
4 5consumer. Modern man values material possessions and his stomach.
His "life-ideal is reduced increasingly to ’’gorging”. "He who has
money is the slave of the money he has. He who has it not is the slave 
of the mad desire to get it. The first and great law is consumption.
loving attitude to the poor, but his words about riches are sharp.
.It is only a fool who builds barns in the face of catastrophe 
(Lk. 12.18), who with an inferno after him rushes into his house .
to rescue some of his possessions (Lk. 17.31; Mk. 13.15 par.).
Earthly possessions are transitory things, which woodworm and rust 
devour (Mtt. 6.19-21 par'.) ... But what is there in possessions that 
leads to sin? It is the danger of mammonism (Mtt. 6.24), the danger 
that money may take the place of God as a dominant factor. Jesus 
regards this danger as such a fearful one that he can say that a 
camel will be able to go through the eye of a needle before a rich 
man can enter the reign of God (Mk. 10.25 par.); i.e. it is — 
from a human point of view — impossible (v. 27, cf. Lk, 6.24f.)" 
(Jeremias, New Testament Theology, Vol. 1, p. 222; see also Rev.. 
3:15-19). ‘
1. "L*Argent”, p. 33.
2. He says that all political forms today regard man primarily as a 
producer and consumer. He believes that the USSR and the USA are in 
essential agreement at this point (L’Homme Mesure, p, 8),
3. ’’Man is included in the economy. He belongs to the economy body 
and soul. That is the serious problem, the appearance of which can 
be called ’economic man’” (Pour une Economie, p. 45).
4» I'He Technological Society, pp. 2l8ff; A Critique, p. 19; Violence, 
pp. 35-36.
5* The Technological Society, p. 193.
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Nothing but this imperative has any value in such a life,” Today 
we are unable to envision comfort except as a part of technological
materialism
Comfort for us means bathrooms, easy chairs, foam ’rubber mattresses, 
air conditioning, washing machines, and so forth. The chief con­
cern is to avoid effort and promote rest and physical euphorea.
For us comfort is closely associated with the material life; it ? 
manifests itself in the perfection of personal goods and machines.
The Relativisingef Money
Ellul believes that the only hope of relativizing money has to
do with the receipt of God’s grace and power which leads to true 
3
freedom. When God’s presence leads to the relativizing of money, 
then it becomes a material instrument, rather than a demonic power of 
temptation.When money is de~demonized, when man's relationship to 
it is no longer that of preoccupation with the things it can buy —
1. The Technological Society, p. 221.
2. JbJ^ii, P* "The gigantic effort at adjustment, the glorification
of the extraverted individual, and the hatred of tensions and conflicts 
rests entirely cn the idea that the only aim, the only sense, the
only value in human life is happiness, and, further, on the conviction 
that the only means, the only road to happiness is comfort — 
material comfort (high living standard, reduction of work, absence 
of physical pain) and moral comfort (security, easily applicable 
doctrines and explanations, idealism). These values are the same in 
the Western and Communist worlds" (The Political Illusion, p. 208).
This statement seems more applicable to Western than to Eastern 
materialism (especially that practised in Communist China). Else­
where Ellul does distinguish between Communist and Capitalist mater-' 
ialism. In both cases man's true life is seen to have to do with 
production and consumption, but Capitalism represents "a suppression 
of 'oeAn& in Personal having", whereas Communism represents "a suppress­
ion of freing in collective doing and having” (L*Homme et L*Argent, 
p. 22). This distinction seems basically accurate, though, in the 
light of the continual Westernization of Russian Communism, not 
absolute. (Even Chinese Communism may be subject to Western influ­
ences. One notes with interest the fact that they have placed 
orders for supersonic aircraft.)
3. ”1?Argent”, pp. 39» 41-42, 43, 60.
4. Ibid., p. 60.
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then money can he used, to the glory of God and tho service of man .J 
In the light of the fact that Ellul does recognize that money can 
assume a proper place in the Christian life, his basic thesis, that, 
the relationship of rnan to money is that of slavery to the demonic, 
really applies only to the non-Christian relationship to money. For
Christians money can cease from being an active subject provided . 
that- Christians find freedom through bondage to Jesus Christ. Christ 
is precisely the Saviour who frees man from bondage to economic
detersn inants
Though the stewardship use of money is important for Ellul, it
is not the sole basis of his attitude toward money. Following the
teachings of Jesus just discussed, he genuinely believes that money
is a threat to man’s relationship to God. He just reverses the ••
modern commonplace that "the spiritual side of life cannot develop
until the standard of living is raised.Quite to the contrary,
he believes that materialistic abundance hinders the spiritual life.
While avoiding a legalistic interpretation which would define true •
Christian life as totally devoid of property, he believes that to choose 
God means to reject lesser gods, money included.^ "No one can serve 
tv/o masters; for either he will hate the one and love the other, or 
he will be devoted to one and despise the other. You cannot serve
God and mammon" (Mtt. 6:24). In keeping with his "One Kingdom” 
reasoning, he believes that the choice of God in opposition to money
1. ’’L’Humilite Precede la Gloire," pp. 41~42.
2. See above, pp. for a general discussion directly related to
this entire chapter.
3- A Critique, pp. 179-195? see also The Technological Society, 
pp". 192, 338. - - ~ '.... •
4. ”L’Argent", pp. 37~38, 42.
is not merely a natter of inner attitude, It involves outward
obedience as well," "There your treasure i,§. i. Gur underline | there 
will your heart be also” (l'tt. 6:2l). The .bible habitually rejects the
2
idea of a possible poverty in spirit when one is rich in terns of money,” 
bnlike much Christian discussion of money and property (which
focuses one-sidedly on the issue of stewardship), Ellul recognises the 
threat which money poses to the human soul. He will not minimize this 
threat by saying that as long as man tithes or gives a large percentage 
of his income to help others— his affluence is no problem to his 
Christian existence. However, he recognises that God the Creator is
•5
aware of man’s need for material things in order to live (Mtt. 6:25-34).J 
His teaching on money is precisely an effort to come to terms with the 
demonic potentials of money, without lapsing into a simple ascetic denial 
of the goodness of creation. His interpretation of the story of the rich 
young man is vexy instructive at this point (Mtt. 19:16-26): ’’Jesus sold 
to him, 'If you would be perfect, go, sell what you possess and give it to the 
poor, and you will have treasure in heaven; and come, followme (Mtt. 19?2l) 1 2 3
1. ”11Argent,” pp. 38, 54•
2. 1’Homme et 1'Argent, p. 189* In I Tim. 6:10 we read, "The love 
of money is the root of all evils.” Ellul will not accept any 
interpretation of this passage which spiritualizes the issue. If 
one does not love money, then one should not devote one’s life to 
monetary accumulation. If one bases one’s outward life on the 
quest for material abundance, this, for Ellul, is evidence that 
one’s inner loyalty is in fact misdirected.
Ellul's teaching is that natural man always has a false under­
standing of money. Both inwardly and outwardly, natural man loves 
money. In Ellul’s view, only faith in Christ can bring deliverance 
from this false relationship with the material world.
3. ”L'Argent," pp. 57-56. Though Mtt. 6:25-34 does not deal
directly with the question of working and earning an income, it 
seems to assume the necessity and legitimacy of so doing. This 
being so, Mtt. 19s21 surely cannot mean that all Christians are 
simply to choose an ascetic life.
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Ellul does not interpret this passage legalistically, as though all
1
Christians simply should sell all of their possessions. He does
believe that the passage must he heard as a warning against directing
our lives toward the acquisition of wealth. Though the saying does 
not establish God's concrete Word for individuals, it provides the 
general context in which that Word can be heard. Christians are to 
be warned of the dangers of wealth and of the dangers of even desiring 
to possess wealth. * (The saying is thus offensive to both rich and 
poor, for the poor often desire to be rich.) He believes that God is 
calling the Church to reject the way of life dictated by the quest for
wealth
Ellul gives an even more specific description of what Christians
ought to do with reference to money. Here one can see the very subtle
way in which he is trying to do justice to the fact that Christians
1. ”L’Argent", p. 41• For examples of Ellul’s rejection of legalism 
concerning the Christian use of money see above, p. 181 n. 2.
2. ’’When Jesus anathematizes the rich young man (that is, what 
modern society wants to make of each of us, to which end it invites 
us to employ our energies), he does not mean the man who could 
forsake his riches, but the one who has directed his energies toward 
the acquisition of wealth, that is, the very spirit of our society 
and our commonplace’♦ For the fundamental question is much less that 
of Having (as opposed to Being) than that of 'Wanting to Have’ , by 
which the will subordinates Being to Having even when one has nothing. 
The problem is to know whether it is legitimate to direct all our 
vital energies toward ’ Having More’(A Critique, p. 189).
3. Ellul’s position is ’close to Barth’s at this point (see above,
p, 11% n. 2). Barth challenges Christians, especially those living 
in the materialistic West, to listen seriously to Jesus’ teachings 
regarding wealth. He nevertheless refuses to give a legalistic 
interpretation to any of Jesus’ words on wealth (Barth, IV/2, pp. 
547-8) • He believes that Jesus’ teachings cannot be ’’reduced to a 
normative technical rule for dealing with possessions" (Barth, IV/2, 
p, 548). Barth tells us that we are not called to follow the rule
of poverty as it was established in the monastic orders. Nor are we 
expected to build a new society freed from the principle of private 
property. In keeping with his covenant ethic, he believes that the 
command of God must be a concrete command claiming us here and now in 
individual ways (Barth, IV/2, p. 548)-
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should receive life in gratitude to God, but without becoming inwardly
or outwardly absorbed in the things of the world. Referring to 11 Cor,
8:3~1z|, he argues that beyond using money for basic needs, Christians 
1
are to give it away, thus helping to establish equality and desacral- 
2izing money, Even with this more detailed direction, he is not giving
a legalistic answer, since it is a matter of concrete obedience to
perceive the precise dividing line between need and excess. Such a
distinction does do justice to the Rev; 'Testament teaching that the
Christian response to the problem of wealth is no merely inward matter 
(Mtt. 6:21).
Ellul has several ways of giving further meaning to this basic
distinction between need and excess. He says that Christians must not
only help the poor, but must themselves assume a style of life which 
shows identification with the poor.- He is not romanticizing crippling 
and destructive poverty. He recognizes that there is a level of need, 
below which no man ought to live. However, he also recognizes that there
is a level of luxury and overconsumption which likewise jeopardizes man’s 
true life. In this regard he refers to Prov. 30:8-9* "Give me neither 
poverty nor riches; feed me with, the food that is needful to me, lest 
I be full, and deny thee, and say,-'Who is the Lord?’ or lest I be poor 
and steal and profane the name of my God.”^ "The man of abundance 
ignores what is Eternal, he satisfies himself with what he possesses..
1. "L’Argent", p. 61 ; L’Homme et L’Argent,pp. 173-174•
2. Violence, p. 166.
3. "The only attitude which Christianity can require is that of personal 
engagement. It is a question of oneself personally assuming the 
situation of the poor, that is, to be .responsible before God, ... It
is a question, in fact, c«f oneself becoming poor with the poor, with 
the Poor One" ("Le Pauvre", p. 125; see also L’Homme et I? Argent, 
p. 208; see above, pp. 138-139.
4. Cited in L’Homme et 1'Argent, p. 171•
5. Ibid., p. 172.
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Yet Ellul admits that poverty is also a great difficulty® ’’The 
relation with God is no more natural in poverty than in riches; the 
poor person is not better disposed: like the rich he comes across a
temptation as difficult to surmount.”
Though Ellul recognizes the dangers of both wealth and poverty,
he puts most of his emphasis on the dangers of the former. He says, 
for example, that the idea of ever-increasing production and consumption
is not a Christian idea, Christianity is not concerned to increase
consumption, ’’but to restrain it”, to bring it back to a normal level.
He believes that Christians must become discerning, making careful 
judgments concerning what the economy offers and eliminating the con™
g
sumption of some things.' (One can see the ecological effect of 
Ellul’s argument, an argument based on uniquely Christian premises*) 
Similarly, in opposition to overconsumption, he says that Christians
must choose in favour of man and in opposition to the domination of 
things over man.^ Christians must gain freedom from obsession with 
material comfort, diminishing the great importance attached to economic
mattersFreedom from material values also means freedom from the
all-important value attached to earning money. He writesi-
A Christian cannot, for example, teach his children that the ultimate 
value is work. He. cannot offer to his children as the purpose of 
life to better one’s position; making them live, as in so many 
bourgeois families ... So many students whom I have seen in my 
courses have always been raised with this idea that the thing which 
counts is to arrive, to have a good profession in society's eyes.
That ... is an absolutely anti-Christian ascendency of work.5
1. L’Homme et 1'Argent, p. 173»
2. Pour une Economie, p. $6,
3. » P» 58; Man's Disorder, p. 56; "I? Argent", p. 50.
4* L’Homme Me sure, p» 17«
5* Pour une Economie, p. 53, An irony of the modern work ethic is 
that man works frantically to attain an ideal which is really the 
absence of work, but never being materially satisfied, continues to 
work harder.
Ellul/...
Because for Ellul what is important is to serve the neighbour, the 
1
primacy of salary is devalued. Though one must work in order to
live, Christian work has to do with seeking to be obedient to God 
?and has nothing to do with earning money.' He believes that only
the Church can challenge materialism, because only the Church has the
freedom to challenge the happiness ideology by which modern men lives-
Ho one else calls in question the happiness of man which comes to 
him by riches, by power, by a greater comfort, by a larger con­
sumption of goods. Humanists are in agreement with this direction. 
There is only the Church, not because it has any virtue, but because 
it- can remember Jesus Christ.3
Ellul gives an elaborate exegetical discussion of the biblical 
meaning of the words "poor" and "rich". His discussion supports his 
view that Christians are not to take part in luxurious overconsumption.
Christians are to be poor, in the threefold biblical sense of the word.
Ellul does not blame the modern work ethic on influences stemming 
from Christianity (A Critique, pp. 150-151)• He recognises that 
Luther shared the values of his day concerning the primacy of work, 
but he thinks that Luther did not create those values, but that they 
had already begun in the 15'th century. Ellul attributes the modern 
work ethic to secular influences beginning in the 15th century, but 
coming to full expression in the 19th century. He thinks that it 
was with the rise of bourgeois society that the work ethic came into 
real prominence (To Will and To Do, p. 195j "Work and Calling", 
pp. 9~10). "The technical movement of the West developed in a • 
world which had already withdrawn from the dominant influence of 
Christianity" (The Technological Society, p. 35)• Previously,
Christianity had been able to apply moral and theological norms, 
which had the effect of retarding technical and material progress 
(ibid., pp. 37-8)* He thinks that Marx later gave work an equally 
high valuation ("Work and Calling", p. 10). "Marx is a truly bourg­
eois, thinker when he explains all of history by work, and when he 
formulates man’s whole relation to the world in terms of work, when 
he evaluates all thought in terms of its relation to work, and when 
he gives work as the creative source of value" (A Critique, p. 154). 
It is Ellul’s opinion that it was only with influences stemming from 
capitalism-technology-communism that work came to be exalted to the 
prime position it now holds (ibid., pp. 151ff.j The Technological 
Society, p. 219)»
1. "L*Argent", pp. 52-3•
2id., p• 59•
3. Pour ur.e Economie, pp. 51~2.
s
‘3
4He begins to define the word ’’poor” by looking to Christ. He says that
the Incarnation was precisely the coming of the Poor One«J Jesus
Christ had nothing of Himself; He depended totally on God. Likewise,
2
He preached the Good Hews to the poor. Prom this Christological
statement one can see two essential elements in Ellul’s biblical under­
standing of the poor: /the absence of material abundance and depend­
ence on God.^ The poor are both financially poor and poor in spirit, 
humble. "One must have an inner attitude of humility ..., an accord 
of the spiritual life and the material condition.”^ He insists that 
neither aspect of this definition can be isolated and still retain the
biblical understanding. If one is financially rich, one’s Christian
spirituality suffers. However, the mere absence of material abund-
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ance does not establish faith. There is both a material and religious 
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aspect to being poor. An additional aspect of Ellul’s biblical
1. ”Le Pauvre”, p. 109.
2. Ibid., pp. 114-115.
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3. Ellul refers to the difference between the Matthean and Lucan 
Beatitudes ("poor in spirit”, ’’poor”) as simply a reflection of the 
double meaning of the Hebrew word. (Mtt. 5:3; Lk. 6:20) (”Le Pauvre,” 
p. 112). Along similar lines, David Hill sees the economic aspect 
of poverty as implied in Matthew’s words "poor in spirit”, though 
of course the religious aspect is intended as well (David Hill, The 
Gospel of Matthew, New Century Bible (London: Marshall, Morgan and 
Scott, 1972), pp. 110-111).
4. ”Le Pauvre”, p. 111. ‘
5* Ibid., pp. 110-111. When poverty is used to justify oneself before 
God it loses all worth. Thus in the parable of the Pharisee and the 
tax-collector (Lk. 18:9-14) the Pharisee, though materially poor, is 
not justified by God (L* Homme et I? Argent, p. 196; see also The Pol­
itics of God, p. 26).
Because poverty in the Christian sense is not the mere absence of ’ 
money, Christians are not to. romanticize physical poverty and resort 
to violence on the behalf of the poor, as though violence on their 
behalf is sacred. One cannot identify the Marxist proletariat with 
the poor in the Christian sense (”Le Pauvre”, p. 117). Since the 
poor are those who hope in God, those who hope in human violence are 
from the biblical perspective among the rich, even if physically poor 
(ibid., p. 114).
Ellul believes that many Christians today support violence because 
they believe that material want is the most important pi’oblem of life. 
’t?0 ~tbe ideal of high consumption and the downgrading of spiritual 
values/..•
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definition of the poor is that they are just' (a point with a Christ- 
ological basis as well). "Otherwise said, poverty is not a justif­
ication for sin. Sin remains sin even if it is accompanied by 
poverty.To the degree that one sins one ceases to be poor in the
biblical sense.
In terms of this threefold definition of being poor, Ellul insists 
that God is on the side of the poor.^ Likewise, he believes that the . 
Bible opposes the rich (Jer. 5:27~29; James 5:1-6), by which he means 
any of the following or any combination of the following: those guilty 
of having more money than they really need, those who direct their ener­
gies toward the acquisition of wealth, those who feel self-sufficient
5
and think they have no need of God's help, or those who victimise others.
values_corresponds a conception of injustice that centers exclusively
on the problem of consumption; and equality in consumption cannot .
be achieved except by violence ""{Violence, p. 37.5T Ellul is not
saying that the only reason Christians today support violence is 
because of an obsession that there be absolute material equality.
He is only saying that this is one prevalent reason why people in 
general support violence and why many Christians do so. Even when 
Christians support violence for the sake of the elimination of 
injustice and exploitation (which of course often express themselves 
in material inequality), one must ask whether they may not often be 
supporting causes which to non-Christians have to do primarily with 
gaining equality of consumption.
1. k* Homme et L'Argent, p. 192.
2. "Le Pauvre", pp. 111-112.
3. Ibid., p. 112.
4. Ibid., p. 114*
5. L'Homme et L'Argent, pp. 41 » 181-6, 201, 203-4; "Le Pauvre", p. 120;
A Critique, p. 189. We should recall that Ellul does insist that
the Church must preach to rich and poor alike ("Le Pauvre", p. 117;
False Presence, p. 35)• For him a degree of poverty is not a pre- ‘
requisite for the receipt of the Gospel, but the style of life which 
constitutes a proper response to the Gospel. (There is a great deal 
of evidence which shows that Jesus had an openness to both rich and 
poor (Mtt. 8:5-13; Ik. 5:27-35; Lk. 7:1-10; Lk. 14:1; Lk. 18:9-14).) 
Apparently for Jesus a level of poverty was not seen as a prerequisite 
for the receipt of grace.
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Ch ristian Stewardship
Having seen that Ellul wishes to relativize money and does so 
by encouraging Christians to rid themselves of all money other than 
that which is truly necessary, we now need to see the connection 
between this relativizing of money and Christian stewardship. One 
obvious connection is negative, Christians are not to justify lux­
urious living on the grounds that by being wealthy they will be in
better positions to help the poor. Though Ellul favours Christian 
stewardship, he rejects such luxurious accumulation, even if stewardship 
is claimed as the motive.^ His 'whole theology stresses the importance 
of consistency between the Christian way of life and the Gospel
proclaimed. If Christians are to witness to the fact that God has
blessed the poor in Jesus Christ, they cannot do so if their own
lives proclaim the gospel of wealth. Another negative conclusion
is apparent. Though Christians are to help the poor to reach a level
whereby their needs are satisfied, they are not to.help them to become 
2rich. Christians are to help the poor, but are not to encourage a
materialistic way of life. Christians are to seek to live in -
faithfulness to Jesus Christ — the One who both healed the sick and
who warned of the dangers of excessive wealth.
We turn now to the positive aspect of Ellul’s teaching on stew­
ardship. He insists that property does not belong to man, but is •
■>
entrusted to him for the purpose of being used in ways pleasing to God. 
This being the case, Christians are not free to do as they like with
1. L’Homme et I? Argent, p♦ 61.
2. Ibid., p. 209.
3. Eour une Economie, p« 56; UHomme Mesure, pp. 17-18; L’Homme et 
I?Argent, p. 36.
•• "si
the goods they "possess".* Beyond simply providing for the ess­
entials of life, the Christian use of money is only for helping the 
poor. (By this Ellul would surely include contributing money toward 
the proclamation of the Gospel.) Christians are to use money in this 
way quite simply because they believe that this is the Christian way 
of using money. In helping the poor Christians must have no feeling 
of virtue or merit,3
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1. Pour une Eoonoroie, p. 57■ Commenting on Luke 16:1-13 G.B. Caird 
writes, "Worldly wealth is given to men on trust; it does not 
belong to them, but by their use of it they can show whether or not 
they are fit to be entrusted with real wealth, the wealth of the 
heavenly kingdom" (G-.B, Caird, Saint bake, p. 188). "All money, 
however acquired, is tainted unless it is used in God's service"
(ibid., p. 189),
2. We have already spoken at length about Ellul’s belief that the 
Church should seek to help the really poor (see above, pp, 138-143) •
We have already had occasion to criticize him for his one-sidedly 
personal understanding of the expression of Christian love (see above, 
pp. 197-208 ) and for his tendency to divorce Christian concern for 
the poor from support for programmes and institutions seeking to help 
the poor (see above,pp. 207-208). We believe that to limit Christian 
activity on the behalf of the poor in this way is unnecessarily to 
restrict the scope of love's concern.
3. "L’Argent", pp. 61-2; L’Homme et L’Argent, p. 60. Ellul refers 
to the parable of the last Judgment to make his point concerning the 
necessity of Christian concern on the behalf of the poor (Mtt. 25:31-46) 
(L’Homme et L’Argent, p. 201).’ "Our attitude with regard to the
poor is a response to the question of God" (L'Homme et L’Argent, 
p. 201). ’
Additional teachings of Jesus can be cited in defence of Ellul’s 
position. Professor Hauc.k writes, "The only possibility for Jesus 
is the renunciation of earthly wealth as this is expressed in giving 
it to the poor. This ethically unobjectionable and religiously 
prudent use of earthly riches in the service of love for others is 
something which the righteous may learn from the ethically unjust­
ifiable but clever use of money for corrupt purposes as this may be 
seen in the world (Lk. 16:1-7, 9)n (Hauck, Theological Dictionary 
of the New Testament, Vol. IV, G-. Kittel, ed., p. 390)7 Joachim 
Jeremias writes, "Again and again Jesus appeals for money to be given 
to the poor (Mark 10:21 par.; Matt. 6:4, 20; Luke 12:33); here we 
should remember that in the east ’almsgiving’ is not a support for 
beggary, but the dominant form of social help. Jesus takes over the 
social demands of the prophets. A3 earlier, in the prophetic 
preaching, the divine right is the right of the poor" (Jeremias,
New Testament Theology, Vol. 1, pp. 221-222). .
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Evaluation .
Ellul has given a modern restatement of several teachings of 
Jesus which are all too easily ignored or softened by a Church living 
in a materialistically prosperous society. His interpretation of
Jesus' teaching on wealth is not ascetic in the strict sense of the
word. The Christian is not to flee from involvement in the material
world; he is not to be ungrateful for God’s creative and providential
1
blessings, even those of a physical sort; he is not to be indifferent 
to the suffering of those who live under the burden of poverty,
Ellul's interpretation of Jesus’ teaching and Jesus' teaching itself
seem to us to have a touch of the ascetic about them. Money and the
things that money can buy are seen to have a seductive power about
them, which leads men to worship the creation, rather than the Creator 
(Rom, 1:25)* Thus both inwardly and outwardly man is to seek to be 
freed from bondage to wealth, and to live at a material level which 
manifests this freedom. We believe that Ellul is correct in noting 
this ascetic aspect of Jesus' thought, and in seeing it as authoritative 
— in spite of the fact that it is often ignored. We especially think
that Mtt. 6:21 ("Where your treasure is • ••”) underlines the point that 
allegiance to Christ should make a real difference in terms of the 
outward possession of wealth. Ellul’s position is based on Scripture
and what he perceives to be the Word of God in Scripture. He knows ‘
that what he has said is not easy to hear and is in fact an offence to
everyone, himself included. Yet he does not believe that he has the 
freedom to deny what he believes to be the Word of God. He writes
1. In support of this contention one recalls that Ellul does affirm 
that God the Creator knows that we have need of material things and 
provides for our needs (Mit. 6:25-33) ("L’Argent”, pp. 57-58)• 
Similarly, he teaches that a parent's gift of money to his children 
can be a sign of genuine love (L'Homme et I?Argent, p. 160).
__ ________ ivi*
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I know that this runs exactly contrary to our interests and to our 
good intentions. This contradicts at the same time the rich and 
those who would like to enable the poor to become rich. This 
contradicts myself. But I believe that it is truly an affirmation 
of the Word of God, and I will hold it for as long as people have 
not shown me by Scripture itself that 1 have been wrong,"!
We agree that Christian stewardship is a masquerade if 
Christians live in luxury while claiming to be concerned for the poor. 
Ellul's insistence that Christians are not only to help the poor, but 
to stand in identification with the poor is one of his most original 
contributions to the Christian conversation concerning wealth. Of
course it is much easier to state the importance of a distinction
. 2between need and excess than it is to realize the difference in life,
(Ellul himself is quite aware that it is easier to talk about the 
Christian life than it is to live it.) Though it is a virtual 
certainty that most Christians in the West are guilty of living in 
affluence, it still is no easy matter to know exactly what does const­
itute a life freed from luxury. How broadly or narrowly is one to 
interpret need? Should aesthetic and educational considera/tions be 1 2
1, "Le Pauvre”, p. 127.
2. In the absence of some distinction between need and luxury Christian 
practice would be faulty. If there were not a level of need, below 
which people ought not to fall, Christians would have no responsibility 
to help raise the living standards of the poor. If there were no 
level of overconsumption to be avoided, Christians would simply
help people from one problem (poverty) into another one (affluence).
By interpreting New Testament teachings on wealth non­
legalistically, Ellul is able to apply the New Testament directly to 
the changed situation of the twentieth century. It is true that his 
discussion focuses one-sidedly on individual responsibility and avoids 
the question of the relative worth of various economic systems. This 
is because Ellul does not think that Christianity can be identified 
with any economic system (it judges them all)'and because he is con­
vinced that many people today avoid individual responsibility because 
they expect economic systems to solve all of their problems concerning 
money (L1Homme et L*Argent, pp. 7“17, 24-29; "L’Argent”, p. 29).
His general political cynicism also influences his thought at this 
point; he has little confidence in either capitalist, socialist or 
communist remedies (I? Iiomme et L* Argent, pp. 20-24).
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included in this category? Even at the level of the consumption of 
food, there is no easy formula as to what constitutes luxury. foes
an occasional hottie of wine? What about an occasional steak? Can
Christians in good conscience own cars, television sets, tape recorders, 
etc., etc.? When one starts thinking xn terms of specific issues it
becomes obvious that the distinction between need and excess cannot
itself give precise answers to the question, ’’What ought the Christian 
to do?" There are no general and timeless answers to such a specific 
question. Ellul’s distinction is not intended to offer any such spec­
ific answers; such answers would be distasteful to him, on the grounds
that they would constitute casuistry pure and simple. What he is seek­
ing to do is to sound a warning, so that Christians will begin to think 
seriously about the concrete way in which their outward lives should 
be shaped to conform to the Gospel. He is not claiming that there is 
some easy way to know, let alone to practise, the distinction between
need and luxury. He is only claiming that Christians as individuals
should struggle to be concretely obedient in ways which seek to make
1
good the distinction as it works out in their own lives. Though the
realisation of his distinction would be no easy matter and though the
shape of obedience would vary from individual to individual and from 
2society to society, we still think that the recognition of some such
distinction is a necessary first step toward the responsible Christian 
use of money.
1» We could restate the distinction in another way. Insofar as 
material things genuinely help Christians to prepare to serve, they 
are to be used. Insofar as they do not help, they are to be rejected. 
Again, this restatement does not answer specific questions as to 
what Christians ought to do.
2. At the present time in the United States, owing to the inadequacies 
of public transportation and the scattered nature of congregations, 
it is impossible for many clergymen to visit the homes of their 
parishmners if the clergymen do not own cars.
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If Christians were to strive to realize a distinction between
need and luxury, they would have to undertake the painful task of 
distancing themselves from the society in which they live (be that in 
the East or in the West). Such a distancing from the world’s values 
would inevitably lead to persecution and suffering, since to call in 
question the materialism of the world would seem like madness to those 
preoccupied with material values. The ethical position Ellul espouses
is never easy •— in fact it is always so difficult that Christians
cannot possibly accomplish what is called for. The only question is
whether Ellul is right in his interpretation of Scripture and whether
the Christian God is the resource adequate to meet the severe demands
that His Scripture lays upon Christians.
Though Ellul is severe at this point, he is not harsh. He is
well aware that the Church in the West is bourgeois and he is not 
claiming that because she is so she is not the Church. Likewise,
his understanding of the Christian faith is such that it is not seen 
to be first and foremost moral demand, but divine forgiveness. Even 
so, Ellul is still trying to help rich Christians to recognize that 
their riches are getting in the way of their relationship to God and 
their service to men. While preaching the same sermon to himself, he 
is calling the Church to repentance in this concrete way.^
1• Ealse Presence, p. 35.
2. ”Le Pauvre”, p. 116

CHAPTER IX
THE CHRISTIAN UNDERSTANDING OP VIOLENCE
In illustrative ways we already have had occasion to refer to
Ellul’s view on violence. In this chapter we will seek to give a 
systematic statement of his position, utilizing earlier scattered refer­
ences, hut going into the topic in greater' depth. As we do so, we will 
see that what he says concerning the issue of violence is really the
application of many of the major theological points we have previously
seen to he essential to his thinking.
We will he concerned to deal with the breadth of Ellul’s social 
and theological thought on the issue of violence. (His analysis of the 
nature of violence is based on both sociological and theological factors.) 
However, it is our view that his normative position can stand on its own, 
even if, for various reasons, we do not find his analysis of the nature 
and consequences of violence to he entirely convincing. We will first 
discuss his social and theological analysis of the nature and consequences 
of violence and secondly will consider his normative theological response
to violence. ’
Ellul defends the importance of Christian realism as the approach 
appropriate to ’’social ethics” and to the issue of violence. By Christ­
ian realism he means the practice of seeing the facts without illusion 
or evasion and the willingness to gauge the probable consequences of 
action. He is not advocating the practice of deriving Christian
1 • Violence, pp. 81-2. ’’Now, I have been studying the problem of 
violence (especially violence as practiced today) for a long time, and 
on several occasions have played some role in violent actions. So 
I,can state that what is most lacking in this regard among my brother 
Christians is neither good will nor charity, neither concern for 
justice nor dedication, neither enthusiasm nor willingness to make 
sacrifices — none of these; what is lacking is realism. Where 
violence/,,. .
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principles of action from an analysis of social reality. Quite to 
the contrary, he believes that Christ grants freedom from bondage to 
the sinful order of necessity. In the case of violence, he sees the
Christian response as involving a direct challenge of the facts of 
the world (violence as an order of necessity), Likewise, his assess­
ment of the results of violence is so pessimistic that it discourages
conduct adjusted to social reality.
pViolence: An Order of Necessity
Ellul sees violence as an aspect of the fallen order of necessity.
(The order of necessity describes the conditions which result from man’s 
□
sinful separation from God.) Though from a Christian perspective he
sees violence as contrary to Christian freedom and obedience, he thinks 
that it is an inescapable reality for the sinful world, which must of 
necessity operate on the basis of its non-Christian assumptions.^ He
violence is concerned, Christians generally behave like imbecile child­
ren. /end I do not believe that stupidity is a Christian virtue. - 
On the other hand, intelligence is obviously not an absolute require­
ment, but realism as I have tried to define it is. I shall cite 
only one text: ’But Jesus did not trust himself to them, for he
knew what was in man’ (John 2:24-25) — though this certainly did not 
keep him from giving his life for these same men’.” (Violence, pp.
93-4» see also pp. 122-125). ,
1. Ibid., p. 83. .
2. Ellul believes that to point out the radically violent nature of 
society is a Christian .judgment made possible by the courage acquired 
through faith in Christ (ibid., p. 91)• We recall our earlier 
discussion of his understanding of the relationship between eschato­
logical hope and Christian realism (see above, pp. 66-68).
3. Ibid., p. 128.
4. Ibid,, p. 91; 
1970Vp. 221. 
hum an nature.
’’Correspondence, ” Christianity and Crisis XXX (Oct. 19, 
"1 am not saying that violence is an expression of 
I am saying, for one thing, that violence is the 
general rule for the existence of societies — including the societies 
that call themselves civilised but have only camouflaged violence by 
explaining and justifying it and putting a good face on it. 1 am 
saying also that when a man goes the way of violence he enters a 
system of necessities and subjects both himself and others to it” 
(Violence/ ... ' .
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speaks of violence as a reality so common and widespread throughout
1
history that it can he compared witn physical laws, such as gravitation.
He thinks that violence is a part of the natural order of the world.
’’Since the days of Cain, there has been no beginning of violence, only
a continuous process of retaliation. □.» When a man is born, violence 
2
is already there, already present in him and around him.” "Wherever
we turn, we find society riddled with violence. Violence is .its 
natural condition, as Thomas Hobbes saw clearly."^ The natural way 
of life is to conform to the order of violence.
That society is plagued by violence is, for Ellul, a sociological 
judgment which he sees confirmed by Scripture. As for the scriptural 
observation of the same, he says that Jesus Christ told us of the 
violent nature of the world when he said, "’You know that the rulers of 
the Gentiles lord it over them, and their great men exercise authority 
over them’"(Mtt. 20:25) One wonders if Ellul has not overinter­
preted this passage in a way which corresponds to his own sociological 
view that government can only employ the means of violence. He says 
that "Violence is not only the means the poor use to claim their rights;
(Violence, p. 92). "As violent persons, we are fully conformed to the 
world. Violence is one of the ‘ rudiments’ (stoioheia) of this 
world" (Prayer and Modern Man, p. 174)*
1 • Violence, p. 129• .
2. Ibid., p. 100.
3. Ibid., p. 87. Having argued that violence is of the order of 
necessity, it seems a curious inconsistency to blame violence on the 
Christians’ failure to be good missionaries. Ellul does precisely 
this when he writes, "If violence is unleashed anywhere at all the 
Christians are always to blame" (ibid., p. 1~56). If violence is as 
widespread as he here suggests, it also seems inconsistent to see war 
as a function of the city (The Meaning of the City, p. 51; see above.,
p. 25). .............................................
4* Violence, pp. 91-2.
5* Ibid., p. 93.
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it is also the sole [my underline] means available to those in places 
of power,”The scriptural passage does imply that worldly rulers 
must of necessity use methods of violence; however, it does not say
that these are the sole means at their disposal.
As we move from Ellul’s biblical statement to consider his modern
sociological observation, he seems similarly to have overstated the 
degree to which the world is ruled by violence, (Since he elsewhere 
argues that some non-Christian acts can be objectively in agreement with 
Cod's intention, we see no theological necessity for this overstatement,) 
We can agree that the relationship between the classes necessarily
involves a degree of violent competition for the attainment of wealth.
We can agree that it is only natural that this is so, since there is
no reason why the lower classes should be willing to accept upper-class 
2
domination. Unfortunately, Ellul goes much further/ writing that 
"Economic relations, class relations, are relations of violence, nothing 
else” [my underline].it simply does not seem empirically true that
1 » Violence, p. 93• .
2. Ibid.t p. 87.
3. Ibid., p. 86; see p. 110. This sweeping statement seems to apply 
to all economic systems. Ellul specifically criticizes the capitalist 
system of free competition, but he also says that the planned economy 
also involves violence (.ibicu, p. 86). If violence is an order of 
necessity, every human economic arrangement will necessarily involve 
violence. (Cur question is simply whether there are not important 
degrees of violence, even within particular economic systems.)
It would be beyond the scope of this work to enter into the inter­
esting question of the relative merits of various economic systems. 
Though Ellul seems to have a human preference on this matter, his 
opinion does not appear to inform his Christian ethic. He explicitly 
states that he prefers socialism, but at most places even this relative 
preference is hard to discern. His cynicism concerning all economic 
systems is stronger than his preference for any (Propaganda, pp. 
222-223; Violence, p, 32; A Critique, p. 21). He can even write, 
"Undoubtedly the problem of poverty can be solved. But nothing
indicates that it can be more easily solved under Socialism than 
under capitalism'1 1 (Propaganda, p. 222). Ellul's Christian ethic is 
applicable to Christians living under any and every economic system.
It is also the case that though he seems to prefer socialism, he sees 
technology/..•
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economic relations and class relations involve nothing but violence.
When Ellul describes the state as necessarily employing violence,
he makes a legitimate observation, but he expresses his point so as to
imply that states can use no means other than those of violence. He
is surely correct in his observation that states are established by
acts of violence and are recognized as states when they have had the 
-j
power to stay in existence for a reasonable period of time, He • 
points out that the first task of any would-be state is to establish
order in the street. Only later can a legal system be established.
Also, he thinks that if any situations arise which threaten the existing
order, '’emergency laws” are enacted whereby the state simply resorts to 
2violence to save itself. It seems true that Christians ought not to ' 
tell states never to employ force, since such advice would involve the 
outright rejection of every state, past and present.^ Such advice
technology as the real menace common to all modern economic systems 
(Presence of the Kingdomtpp. 36, 121). Whether or not the workers 
own the means of production is to him a less important issue than 
the dehumanizing effect of technique on modern man (The Technological 
Society, pp. 197~t98; Propaganda, pp. 222-223). Assembly line work 
is boring and dehumanizing whether done in a capitalist, socialist, 
or communist society.
1. Violence, pp. 84-5* As an example of the way in which the United 
States was established and is maintained by violence Ellul refers to 
the slow and ’’sanctimonious extermination of the Indians, the system 
of occupying the land (Faustrecht), the competitive methods of 
leading capitalist groups, the annexation of California along with 
the retrieval of Texas", not to mention Negro slavery(ibid., p. 88)*
2. Ibid., pp. 85-6$ The Political Illusion, p. 74.
3. "To say that the state should not employ force is simply to say 
that there should be no state. It is the same with regard to war. • 
To the extent that the state is charged with ensuring the survival
of the social group that it leads and represents, it cannot avoid 
war" (ibid., p. 76). "To demand that a non-Christian state should 
refrain from using violence is hypocrisy of the worst sort; for the 
Christian position derives from the faith, and moreover he exercises 
no responsible political function. To ask a government not to use 
the police when revolutionary trouble is afoot, or not to use the army 
when the international situation is dangerous, is to ask the state 
to commit hara-kiri. A state responsible for maintaining order and 
defending/...
- 343
would, also involve the Christian in the confusion of demanding that
non-Christians conduct themselves in Christian ways. We are pre­
pared to admit that violence is an aspect of every society and is 
present at every point in society’s development. Ellul, however, is 
not content to leave matters here, but goes on to say that the only 
means available to governments are those of violence. . How does he
say that a government stays in power? "By violence, simply by vio-
1
lence. It has to eliminate its enemies.” In democratic countries
one would think that governments would have to attain certain goals 
pleasing to the people. Thus, one would think that governments could 
not stay in power simply by the use of violence. Ellul can counter 
that even in democracies, governments stay in power by the use of 
propaganda, a form of violence. To argue as he does, that governments 
don’t at alI reflect the interests of the voters, but simply mould 
public opinion to reflect the government’s concerns, seems an
exaggeration.
The Laws of Violence
Having established that violence is an inevitable aspect of all
societies, having seen the facts, Ellul goes on to develop the second
aspect of his realism as applied to violence. He examines the con­
' 2sequences of violence , and describes the consequences in terms of
various “laws of violence.Just as we have had occasion to criticize
defending the nation cannot accede to such a request" (Violence, p.
159). " I can say that all war is unjust and all force to be con­
demned. . But this is a matter for the moralist or the individual; 
the state cannot possibly judge in this fashion. It would simply 
condemn itself to disappear and to be replaced by another state that 
would show less compunction to use force” (The Political Illusion, p. 77).
1* Violence, p. 85; see also p. 93 •
2. Ibid., p. 93. '
3. Ellul gives a short summary of the meaning of these sociological
laws/'***. . .
the overdrawn way in which he describes the violent nature of the world, 
so we will need to criticize his laws of violence. Though we find a 
great deal of truth implied in these laws, we believe that Ellul has 
in most cases pushed the truth further than it will really go.
The first of Ellul’s laws of violence which we will discuss is
that of sameness. His basic point concerning this law is that "all 
■j
kinds of violence are the same.” "Violence is hubris, fury, madness.
There are no such things as major and minor violence. Violence is a 
2single thing, and it is always the same." Because he regards all
forms of violence as similar, he refuses to distinguish between justifi- 
3
able and unjustifiable violence, He refuses to evaluate violence on
the basis of the goals to which it is committed, rejecting the assump­
tion that particular moral ends justify the means of violence. He 
lumps in the. same category the physical violence of "the soldier who 
kills, the policeman who bludgeons, the rebel who commits arson, the
/i
revolutionary who assassinates."f In the same category with physical
violence he includes economic violence,
the violence of the privileged proprietor against his workers, of the 
’haves’ against the 'have-nots’; the violence done in international 
economic relations between our own-societies and those of the Third 
World; the violence done through powerful corporations which exploit 
the resources of a country that is unable to defend itself.5
Iiis reasoning here is based not only on modern sociological observation, 
but on Jesus' refusal to draw a distinction between being angry and 
murdering (Mtt. 5:21-22), which Ellul understands as a sociological
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laws. He says that violence "necessarily produces new violence, and 
that situations created by violence are never just" ("Correspondence," 
p. 221). - .
1 * Violence, p. 97 •
2. i P- 99­
3. Ibid., p. 97­
4- Ibid,, p, 97•
5. Ibid., p. 97-
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observation about the sameness of violence in the world at large.
From the above statements we can see that one aspect of Ellul’s
law of sameness is his emphasis on the violent nature of subtle forms
of violence. It is his viev; that velvet-gloved violence can be just 
as violent as the ironhanded variety. He condemns psychological 
forms of violence, such as
propaganda, biased reports, meetings of secret societies that inflate 
the egos of their members, brainwashing;, or intellectual terrorism.
In all these cases the victim is subjected to violence and is led to 
do what he did not want to do, so that his capacity for further 
personal development is destroyed. Psychological violence, though 
it seems less cruel than the policemen’s bludgeon, is in fact worse, 
because the reaction it stimulates does not take the form of pride 
or self-assertion.2
He even argues that the psychological violence employed by all countries 
is the worst form of violence, ’’because it lays hold of the whole man, 
and, without his knowing it, gelds him;”^
Though we doubt that Mtt. 5:21-22 can legitimately be used to
make the above point, we have no basic quarrel with the notion that
subtle forms of violence are indeed violent. This aspect of Ellul’s
argument could help Christians to repent of involvement in forms of
1. Violence, p, 99* ’
2. Ibid,, p. 97­
3. Ibid., p. 98. ’’The velvet-gloved, violence of the powerful who
maintain the regimes of injustice, exploitation, profiteering, and 
hatred has its exact counterpart in the iron-fist violence of the 
oppressed. Likewise the violence of nations, be they weak or power­
ful, encourages violence in their people. When a nation — as all 
European nations do — trains its young men in the most extreme kinds 
of violence in order to prepare them for battle (parachutists, etc.), 
the result is hound to be that the whole nation imitates this violence” 
(ibid., p. 98)* Among the varieties of violence Ellul includes: -
’‘psychological manipulation, doctrinal terrorism, economic imperial­
ism, the venomous warfare of free competition, as well as torture, 
guerrilla movements, police action. The capitalist who, operating 
from his headquarters, exploits the mass of xvorkers or colonial peo­
ples is just as violent as the guerrilla ...” (ibid., p. 130),
- 346
violence which are easily overlooked, by those who merely criticize 
physical violence. Though Ellul seems to single out psychological 
violence as xvorse than other forms of violence, it is clear that his 
basic point is the similarity of both subtle and. more overt forms of
violence•
Not only is Ellul arguing for the essential similarity of 
subtle and overt forms of violence, he is also saying that all forms 
of physical violence are identical. He thus rejects any distinction
between violence and force, the latter being legitimate and .justified
j
because it is undertaken by the state, At this point we think
Ellul’s position must be subjected to severe criticism. We agree 
othat states are established by violence and to some degree are main­
tained by the same.^ We also agree that much that has been justified 
as the state’s exercize of legitimate force really falls under the 
heading of violence pure and simple, But is all force employed by the 
state to be so categorized and condemned? We think not.
To make this identification of all force with violence Ellul
appeals to Mtt. 5!21-22. He writes, "This passage is no ’evangelical
counsel for the converted’; it is purely and simply, a description of 
A '
the nature of violence," Quite to the contrary, we think that this 
passage is precisely what he claims it is not. It seems to be a norm­
ative statement of what Matthew understood as a requirement of Jesus for 
Christians. It does not seem to be a sociological description of
1. Violence, p. 84.
2. The fact that states are established by violence does not prove 
that all future acts of force committed by states so established 
are necessarily violent in the same sense.
3* Violence, pp. 84-85•
4* Ibid., p. 99*
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Jesus’reality; in fact, it does not even seem to refer to society. ’ 
obliteration of the distinction between anger and murder radicalises the 
meaning of obedience for Christions■> It is unlikely that this teaching
was intended to obliterate all social distinctions between different
forms of violence in the social order.
Wot only does Mtt, 5^21-22 seem to be incapable of establishing
the sameness between force and violence, but Rom. 13 and parallel ■ •
passages seem to imply the very distinction Ellul is attempting to 
use Mtt. 5:21-22 to refute, Though we think that Rom. 13 is much too 
flattering concerning the state, it nevertheless seems to contain an 
element of truth. When the Christian thinks of physical violence in 
society (as contrasted with the question of whether the Christian can • 
use violence), he finds that some forms of violence are justified, 
because of the end sought. Though the police may indeed employ illeg­
itimate violence, they can also use legitimate force, when seeking to 
protect the common good of society from the outbreak of criminal violence. 
Ellul, to the contrary (and unlike Paul), assumes that even legitimate 
police action is of the same nature, as all other forms of
1 . Of course there is such a thing as police brutality (Violence, 
p. 85) and we think that there is a great deal of it today. All we 
are saying is that not all violent action by the police can be so 
categorized. By the law of sameness, the thief who kills hostages 
and fires on unarmed civilians is no more guilty than the police­
man who fires back to protect society.
I11 rejecting the idea that there are two kinds, of violence, Ellul 
says that ’’violence operates only for the good of its users” (ibid., 
p. 110). This would mean that policemen resort to violence only 
for their own sake*. '
Ellul confuses his own argument concerning the sameness of violence 
by saying that all violence is the same because violence provokes 
counter—violence, which in turn necessitates greater violence.
Because he regards this to be the case, he says that violence knows 
no-Jimits, and.hence condoning violence in one form means condoning all 
other forms (ibid,, p. 98). The police use of force may have the 
effect of provoking counter-violence on the part of the criminals. 
However, it seems even truer that the absence of all force on the part 
of the polio© would provoke the greatest violence of all — virtual 
mob rule’.
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violence,' Using Rom. 13, one can argue that the violence committed 
by a hijacker, endangering innocent lives, is different from that of 
a policeman who, in an effort to protect the passengers, is forced to 
shoot the hijacker. It’s not just that common sense seems to recognise
the difference between various forms of physical violence — Scripture
itself sees the difference. Of course, this is not to say that the * 
Christian as such can in good conscience be involved in violence. It
is to say that the Christian attitude toward violence in society need
not be as simplistic as Ellul suggests.
A second law of violence is that of continuity. The point here
is very simple: ’’Once you start using violence, you cannot get away 
from it."1* To resort to violence is a way of simplifying situations 
and Ellul thinks that this habit once learned cannot be quickly 
broken,He goes on to use language which states that the habit of 
violence once learned cannot be broken at all. "Once a man has begun 
to use violence he will never stop using it, for it is so much easier 1 2 3
1. Violence, pp. 84, 97~99» 130. Earlier in Ellul’s career he had 
seen a positive role for the use of force by the state. At that time 
he believed that some use of force by the state is legitimate, since 
the state is charged with sustaining the life of the nation. Refer­
ring to the state he wrote, "It has received the sword, and we know 
how the use of this weapon is justified. The state is charged with 
making law effective, supporting law by force. Law simply cannot
be conceived of without enforcement by an outside authority" (Theolo- ’ 
gical Foundation of Law, p. 125) • As his sociological pessimism 
increased over the years, his ability to distinguish between shades 
of grey seems to have decreased,
Ellul elsewhere wrote that the state is“charged by God with the 
responsibility of punishing evil" ("Rappels et Reflexions", p. 166). 
Having recognized this insight, it is strange that he affirms this 
law of sameness, which has the effect of denying the obvious impli­
cation of the Pauline teaching -— the possibility that certain 
forms of state violence are justified because of the goals to which 
they are dedicated.
2. Violence, p. 94*
3. Ibid,, p. 94.
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and more practical than any other method* It simplifies relations with
the other completely by denying that the other exists.”Ellul thinks
that this reasoning applies not only to individuals but to nations*
He thinks that revolutionary movements learn the habit of violence; 
thus, when they come to power they become violent like the reactionary 
governments they have overthrown
The Marxist idealists are simply naive when they believe that, once 
a reactionary government has been overthrown by violence, a just and 
peaceful regime will be established* Castro rules only by violence, 
Nasser and Boumedienne likewise; there is no difference at all 
between their regimes and the previous colonialist regimes that they 
ousted by violence*2
Ellul himself was a freedom fighter” who has now become an advocate 
of non-violence. To say that once an individual has used violence he
cannot cease using it, is to minimise the significance of repentance. 
Perhaps Ellul’s language is not to be taken literally. He rnay simply 
mean that the habit of violence once learned is not easily set aside. 
Stated this way there is a great deal of truth to what he says, at
least at the individual level,
On the social-political level one can see that Ellul is rebelling 
against the Marxist doctrine that a kingdom of peace can come about 
through violent means. Since he has’already argued that every govern­
ment maintains itself by violence, he certainly cannot agree with the 
Marxists* claim that once they are in power peace will reign. By 
talking of the acquisition of the habit of violence, he apparently is 
describing one of the ways in which violence perpetuates itself within
all states.
1• Violence, p» 94•
2. Ebid., p. 94.
3. Of course, for Ellul the difficulties are deeper than the establish­
ment of the habit of violence. On his terms governments must of 
necessity employ violence.
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The third law of violence we will discuss is really but an
amplification of the law of continuity. The main point here is
likewise to refute the Marxist claim that violence can create a just 
j
and peaceful society, This is unlikely because violent revolutionaries, 
having learned the habit of violence, bring about a reign of violence, 
when they become statesmen. He does not give a title to this law, but 
instead simply states it: "Violence begets violence no thing
p
eljee." It is understandable that violence cannot itself create 
justice and peace, the latter being a political rather than a military 
task. The confusion in Ellul’s thought is whether violent revolution 
can even, be instrumental in the eventual^ creation of a society ’which • 
has a higher degree of justice than the previous one. His language 
at this point is not clear, since he can be quoted on both sides.
1. Violence, p. 101, "Violence can never realize a noble aim, can 
never create a liberty or justice. ... Violence will never establish 
a just society" (ibid., p. 102).
2. Ibid., p. 100. Ellul’s language here is so similar to the language 
he uses for the fourth law of violence (violence provoking counter­
violence) that it. is easy to confuse this law and see it as an aspect 
of the law of reciprocity. Of course, all of the laws of violence 
interrelate and it is hard to draw a line between one and the other. 
Nevertheless, we think that the main similarity is with the law of 
continuity. Though violence begets the reaction of counter­
violence, his main point here is that this counter-violence once 
learned is not easily set aside. Because this is so, violent • 
revolutionaries who come to power are unlikely to be less violent 
than the statesmen they eliminate,
3. Even if revolutionaries do not themselves make good politicians, 
this does not disprove the possibility that the eventual results of 
a revolution can be an improvement in the political order, This is 
not to claim that the eventual results of revolution usually are . 
positive, only that they may be.
4. In opposition to the idea that violence can even be instrumental
in the creation of a relatively better society, one can quote the 
following: "Let us then ask what, concretely, is the result, the
actual result of ’legitimate, liberating’ violence. It is plain that 
in every case this violence has in fact led to establishing a 
greater violence. ... What did Algeria’s National Liberation Front 
achieve by its use of violence? Elimination of the French, of 
course; but also an economic recession, the establishment of a 
dictatorial state, a false and altogether regressive socialism, and 
the/...
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Since there is a seeming contradiction in his thought at this point, 
it is perhaps best to read his words as a general warning. Ellul, 
as a student of history, knows that revolutionary movements when they
•5
come to power are seldom improvements over the regimes they have ousted.
in general terms, he regards this as factually true and hence states 
what he regards as the facts of the matter. lie is also saying that 
violence as such never creates a just society. It seems unlikely
the condemnation of all who had participated in the violent struggle, 
because they proved completely unfitted for conducting a rational 
government" (Violence , pp . 110-111). "Institutions established 
through ‘just’ violence are never* an improvement" (ibid., p. 114). 
"Whenever a violent movement has seised power it has made violence 
the law of power. The only thing that has changed is the person 
who exercises violence. Ho government established by violence has 
given the people either liberty or justice — only a show of 
liberty ... And I am speaking not only of the revolutions of 1789, 
1917? or 1933, or the revolutions of Mao, Nasser, Ben Bella, Castro, 
v/hat I say above is true also of ‘liberal’ or ‘democratic’ govern­
ments (l have cited the U.S.A. as an example)" (ibid., p. 101).
Ellul makes one statement on the law of reciprocity which also 
implies that the political order which comes about as a result of 
violence is necessarily worse than the one which preceded it. He 
writes, "The violence of the colonialists creates the violence of 
the anticolonialists, which in turn exceeds that of the colonial- " 
ists" (ibid., p. 95)•
While recognizing that the only certain result of violence is the 
provocation of counter-violence, Ellul elsewhere admits that violence 
may sometimes be instrumental in the later political procurement of 
such values as "equal rights" (ibid., pp. 96-7)• He speaks of
violence as that which can create "a state of disorder out of which 
(depending on hov/ fluid the situation is) renewal may issue" (ibid., 
p. 133). ' That is, though violence cannot itself create order and ' 
justice, the latter may in some cases flow as the result of political 
activity made possible because of revolution.
1. Ellul’s position is related to his own experience of recent French 
history. He writes, "The French resistance to Nazism aimed to 
create a free and just republic. In 1945» the same resisters 
massacred 45>C"3Q people in Seti.f in Algeria, and in 1947 they 
massacred almost 100,000 in Madagascar" (ibid., p. 102)» "The 
French and Italians were held in check by the Nazi occupation. The 
moment they were liberated, their violence exploded, and they per­
petrated crimes and torturings that imitated the atrocities of the 
Germans. I am bound to say that I see no differences at all. 
between the Nazi concentration camps and the camps in which France 
confined the ’collaborators* in 1944 • ••*’ (ibid., p. 9b).
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that he really intends to say that the birth of a nation never leads
eventually to an improved situation,
It see/ns more likely that what he means is that there is no nec­
essity that a new nation will be an improvement and many factors work 
against the likelihood (the laws of violence).
A fourth law of violence is that of reciprocity. Here Ellul is 
thinking not of the creation of a habit, but the provocation of counter­
violence by those against whom violence is directed. ("Violence 
creates violence.")" He thinks that the only certain result of violence 
is "the reciprocity and the reproduction of violence.Violence
creates counter-violence, which in turn necessitates an escalation of
violence."The man who, in whatever ivay, uses violence should realize
that he is entering into a reciprocal kind of relation capable of being 
s
renewed indefinitelyEllul claims to have learned this sooiological 
law from Jesus* words, "’All who take the sword will perish by the
1. If one is not willing to de-literalize Ellul's words in this way, 
one must criticize that side of his thought where he seems to say 
that violence can never be instrumental in the creation of a society 
with a higher degree of justide than previously realized. It simply 
does not seem empirically true that every time a new nation has been 
formed, that nation has always become more violent than the previous 
one. In some situations violence seems to have been an instrument 
in ushering in a relatively better social order, for there are social 
orders which seem relatively better than others and all of them have 
been brought into existence through violence.
If one really believes that with the establishment of a new nation 
greater violence is always in store, then such a belief would con­
tribute to a particular view of history, whereby the world is seen 
as becoming progressively more degenerate. Since Ellul’s apocalyptic 
view of history is not of this kind, we have additional evidence that 
his words on the issue under consideration should be de-literalized.
2. Violence, p. 95­
3- Ibid., p. 96.
4- Ibid., p. 98.
5. Ibid., p. 98.
♦
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sword’" (Mtt, 26:52). He finds Jesus’ statement confirmed by his 
own sociological study.The reason that violence begets violence 
is the psychological fact that violence creates hatred in the recipi­
ents of violence, which eventually breaks out in retaliatory violence."' 
It seems to be true that violence does create resentment, which in
turn leads to further acts of violence. This is indeed one reason
why violence is such a widespread reality.
A fifth law of violence is that the man who uses violence seeks
to justify himself and his violence. Ellul thinks that the reason
so much effort is expended to justify violence is that violence as 
such is so unappealing.More specifically, he believes that it is 
impossible to engage in violence without also hating the person or 
persons against whom violence is directed; yet men are not willing to
admit such hatred. Justifications have to be invented to exonerate
oneself, to make it seem to oneself and to others that the enemy is 
5
not really hated. Contrary to this law of violence, Ellul’s approach
1. lence, p. 95» Matthew alone records Jesus as having said the 
words which form the basis of Ellul's argument. It does seem that 
these words are not a form of moral command to disciples (cf. Mtt.
5:39)» Hut a description of social reality. The text speaks of the 
futility and destructiveness of violence rather than its immorality. 
The reference must be to society rather than to individuals. Surely 
the early Church was not so naive as to understand these words indiv­
idually, as though each person who kills will be killed.
2. Ellul refers to the violence of the blacks at Newark, which, though 
justified, prevoked an even more severe system of repression than 
that against which they were originally rebelling (Violence, pp. 95™6)
3. Ibid.t p. 96.
4* IHid., p. 103.
5« Ibid., pp. 104-3. "The violence exercised by the French and Amer­
ican governments in Algeria and Vietnam, respectively, involves hatred 
only in these cases the hatred is expressed by intermediaries. The 
head of the government can keep on declaring his good will, his object 
ivity, his freedom from hate, for he is net directly engaged in the 
military action. He can keep on pretending to pray and professing 
to love humanity. He can praise non-violence, as President Johnson 
did when Martin Luther King was assassinated. But all that is facade
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is never io give an air of legitimacy to violence. "Christians should.
never offer a spiritual justification for an action or situation of
pure necessity.
We have found typical Ellulian overstatements in this discussion
of Christian realism concerning violence. Concerning both the facts
of violence and the consequences of violence, we have had occasion to
criticize these formulations. It’s not that we think that Ellul is
simply wrong on these points — it’s just that his formulations go 
further than the biblical and sociological evidence seems to permit.
We now move from an analysis of the nature and consequences of violence
to a discussion of Ellul’s normative Christian response to violence.
Christian Freedom from the Violent Order of Necessity
We have seen previously that Ellul believes that violence is an
order of necessity. He thinks "that violence is the general rule for 
2
the existence of societies"; he thinks that violence is a reality so 
common in the world that its existence is comparable to physical laws. 
Ellul, however, does not believe that the universality of a phenomenon 
establishes its legitimacy, that what is natural is necessarily good.^ 
Though he recognizes the all-pervasive reality of violence, he sees it 
as a part of that sinful way of life from which Christ grants freedom.
A ruler has to save face and show that he is a well-disposed man; he 
has to justify himself'." (Violence, pp. 1O4~5)«
1. "Correspondence," p. 221.
2* Violence, p. 92.' •
3. Ibid., p. 129.
3bid., p. 128; To Will and To Do, p. 48; Theological Foundation 
of Law, pp. 11-12. "Necessity does not establish legitimacy" 
(Propaganda, p. xv)• .
5. "For the role of the Christian in society, in the midst of men, is 
to shatter fatalities and necessities. And he cannot fulfill this 
role by using violent means, simply because violence is of the order 
of necessity. To use violence is to be of the world" (Violence, p. 129)
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Jesus recognized the violent nature of the world, hut also went on to
teach that this is not to he the way of life for disciples «J Likewise,
Ellul teaches that violence is normal and natural, but that Christ grants 
ofreedom from this bondage, The exegetical assumption behind his 
rejection of violence because it is of the order of necessity is that 
violence is of the sinful order of necessity. His language itself
often does not make this point,but it is surely assumed. .If we are 
permitted to deliteralize his words about rebellion against the violent 
ordei' of necessity, we can restate his intention as follows: Christians 
are to rebel against the order of necessity which includes violence,
because violence is a sinful expression of man’s fallen condition.
This modified way of expressing Ellul’s thesis does justice to his abso­
lute Christian opposition to violence, while making sense of the fact 
that he does recognize that Christians can sometimes (and perhaps often) 
agree with non-Christians at the level of specific action.
1. ’’’You know that the rulers of the Gentiles lord it over them, 
and their great men exercize authority over them. It shall not be 
so among you; but whoever would be great among you must be your 
servant, and whoever would be first among you must be your slave; 
even as the Son of man came not to be served but to serve, and to give 
his life as a ransom for many’” (Mtt. 20:25-28).
2. Violencet pp. 127, 129.
3. Ellul writes, ’’Therefore I say that only one line of action is open 
to the Christian who is free in Christ. He must struggle against 
violence precisely because violence is the form that human relations
' normally and necessarily take” (ibid., p. 127). ’’The better we 
understand that violence is necessary, indispensible, inevitable,- the 
better shall we be able to reject it and oppose it. If we are free 
in Jesus Christ, we shall reject violence precisely because violence 
is necessary” (ibid., p. 130; see also p. 146). To understand 
these words properly we must remember that Ellul has defined the 
order of necessity as the order of separation from God (ibid., p. 128). 
Though the force of gravity is a fact of life, it is not a part of 
the’’order of necessity”, because it is not the expression of sin.
We think that Ellul basically opposes violence because he regards it 
as contrary to God’s will, not because it is a fact of life*.
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Non-Violence an 3ased oh Un1quely Christian Premises
Ellul's attitude toward violence is not only based on his con­
viction about the freedom which comes through the receipt of grace.
His position is also related to his understanding of the unique nature
and purpose of the Christian life, his belief that Christian conduct
• 4
should be the expression of the Gospel to which Christians adhere.*
Ellul writes, "The Holy Spirit will give true power and efficacy only
to means which are in exact agreement with the actual content of the 
2
gospel,"" He thinks that Christians who endorse violence are not 
introducing a uniquely Christian perspective into their environment, 
but are rather conforming to their social milieu.He believes that
1, He affirms both a social realism and a Christian perfectionism when 
he writes, "The man who does not know freedom in Christ cannot under­
stand the word of freedom Paul spoke in the midst of necessity: 'We 
are afflicted in every way, but not crushed; perplexed, but not 
driven to despair; persecuted, but not forsaken; struck down, but 
not destroyed.’ (ll Corinthians 4t8~9)• Such a man thinks that in 
this situation Paul should have used other means — violence in par­
ticular. We must accept and try to understand this man who does not 
know Christ’s freedom. But let us distinguish clearly between him 
and the man who has known Christ and calls himself a Christian. The 
latter cannot be excused if he uses violence for his own ends. So, 
too, the capitalist or the colonialist who exploits and oppresses his 
fellow men, and the government leader who uses police or military 
violence, are to be radically condemned" (Violence, p. 131).
2. The Politics of God, p. 136.
3» Violence, pp, 46, 66, 6% 147* Ellul’s basic criticism of those 
Christians who today advocate revolution is that they are basically 
conforming to worldly trends. He thinks they accept the fact of 
revolution as a fate and Christianity becomes the variable that is 
modified accordingly (ibid., pp. 47» 51~56, 66, 7^)« Referring 
specifically to Richard Shaull, he accuses him of thinking that it is 
more important to be a revolutionary than to be a Christian (ibid., 
p. 54; Aut-opsie de la Revolution (1969), P* 261). He accuses Shaull 
of naivete about the actual means of violence, when he assumes that 
the bloody methods of war accomplish God's humanizing work. Ellul 
believes that the means of revolution are such as to undermine the 
Christian goals of "forgiveness, freedom, justice and reconciliation", 
the goals Shaull claims are accomplished by revolution (Violence, 
pp. 55-6; Autopsie, pp. 261-2). "1 say only that the act of
torturing a human being, though it be intended to advance the noblest 
of causes, cancels out utterly all intentions and objectives”
(Violence, p, 29)* He says that Shaull fails to remember that "the 
Prince/7. • .
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Christians who advocate violence have forgotten the eschatological
context in which their lives are to he lived,As an historian and
sociologist Ellul understands and sympathizes with the violent rebellion
of the downtrodden, but he thinks Christian participation in violence
’ 2is due to the failure to discern the uniquely Christian form of action, '
Lhat troubles me is that Christians conform to the trend of the 
moment without introducing into it anything specifically Christian,, 
Their convictions are determined by their social milieu, not by 
faith in revelation; they lack the uniqueness which ought to be 
the expression of that faith. Thus theologies become mechanical 
exercises that justify the positions adopted, and justify them on 
grounds that are absolutely not Christian.^1
He also believes that Christians have no excuse for agreeing to support 
violence. The fact that one may have to suffer for one’s beliefs is
seen by him to be no excuse at all. He very much resents the kind of 
reasoning which says that if a government has a draft system, then 
Christians have no choice but to support that system. He believes,
to the contrary, that we can always choose non-violence if we are
prepared to pay the price of suffering which our refusal may entail.
The basic premise of Ellul* s evangelical understanding of the -
purpose of the Christian life is that only conduct consistent with the 
Gospel can truly witness to it. Along the lines of this kind of
perfectionism, he rejects the "Two Kingdom" kind of reasoning as applied 
to war. He rejects the notion that Christianity only has to do with • 
inner dispositions, that one can kill and yet at the same time love the * 1 2 3 4
Prince of this world also has a finger in revolutions" (Violence, pp. 
54-5i see also Autopsie, pp. 261-2). (Shaull’s position is, of 
course, simply a repetition of Paul Lehmann's point of view}
1. Violence, p. 150.
2. Ibid., pp. 26, 46, 69~7O.
3. Ibid., p. 28.
4. A Criticrue, pp. 173-174
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one being killed. (lie accuses the theologians of revolution of 
advocating this very kind of reasoning,) To the contrary, he says 
that since the Christian life has to do with love, it must not lead
to acts contrary to love. in his view, Christianity has a great
deal to do with the choice of means and does not have to do merely with
,.2 . * motives.
At the basis of Ellul’s opposition to the Christian use of violence
is his conviction that Christians should trust the results of their
action into God's keeping. The Christian task is to make a consistent
witness to the C-ospel in word and deed. Because the results can be
entrusted to God, the Christian can be freed from resorting to the
methods of violence to procure particular results.He believes
that God’s intentional will is not accomplished through violence, but 
through sacrificial non-resistance which prepares the way for God’s own
action.
Ellul’s attitude toward violence is a classic example of his dual 
morality. Since Christians cannot require others to act as if they -
1. He believes that Christian love is precisely love for one’s enemies, 
modelled on God’s indiscriminate love in Jesus Christ (see above>
pp. 195-197? a fuller discussion of these issues).
2. ’’Theologie Bogmatique,” pp, 146-147* Ellul sees prayer as the
motivational basis for the Christian attitude and practice of non­
violence. ’’Apart from prayer, action is necessarily violent and 
falsehood. ... Prayer is the only possible substitute for violence 
in human relations. Henceforth it is from prayer that one expects 
action to take its value. ... It is impossible to enga.ge in the combat 
of prayer for the brother whom one loves in Christ, and still to 
employ physical and psychological violence against him. ... If we 
choose to use violence, so be it, but in that case let us stop play­
ing the farce of prayer and love of neighbor” (Prayer and Modern Man, 
p. 173). . * - • -
3. Violence, pp. 45-48, 149» 161, 170-1; Presence of the Kingdom, 
p. 80.
4* Violence, p. 13.
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were Christians, he admits that non-violence is not to be expected or
required of non-believerss~
In so far as 1 firmly believe that faith in Jesus Christ requires 
action of a specific, uniquet singular kind, I must admit that the 
counsels on violence issuing from faith are addressed to faith, 
therefore can have no meaning for those who do not believe that 
Jesus Christ is Lord, For example, we cannot expect non-Christians 
to bear oppression and injustice as we ought to bear them. So 
we cannot do as the Church has so often done: remind the world’s 
oppressed (very few of whom are Christians) of their ’Christian 
duty’ to submit and practice resignation,^
'’The Christian's first act of non-violence is that he refrain from
asking others to live as if they were Christian. When violence is in
question, it is not our business to lecture them and urge them to be 
. 2
non-violent.” To ask non-believers to be non-violent would mean
asking them to govern their lives on the basis of a divine authority 
which they do not accept. 1^ Ellul thinks that Christians have a 
responsibility to try to limit the causes of violence^ and he believes
5
that Christians must themselves refrain from violence, but he does 
not envision the Christian's verbal witness to Christ as extending to 
a criticism of the non-Christian's use of violence, unless it is an 
aspect of a directly Christian confession of faith.He thinks that
1. Violence, pp. 156-157• "We Christians must submit and bear unjust
suffering; 'for if when you do right and suffer for it you take it 
patiently, you have God's approval' (I Peter 2:20). But we cannot 
make this a law for all men. We must accept injustice ourselves, 
but we can neither require others to bear it patiently nor serve 
as example for them, nor yet bear their suffering for them. That 
is to say, we cannot tolerate the injustice done others” (ibid., p. 157)
2. Ibid., p. 157.
3. Ibid., P. 157.
4. Ibid., PP . 157-8.
5. Ibid., P. 131.
6. Ibid., P* 159. Ellul on one occasion contradicts his view that
non-violence only makes sense for Christians. He quotes Gandhi 
with approval and then says: ’’These words show that tho way Christ 
appointed is open to all, that the victory of good over evil benefit’s 
not only Christians but non-Christians also” (ibid., p. 173).
By/.•.
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it is futile and not a Christian task to try to tell either secular 
governments or revolutionary groups that they ought not to use violence. 
Though an advocate of Christian non-violence, Ellul as a Christian is
2a neutralist when it comes.to violent power conflicts within society.
Since non-Christi.ans cannot he expected to behave according to 
Christian convictions, Ellul holds open absolutely no hope that society 
can be restructured along pacifist lines.Nor does he believe that
By referring to Gandhi, Ellul confuses his own argument concerning 
the sameness of violence. Gandhi’s non-violent resistance was surely 
an exercise of force and thus would seem to fall under the broad and 
all-inclusive concept of violence Ellul has earlier enunciated and 
rejected. If one agrees with Gandhi's practices and even those of 
Martin Luther King (as Ellul seems to), then one is in effect accept-' 
ing the legitimacy of some distinction between force and violence, the 
forraei' being justified because of the goals sought (and perhaps 
because of the less violent methods used). Ellul sometimes seems to 
equate non-resistance and non-violent resistance, as when he refers 
to Gandhi as an exemplar of Christian non-violence. We think that 
Ellul’s discussion of violence suffers from the failure to clarify this 
distinction.
Ellul says that if a statesman or president declares himself to be 
a Christian, the Christian should be able to call him to embody his 
faith. "It ought to be possible to tell a President Johnson that 
his faith forbids any use of violence" (Violence, p. 16C), His argu­
ment here seems naive. It overlooks what he himself has said about 
the state necessarily having to use violence. it also ignores the 
propaganda reasons why many politicians claim religious loyalty of one 
sort or another, though that loyalty may be very nominal. Ellul 
may have his own doubts about the value of this suggestion, since he 
admits that to call a president to embody his Christian faith may in 
fact indicate that it is impossible to be a Christian and to conduct 
successful politics, for that would necessarily require the use of 
some form of violence (ibid., p. 16O).
1. Ibid., pp. 157, 159>
2. Earlier in our work (see above, pp. 295-299) we saw that from a human 
perspective Ellul thinks that sometimes states should go to war, rather 
than waiting patiently while an aggressor prepares to crush them. * 
This is his human reasoning; his Christian conviction is that all
war is wrong.
3. When Ellul denies that non-violent action is effectual (ibid., 
p. 144), he apparently means simply that there is no hope that a 
pacifist social order can be established. "Their concern to show 
that their position is also efficacious lands pacifists in a position 
that, ultimately, is completely unrealistic. They would do better 
to declare the validity of non-violence without pretending that it
is universally applicable" (ibid., pp. 15“16). He points out, for 
example/...
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war can ever be totally prevented, hi keeping' with his emphasis on 
the duality between the Church and the world, he denies that the New 
Order made possible in Christ is directly applicable to a non-believing 
world. However, he does recognize that Christian non-violence can 
have an indirect effect on society, though the possibility of such
an effect is not to be the basis of Christian non-violence.
To understand the effect that Christian non-violence can have
on society one must remember that governments need to have public opinion 
on their side, they need to have good consciences. If a state is to 
engage in war, it needs to convince the people of the sanctity of the 
war. It is at this level that Ellul thinks the Church’s advocacy of
non-violence can have an effect on society. Without being able to
alter fundamentally the world's violence, the Church, by attacking the
consciences of a regime’s supporters, can moderate a state’s warring 
2tendency. Christianity can influence public opinion, making it 
difficult for .wars to be regarded as "holy".^ Ellul cites two examples
example, that Gandhi’s efforts would not have been effective had he 
not been dealing with the British nation, a nation especially influ­
enced by Christianity (Violence, p. 15)» "Put Gandhi into the Russia 
of 1925 or fhe Germany of 1933- The solution would be simple: after 
a few days.he would be arrested and nothing more would be heard of * 
him" (ibid. 1 p. 15)« Ellul thinks that those who advocate non-vio­
lence as a policy of world reform fail to recognize that India’s 
case was unique and cannot be repeated throughout history (ibid., p. 15)«
1. "It is a great illusion to think that the Church can prevent wax's 
.." (The Politics of God, p. 35) •
2. Violence, p. 144«
3. "Almost always, it is the conviction that ’I am right’ or ’my cause 
is the cause of justice’ that triggers violence. That is, the moment 
a value or an ideal is introduced, the moment motivations for fighting, 
are advanced — in other words, the moment propaganda does its work 
—- violence is unleashed. And violence can be reduced by countering 
this propaganda [my underlinej , For when a man is not cfuite sure
of the virtue of his cause he hesitates to kill. So exposing the 
reality of violence as an animal reaction, as a ‘necessity,' is auto­
matically to reduce the use of violence" (ibid., p. 14<-)* ”To 
induce/...
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of the effect that non-violent concern can have on public opinion,
which in turn effects political decisions. He points out that it was
because of French public opinion that France had to get out of Algeria, 
even though France had all but won militarily. He also says that 
public opinion is forcing the United States out of Viet Nam, though the 
United States could probably have won militarily. The clear impli­
cation is that Christians can influence public opinion and public 
opinion can reduce violence, though not eliminate it. He concludes 
that /‘Events of this kind [Algeria and Viet UanJ. both prompt and confirm
my contention that the refusal of Christians to condone an unjust regime 
2
will, in time, work powerfully.”
The Biblical Basis
Before we examine the biblical basis of Ellul’s opposition to • 
violence, we need to be clear that he does absolutely reject the legi 
timacy of Christian recourse to violence. He writes, '‘‘Violence can
induce a government ... to see its action as simple brute violence is 
to induce it to hesitate to use violence” (Violence, p. 143)• ”1
am saying that by demolishing a regime’s moral justifications, Christ­
ian itfitness deals it a much severer -blow than criminal or guerrilla 
action can deliver” (ibid., p. 144) • "It is only by love that is 
total, without defense, without reservation, love that does not cal­
culate or bargain, that the white Christian will overcome the evil of 
revolution, arson, and looting. 1 make bold to say this even though 
I am not in the United States; I have lived through similar situations 
elsewhere” (ibid., p. 174)•
* 1• Ibid., p. 145•
2. Ibid. In ms view the Church’s witness concerning non-violence would 
be false were it to become politicized or selective. The Church is 
to witness continuously to the horror of war and is not to condemn 
the violence of the West while endorsing Communist violence, or vice 
versa. Such politicized special pleading is to Ellul sheer hypocrisy. 
For example, he believes that the Church should have witnessed in 
opposition to the violence of the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese, as 
well as in opposition to American violence (ibid., pp. 16—47, 24, 99» 
106, 118-119)♦ The witness which the Church owes the world concerning 
violence has to do with proclaiming God’s opposition to all violence.
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■ 1 never "be justified or acceptable before God.” Without any words of
qualification whatsoever he says that ’’doing violence is evil in God’s 
2 'sight”. "Christians can never participate .in violence for -any reason 
whatever . .He is even critical of particular vocations for Christ­
ians because they necessarily involve the practice of violence. Of 
the Christian he writes, "He makes himself ridiculous when he tries 
to be a politician, a revolutionary, a guerrilla, a policeman,^ a • 
general."y
Ellul (as a biblical Christian) could not be as firmly opposed 
to Christian participation in violence as he is if he did not have
biblical reasons for feeling the way he does. It is thus surprising
that at one place he seems to say that the Christian position on vio- '
lence cannot be based on Scripture, but must be based on sociological
realism concerning the nature of violence. It is true that his '
1 * Violence, p, 138.
2. Ibid., p. 140.
3. Ibid., p. 158. He says that if a Christian under any circumstances
resorts to violence he should recognize that he is not behaving in a 
Christian way (ibid., p. 137). "Violence is radically incompatible 
with faith in Jesus Christ" (ibid., p. 159)* "The Christian ...
may never use violence ..." (ibid,, p. 135). "We cannot participate
in violence ..." (ibid., p. 157).
4. Ellul rejects the possibility of Christian police work because he 
refuses to justify any form of violence in the name of the noble 
purposes sought. He defines violence in an autonomous way, insisting 
on the sameness of all violence (ibid., pp. 84» 97'~99» 130). He 
does not reject the necessity of police forces or armies; he does 
seem to believe that Christians should not be involved in these.
5. Ibid., p, 169.
6. "If we want to find out what the Christian attitude toward violence 
should be, we cannot proceed by deducing the consequences of Christian 
principles or by enumerating biblical texts. The Bible does frequently 
condemn violence, but it defends violence just as frequently —
even in the New Testament. So this is not a good method of seeking 
an answer to our question. I believe that the first thing the Christ­
ian must do in relation to problems of social ethics is to be completely 
realistic, to get as clear arid exact an'understanding of the facts as 
possible" (ibid,, p. 81).
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pessimistic assessment of the nature and consequences of violence dis­
courages the practice of violence, since the only sure results of vio­
lence are the creation of the habit of violence and the provocation
of counter-violence. Still, it seems to us that in fact he does
base his position on normative biblical considerations, When he says
that the Christian position toward violence cannot be based on Scripture,
perhaps what he means is that Scripture offers no consistent doctrine
at this point. Though Scripture does not offer a consistent doctrine
concerning violence, Ellul does believe that he hears the Word of God 
speaking through certain aspects of biblical tradition, and he becomes
a witness for that aspect of biblical tradition which has claimed his
allegiance. In the light of his complete acceptance of certain 
aspects of biblical tradition, which witness to the importance of non­
violence, there is no debating the fact that in actual practice he 
does use the Bible to establish his normative position. The only 
question is the way in which he does so. It seerns to us that he does
so in a Barthian way, by listening for the living Word of God in the 
various and sometimes conflicting words of the Bible. Though he
recognizes the multiplicity of biblical and post-biblical Christian
opinion on war, he proceeds to select and to defend one aspect of bib­
lical tradition. His decision is made not without a careful analysis ' 
of the horrors of modem war, the knowledge of the impossibility of moral 
control over modern war, and an understanding of the tragic consequences 
of violence. Yet he does not base his decision merely cn sociological 
analysis, nor does he, in the final analysis, appeal to sociological 
analysis as the ultimate basis of his decision; otherwise he would, 
commend non-violence to non-believers and regard sociological reasoning 
as itself a convincing basis for his position. (Thus he would not need 
to appeal to Scripture the way he does^
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After halving said that violence is always and in all circumstances 
evil, Ellul affirms that non-violence is most definitely an aspect of 
the Christian faith. Non-violence is assumed to be <?. part of Christ­
ianity which ’’must be accepted in its revealed totality — accepted 
absolutely intransigently, without cultural or philosophical or any 
other kind of accommodation or adaptation," He goes on to state
the exegetical basis of his opposition to Christian participation in 
2
violence. Though he tells us that ’’Thou shalt not kill” is not to be 
understood as a law, but as a principle guiding our thought,^ he himself 
takes these words very seriously. He interprets these four words of
Scripture in the context of Jesus’ intensified understanding of the
Old Testament prohibition against killingt-
It is when man is guided by these four words that man is man. ...
’.'.hat differentiates man radically from all other animals is this . 
"Thou shalt not kill”. ... All demands implied in these words — 
faith in Jesus Christ, love of enemy, the overcoming of evil by 
love —- must be affirmed, taught and lived with the most absolute 
intransigence.4
He refers to Jesus’ own non-violent example as a model for the Christian
1. Violence, p. 145* ’’The effectualness of this approach depends on 
what I shall call Christian radicalism. That is, if the Christian 
is to contend against violence (whatever its source), he will have 
to be absolutely intransigent, he will have to refuse to be concil­
iated. The Christian faith implies rejection and condemnation of 
both revolutionary violence and the violence of the established powers” 
(ibid., p. 145)«
2. From the passages Ellul refers to one can see that one aspect of 
the hermeneutical issue here is the acceptance of New Testament 
tradition in opposition to much Old Testament tradition. Though ‘ 
the New Testament may not consistently oppose violence, it certainly 
does so to a far greater extent than the Old Testament. Thus,
Ellul’s passages in defence of non-violence are filled with explicitly 
New Testament meaning, even the words taken directly from the Old 
Testament.
3• Ibid., pp• 145-6.‘
4» ibid*, p. 146. ’’The whole meaning of the violence of love is 
contained in Paul’s.word that evil is to be overcome with good (Rom. 
12:17-21), This is a generalisation of the Sermon on the Mount” 
(ibid., p. 172). '
life. He appeals to Oscar Cullrnann as having conclusively proved that 
p
Jesus did not advocate violence.' Ellul writes?-
To use violence is to he of the world. Every tine the disciples 
wanted to use any kind of violence they came up against Christ’s 
veto (the episode of the fire pouring from heaven on the cities 
that rejected Christ, the parable of the tares and the wheat,
Peter's sword, etc.). 3
Jesus carried the commandment "Thou shalt not kill" to the extreme 
limit, and in his person manifested non-violence end even non-resist­
ance to evil. When he was arrested, he neither allowed Peter to 
defend him nor called the "twelve legions of angels" to his aid. 4
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The Refusal to Use Christianity to Justify Violence
. Ellul is even more opposed to using Christianity to justify violence
than he is opposed to Christian participation in violence. Though he con­
sistently sees violence as a sin in the eyes of God, he does recognize that 
Christians for human reasons sometimes may find themselves participating in 
violence. If the Christian finds himself in such a position (as Ellul did in
World War II), he should never seek to give a Christian justification for his 
5
conduct. Rather, he must confess that he is involved in sin and pray for 
forgiveness, knowing that violent conduct cannot witness tc a Kingdom of love?
1. Pieu et Cesar (Neuchatel and’Parisi Pelau.chaux and Niestle, 195&)*
2. Violence, p. 47* . .
3* Ibid., pp. 129-130? see also p. 18.
4. Ibid., p» 9»
5. "We must reject all attempts to justify violence on Christian grounds. 
... Violence as such, on the animal level, is the direct expression of 
our nature as animals; it certainly shows that we live in a state of 
sin — but that is nothing new. But any attempt to justify violence (by 
emotional considerations, by a doctrine, a theology, etc.) is a supple­
mentary perversion of fallen nature at the hands of man. ... Thus we as 
Christians are obliged on the one hand to attack all justifications for 
the use of violence, and on the other to refuse to provide Christian 
justifications" (ibid., p. 140; see also p. 74)*
6. Ibid., p. 137; The Politics of God, pp. 37-38; "Correspondence," 
p. 211. "If a Christian feels that he must participate in a violent 
movement (or.-in a war!) let him do so discerningly. He ought to be 
the one who, even as he acts with the others, proclaims the injustice 
and the unacceptability of what he and they are doing" (Violence, p. 
14l). "Violence can never be justified or acceptable before God. The 
Christian/...
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Though Ellul may appear to be a legalist on the issue of violence, 
he does not intend to be so and says several things which qualify a 
legalistic interpretation. He never identifies his position with 
that of ’’pacifism”, for the reason that he thinks that pacifists focus 
so one-sidedly on the issue of non-violence that they forget that peace 
has no meaning in isolation from the Prince of peace, Jesus Christ. 
Because Ellul’s theology is so Christocentric, he is not willing to let
specific moral issues become the either-or issues of faith. To see
the whole of Christianity as determined by such issues as speaking in 
2tongues, adult baptism, or non-violence is to him sectarianism.' 
Sometimes (as above) Ellul seems to regard non-violence as itself an 
aspect of the kerygma, rather than as an implication flowing from the 
kerygma (which is subject to debate). Yet he can also give an histor­
ical assessment of the Church which shows that genuine Christians hist­
orically have taken differing positions on the issue of war.^ Along
Christian can only admit humbly that he could not do otherwise, that 
he took the easy way and yielded to necessity and the pressures of the 
world. That is why the Chris.tian, even when he permits himself to 
use violence in what he considers the best of causes, cannot either 
feel or say that he is justified; he can only confess that he is a 
sinner, submit to God’s judgment, and hope for God’s grace and 
forgiveness” (Violence, p. 138).
In a letter to this writer dated Sept.14, 1972, Ellul agreed that 
there had been a translation mistake made in a letter from him pub­
lished in Christianity and Crisis ("Correspondence,” p, 221). As 
published, it appears that he believes that violent conduct can 
witness to the love of God and the nearness of the Kingdom. Quite 
to the contrary, he says that he believes that violent conduct, though 
sometimes humanly necessary, is an inappropriate means of witnessing 
to Christ. Of course, God in His sovereignty can accomplish His 
purposes even in and through the world’s violence, and thus can use 
violence to effect His purpose of love. To Ellul this fact is not 
to be confused either with the notion that violence can conform to 
God’s intentional will or with the idea that violence witnesses to 
God’s love.
1 • Politics of God, p. 138.
2. False Presence, p. 99•
8« Violence, pp. 1-26.
similar lines, he can refer to General Haaman who, as a man of war, was 
not excluded from God’s love (which in the context means Cod’s covenant 
fellowship)It is very difficult to resolve these two sides of 
Ellul’s thought* Ferhaps what he. is really doing is stating what he 
regards as the Christian ideal (the non-violent pursuance of pea.ce), 
while recognizing that because of the tragic sinfulness of the world,
Christians sometimes find that they are caught up in the world’s sin.
Even if Christians are involved in violence, they should know that God’s
love is not withdrawn. His thought here may relate to his view
(discussed earlier in our dissertation) that compromise is not to be
glorified by being charted in advance. Though ’’’evil may eventually
creep in’”, it is not to be tolerated or justified. ’’Killing is killing 
. 2and ... there is no way to resign oneself to it.”' Though in some
situations violence even to the Christian may seem humanly defensible 
and necessary, he is not to use his faith to justify his violence.
Strictly speaking Ellul does not offer even a human, defence of
violence. What he does say is that while he believes violence to be 
contrary to Christianity and hence to be avoided by Christians, he 
understands and sympathises with those non-believers who under certain 
circumstances resort to violence. He is not offering a ’’just war” 
theory, since he regards all war as unjust. He differs from the just 
war theologians in rejecting Christian participation in violence and 
by absolutely refusing to use Christianity to justify violence — 
under any circumstances. Nevertheless, he does recognise that the ‘
world’s violence is under certain circumstances understandable. He
1 . The Politics of God, p. 25 •
2. A Critique, p. 45*
3. See above,, p. 86, n. 2.
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writes
I fully understand the insurrection of the oppressed who see no 
way out, who fight desperately against the violence done them and 
will break loose from their chains the moment they can, I fully 
understand the revolt of the slaves, the violent workers’ strikes 
of the nineteenth century, the rebellion of colonized peoples who 
want to avenge a century of humiliation, privation and injustice at 
one blow’. 1 understand these explosions, and, what is more, I 
approve of them. The oppressed have no other way of protesting 
their human right to live; and they think, too, that by rebelling 
they can change their situation for the better, if only in some 
small degree. But what cannot be condoned is that Christians 
associate themselves with this avengement, and, worse, that Christ­
ians affirm that violence will secure fundamental change.1 ......
Thus — speaking as a Christian — I say that while I cannot call 
violence good, legitimate, and just, I find its use condonable 
(l) when a man is in despair and sees no other way out, or (<?) when 
a hypocritically just and peaceful situation must be exposed for 
what it is in ordei' to end it. But 1 must emphasize that in 
these cases, too, violence is of the ’order of necessity’ therefore 
contradictory to the Christian life, whose root is freedom.
Moreover, I must emphasize that this understandable, acceptable, 
condonable violence may change quickly. Opposing an unjust order, 
creating a state of disorder out of which (depending on how fluid 
the situation is) renewal may issue -— this is acceptable, providing 
that the users of violence do not pretend that they are creating 
order; what they are creating is pne more injustice.2
While sympathizing with spontaneous violence, Ellul has no sympathy' 
with those revolutionaries who make violence a factor of strategy." •
One might wonder why Ellul draws the line in this way, seeming to give
preferential treatment to spontaneous acts of violence as contrasted
with acts thought out ahead of time. The fact of the matter is that 
he is not giving preferential treatment to any kind of violence, since 
he regards it- all as wrong. What he is saying is that he understands 
those who have been so deprived that they are no longer able to restrain 
their violence — and hence they turn to revolution. However, those
1’ Violence, pp. 68~9♦
2. Tbid., p. 133.
3. "We must sympathize with the man whose suffering explodes in violence, 
but we must refuse to countenance the one who considers violence a 
tool, a strategical tactic he is free to use at will’’ (ibid., p. 134).
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who use revolution as a tool lead others astray, promising great things 
which revolution as such can never accomplish and which revolution is
seldom even instrumental in attaining.
Since Ellul is unwilling to use Christianity to justify violence
of any sort, it comes as no surprise that he criticizes ’’just war”
theories. in addition to the criticism of the ultima ratio type of
just war theory, he has two basic criticisms of these theories.
First, he thinks that just war reasoning has traditionally assumed that 
2men can retain moral control over the conduct of war. He believes
that in modern warfare there are no moral controls. To conduct modern
warfare in a moral way means to lose wars ~~ a cost no nation will
accept.For example, in torturing prisoners to get information, all
methods will be used that are necessary to get the needed information.^
“The rules of war really .’are valid only when there is no war. For 
5
the sole rule of war is to win.” Ellul believes that the traditional
conditions which were assumed as the basis of just war reasoning were
1. See above, pp. 295~9> fox' Ellul’s criticisms of a particular type 
of just war theory (ultima, ratio). There his point was that to wait 
to wage war until all peaceful alternatives have been exhausted may 
lead to greater violence in the end.
2. Violence, p, 5*
3. ’’The nature of violence is such that it has no limits. We have 
seen that it is impossible to set up laws of warfare. Either no 
war happens to be going on, and then it is easy to make agreements 
as to the limitations that should be established; or else a war is 
under way, and then all agreements fall before the imperative of 
victory” (ibid., pp. 98“99)«
Ellul’s whole discussion of violence reads like the personal 
confession of a man who has seen the horrors of modern war and has 
concluded that the horrible reality of war invalidates it as a 
strategy Christians should defend (ibid., p. 29)• He writes that 
"violence means bloodshed ... human beings screaming in pain and 
fear” (ibid., p. 116). This, I take it, is the reality of violence
as Ellul came to know it as a participant in the French Resistance.
4* » P* 98*
5* The Political Illusion, p. 77.
I
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formulated in a, day when the,re was a relative clarity about the war
situation. He says that the phenomenon of modern war and the extent
of the battlefields rule out the application of these criteria and
make them inoperable. Secondly, just war theories assume that the
end sanctifies the means, ’’that violence is pood or bad depending on 
2
the use or purpose to which it is dedicated.” Ellul, to the contrary, 
argues that there are not two kinds of violence, but all violence is 
wrong — regardless of the goals to which it is dedicated.”0n the 
moral scale, violence exercised against a single human being is an 
absolute weight, whatever the form, the result or the cause of that
violence
Critical Issues
Ellul is not unaware of the obvious criticism that can be levied
against his and all other non-violent positions. The accusation is 
that if one is not willing to resort to violence to help the oppressed,
5
one is encouraging and condoning the violence of oppressors. The 
person who is consistently non-violent Is said to be unloving toward 
the victims of violence. The fact that Ellul recognizes this problem
and-admits that even those who advocate non-violence are not free from
• Violence, p. 6. .
2. Ibid., p. 6.
3. Ibid., p. 113.
4* Ibid., p. 112. While agreeing that for Christians the end does not 
justify the means, we have already argued that police action can be 
defended on the basis of Rom. 13» Though the Christian may not 
himself engage in violence, he is aware that when it comes to society 
some ends do justify some means. Concerning modem warfare, we 
agree with Ellul that it is hard to see how Christianity can justify 
war. Though some people might appeal to Rom. 13 in defence of war, 
we think that the nature of war is such as to invalidate any effort 
to give it a Christian justification.
5. Ibid., p. 136.
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guilt, sets his position off from the self-righteousness associated.
'with ’’pacifism’'. However, in spite of the fact that the advocacy of 
non-violence involves guilt, he feels that non-violence more approp­
riately witnesses to Jesus Christ. (After all, the charge that can be 
levied against the advocates of non-violence can also be raised in 
criticism of Jesus’ own conduct) Those who criticize concerning the 
guilt involved in non-violence need to be reminded that there is also
great guilt connected with violence® We also must remember that Ellul
has spoken of a Christian alternative service. Though the Christian
cannot resort to violence, he is to stand in active identification 
2
with the oppressed. '
A deeper problem in Ellul’s thought is that it may not be so 
easy to separate the verbal defence of violence from the act of pulling 
the trigger. Because Ellul is such a social and political realist, 
he is not at all a pacifist when it comes to his opinion about the 
state’s use of violence. As a member of a democratic society, his 
political opinions would in some cases tend to support the state’s 
war efforts, though as a Christian he himself could participate in 
violence only as an act of disobedience. The duality here goes back 
to the basic duality he establishes between the Church and the world, 
the clash he envisions between Christian perfectionism and social and
political realism. The problem is that the verbal defence of the 
state's violence may be as instrumental in the accomplishment of violent 
acts as the direct act of killing. In giving verbal support for the •
1. Violence, p. 138; see above, p. 196, n. 3«
2. ”1 hold that in every situation of injustice and oppression, the 
Christian —- who cannot deal with it by violence — must make 
himself completely a part of it as ■representa.tive of the victims"
( ibid®, pp. 151-2; see above, pp. 327-328).
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state's violence the Christian himself may thus he engaged, in violence. 
Ellul does not seem to deal with this charge, hut one suspects that 
he would he willing to admit the gailt involved. Ke would certainly 
not he willing to hack down from his social and political realism,
since he thinks that in a world of sin the direct application of Christ—
1 ’ian ideals to politics is disastrous.
1. Even if Christians could agree that all killing is wrong, this 
would not in many cases tell them which political alternatives to 
support, because in many situations all political alternatives 
involve violence. If other nations are preparing for war against 
one's own country, the counsel of patience may eventually lead to 
more deaths than would a quick declaration of war. Either choice 
involves violence. As tragic as it is, there just does not seem • 
to he a Christian alternative for a non-Christian society.
Assuming that all Christians regarded abortions as wrong (except 
in the case of a threat to the mother’s life) this would not establish 
a Christian political decision on the issue. Those Christians who 
opposed all legislation favouring abortion would have the death of 
thousands of women on their hands. (in the absence of abortion 
laws, we know that thousands of women die because they seek illegal 
abortions from unqualified people). On the other hand, those Christ­
ians who favour legal abortion have the deaths of thousands of unborn 
infants as the guilt they must bear for their political decision.
On such political issues, Which do not offer Christian alternatives, 
one can only balance the factors and make what seems to be the best 
decision possible. Ko decision will represent the Christian truth, 
since the Christian truth cannot be directly applied to a non­
Christian society.
iCHAPTER X
CHAPTER X
CONCLUSION
Ellul the Prophetic Christian Witness
Xt is obvious from the preceding pages that Jacques Ellul is a 
very difficult man to pin down. Studying him is like studying a bird 
in flight? or a bird who occasionally touches down only to take off 
again. By the time the interpreter thinks that he has understood him 
at one point, he has already flown elsewhere and is fighting on a 
different battle-line from the one which had just become familiar. The 
interpreter is always chasing after him and having the haunting feeling 
that he has never really gotten hold of him. It is impossible to 
predict what he is going to say next, in the next book or article, on 
the next page, or in the next sentence! Even when the interpreter 
seizes Ellul at his latest resting place, he has great difficulties 
relating what he hears him saying to what he thinks he has heard pre­
viously. And so the interpreter’s dilemma goes on and on!
There is a prophetic imprecision about Ellul’s style of writing 
which must in- the final analysis be a part of the man himself, or better, 
God’s use of this passionate servant. Chronological development 
explains very little. True, he has become more of a social pessimist 
with every tick of the clock, but such chronological development accounts 
for only a small proportion of the seeming contradictions we have faced 
in the foregoing pages. To put the matter bluntly: Ellul has been 
wildly paradoxical., in his formulations from the very first, and often
even within the same book contradictions can be found. The fact that
contradictions occur in different parts of the same book also moderates
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the thesis that the polemical context of his writings explains his 
one-sided way of putting points. This theory is not to he discounted 
entirely, since he always does seem to have a theological idea or
opponent in view, and always sets his position over against something 
else (usually something very popular). It still seems to he true 
that though for individual hooks the sparring partner or partners remain
the same, contradictory formulations are nevertheless present. In the 
final analysis the only satisfactory explanation for Ellul’s writing 
style is Ellul himself. Here we encounter a modem Johannine man, who 
thinks in sharp contrasts, and leaves it for his interpreters to sort
out the relationships between the various polarities he has thrown up 
for consideration. Just as the Old Testament prophet did not sit down
and write a systematic interpretation of his own utterances, hut instead 
continued to speak the one-sided Word as he felt called by God to do, 
so Ellul does not do the interpreter's job for him. He does nob . 
attempt to give a systematic interpretation of his own thought.
Are we perhaps doing Ellul an injustice in seeking systematic 
coherence, rather than being content with what at many places borders 
on prophetic incoherence? In spite of the fact that we have done 
something different with Ellul's thought from what he himself has done, 
wre do not believe that he would oppose our effort (though he may not 
agree with all of our interpretations). Though he thinks io. sharp 
contrasts and has the writing habit of making overstatements, we do not 
think that he intends for either his way of writing or his thinking to 
be destructive of the Church’s effort to find theological truth. 
Theological truth is very important and precious to him.
Methodological Remarks
Our conclusion will consist mainly of a summary of the interpretative
conclusions we have reached in the previous chapters.' (in the final 
section we will mention some more general conclusions related to the 
way Ellul does Christian ethics.) In these interpretative conclusions 
we will deal with only four types of material. First, we will attempt 
to state what we regard as the main lines of Ellul’s Christian ethic.
A great deal of discretion will he called for here, since space Is 
limited and since the basic subject matter of his ethic is very broad.
In all cases more complete statements can be found in the individual 
chapters in question. Secondly, we will state some of the negative 
criticisms that we have of the main thrust of his ethic. (We are not 
attempting to state all such criticisms.) Sven concerning these major 
criticisms, we will not repeat all of the details involved (which again 
can be located in the chapters in question). Thirdly, we will mention 
the major contradictions which still seem to stand with reference to the 
essential content of his ethic. Fourthly, we will occasionally, refer 
to the arguments which were involved in evaluations which led to agree­
ment at particular points. (At all points we have sought to be 
evaluatory.) Frequently we will not state such arguments, since they 
have often involved detailed exegetical considerations which would be 
tedious to summarize in conclusion. At those points where we offer
neither negative criticism nor positive evaluation, it is assumed that 
we agree with Ellul, but that we are not taking the space to discuss the 
basis of our agreement (which can be located in preceding chapters).
Our conclusion represents a radical methodological shift from what
---- ----------------------- -—- -------------- -
1* Though we will state our conclusions by going chapter by chapter, 
we will not adhere to this method with absolute rigidity. For the 
sake of brevity and synthesis, we will sometimes allow insights from 
chapters other than those in question to appear. Likewise, when 
attempting to summarize our conclusions from particular chapters, 
every effort will be made to allow the material to interpenetrate. 
Y/hereas in our analysis we needed to break the material into many sep­
arate units for the purpose of detailed analysis and documentation, here 
every effort will be made to synthesize the various conclusions reached.
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precededj bub we believe that this shift is justified by the subject 
matter? as we believe that the previous methods are justified by the 
same. Previously we were seeking bo establish our interpretation of 
Ellul’s ethic; consequently, our method was to a large extent analyti­
cal. Specifically? we. had to analyze numerous seemingly contradictory 
statements to discover whether the contradictions were real or only 
apparent and whether they were major or peripheral. The decisions we 
reached on such questions directly informed the various interpretations
made. All of the evidence of which we are aware has now been discussed
and our interpretations and evaluations have been stated. However?
because analysis and interpretative conclusions are woven together in
the preceding chapters? it is not easy to locate the conclusions. It
is our purpose here to isolate our interpretative conclusions from the
previous detailed argumentation? that the broad shape of Sllul’s ethic
may be seen at a single glance. It is hoped that our conclusion will
help us to guard against the danger of losing sight of the essential
points. Of course, our conclusion cannot stand on .its own, for it
proves nothing; it only summarizes in a systematic way the main con- 
1
elusions previously reached.
Because of the nature and purpose of our conclusion? there are 
many categories of material previously dealt with which will not be 
summarized here (though all of these considerations have directly 
informed the conclusions reached). First? there will be no discussion 
of minor contradictions which we believe are peripheral to Ellul’s 
thought. Though honesty required that we recognize these in the body 
of cur work? discretion demands that we omit them here. As things
actually have worked out? most of our criticisms have been of this
I. We do not believe that our conclusion should attempt to prove the cor­
rectness of our analysis and interpretation. We do not think that the 
conclusion should attempt to accomplish what only the dissertation 
itself can accomplish.
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peripheral aide of his thought.Though not uncritical of even the 
main thrust of his thinking, we are much more sympathetic towards that 
than towards his various peripheral formulations, which often seemed to 
us quite untenable. Because so many of our criticisms have been of 
the periphery of his thought, our conclusion will be much more construc­
tive than was much of the preceding analysis.
Secondly, contradictory formulations which we argued were best
interpreted by de-literalization will not be considered directly, since 
2
in their de-literalized form they actually support the major points.'
Thirdly, our conclusion will not deal with theological parallels.
The consideration of such parallels has been a major part of our work. 
Ellul i,s a lay theologian who sometimes states points without fully 
developing them. Because this is the case, we have paid a great deal 
of attention to his theological teachers, in order more fully to under­
stand his intention. At specific points, we have been able to trace 
out more fully ideas found in rudimentary form in Ellul’s own writings. 
Since the purpose of studying theological parallels was to understand ' 
Ellul’s thought better, we will not here discuss parallels as such, but 
will summarize what we believe is the essential content of Ellul's
ethical thought, which these parallels have helped us to understand.
1. At many points the choice we faced was not that of choosing for or 
against Ellul, but for one aspect of his thought in opposition to 
another. However, we have tried not to use our own evaluatory posi­
tion as a norm for deciding what was or was not central to his 
thinking, but have tried to let the evidence speak for itself, even 
when that meant that we had to disagree at major points.
2. Our interpretative labours have involved the effort to distinguish 
between major contradictions which distort the main line of Ellul’s 
thought, minor peripheral contradictions, and seeming contradictions 
which can legitimately be de-literalized. Since there have been so 
many seemingly contradictory statements, we absolutely do not claim 
finality to our interpretation. At each point of cur analysis the 
evidence must be weighed and the adequacy of our interpretation 
evaluated. It is easy to see how the recognition of a differing 
emphasis might in seme cases tip the balance and call for a re-align­
ment of these three categories.
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Fourthly, our conclusion will not involve a major effort to 
summarize the various strategy proposals which Ellul has made, though 
we will occasionally mention some. for will we attempt to state our
evaluations of such proposals. We are mainly concerned to summarize 
the general theological principles underlying such suggestions, rather
than to repeat the proposals themselves.
Interpretative Conclusions from Previous Chapters
Chapter I. The Hunan Condition? Bondage
Ellul believes that the natural human condition is marked by the 
absence of freedom and a bondage to various determinants. One way he 
describes the human situation is in terms of a radical bondage to sin, ' 
which he sees as man's natural state of existence. With good Johannine 
and Pauline justification, he describes sin as autonomy or separation 
from God, the failure to live in and from God. Sin is thus not 
defined in terms of external moral acts, but in terns of the sphere, of 
influence in which a person lives. Sin is man’s separation from the 
Source of true life,.a state of being which affects all men at the very 
centre of their existence. For the natural man, the man who trusts in
his own strength and self-reliance and fails to live in and from the 
Spirit of God, even morally good deeds are the expression of sin, the 
expression of autonomy and separation from God. (God does not claim 
merely man's outward life, but also his inward being.)
In Ellul's understanding, the moral consequences of separation from 
God are immense, widespread, and disastrous. He is very pessimistic 
about the moral goodness of natural man and thus warns Christians against 
naively thinking that they can automatically agree with the ways of the 
world. (A major emphasis of his writings is to warn the Church against 
the ever popular tendency of conforming to the world.) Nevertheless, 
because he defines sin as a religious category, he does not deny that
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some non-Christian deeds may on particular occasions be objectively 
in agreement with God's intention (this because of God's providential 
guidance, not because of natural man's inherent goodness or because of 
a natural relationship to God). Though ail non-Christian acts are the 
expression of autonomy, they are not all for that reason objectively 
contrary to God's intention. Though man's fall from God is complete ’ 
and total in terms of his covenant relationship with God, it is not 
total and complete in the moral sphere (though neither is the moral 
effect modest). This being Sllul’s general understanding (some contra­
dictory formulations being present), he can advise Christians that 
sometimes they can in good conscience agree with non-believers at the 
level of concrete activity. The Church is required only to aim at 
absolute faithfulness to God, not at absolute distinctiveness. (This 
point can be given Pauline support.) Because he see3 the moral 
consequences of the fall as severe, he warns Christians that the only 
way in which this area of overlap can be determined is by the Christian 
effort to agree only at those points where non-believers for their own 
various reasons happen to agree with conduct which Christians judge by
their ovai norms to be faithful to God's will. It is the Christians’
task first of all to perceive God's will; only then can the area of 
overlap be determined. Agreement or disagreement with the world can . 
only be the concrete event in vzhich Christians find that in obedience 
to Christ they can agree at particular points oi* that they must disagree
Ellul's understanding of man’s bondage to sin comes to expression 
in his statements concerning human morality. Human morality is natural 
morality and thus Is the expression of man's autonomy and separation 
from God. Human morality is of the order of the fall. it is also of 
the order of necessity. Tt is necessary in the sense that in a fallen 
world which must operate on the basis of non-Christian'assumptions, 
human morality is imperative for the sake of order and stability.
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Because the world cannot base its life on the Spirit morality of the 
Church, there is a basic duality between the morality of the world and 
the Christian ethic, In. the two cases the moral dynamic is entirely 
different. One is based on autonomy; the other is based on a covenant 
relationship with God. Human morality is also of the order of necessity 
because it is the expression of biological, sociological and psychologi­
cal necessities, rather than an example of human transcendence. Because 
Christians recognize that non-Christians cannot base their lives on the 
demands of a Christ in whom they do not believe, Christians themselves 
are not to despise the world's morality, even though that morality is 
based merely on various human necessities.
Hot only does Ellul speak of human bondage to sin, but he also 
refers to a supra-individual force of evil in the world. As a student 
of the New Testament, he knows that it talks about a fallen world and of
the activity of a demonic force inimical to God's purposes. As a modern 
sociologist, he sees supra-personal social forces moulding and influenc­
ing human, life, even when such influences are not recognized. His 
theological and sociological thinking interpenetrate at this point. He 
translates his biblical point of view into sociological thought forms.
In a general way he accepcs the Nevz Testament category of the demonic, 
but instead of referring to the first-century world view in which this 
understanding was originally expressed, he finds modern analogies from 
within his sociological study: he sees the detrimental influence of
institutions on men. .
Since Ellul sees human bondage as a bondage to sin, he cannot be 
justly accused of being a mere environmentalist. For him, the human
problem is not merely external to man, but is at the very centre of every 
human life. However, he believes that the world effectively proclaims 
and helps to propagate an autonomous self—understanding and also works
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to influence men io commit particular sins, The world encourages man's 
alienation from God and it is impossible to draw a clear dividing line
between the detrimental influence of the world on man end man’s natural
autonomy. There is an interaction of the sinful world on man and man 
on the sinful world. Though there is circularity involved here, there
is no inconsistency in believing in a covenant definition of sin and 
yet also believing that society helps to transmit this false understanding
V/e think that Ellul's thought is defensible at this point. Per­
haps he could have been more frank about the extent to which he is 
offering a somewhat d©mythologized version of the New Testament category 
of the demonic. Still, we think that a position which recognizes the
supra-individual power of evil is more akin to the New Testament view 
than one which simply identifies the human problem with individual sin.
In relating human sin to a corporate power of evil, Ellul has, in
effect, given us a modern restatement of the traditional doctrine of 
original sin. He believes that prior to any conscious will to sin, man 
Is already in bondage to a false understanding of life. Living in a - 
technological society, one is already influenced by a materialistic way 
of life. Living in a society preoccupied with work, one already has a 
distorted view of what truly constitutes vocation. .Living in a society 
where political affairs are often regarded as the sole ingredients of ‘ 
history, one already is to some extent politicized in one's thinking.
A part of the meaning of becoming a Christian is thus to receive a degree
of freedom from such determinants.
Ellul has extended the Reformation and Neo-Reformation understand­
ing of the bondage of the will to include a bondage to social determin­
ants. Though we agree with the value and relevance of this insight, we 
think that at some places he overstates himself by saying that sin 
implies total bondage to these determinants. We think that, here his own
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sociological pessimism and cynicism hava led to conclusions which are 
not justified by either the biblical or the empirical evidence. For 
example, at some places he says that bondage to sin implies total bondage 
to sociological patterns of conformity, as though non-believers can do 
no acts which might manifest even a small degree of freedom from the 
moulding influences of their environment. (At other places he seems to 
qualify this statement; hence, our criticism is but a criticism of one 
side of his thinking.) Since sin leads to moral disruption, we believe 
that it is defensible to say that separation from God severely lessens 
the possibility of transcending social conditioning. We think, however, 
that neither exegetical nor sociological proof can be found to substan­
tiate a claim that this conformity to one’s social milieu is total.
Another example of a case where Ellul’s sociological cynicism gets 
the better of him is in his analysis of the city. He points to the 
city as a specific example of the way in which man is influenced by social 
determinants. We agree with the basic point, but disagree that either 
biblically or sociologically the city can be shown to be as monstrous as 
he imagines. Certainly the city influences man both in terms of sin 
and sins. Just as the world in general proclaims an autonomous way of 
life, so the secular city does the same. At particular points the city 
may indeed be .guilty of contributing to particular sins, materialism 
especially. We disagree, however, with the way in which Ellul cynically 
singles out the city for blame, both in terms of sin and sins. if sin 
is a category common to all men, if all men are separated from God, v/e 
fail to see how sin can be a unique function of the city. Likewise, 
though the sins of the city may be worse than those of the country, we 
think that the balance is not as decisively against the city a3 he thinks. 
For example, we disagree that war is a phenomenon possible only in a city 
culture. This historical assertion seems to us simply to be false. He
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mentions some of the contributions of the city, bub fails to take them 
into account when he pronounces his judgment of condemnation. Of 
course, we are nob trying to baptise the city, as, for example, Harvey 
Cox has done. Vo simply think that more fairness is called for. If 
the sins of *bhe city are to be compared with the sins of the country,
this ought to be a matter for fair debate, drawing on empirical observa­
tion.
Beneath our criticism of Ellul's scathing critique of the city is 
a conviction that the scriptural methods of interpretation used to 
establish his critique are themselves dubious. We are suspicious of 
his inferential method of isolating references to the city from contexts 
not having to do directly with the city. He deduces a unified doctrine 
of the city from the Bible only by isolating and then synthesizing 
references to the city which occur in historical contexts not directly 
implying judgment on the city — but judgment on Israel or on man 
generally. We think that the Bible does not offer an ontology of the 
city, Ellul's eisegetical methods used to deduce such a doctrine are • 
themselves evidence against the very point he is trying to make. If the 
only way such a doctrine can be found is by such Interpretative methods, 
one is suspicious that no such doctrine actually exists in the Bible.
Ear from using, the Bible bo establish a doctrine of the city, we think ■ 
that Ellul's labours only shov/ how easy it is to rea,d modern viewpoints 
back into Scripture (in this case modern sociological viewpoints). .
Chapter II. Freedom as Christocentric Existence.
Ellul understands true freedom as based on existence in and from
Christ. Though natural man is in bondage to sin and affected by various 
social determinants, Christ is the Deliverer who is adequate to meet the 
human dilemma. Just as Jesus Christ was the true man, who found freedom
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through obedience to God, so Christian freedom is freedom for God, 
which comes through the receipt of grace. The words freedom, grace, 
and obedience are words which have meaning only in relationship ,to one
another.
311ul»believes that the receipt of grace leads to freedom from 
bondage to sociological patterns of conformity. Christ is the 
Saviour who grants freedom with respect to such things as materialism, 
professionalism or preoccupation with work and status, ideological 
bondage and obsession with politics, public opinion, current events,
the sacredness of technology, etc.
We believe that there is plenty of biblical support for Ellul’s 
theocentric understanding of freedom. Though modern men tend to think 
of freedom as the right to do whatever one wants, the New Testament 
regards that kind of freedom as a virtual slavery to sin. By defining 
freedom as he has, Ellul has overcome the hiatus between freedom and 
authority, without encouraging human tyranny. (Freedom is slavery to 
God, not to other human beings.)
In Ellul’s understanding, the Christian good has to do with 
continually coming within the sphere of influence of the Risen Lord.
The Christian good has to do with the continuing receipt of grace, 
whereby a man’s life becomes responsive to God’s purposes. Since the . 
Christian good has to do with living in daily openness to the impact of 
God, prayer is seen as the crucial means of grace from which the Christ
ian ethical life is nourished.
Ellul stresses the priority of Christian being, while recognizing 
that being must express itself in Christian doing. lie is insistent 
that the only doing which is pleasing to God is that which is the fruit 
cf faith. He believes that in a world preoccupied with activity, a 
Christian emphasis on the priority of being comes as a revolutionary
Word.
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His emphasis on the covenant basis of the Christian life reminds 
the Church of the importance of her own spiritual and reflective life.
His stress on the priority of being, but the necessity of doing, helps 
to bridge the gap between evangelical and liberal Christians. With the 
evangelicals he opposes a humanism which denies the primacy of man's 
relationship to God. When Christian activists underemphasize the 
importance of prayer and Christian reflection, their activity becomes * 
superficial and the conformist expression of purely human viewpoints.
With Christian liberals or activists he believes in the importance of 
loving service to the neighbour. It is no less heretical to focus 
one-sidedly on man's relationship with God (orthodox quietism) than it 
is to think that one can serve one’s neighbour in a Christian way without 
continual renewal through worship and Christian education.
Chapter 111. Freedom as Eschatological Existence .
Ellul's Christian ethic is very much in the tradition of the New 
Testament emphasis on the eschatological nature of Christian life. The 
receipt of grace is seen as talcing the form of deliverance from bondage 
to the ways of the present evil age. Such deliverance is seen as 
possible because both inwardly and outwardly Christians are enabled to 
live in faithfulness to the coming Kingdom. Though such an emphasis runs 
directly counter to secular theology’s stress on the similarity between 
Christians and men in general, we think that the New Testament does • 
recognize the otherness of the Christian life, just as it recognizes the 
transcendent otherness of the Christian God. VZe agree with Ellul that 
it is hard to see what the Church's being sent into the world can mean, 
if she is indistinguishable from the world and has nothing to offer the 
world v/hich the world cannot offer itself. Likewise, we agree that it
is superficial to talk of laymen offering a Christian witness in the world,
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unless more effort goes into theological and spiritual training for
this mission.
We think that Ellul’s sanctification theology is all the stronger 
because it avoids the sectarian pitfall of failing to see the importance 
of justification. He cannot be justly accused of advocating a Christian 
self-righteousnessj because he is aware that converted Christians
continue to remain sinners desperately in need of divine forgiveness and 
renewal. Because even Christians are radically sinful, they must con­
tinually struggle in opposition to their own sin and in opposition to 
their bondage to the sinful ways of the world. Christians must daily 
receive the power of God and His forgiveness, that they may continue the 
agonizing effort to become obedient. Christian obedience is not easy 
or automatic. The Christian life involves a dynamic movement in which 
Christians must continually move from bondage to sin to freedom through 
grace. The paradoxical nature of the Christian life cannot be under­
stood by those who stress only forgiveness or only holiness. Though 
Christians know the power of the new age, they are still very much sub-- 
ject to the influence of the old age and thus must daily repent of their
sinfulness.
In keeping with the otherness of the Christian life, Ellul
advocates what, we have labelled "perfectionism”. He believes that '
Christians must strive to have the means which they use be the consistent
reflection of the Gospel in which they believe. "What is in the service
of Jesus Christ receives its character and effectiveness from Jesus 
1
Christ." Christians are called to manifest the coming Kingdom in 
their own persons and thus to fulfil a unique function. Unchristian 
methods distract from the Christian’s purpose, because that purpose has 
to do with embodying a quality of faithfulness which witnesses to the
X « Propaganda, p. 231.
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Gospel. The basis of Ellul’s reasoning is Chrisbological. He
believes that in Jesus Christ the means utilized was the realized
presence of the end sought. To reveal a Kingdom of love, Jesus Christ 
manifested in His own person a manner of life consistent with that 
Kingdom. Those who live in Christ are called to share in this 
reunification of means and ends, which is possible through eschatologi­
cal existence.
Perhaps one of the most inspiring features of Ellul’s ethic is his 
stress on the importance of not compromising for the sake of getting 
ahead, his insistence that we should not sacrifice obedience today for 
the sake of some more effective opportunity tomorrow. He inspires 
Christians to get on with the business of living the Christian life here 
and now, and living it in the strenuous effort to be truly faithful to 
God. He helps Christians to stop worrying about being influential or 
famous and to start worrying about how their present lives are measuring 
up to God's radical expectations.
Ellul's discussion of Christian styles of life has to do with his 
belief concerning the importance of a correspondence between Christian 
belief and conduct. He thinks that the ability to communicate the
Gospel relates directly to the degree to which one is faithful to the 
Gospel proclaimed. He is not concerned that all Christian lives be ■
outwardly identical. In fact, he utterly denies that such would be an 
ideal state of affairs. If God is a living God who demands particular 
forms of obedience from different individuals, the assumption of a 
common pattern of existence by all Christians would deny the unique and 
specific response God expects. What Ellul is insisting upon is that 
both inwardly and outwardly Christian life should manifest allegiance to
Christ. What worries him is that Christian behaviour is all too often
based on conformity to one’s social milieu, rather than being the 
expression of the Gospel. His acceptance of Barth’s "One Kingdom"
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reasoning is really but an aspect of the Calvinist (and Christian!) 
belief that the whole of life is to be lived for the glory of God.
When he says that there should be a visibility about the Christian 
life, he is not saying that at all points the Christian life must be 
absolutely different from non-Christian life. He is merely insisting
that points of agreement or disagreement must be determined by Christ­
ians on the basis of what they genuinely believe constitutes obedience
to Christ. ■
In addition to the perfectionism just discussed, another character 
istic feature of Ellul’s eschatological understanding is that it relates 
to social realism. In his thought eschatological hope leads to the 
establishment of a Christian courage to withstand the evils of the world 
and to represent a higher way. (in his view Christian hope has nothing 
to do with the view that the world is improving.) Specifically, he 
believes that through a hope which transcends history, Christians can 
become free to criticize the commonplace assumptions which form the 
basis of the modern world.. Eschatological hope leads Christians to be 
discontented with every existing society, because when judged by the 
transcendent Kingdom revealed in Christ, all human social orders are 
found wanting.
Chapter IV. The Concreteness of Obedience
What Ellul says about the concreteness of obedience is really the 
direct expression of what he has learned from Karl Barth. At this
point an evaluation of Ellul is a direct evaluation of Barth.
Both men see the Christian good as having to do with God in Eis 
living activity as Commander.1 Though biblical laws and moral
1. Because of their belief in the living God. Barth and Ellul are not 
willing to ’understand the Christian ethic as the rational application 
of rules or principles.
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injunctions are seen as vitally important for the perception of God's 
living command, they are not simply identified with God's will for today 
Behind such an understanding are several basic Barthian convictions« 
the reversal of the traditional Law-Gospel schema, the belief in the 
freedom of God in the present, the recognition that the Bible is 
primarily a theological document revealing the nature of God (hence 
biblical morality is to be received in a more relative way than 
biblical theology). Another basic assumption is the acceptance of a 
doctrine of Scripture whereby the Word of God is seen as a living event, 
rather than as identifiable with the words of the Bible. While agree­
ing that the Word of God can repeat the message of Scripture, it is also 
recognized that especially in moral matters God can speak a new Word or 
can give concrete applications having differing ranges of meaning to
different .individuals.
The most basic assumption (though not the most explicit one!) is 
the acceptance of a trinitarian doctrine of God. This belief is really 
assumed in all the convictions just stated and seems to us to be the 
basic premise underlying both Barthian theology and ethics. Of course, 
no belief as such is going to solve the problem of the Christian ethic 
-—which is a matter of daily faithfulness to God. This belief does 
point to the basic way Christians are to go about the task of attempting 
to perceive God's will.
The doctrine of the trinity affirms that the same God who has 
spoken in the past speaks today. At least in Western tradition, the 
Holy Spirit has been identified with the Spirit of the Risen Lord. At 
a very minimum the ethical meaning of this identification is that there 
is a vital connection between God's moral Word in the past and His moral 
Word today. This connection can be misunderstood in two ways. With 
the extreme situationalists, one can underemphasize the importance of
past revelation; with the legalists, one can fail to recognize the
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freedom of the Holy Spirit to speak a concrete and specific Word to man 
today» The former group virtually ignores biblical law; the latter 
group codifies biblical law so rigidly that God's present activity is 
seen as limited to endorsing what He has said in the past.
Barth's and Sllul's approach to ethics transcends the two alterna­
tives just mentioned. Both men insist on the absolute necessity of 
doing one's biblical and exegetical homework if God's living Word is to 
be perceived and if ethics is to be anything more than human opinion.
Both men also insist that though God commands in ways consistent with 
His past activity, He is not a boring and monotonous God who .is limited 
to merely repeating what He once said, though He is free to do that very 
thing. Past revelation is concretized by and in some cases severely 
relativized by God's present activity. Ethics in a trinitarian style 
involves openness to change, because the Holy Spirit is alive today.
It also involves continuity with the past, because the God who is alive 
today is the same God who has come to man in Jesus Christ.
From these basic theological convictions certain ethical consequen­
ces follow. For one thing, the role of Christian ethics must itself be 
relativized so as t.o recognize the freedom of God. A practical 
casuistry is possible; a casuistry as such is not. A practical 
casuistry is aware of its own relativity; it doe3 not confuse its own . 
witness with the absolutely authoritative Word which only God can speak.
A practical casuistry makes no claims to infallibility. The Church's 
voice is not confused with the voice of the Church's Lord, though it is 
recognized that the free Lord can and does speak through the Church’s 
witness. Because of the belief in the freedom of God, Christians can 
offer only advice, not absolute imperatives. A practical casuistry is 
simply the effort of one Christian to witness to another’ concerning what 
he believes should be the concrete shape of the Christian life. The task
assumes the effort to be responsive to past revelation, but it also
assumes that there is no legally binding biblical hermeneutic that can. 
infallibly establish the present meaning of biblical moral revelation.
Another consequence of the trinitarian understanding of God, the 
Barthian understanding of the Word, and the other convictions we have 
mentioned is that there is seen to be no single way to deal with all 
biblical moral injunctions. A wide spectrum of givenness is attached 
to various biblical commands, because the Holy Spirit is free to attach 
Himself in various ways to past moral revelation. In some cases Ellul 
and Barth regard, the possibility of C-od taking exception to His past 
commands to be very remote. In these cases they speak of the law as a 
lower limit. Though the Christian life is to exceed such structural 
guidelines, it is not to fall below them and they are seen as relatively 
firm.^ Though a biblical commandment becomes authoritative only when 
by God’s grace it becomes God’s personal command, there can be an 
ongoing givenness to the command in a person's life, once it has been 
established in this way. There is a structural side to the Christian 
life which is not a mere function of momentary inspiration. Ellul is 
especially concerned.that Christians not use their freedom as an excuse 
.for not being radically faithful to God, as an excuse for choosing an 
easier life than life under the law. (This is a major motive in his 
insistence on the law as a lower limit.) Christians are called to a 
righteousness which exceeds that of the law, without totally abolishing
the demands of the law.
In other cases past commands are understood more as provocative 
illustrations, as points of departure, rather than as tangible givens.
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1. Exegetic-al support can be established with reference to Pauline 
theology. Though Paul used the law to give shape to the Christian 
life, he did not see it as establishing an exhaustive statement of 
God’s expectations. Likewise, in the synoptic gospels the command 
to love issues in specific structural guidelines, but those guide­
lines do not exhaustively describe the meaning of love.
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Here biblical commandments are thought of as instructionally necessary, 
rather than as relatively firm guidelines. In this mode, the Bible is
used as a source of analogies or as establishing the general direction 
of God’s commanding activity. Our response is to be less that of
imitation and more that of a creative obedience which listens for the
particularising Word of the Holy Spirit to our individual situation, 
taking God's past revelation into consideration.
Barth and Ellul believe that it is very unlikely that God is 
going to take exception to the teachings of the Ten Commandments or the 
Sermon on the Mount (Barth) or the Old Testament teaching concerning 
tithing (Ellul). Exceptions to such biblical injunctions are to be 
understood as real exceptions, the rarity of which must be stressed.
When Barth talks about other biblical injunctions, such as Jesus’s 
specific call to particular people, he emphasizes the instructional, 
rather than the legal nature of such teachings — and Ellul agrees with 
his general point. •
The practice of attributing varying degrees of givenness to various 
biblical moral teachings is the expression of the conviction that the 
Word of God is related to the content of Scripture in varying ways (this 
belief itself being the expression of a trinitarian understanding). The 
Holy Spirit’s relationship to past moral revelation is not standardized. 
This being the case, Christian ethicists cannot avoid the problem of 
subjectivity (though true subjectivity is not autonomy — but the effort 
to be obedient to the living God). The task of Christian ethics is • 
very much a spiritual one. Obedience is involved in the selection of 
biblical moral commands which are believed still to embody God’s claim 
for today. (Barth’s and Ellul’s ethical theory recognizes the diversity 
present in various biblical moralities.) Obedience is also involved in 
seeking to distinguish between those commands which are relatively firm 
and those of a more relative (though equally important) nature.
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The Christian ethieist is himself a witness to the Word which he
believes that he has heard. He can only invite others to consider what 
he has heard and bo test it by their own openness to the living Cod who 
speaks today as we attempt to study His revelation in the past. Barth 
and Ellul have offered a modest practical casuistry for Christian
consideration. More than this is not claimed for their work.
Chanter V. The .Purpose of the Christian Life? Faithful Witness
to Jesus Christ
As with many other Christians, Ellul defines the purpose of Christ­
ian life as that of witnessing to Jesus Christ. He expands this 
definition by insisting that proclamation occurs in both words and deeds, 
and goes even further by saying that Christian verbal witness becomes 
credible only to the extent that Christian behaviour is consistent with 
the Gospel proclaimed. The Christian's unique task in everything that 
he does is to be a missionary who introduces that which is specifically 
Christian into the life of the world. Ellul's understanding has the 
effect of simplifying the Christian life to a remarkable degree. Amid 
every activity in which Christians engage, they are called to accomplish 
one thing and one thing only and to do so with methods consistent with 
the goal sought.
■ Ellul recognizes that Christian witness can extend to the social 
realm and in an indirect way sometimes can influence the world at various 
points. However, he rejects the idea that the Christian ethic can be • 
applied to the world. The Christian ethic is inapplicable to the world 
because the Christian life is itself the expression of faith in Christ. 
The consequences of fa,ith cannot be expected of or imposed upon those 
who do not share the faith. He believes that it would be a secular 
distortion of biblical law to attempt to apply it in isolation from an 
acceptance of the Gospel of God's guiding presence. He believes that
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Christian "values’* are themselves dependent upon the personal activity 
of the Commander, who speaks His law in the context of revealing His 
presence. The basic God-centredness of his ethic prevents him from 
being able to offer a Christian "social ethic" to the world.
Ellul’s specific examples of Christian social witness show that 
though Christians manifesting a uniquely Christian position may sometimes 
agree with non-believers at the level of concrete action, they will often . ’ 
find themselves all alone. For example, his advocacy of racial 
integration will meet with wide support from many humanitarians, but the 
specific proposals he makes concerning Christian involvement on behalf 
of the poor are unlikely to meet with favourable response from non­
believers. He is not attempting to apply Christianity to the social 
order. For example he speaks of the inapplicability of the Gospel to 
the secular legal realm. (A frequent theme in his ethic is precisely 
this duality between the Church and the vzorld.)
Sines Ellul does not attempt to apply the Christian Gospel to the 
non-believing world, it comes as no surprise that he does not relate his 
Christian ethic to the hope of the moral improvement of the world. He 
explicitly rejects the doctrine of general moral progress in history as 
being .inconsistent with the biblical view of man as radically sinful and 
as inconsistent with the New Testament understanding that history ends 
in judgment and does not gradually evolve toward the Kingdom of God.
He believes that the immoral results of sin are so immense as bo rule 
out speculation about general moral progress in history. (He admits • 
that in each generation there may be moral gains at particular points 
which are offset by losses at other points. It’s just that he does not 
believe in any general growth of good in history.) Ellul is surely of 
one mind with early Christianity here, since the New Testament established
the motivational basis of the Christian life on a foundation which was
not disturbed by the belief that history would soon end in judgment.
-•A
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Ellul sees the Christian task as that of making a faithful witness 
to Christ; which is itself freed from obsession about human results.
Were the Christian ethic based on the hope of the improvement of society;
Christians would be tempted to resort to the realistic methods necessary
to procure such results; rather than being content to make a faithful 
witness, trusting the results into God’s care.
Since we agree that the style of the Christian life is to be • •
defined by the Christian Gospel and limited to methods consistent with 
that Gospel; we also agree with Ellul’s rejection of world improvement 
as the goal of the Christian life. Though we are called to love our 
neighbours, we are asked to do so in Christian ways, not in the pragmatic 
ways necessary to attain certain social or political results. We also * 
think that Ellul is not encouraging a defeatist attitude toward human 
works. Quite to the contrary, by brushing aside false hopes, he helps 
Christians to make an ethical witness even in very discouraging times.
On his terns, the Christian has no right to give up moral effort, using 
the imperfectibility of the world as his excuse. .No matter how difficult 
may be the world situation in which Christians live, the moral task of 
the Christian life continues — because it is not based on the hope of 
world improvement. A Christian ethic based decisively on the hope of 
moral progress in general history (as was the social gospel) is liable to 
have its very motivation destroyed when it confronts a h.istoiy more
tragic than hopeful.
Just as in Ellul’s understanding eschatological hope leads Christ-r 
ians to be discontented with every existing society (because every social 
order falls short of the Kingdom of God), so his rejection of general 
moral progress in history encourages the same critical stance with refer­
ence to any society in which Christians might live. Christians must 
always be critical of any achieved state of affairs, because they represent 
a transcendent Kingdom in a world that continually rejects that Kingdom.
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While agreeing that the motivational oasis of the Christian life 
should have nothing to do with the hope of human progress in any sense 
and while agreeing that Ellul 1s rejection of the doctrine of general 
moral progress is well founded, we think at places he makes an untenable 
further assumption—that social progress is also impossible. Ho can 
be quoted against himself at this point, so our criticism only applies to 
that aspect of his thought where he utterly denies that there can be any 
social improvement of the technological society, the city, and the modern 
world. We think that such ruthless sociological pessimism is not necessi­
tated by the denial of general moral progress. We believe that the utter 
bleakness of this sociological point of view is not necessitated by 
Ellul's theology. The Christian belief in sin docs not imply the world’s 
total incapacity for social and institutional improvement. Though the 
general moral direction of history does not basically change (moral 
improvements concerning particular issues being offset by moral losses 
at other points), we think that man can improve his external living situa­
tion and that such improvement is not without significance. We are not
claiming that history as such is progressive, even in this social sense; 
we are only arguing that the.re can be widespread social improvement and
that such a recognition is perfectly consistent with the belief in the
fallenness of man.
Ellul goes on to describe the general shape of the Christian life 
which he believes is capable of witnessing to the Gospel. He thinks that 
such a way of life should include inward and outward humility, the 
abandonment of the quest for status and worldly success. We agree that 
Christians are not to seek self-aggrandisement and that this prohibition 
should have outward behavioural consequences. (We agree that this point 
can be biblically established vzith reference to the teachings of Jesus 
and Paul.) A*life lived in faithfulness to Christ in a world that rejects
Christ will surely bring one into a position of receiving less worldly
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success than one otherwise would* If the way of Christ does not always 
conflict with the actions of the world, it surely conflicts at many 
points. We also appreciate the fact that Ellul does not appear to be 
offering a timeless legalistic formula as to what in individual cases 
constitutes this life of outward humility. He generally does not deny 
that Christians can keep influential leadership positions.
Ellul also believes that a life that is a faithful witness to 
Christ will include a great deal of suffering. (Christian humility 
involves a type of suffering, in that it brings about a diminution of 
worldly success.) The very task of witnessing to Christ itself brings 
suffering and persecution, because Christians, by virtue of their 
allegiance to the Kingdom of God, are forced to call into question many’ 
of the 'world’s values. Such a transvaluation cf values has the effect
of calling the world to repentance, a call that the world resents.
We agree with this point and agree that it can be substantiated on the
basis of the New Testament witness.
Ellul’s discussion of Christian love also indicates the shape of
the Christian life which he bleieves is a faithful reflection of allegi­
ance to Christ. We agree that Christian love is based on a participa­
tion in the Holy Spirit and. thus is qualitatively different from 
natural love. We also agree that Christian love is sacrificial love 
and is most truly indicated in love for one’s enemies (in response to 
God’s love for undeserving sinners). Because we agree concerning the 
importance of an all-inclusive love, which includes even a love for 
enemies, we disagree with Ellul's tendency to privatize love, his 
tendency to confine love to the personal sphere. We believe that to 
limit love’s scope in this way is to contradict the insight that
Christians are to love even mheir enemies.’ How can Christians love
all enemies, if their expression of love is to be limited to those people
near at hand? We agree that Christian love must include personal acts
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of love; we cannot agree that these are the only avenues of express­
ion open to Christians. We think that to argue that Christian love 
cannot possibly inspire participation in society’s programmes and 
institutions is to distort the biblical teaching by superimposing a 
personalis vie philosophy on the Bible. We do not agree that the Bible 
articulates an ontology of love which limits love to the personal 
sphere. In particular, we do not think that the parable of the Good 
Samaritan makes this point, though Ellul is confident that it does.
That parable seems to us to reject any limiting definition as to who 
is or is not a Christian’s neighbour. Instead of advocating limiting 
definitions as to who is one’s neighbour, the parable talks, about
being a neighbour to those in need. V/e see no reason why the 
category of neighbours in need should not include distant neighbours,
whom we cannot possibly know personally, but whom v/e nevertheless are
called to love.
Chapter Yl. Christ’s Lordship over a Rebellious World -
We have seen that Ellul understands the Christian life in escha­
tological perspective. The Christian is to be in the world, but not 
of the world. His understanding of the sovereignty of God is con­
sistent with-this point of view. Believing in the hidden sovereignty 
of Christ, he insists that Christ’s intentional will cannot be per­
ceived simply by looking at external events and conforming to what is 
happening. God's will is not a function of history as such, but is 
the expression of God’s own freedom and purpose. Though in a hidden 
way Christ is absolutely sovereign in and through the evil which He 
permits, Christian obedience is never a mere conformity to the world. 
This cannot be the case because the world over which Christ reigns is 
a sinful one, whose actions are often not in conformity with Christ’s
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intentions.~ The fact that God can use evil to accomplish His
benevolent purposes is not to be used as an excuse for Christians to 
sin by conforming to the sinful ways of the world. The way of
Christian obedience involves the conscious effort to seek God’s
intentional 'will and to be obedient to that) even though so doing often
sets one at odds with one’s environment. By recognizing the reality 
of sin and also God’s creative ability to accomplish His purposes in 
the midst of sin, Ellul encourages Christians to strive to lead lives 
freed from the sinful ways of the world, while at the same time 
encouraging them to trust in God’s hidden wisdom.
A modest criticism we have had .is that Ellul’s thought at this 
point is so polemically determined by his disagreement with those who 
advocate conformity to the world, that he seems to stress only the 
critical insight implied in the Christian belief in providence. V/e 
agree that the Christian belief in providence does not imply an 
endorsement of all that happens. Christians are not pantheists and 
a critical attitude toward public events is not inconsistent with faith 
in the lordship of Christ, but is implied by the knowledge that Christ 
rules over a rebellious world. We think, however, that Ellul could
have said more about the fact that God does do positive things in public 
or external history. If God’s positive actions in public history are 
not self-evident, neither are they negligible. Thus the Christian mood 
need not be one-sidedly critical; it must also involve gratitude for 
the ways in which God brings together external factors to contribute 
toward the Christian perception of His will. What God demands of a 
man has some relationship t.o the external factors in which God the 
Creator and Lord has allowed a man’s life to be placed. If God’s will 
cannot be read off from a knowledge of external factors, neither can it
1. We agree that when the Bible talks about God’s sovereignty it does 
not forget v/hat it has already said about human sinfulness. We also 
agree that the Bible sees God as a free agent and not as a more structure 
of history.
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be perceived if careful attention is not paid to such factors as one’s 
particular gifts and limitations, one's external opportunities and the 
lack thereof, etc. We doubt whether' Ellul would disagree concerning 
the positive attitude we have been discussing which is implied in the 
Christian belief in providence, (We have attempted to make it clear 
that such an attitude must not involve a conformity to the factors of
one's environment, only the effort to listen for the Word as it relates 
to these factors.) It's just that he himself has nt»t developed this 
aspect to any great extent ana, having failed to do so, he could easily 
give a one-sidedly negative ifapression of the Christian attitude 
implied by the belief in the sovereignty of Christ.
The real problem in Ellul's thought concerning the sovereignty of 
Christ i3 where he flirts with the apocalyptic category of history 
becoming more degenerate as a result of Christ's resurrection. We 
regard his thought at this point as entirely unstable and self-confcradic 
tory. At some places he contradicts this point by saying that history 
has always been marked by the signs which New Testament apocalyptic 
passages attribute to the time following the resurrection. At other 
places he contradicts his point by implying that if history has gotten 
worse at any one time, it has been in the modern period, not immediately 
following Christ's resurrection. Along these later lines, he argues 
that a-unique characteristic of the present period is the relative 
absence of the Spirit; but then he seemingly contradicts himself by 
saying that the period following Christ's resurrection is marked by a 
more active presence of the Spirit.
With all these contradictions one seriously doubts whether this 
aspect of Ellul's thought is of much importance. Were It of importance, 
he would surely have attempted to sort out his thinking better than he 
has done. Of his various formulations, we agree with the idea that
public history has always been marked by the same signs cf evil, though
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we agree that Christ's resurrection did bring about a fuller manifesta­
tion of the Spirit to the Church (which did not itself change the 
general shape of public history). We do not agree that Christ's 
resurrection called forth a fuller expression of evil. We can under­
stand that the New Testament authors who saw Christ's resurrection as 
the inauguration of the eschaton could put the issue in this way, but 
we fail to see how it can be so put with the endurance of history for • 
these many centuries. Also, if this point is really true, it'should 
be capable of historical verification. If world history suddenly 
became worse as a result of Christ's resurrection, then secular his­
torians should be able to see signs of this. We are aware of no 
empirical verification of this point and we do not believe that it can ' 
be sustained theologically in the absence of such verification.
Chapter VII. The Christian Life and the Political Order
Ellul argues on both theological and sociological grounds that
the state has the inevitable tendency to make a religion of itself.
He thinks that the modern form of this tendency is the continuing growth
of centralized states, which justify their omnicompetence on the 
grounds that the important problems in life are all political and are 
capable of political solution. Politization is Ellul's name for the 
tendency to accept this state of affairs. Just as politization in the 
world involves the sacralizing of political affairs and the assumption 
that all true history is political, in the Church politization takes . 
the form of the identification of highly debatable and relative politi­
cal choices with the truth of the Gospel.
• Over against this politicizing tendency, Ellul appeals to the 
Bible as establishing the relativity of politics. He argues that
though the state preserves a relative order and justice, which permit
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the freedoms necessary for the Gospel to be preached, he says that the 
Bible sees the state as incapable of establishing true meaning for life. 
He insists that by biblical standards the state should be regarded as a 
limited thing) having nothing a/Lrect to do with the establishment of 
the good revealed by God. This being the case, he insists that politics 
is not an area of sacred truth, as it is currently made out to be. He- 
opposes the omnicompetent state because he believes that the Gospel and 
it alone offers true meaning for life. •
Relating his theological insight concerning the relativity of 
politics to his sociological observations, he argues that not only is 
the state incapable of providing "solutions" to life’s major problems, 
but he says that it is incapable of providing "solutions" of any sort.
He believes that true political problems are by their very nature always 
incapable of solution. At best all that political decisions can offer 
is a tolerable balance between various conflicting claims.
V/e agree that the state should be understood as indirectly related 
to salvation, in the way just suggested. If God’s purpose is revealed 
in Christ and is covenant fellowship, then surely God’s purpose in 
creation and in providence is related. Specifically, v/e believe that 
the state does not just preserve order, but unbeknownst to itself is 
used by God to permit the preaching of the Gospel. .
Concerning atheology of the state, we also agree in general with 
Ellul that to some extent the demonic has invaded every state. This 
being the case, all states are to be relativized and Christians are to 
adopt critical (though also appreciative) attitudes toward all states.
We disagree, however, with Ellul’s acceptance of Barth’s and Cullmann's 
exegesis concerning Rom. 13. V/e do not think that an implied reference 
to angelic powers can be assumed to be present when Rom. 13 refers to 
political "authoritiesWe think that there are much more convincing
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theological ways ol establishing the truth of the moral ambiguity of 
government than resting one’s case on ingenious exegetical speculation, 
admittedly .incapable of proof (so admitted by Culfonann). One can 
establish the same theological point by setting Hom, 13 in polar tension, 
vzith Rev. 13 or in tension with the Old Testament prophetic tradition.
By making the point in this way in the broader context of the canon, 
one’s theological convictions seem to rest on surer biblical grounds 
than if one attempts to. wring more theological meaning out of Rom. 13
than it seems to contain. .
Ellul has an array of additional biblical arguments (two of which 
we will briefly mention here) which leads him to his conclusion con­
cerning the relativity of politics and the state. for example, he 
says that Jesus Christ was not politically involved and this being so, 
political involvement cannot be said to be an imperative of faith.
(Ellul is not denying that as an act of freedom a Christian may choose 
to become active in politics.) To put his point our vzay: if Jesus 
Christ were the true man and as such were non-political, how can 
political participation be imperative, as politicized Christians claim 
it is? He also argues that there is no legitimate way to use the Bible 
to establish the timeless preferability of one particular form of the 
state. This being the case, politicized Christians, who use the Bible 
to defend the timeless preferability of the form of the abate they 
favour, do a disservice to the Bible and confuse their human prefer­
ences with what can be said as a clear aspect of Christian truth.
Ellul is quite frank in recognizing that revelation declares the 
whole area of politics as relative. A characteristic conclusion he 
reaches is that ’’all points of view have their motives of justice and 
their burdens of injustice”.'1' He thinks that no matter what political
1. Raise Presence, p. 151«
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decision is taken? it generally involves guilt? this being so because 
political decisions seldom offer Christian choices or even choices the 
Christian preferability of which can be clearly established. He 
thinks that legitimate Christian considerations are often both represen­
ted and denied by the various sides (though of course some sides may 
not represent any Christian considerations). Against political 
Christians? he insists that the Christian preferability of day-in-and- 
day-out political choices is seldom obvious, though he admits that 
occasionally the Church as Church can and must stand on one side of a 
political issue (for example? at Barmen). Though individual Christians 
can have their own political opinions and can even have their own 
opinions as to what is relatively preferable from the Christian perspec­
tive? he thinks that Christians should be very reluctant to identify 
one side of complex and debatable political issues with true doctrine.
He has no objections to Christian discussion of political issues; in 
fact? political discussion, rather than the preaching of political 
stances? is what he advocates.'*’ .
If Christians feel called to participate in direct political 
channels? he thinks that the main contribution they can make stems in 
large part from their recognition of the relativity of political affairs 
and their awareness of the otherness of Christianity in relation to all 
political options. Recognizing the common allegiance that Christians 
of even diverse political viewpoints should have (an allegiance due to 
the Christocentric focus of the faith), Christians can help calm politi­
cal passions and can introduce cool rationality into heated political
1. We think Sllul is inconsistent when he says that the la,.ity has the 
right to discuss political issues, but then vocationally excludes the 
clergy from the same discussions. We also think he is inconsistent 
in arguing that laymen may participate in political parties, but that 
clergymen must not. bince all Christians are? according to him., to 
seek to express a reconciling presence in the world, why must the 
style of this presence be so totally different between clergy and 
laity?
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rhetoric. Being free of ideological bondage and partisan points of 
view, Christians can help those in their own political groups to try 
to take account of the legitimate criticisms that others of other points 
of view are raising. V/hether such a one-sidedly critical presence 
within political groups can be called true political participation ox1 
not, it may nevertheless be a significant activity and one made possible 
in part by the Christian recognition of the relativity of politics.
Looking back over what we have said here concerning polibization 
and the relativity of politics, we agree that there is much misguided 
enthusiasm for politics in the world and in the Church, enthusiasm which 
borders on a sacralizing of political decisions and political affairs in 
general. Even if the Church is not politicized to the extent that 
Ellul imagines and even if the pietist problem (escapism from service 
to Christ in the world) lingers on more than he suspects, we still think 
that he has put his finger on an area where the world has invaded and
influenced the Church to the detriment of her own faith. We think that
he is correct that only rarely can political decisions legitimately be 
identified with the Christian position. Yve also think that what he says
about the relativity of politics could greatly contribute to a more 
loving and tolerant spirit of political discussion among Christians.
His thought could have the effect of helping to lower the temperature of 
Christian political discussion—and this contribution alone would be
monumental!
Not only does Ellul affirm the relativity of politics; he also 
affirms the autonomy of politics in relationship to Christian values and 
sometimes he affirms the same in relationship to human values. Arguing 
on the basis of both biblical and sociological insights, he insists that 
political affairs are incapable of being influenced by Christian values. 
He even says that the effort to apply Christian values to the secular
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political realm has disastrous consequences, Christians are blinded 
to the actual reality of the state and states are led to commit acts of 
worldly imprudence, giving their enemies unfair advantage. His con­
clusion is that the state does a better job if it bases its policies on 
human realism, rather than on the futile effort to apply Christian truth.
We agree that the Christian ethic is inapplicable to non-Christians 
and to the secular state in particular. Hov/ever, we do not agree that 
politics is autonomous with reference to human values. Politics being 
one aspect of human affairs, it niust surely be the expression of human 
morality. Though the human values represented by politics may often 
need to be criticized by Christians and though they will always fall 
short of Christian ideals, nevertheless we think that there is no such 
thing as a state devoid of human values of one sort or another. Ellul
himself is not able consistently to sustain this point of view, which is 
as abstract as his tendency to isolate technology from human goals and
purposes.
Granted Ellul’s verdict concerning the autonomous nature of polit­
ics (a verdict we share as far as Christian values are concerned), and 
granted his perfectionistic understanding of the Christian life, one can 
see that on his terms it is very difficult for Christians to be politi­
cians in the usual sense of the word. Because of the autonomous nature
of politics, politicians are to be decisively concerned to weigh 
probable consequences and to make decisions on the basis of prudent 
realism. Christians, on the other hand, are to be decisively concerned 
about the purity of the means used, trusting the results into God’s 
keeping. Since Christians are to witness to Christ with means consist­
ent with Christ and since it is seen as disastrous to attempt to apply 
Christianity to political affairs, the Christian who chooses to be a 
politician is faced with the inescapable dilemma of having his political
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vocation at odds with his Christian vocation (which for Ellul includes 
the whole of life). Since Sllul will not qualify either his social 
or his political realism or his Christian perfectionism, he has to admit 
the existence of this dilemma for those who choose to be politicians 
in the normal sense of the word. Because of his aversion to legalism, 
he does not flatly reject, this option, but seeing the dilemma that it 
poses for Christians, he encourages other modes of response. These 
other ways of relating to political affairs enable Christians to make 
contributions to politics without having to deny the perfectionism of
their witness.
V/hen one thinks about the actual substance of Ellul’s suggestions 
for Christians who choose to be involved in direct political channels, '
one realizes that what he usually is referring to is very different from
political participation in the standard sense of the word. Rather 
than participating normally in politics, Christians are encouraged to 
preach Christ to those who do participate (at least to preach Christ in 
the sense of introducing Christian transcendence at points where it is 
little expected). By witnessing to' divergent points of view and by 
pointing to the importance of pure means, Christians within political 
groupings critically qualify political affairs, without themselves being 
in bondage to the ideology of their group and without putting a major 
emphasis on seeking to get candidates elected or issues passed. Though 
he holds open such an approach as a genuine Christian option, he himself 
has reasons for preferring even more indirect forms of witness. .
From Ellul’s sociological analysis he has come to ruthlessly 
pessimistic conclusions concerning the inability of democratic citizens 
to control the state or to participate effectively in politics. We 
think that he may have overstated the degree tc which democracy has 
become an illusion, the extent to which democratic citizens cannot
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control the state or effectively participate in politics. However, what 
is important for our considerations is that his political disillusionment 
and cynicism concerning direct political participation directly relates 
to his personal preference for forms of political witness of totally 
indirect sorts. If one thinks that very little can be accomplished 
through direct political channels, indirect channels become all the more
attractive.
Another reason why Ellul prefers indirect approaches is that he is 
convinced that politics is not a very opportune place to make a witness 
for Christ. He thinks that when political activists are directly 
involved in political affairs they are very inattentive to Christian 
preaching. Though this insight does not negate the possibility of 
attempting to make a Christian witness in political affairs, neither does
it encourage such activities.
The totally indirect proposals Ellul discusses are means whereby 
Christians could influence political reality without any direct political 
participation. In order to make this witness, groups would have to 
become more autonomous over against the state, working to define their own 
values. Having established this autonomy (which he proposes for 
Christian and non-Christian groups), Christians in particular could become 
good political critics (rather than politicians). Possessing a transcen­
dent reference point (the future Kingdom revealed in Christ), they could 
criticise the sociological and psychological assumptions accepted by most 
people and employed by political propagandists. By criticising these ' 
commonplace assumptions, Christians would help their fellow-citisens to
become more critical of the state, and when citizens become more critical
the totalitarian omnicompetence of the modern state is threatened.
(Even the establishment of autonomous groups is a blow against the 
totalitarian state.) In addition, by studying political. reality.
f
Christians might be able to issue early prophetic warnings concerning
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particular political situations; the state might then be able to
establish a degree of justice and human disaster might be avoided. Last 
of all» Christians could personally converse with those in positions of
authorityj and in this personal and non-political way help the poor and 
the oppressed.
Ellul's discussion of possible Christian responses to politics 
opens up a vast spectrum of political possibilities. Though he seems to 
favour the totally indirect forms of -witness, he does not rule out the
other possibilities. He has made a good case for more indirect forms 
of political witness, which can be undertaken with less necessity for 
Christian compromise and which actually take advantage of uniquely Christ­
ian convictions. (For example, the Christian's eschatological distancing 
from all political options could help him to be a more objective critic 
of political affairs.) However, though he sees the difficult situation 
facing Christians who choose to be involved in direct political activity 
in the usual sense of the word, he does not deny that some Christians may 
be called to that agonizing situation. Neither should we deny this • 
possibility. Noting the advantages and disadvantages of the various 
Christian options in relationship to politics, each Christian must seek
that response which seems most faithful in his own circumstances.
Chapter VIII. The Christian Understanding of Money
In keeping with the teaching of Jesus, Ellul sees the seductive 
power of money, the attractive influence it exerts over all men. He 
thinks that man’s natural relationship to the material world i3 one of 
bondage to the things that money can buy. As a part of the meaning of 
human bondage to sin, natural man is in captivity to a false understanding 
of life which, puts monetary accumulation, rather than God, at the centre.
Ellul believes that a major aspect of the meaning of Christ's work
as Saviour is that He delivers Christians from this false understanding of
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life. Instead of being in captivity to the power of money, Christ 
enables Christians to use the material world for the glory of God and 
the service of man. Though he affirms no timeless legalistic formula 
as to what constitutes the dividing line between need and excess, he says 
that Christians are to divest themselves of all money and material 
possessions which exceed that of need. Instead of luxurious over­
consumption, Christians are to give their wealth away to help the poor.
In so doing, Christians are not only performing the stewardship function
which is a part of their Christian calling; they are also acting to free 
themselves from bondage to ’’mammon”.
Ellul believes that the Christian detachment from money is not 
merely a matter of disposition, but must express itself in outward 
practice. "For where your treasure is, there will you?? heart be also” 
(Mtfc. 6:21). If one does not love money (l Tim. 6:10), then one should 
not devote one’s life to monetary accumulation. If one bases one’s . 
outward life on the quest for material abundance, this, for Ellul, is 
evidence that one’s inner loyalty is in fact misdirected. •
There is a great deal to be said for Ellul’s understanding of the 
Christian’s relationship to money. In line with the teachings of Jesus, 
he rightly recognises the threat that money poses to the human soul. He
knows that affluence is a problem for Christian existence and that bhe ’ 
Christian issue concerning money is not simply that of stewardship)
(though it is also that). He also recognizes that the danger of wealth 
is not simply that of having, but also that of wanting to have. Physi­
cally poor people ca,n be in bondage to a materialistic value system, as 
are the physically rich. Though true Christian being expresses itself 
both in not having an excess of material things and in not wanting to 
have, non-Christian being can be present even when one is not rich, but 
v/hen one directs one’s energies toward that goal. Ellul’s position also 
has the merit that it avoids legalism. His distinction between need and
~ 412 -
excess will not itself tell individuals in diverse cultural and economic
situations what does or does not constitute a life devoid of luxury, but 
by pointing to the distinction he does help Christians to approach the 
problem of consumption in the proper spirit. A further merit of his 
stance is that while trying to help Christians to recover styles of life 
which are appropriate responses to the Gospel, he is not' saying that an 
absence of abundance is a prerequisite for the receipt of grace. He is 
not encouraging the Church to preach only to the poor, but is saying that 
the Church's pre0.ch.ing to all men should include an indication of the way 
of life which is a faithful response to the Gospel.
We believe that what Ellul has to say concerning the Christian 
attitude toward money could be of immense help to the modern Church, 
especially to the Church living in the superabundance of the West. What 
he says could help the Church of the West to gain a Christian identity 
over against the affluent society in which she lives. .
Chapter IX. The Christian Understanding of Violence -
Ellul begins his discussion of violence with a statement of what he 
regards as Christian realism concerning violence. Concerning both the 
facts of violence and the consequences of violence, we have been critical 
of many of his formulations, not because we regard his views as simply ' 
wrong, but because we think that the statements often go further than 
the biblical and sociological evidence seems to permit. .
We agree that violence is an order of necessity, a necessary and 
common aspect of the fallen world. The fact of sin surely implies the 
fact of violence and we agree that this can be biblically shown and 
sociologically confirmed. We also agree that states are established by 
violence and at least in part are maintained by the same. We think that
Ellul overstates his case when he describes violence as the sole means
available to those in places of political power. We see neither
biblical nor sociological evidence for this sweeping extension of the 
argument. Likewise} we think that he overstates the degree to which the 
world as a whole is ruled by violence. While agreeing that economic and
class relations involve a great deal of violence, we disagree that such 
relations are nothing but violence. We do not believe that his general 
theology necessitates these sweeping statements. Since he recognizes 
that Christians and non-Christians can sometimes agree at the level of '
concrete action, he has no vested interest in proving that all non­
Christian actions are objectively contrary to God's intention. His 
general theology does not necessitate the simplistic view that non­
Christian relations involve nothing but violence. Such a view is really 
consistent only with a doctrine of man's total moral depravity, which 
Ellul is not willing to affirm.
Having stated what he regards as the facts of violence, he goes on 
to describe what he regards as the consequences of violence. He calls 
these consequences "laws of violence". The first one he discusses is 
that of "sameness". We agree that subtle forms of violence can be as 
violent as more overt forms and thus are essentially similar. We dis­
agree, however, that Christians are to make no distinctions between 
various types of physical violence, totally rejecting the legitimacy of 
any distinction between legitimate force and illegitimate violence. We 
believe that Ellul makes an exegetical mistake in his assumption that
Mtt. 5s21-22 is a statement about the sameness of violence in the social 
and political order. "’You have heard that it was said to men of old, • 
"You shall not kill; and whoever kills shall be liable to judgment.” But 
I say to you that eveiy one who is angry with his brother shall be liable 
to judgment We think that this passage does not refer to the .social
order at all, but is a normative statement of what Matthew understood as 
a requirement of Jesus for Christians. Hot only does this passage seem
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incapable of establishing the sameness between force and violence, but we
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think that Hom. 13 and parallel passages imply the legitimacy of some 
such distinction, When Christians consider the issue of physical 
violence in society (as contrasted with the question of the Christian 
recourse to violence), they seem biblically justified in arguing that 
some fo;cus of violence are justified, because of the end sought. If 
the police use violence for the sake of protecting society from criminal' 
violence (and are not doing so with unnecessary violence), we think that 
their violence is legitimate and falls under the category of justifiable
force.
Another’ law of violence (’’continuity”) has to do with the estab­
lishment of the habit of violence. While agreeing that the habit of 
violence is not easily broken, we think that Ellul overstates his case 
at those points where he seems to say that the habit cannot be broken at
all. However, we are not sure whether he really intends for us to take 
such sweeping statements literally.
A further law of violence (formulated rather confusingly) has to 
do with the issue of whether violence can be instrumental in the creation
of a relatively more just political order. Not only does violence 
provoke counter-violence, but the habit of violence once learned is so 
hard to set aside that revolutionaries do not make good statesmen. This
being so, the immediate result of violent revolution can never .involve an 
improvement over the order against which the revolution was fought. We 
see truth in this argument, as long as it is not extended to affirm that 
the eventual result of violent revolution can never involve an improved 
political situation. This extension of the argument seems insupportable 
for the simple rea,son that all states have come into existence by violence,
but some seem to be relatively better than their predecessor's. Some of 
Ellul’s words do seem to imply this extension of the argument and we are 
not entirely sure whether his words can be legitimately de-lite.ralized or
whether they must be criticized. On balance, we favour a de-l.iteralization
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at this points but we think that his exact intention cannot he finally
established.
The last two laws of violence can be easily stated. One is called 
the law of "reciprocity". The point here is that violence provokes 
hatred, which in turn provokes counter-violence, which then leads to a
further escalation of violence. This being the case, the only sure and 
certain result of violence .is the provocation of more violence. The 
last law of violence states that the practitioners of violence, recog­
nizing the detestable nature of violence, always attempt to hide the true 
nature of violence from themselves and from others. They do so by 
seeking to justify violence in the name of noble purposes.
.Having established a realistic attitude toward violence, Ellul 
goes on to state his Christian response and to do so by appealing to 
normative biblical considerations. At some points he simply refers to
Christ as the Saviour who delivers Christians from the violent order of 
necessity (the implicit assumption being that violence is a sinful 
expression of man's fallen condition). Not only does he believe that 
Christians are enabled by Christ to rebel against the violent order' of 
necessity, he also believes that the failure to do so is due to con­
formity to the world and the failure to discern the uniquely Christian 
form of action. (Thus both his eschatological reasoning and his 
perfectionism come to expression.)
Ellul’s understanding of violence is also the expression of his 
biblical conviction concerning the duality between the Church and the 
world, his belief that Christian obedience is impossible for a non­
Christian world. Since Christians cannot expect others to act as though 
they were Christian, he believes that the way of non-violence is not to 
be expected or required of non-believers. He does recognize, however, 
that the Christian life of peace and the Christian criticism of all
violence can have an indirect effect on society. Without being able
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fundamentally to alter the world’s violence) the Church can moderate 
the warring tendency of nations and can do so by attacking the easy 
conscience of & regime's supporters. The Church can influence public 
opinion, which in turn can influence a nation's war policies.
Ellul absolutely rejects the legitimacy of Christian recourse to 
violence and does so by appealing to the teachings of Jesus and Jesus’s 
non-violent example. He does not claim that the Bible offers a con­
sistent teaching on violence and war, but he nevertheless confesses that 
aspect of biblical tradition which has claimed his allegiance. (A 
Barthian doctrine of Scripture can be seen to be at work here.)
Though Ellul rejects the legitimacy of Christian recourse to 
violence, he is even more adamant in his rejection of the use of Christi­
anity to justify violence. He believes that only human (not Christian) 
reasons can be found to justify violence. Even if for human reasons 
Christians feel compelled to participate in violence, they must not 
attempt to use Christianity to justify their conduct. Rather, they 
should confess their sin even in the act of sinning and seek forgiveness. 
Since he sees violence as always and in all circumstances of the sinful 
order of necessity, he will never give it a Christian defence. Because 
he will not use Christianity to justify violence, he rejects all just war
theories.
Granted the nature of modern warfare, we agree that it is misguided 
to attempt to use Christianity to justify war. However, we believe that 
legitimate police action, conducted with a degree of restraint and for 
defensible purposes, can be justified on Christian grounds. (This is 
not to say that Christians themselves can be involved in such use of 
force.)
One significant advantage of Ellul’s advocacy of Christian non­
violence, as compared with ''pacifists'’ in general, is that his position 
is free from self-righteousness. He is intensely aware that the
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advocates of non-violence (himself included) are not free from the guilt 
stemming from their refusal to offer violent defence on behalf of the 
victims of violence. However, he does believe that those who resort
to violence also have a great deal of guilt on their hands and thus have 
no i*eason to become self-righteous about their virtuei
A deeper problem in Ellul’s thought concerning violence is that it 
may not be easy in a democracy to distinguish between the verbal defence 
of violence for the state or for revolutionary groups and one’s own 
physical recourse to violence. Because of his advocacy of social and 
political realism? he is not non-violent when it comes to his attitude
toward violence on the part of the state or on the part of revolutionaries
In many cases he would seem to be in the situation of verbally defending
the necessity of violence by these groups. Since such verbal defence
of violence contributes to acts of violence, it is hard to separate it
from the direct act of killing, in which he says Christians must not 
engage. On his terms there is no way out of this dilemma. He genuinely 
believes that the action of the state must be guided by a realism offen­
sive to Christians; • he also believes that Christians should not engage 
in conduct contrary to the Gospel of love. This problem is simply the 
expression of a central feature of Ellul's ethic — the duality between
the Church and the world. •
The Ingredients of Ellul’s Christian Ethic
All that remains to be done is to mention a fev/ general conclusions 
v/hich become apparent when one looks back over the broad sweep of Ellul’s 
ethical thought. These remarks relate to the way he does Christian
ethics.. .
It is interesting how central Scripture is for Ellul's approach to 
ethics. To discuss the meaning of Christian ethics with him is to enter
a conversation about the meaning of the Bible for today. Y.'s agree with
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his emphasis on the importance of the Bible for ethics- Such an approach 
is a welcome relief from the tendency of many Christian ethicists 
(especially in America^) to do ethics on the basis of philosophical 
assumptions or pragmatic assumptions of culture. It seems to us almost 
incredible that so many Protestant ethicists use Scripture so little.
(This may be due in part to the uniquely modern tendency for various 
theological departments to become isolated from one another—-almost as 
though one field of Christian understanding had no relationship to others. 
Over-specialization has had its casualties in theology, as in other areas 
of life.)
Not only do we agree with Ellul*s emphasis on the importance of 
Scripture for ethics, we also agree with his procedure of attempting to 
listen to the witness of the whole canon. What one learns at one place 
in Scripture must surely be understood in conversation with what one 
learns elsewhere. We also agree with the effort to make a theological 
expansion of the text, seeking the broader meaning of the Word fox* our 
time. We do not agree with those who claim that the original historical
meaning of a text of Scripture should be regarded as its sole meaning.
While not disagreeing at the level of basic principles, at several 
places we have had to criticize Sllul’s actual practice of biblical 
interpretation. The common denominator of all of our criticisms has been
a conviction that at several places he seems so anxious to state the 
modern meaning of the Word that he fails to do adequate historical home­
work concerning the probable original meaning of the text. For example, 
we think that his ontology of the city was constructed by the practice of 
continually avoiding the original meaning of various biblical teachings, 
which we think were not intended to refer to the city. V/e believe that 
on this issue he simply read his modern sociological viewpoint into 
Scripture.
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Likewise, we think that his exegesis of the parable of the Good 
Samaritan was more of an eisegesis for his own personalis tic assumptions, 
rather than an actual exegesis of the text* On violence? we believe 
that concerning both the nature and consequences of violence? he some™ 
times tended to extend biblical teachings further than they will 
legitimately go, When he talks of the law of “sameness”, we think he 
misapplies Jesus’ teaching on the sameness of anger and murder, by 
seeing it as referring to society at large* These are examples of 
points where we have had reason to criticize his exegetical methods. In 
all cases we have criticized because we have thought that he has not done 
justice to the original meaning, Ellul would surely agree in principle 
that any interpretation which ignores the original historical meaning is* 
unlikely to be capable of providing the theologically expanded meaning
for today.
We ought not to overstate the degree to which we disagree with 
Ellul1s practice of biblical interpretation. In actual fact, we have 
agreed with his exegesis at far more points than we have disagreed. We 
are not intending to say that his practice of interpretation is usually 
faulty or even often so. V/e are simply criticizing him at those specific
points where we feel his interpretation can be corrected by a more
careful exegesis.
Not only are we grateful for the centrality of the Bible in Ellul’s 
approach to ethics, we very much agree with his eclectic way of using 
other theologians at those points where he thinks they help in understand­
ing the biblical faith. We entirely agree that the biblical Word must 
be normative. The insights of various theologians are to be used with 
discretion and the discretion required involves one’s own effort to be 
faithful to the biblical Word. Theologian's are hut commentators on 
Scripture, no more and no less. Insofar and only insofar as their 
comments are biblically helpful are they of use to the Cnurch. This is'
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surely a Reformation understanding of the role of Church tradition in 
relationship to the Bible and it is most decisively Jacques Ellul’s view.
It seems to us fair to sa5r that Sllul is more influenced by Barth 
than by any other theologian. What is interesting, however, is that 
he uses Barth only at those places where he finds him to be helpful.
Ellul is no mere Barthian, one who rather worshipfully adores evexything’ 
Barth has written. For example, when Barth soars off into ontological 
speculation, Ellul remains right on the ground and doesn’t even seem to 
take notice. The speculative side of Barth's theology is entirely 
missing from Ellul's discussion.
What Is especially interesting is that Ellul is willing to learn 
at particular points from those with whom he most severely disagrees at 
other points. For example, he utterly rejects Bultrnann’s demythologising 
enterprise, but he recognizes that Bultmann is sometimes a very perceptive 
expositor, especially with reference to the ethical meaning of the 
eschatology of the Fourth Gospel. The Church has much to learn from 
Ellul’s practice J All too often the Church refuses to listen to any-, 
thing a particular theologian says, because she disagrees with him at 
some points. If one is a real student of the Bible (as Sllul is), one 
need not be defensive in this way. Since whatever theologians say can 
be compared with Scripture and one's own encounter with the V/ord speaking 
through Scripture, the Church can be free to learn what she can from all 
quarters, utilizing the unique contributions of various theologians at 
the very places where they are especially helpful.
Having spoken of Ellul’s use of both Scripture and theological 
tradition, the other ingredient of his ethic is obviously sociology. He 
is very much a man whose thinking is of one piece. Though he has mul­
tiple insights relating to diverse fields, his insights all interrelate.
It is not fair to say that the sole key to all of his thinking is theology 
that would be to oversimplify and tc forget that he is also a sociologist.
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from his theology
he writes theolo-
it is naive to
V/e do
is bo
gical
insist, however, that to isolate his sociology 
1
fail to understand even his sociology. Since 
counterpoints to his major sociological, works,
believe that his
text alone. We
sociology can be understood from the sociological con- 
thus believe that radical students who read only Sllul's
sociology (because they like his scathing critique of the modern world) 
are bound to misunderstand even that. We also believe that since his
1. The fact that there are no major secondary sources on Ellul's 
theology perhaps contributes to this danger.
Because the secondary literature on his theology is so scarce, we 
have been assisted only modestly by what others have said concerning 
him. (The situation would be entirely different were we writing on 
his sociology.) The near absence of secondary literature related to 
our topic has meant that we have had to do our best on our own, 
learning directly from Ellul and learning from his theological 
teachers. Criticisms have come mainly either from our own direct 
encounter with his thought or from setting other’ theological points of 
view in conversation.
In the Katallagetei Bp Reconciled issue later republished as Intro­
ducing Jacques Ellul there are occasional comments related to our theme. 
Also, there are a few other articles which touch on our topic. In 
various preceding footnotes we have evaluated these miscellaneous 
comments and criticisms. Often we have disagreed with the points made. 
For example, we had to disagree with Kollovfay’s and Rose's contention 
that Ellul has flatly rejected the organized Church (see above, p. vi, 
n. 2). A related criticism had to do with Rose's view that Ellul i3 
guilty of an all-out individualism (see above, p. I64, n. 4)» We also 
said that Gabriel Vahanian somewhat confuses Ellul's thought when he 
credits him with believing that the chief characteristic of man is his 
"ability" to contest the way things are (see above, p. 56, n. l). We 
believe that Ellul sees natural man as hopelessly incapable of making 
such contestation and that far from being a natural ability, he sees 
such a capacity as entirely a gift of grace. Vahanian may be aware of 
our point, but his statement itself does not show that he is* V/e also 
had a modest criticism of Richard Ray’s view that Ellul bases prayer 
entirely on the command to pray, rather than on the receipt of grace 
(see above, p. 114, Tn. from previous page). There seems to be an 
ambiguity in Ellul's thought at this point, but we disagree with Ray's 
flat assertion.
We agreed with Harvey Cox's criticism that war cannot legitimately 
be said to be a mere function of the city (above, p. 25)• We were also 
in agreement with a statement by Vernard Eller. We agreed that Ellul's 
sociological criticism is really the reverse side of his eschatological 
hope: and also that his rather straightforward reading of the Bible 
(perhaps not always so straightforward) leads him to contend that the 
Christian life does not have to do with an interpretation of natural 
existence, but with new life. Most importantly, wo agreed that- Ellul 
is indeed a Christian prophet. (We saw no evidence for Eller's conten­
tion that Christoph Blunhardt has directly influenced Ellul: see above,
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sociology is so radically pessimistic, it, by itself.', can leal nowhere. 
Though some sociologists may believe that meaning in life can be found 
from within their sociology, Ellul is not one of these! In fact, Ellul 
leads one to the opposite dilemma. His sociological position leads to 
the brink of cynicism, hopelessness, and nihilism—unless one accepts 
the Gospel which extends from the other side. Though he has little hope 
to offer as a sociologist, he has much hope to offer as a Christian. We ' 
believe that not only is his sociology misunderstood if studied in 
isolation from his theology, but also that his sociology by itself is 
spiritually disastrous! He never intended that his sociology be read in 
isolation from his proclamation of the Gospel. if our work has shown 
nothing else, it has surely shown the centrality of a Christ-centred faith 
for Jacques Ellul.
In our work we have attempted to avoid the opposite danger of totally 
ignoring Ellul's sociology in preoccupation with his theology. To do so 
would have been to misunderstand the applied meaning of his theology.
While recognizing that neither theme nor space allowed us to attempt to 
evaluate his sociological insights as such and his fascinating critique of 
the modern world, we have attempted to trace out and to evaluate the 
sociological corrolaries to all major theological ideas. Whenever his 
sociology has been directly related to the question "What ought Christians 
to do?" we have tried to pay close attention.
p. 67j n. 3. We also agreed with Gabriel Vahanian’s observation that. 
Ellul is critical of theologians who interpret eschatology in the light 
of history, rather than history in the light of eschatology (see above, 
pp. 214-215).
In a somewhat different category from the above interpreters is 
William Stringfellow, a man who has been deeply influenced by Ellul.
On the issue of human law, we believe that Stringfellow’s position is 
essentially based on Ellul's thought and is a faithful reflection of 
it. Though Stringfellow's views did not'help us to uncover any new 
insight about Ellul, it was interesting to see the thinking of a man 
directly influenced by him (see above, pp. 146(-148), n. 7).
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We believe that the final word which must be said about Jacques
Sllul is that no interpretation of his thinking can really capture the 
man and his elusive thought. Like'the prophets of old, Jacques Ellul 
is very much an enigma and will always remain so. In spite of the 
imperfection of our interpretation and, we believe, any interpretation 
of this man’s thought, we believe that we have come to know more about 
Christ and His ways by having sat at the feet of this most baffling, 
intriguing witness — Jacques Ellul.
APPENDIX
Appendix:
The Impossibility of a Christian Ethic
Ellul’s eschatological understanding of the Christian life relates 
to his view that it is ".impossible” to foimulate a final, and systematic ’ 
Christian ethic. If the Christian life is a daily struggle of warfare 
against one’s ovrn sin 'and against our sinful bondage to the world, if the 
Christian life is a daily effort to perceive the transcendent will of God 
ana place ourselves at the point where the world's opposition grows 
fierce, it is hard to see how this daily struggle can possibly be mapped 
out in a definitive way in advance. Agreeing with Bultmann’s formula­
tion that Christian life is life at "the end of the ages”. Ellul con­
cludes: "It is quite obviously impossible to construct the ethic of a 
life lived in terms of last things ...”
Ellul is aware that for an ethic to be applied on a wide scale its
radicalism must be softened, and it must be adapted to man's capacities.
9
lie believes that this is the case even for Christian morality.“ "Faced 
with the necessity of an incarnation of the faith, one feels the need to 
state the Christian truth in such a way that it can be lived. From that 
moment on we witness a theological effort which ends in heresy.”He,- 
of course, is not opposed to seeking to incarnate Christian faith in life. 
What he does oppose is making this easier by softening the radical
otherness of Christ’s demands.
Because of Ellul’s emphasis on the free guidance of the Holy Spirit, 
he has another reason for thinking that it is impossible to construct a
1- ?o ffiill and To Bo, p. 222.
2. Ibid., pp. 137-138.
3- Ibid., p. 89-
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Christian ethic.1 He agrees with Barth that ethics is not the science
of Cod’s will, but an openness to grace which continually calls man and 
2his response into question. ' If the Christ<an ’.ifc has decisively to do
with listening to God and seeking to be obedient to His personal 'will,
then the Christian life has much less to do with theoretical moral-ity 
3
than has often been assumed.
At some points Ellul even seems to go too far in arguing for the
relativity of biblical and post-biblical ethical formulations concerning 
the Christian life. We do not question that there is a degree of 
relativity to all formulations of the Christian life. We cannot agree, 
however, that past ethical formulations are entirely superseded. He 
says, "Because times change and conditions are never the same, the
/ethical/ works of bhe past can be of very little use to us.”^ He says 
of former statements of Christian ethics, "Their conclusions (if not 
their point of departure and their method) are thus entirely outmoded." 
Surely ethical problems and solutions have more in common than Ellul’s 
position here indicates. (Nor can what he says here be entirely recon­
ciled with what he says elsewhere about the givenness of the law!) 
Neither can we agree that biblical ethical statements are so relativized 
while biblical dogmatic statements are to stand firm.^ It would seem 
that the issue is more complex. There seem to be both dogmatic and 
ethical aspects of the biblical and post-biblical witness which are 
superseded and aspects which are not. Also, though it may be true that 
the Bible offers a cleax*er theology than ethic, it is really only a 1 2 3 4 * 6
1. Will and To Bo, pp. 203-205, 213, 304.
2. Ib i d ., pp. 259> 305.
3. Ibid., pp, 215* 225ff*? 299; Presence of the Kingdom, p« 20,
4. To Will and To Do, pp, 220-221.
5» Ibid., p. 225*
6. Ibid.
426 -
difference oC degree and neb of kind. Some biblical authors may even 
reverse the priorities. Paul may not present as complete an ethic as 
theology? but the authors of ilabbhew and James may present more complete 
ethical statements than theological statements.
Ellul at a few places even seems to imply that all efforts to for­
mulate a Christian ethic are an act of unfaithfulness. "The closer the
morality put together by man is to the will of God the more suspect it is,- 
the more it is a proof of the absence of love on the part of that man? 
the more harshly it will be attacked by God."The .foimulation of a 
Christian ethic may be a way of protecting ourselves against the free 
revelation of God? but it is surely uncharacteristic of Ellul’s general 
approach to imply that it is necessarily so. He seems guilty of 
antinomianism when he writes, "He who lives in the covenant of his Lord 
by faith has no further need of these orders, of these prescriptions for
the Christian life. He knows what he has to do. He knows where he is
ng,
cnee vain and sterile, and the pretention expressed therein is prejudicial 
to the freedom of God . If these words truly represented his view,
then both biblical morality and Sllul’s books about the Christian life
and all other such efforts are an affront to the freedom of God. At a
few other places he uses language which borders on an outright devaluation
of the task of Christian ethics.These other words do not rule out the
relative significance of Christian ethics, provided it does not seek to 
become a substitute for God’s free activity. His flat rejection of . 
ethical "systems" may really mean closed systems, logical systems which
goi , "Every description /my underline/" of Christian behavior is at
1.
2.
3.
4. 
5-
To Will and To Do, p, 212.
Ibid., p. 218.
Ibidp. 201.
Ibid., pp.'97? 202, 204, 3O5. 
Ibid., p. 97•
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hold open no significant place for God’s free revelation, When ho 
says that to define a Christian ethic is to "revolt against God," he
may have in mind a system in the above sense. That this is his mean­
ing is indicated in a following sentence where he implies that the task 
of Christian ethics can be made legitimate, "The only things then,
that can make this quest legitimate, and can render it possible, is
God’s decision, which wo cannot prejudge, and which we can only await in 
2
prayer and submission." When he tells us that the covenant relation­
ship "cannot be elaborated by us," he may not intend to minimize the 
importance of relative guidelines, but may be rejecting the sort of
infallible claims made, for human moralities which Keinhold Niebuhr so
eloquently criticizes.
What cannot be debated is that Ellul goes on to refer to the 
necessity of a Christian ethic and says several very positive things about 
the importance of biblical law. Despite a few contradictory formulations, 
it is clear that he does not wish to deny the importance of biblical 
moral teaching. His language of "impossibility" and "necessity" with 
reference to Christian ethics is thus overdrawn, V/e must look at pre­
cisely what he says under these headings rather than imagining that he is 
doing nothing more than affirming a logical contradiction.
1. rF° Y/ill and To Do, p. 202; see also p. 204.
2. Ibid., p. 202.
3- Ibid., p. 305.
4* Ibid ., p. 300. Spren Kierkegaard was very suspicions of both theo­
logical and ethical "systems". He thought that concern for ethical 
theory can easily become a substitute for ethical practice. He at one 
point virtually denied the significance of ethical theory (Kierkegaard, 
The Last, Years, p. 247) • Ellul indicates that he has read Kierkegaard's 
journals^CPrs^yer and Modern Man, pp. Ill, 139) and that he regards 
Kierkegaard as the one who alone can show us where to start today as 
Christians (Ellul, "Between Chaos arid Paralysis," p. 749)* He thus may 
be influenced by Kierkegaard in the rather careless language he uses at 
this point. '
5* Will and To Do, pp. 201ff., 245DT*
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